NATIONAL: Chinese Threat on Border and India’s Defence Preparedness
BY AMITAVA MUKHERJEE
Notwithstanding the assertion made by S.M. Krishna, the Indian External Affairs Minister, that the India-China boundary happens to be one of the most peaceful of our borders, continued Chinese incursions along the Line of Actual Control and the series of strategic moves being undertaken by Beijing in regard to its relations with some smaller countries of the subcontinent, point to a sinister Chinese design of encircling India. It appears that Beijing still rues its decision of voluntarily withdrawing from the 90,000 sq km of Indian territory it had occupied in 1962 and has been harbouring a desire to make up the loss at an opportune moment.
China wears an inscrutable mask and India has so far been unable to see through it as it did in 1962. China is now India’s largest trading partner and the amount of transaction between the two countries touched a whopping $ 52 billion last year. This has possibly given India a comforting idea that China would never choose to go for an all-out war in spite of the fact that the Chinese Army has been carrying on incursions into Indian territories not just in the western and central sectors but in Sikkim too where the border is now undisputed.
But the Government of India is trying to keep the people in the dark about some serious moves of the Chinese Army. Recently they penetrated deep inside Ladakh and painted the word China on rocks and boulders in an area which is not very far from the Pangong-Tso lake, a highly sensitive point near the international boundary. But long before there were reports that China had built a helipad in an area in the Arunachal Pradesh sector which, in fact, belongs to India. There is nothing new about the Chinese presence in Ladakh as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has often been violating the boundary in the Pangong-Tso lake which is situated in the neighbourhood of the Chushul mountains acoross the Changla Pass in the northeast of Leh. Forty per cent of this lake belongs to India while the rest sixty per cent is Chinese domain. But China’s patrol boats often penetrate deep into Indian waters and they sometimes willingly barge into Indian naval vessels. Intelligence reports, quoted by the national as well as regional media, have pointed out quite sometime back that China has built its own road network inside Ladakh.
The Government of India is well aware of the Chinese moves along the border and in recent past it has, on quite a few occasions, hurriedly moved Army units away from the Jammu and Kashmir border and posted them along the boundary with China. This happened sometime ago when Beijing had suddenly increased the strength of its Army near a mountain ridge which is very close to the trijunction of India, Bhutan and China. But the most inexplicable side of the whole story is the hush-hush atmosphere which India prefers to drape over the whole issue.
A.K. Antony, the Indian Defence Minister, was perfectly right when he had voiced his concerns sometime back about the unsatisfactory state of communication network on the Indian side of the border. He had reasons to do so as China has not only been strengthening its communication system in the area but trying to attract some smaller subcontinental countries in such a type of patron- client relationship which would go a long way towards putting India in a disadvantageous position.
This forms China’s policy of ‘encirclement’, a diplomatic-military initiative Beijing has been practising for a long time. In line with this, China has been gradually pushing its outposts nearer to the Indian border, the most important example being Xigatse, the second most important city of Tibet which has been put on the Golmud-Lhasa extended railway line. Xigatse has now become a bustling centre of not only trade and commerce but Chinese espionage activity as well. So far as Nepal is concerned, in addition to the Kodari highway, which was built with Chinese assistance in 1960, a second highway connecting Nepal and Tibet has come up. Although the Maoists are no more part of the Nepalese Government, yet there are valid reasons to believe that the bashing of Indian priests by the Maoists at the Pashupatinath temple may have had Chinese blessings.
China is now one of the most important patrons of Pakistan in international politics and in return Pakistan has allowed Beijing to open at least four link roads from the Karakoram Highway one of which will connect the Gwadar deep- sea port which China has built for Pakistan. In the world energy market Beijing is now in brisk business of securing energy supplies most of which pass through the Persian Gulf. By using the Gwadar port China gets an automatic access to the Persian Gulf where it has substantially increased its naval strength in recent times. For Myanmar, it has developed the Irrawady corridor thereby creating a netwok of roads, rails and waterways. This corridor is extremely important for China as it would give its landlocked areas an access to the Bay of Bengal where Beijing is rapidly increasing its naval strength. In competition India has also agreed to invest $ 100 million for upgrading the Sittwe port and developing the Kaladan river system of Myanmar. However, in matters of respective bilateral relations China has left India way behind. Beijing’s relations with the Myanmar military junta are extremely cozy and it has always stood up for Yangon to block sanctions against the junta in international organi-sations. China has already secured rights for free use of Myanmar’s river systems. Due to this facility it has been able to build up surveillance stations on the Coco Island near the Andamans. That India has recognised the probable Chinese threat from the sea becomes clear from New Delhi’s decision to upgrade its naval station in the Andamans.
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The military threat from China is real. The numerical strength of its Army is 2.5 million, more than double that of India, while the range of its missiles is more than its Indian counterparts. Quite a good number of Chinese missiles in Tibet carry nuclear warheads. This year China’s defence expenditure has increased by 14.9 per cent. This would push up Beijing’s defence budget to $ 70.2 billion, an increase of $ 9.1 billion from the previous year. While India lags far behind in this respect, China now stands very near to Japan, Russia and the UK in respect of military spending. Chinese experts are always at pains to point out that their country spends only about 1.5 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for defence. But China’s GDP has been growing by more than 10 per cent annually. It has no staggering inflation and its currency is stable.
This has enabled China to build its war industry. China now not only produces arms and ammunitions for its own use but supplies them to a good number of other countries also. They include, apart from Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, Tanzania, Albania, Iran, Iraq and Sri Lanka. In 2007 China successfully carried out its anti-satellite test. It has acquired technology for construction of aircraft carriers, for carrying out air-to-air refuelling and for developing anti-tank missiles. While its MiG- 33 is much superior to the accident prone MiG-21 which the Indian Air Force uses, it has also developed a multi-role fighter aircraft christened CAC-J7 which is widely used not only by Pakistan but Myanmar and Bangladesh as well. Another very important arsenal rolling out of China is the basic jet trainer-cum-light attack aircraft, a product of the Hongdu Aviation Industry. Its export variety is called K-8 in Pakistan which uses it extensively and has a 45 per cent share in its joint production with China. China’s participation in the production of the Jalalat class missile fast attack naval craft in the Pakistan Navy Dockyard at Karachi is too well known. Nowadays Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh use large numbers of patrol boats, fast attack crafts and vessels for amphibious operations either designed or built by China. India’s presence in this field is minimal, the only noteworthy example being the Hindustan Shipyard-built 1890 tonne patrol vessel “Shaurya” which is used by the Sri Lankan Navy.
China now considers itself a great power and a clash of interests with India is inevitable. It looks upon the Asia-Pacific region as its hegemony. As a consequence it s likely to come into conflict with India’s “look East” policy. So there are enough grounds, strewn all over, for escalation of tension between India and China, the most important of them being the unresolved border question with Beijing not accepting the Line of Actual Control and the Mcmahon Line. New Delhi recognises the danger and therefore it has recently decided on a series of steps like stationing of Sukhoi-30 aircraft at Tejpur, revival of abandoned airfields in Ladakh, posting of two Army divisions for the defence of Tawang and building of all-weather roads upto the farthest Army post in the border. Defence experts, however, opine that due to the Pakistan-centric defence policy pursued so long, not an illogical thing either, India’s defence preparedness has to be improved considerably to meet the Chinese might in the extreme heights of the Himalayas.
Unfortunately the biggest impediment before such an important task is the attitude and self-deception of the Indian ruling class. Although George Fernandes, the Defence Minister during the NDA regime, always voiced concern about Chinese intentions, he did not get sufficient support from other members of the Vajpaiyee Cabinet. Manmohan Singh, the present Prime Minister, is also advising restraint with respect to the attitude towards China. Obviously he is trying to sweep every uncomfortable information beneath the carpet. Manmohan Singh has reasons to do so as he is in the best position to know how unprepared his government is to match China force by force.
Some honest confessions are also emerging. Sometime back Admiral Sureesh Mehta, the former Naval Chief, was honest enough to admit the inadequacies of the Indian Navy. The other day Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik, the incumbent Chief of the Indian Air Force, has said that the IAF is only one-third the size of its Chinese counterpart. But the political tribe is desperate to hide its failure.
Indira Gandhi always tried to keep herself posted with latest indepth information about the security affairs of her country. The same should be expected from Manmohan Singh. If he is honest enough he should ask explanations from Pranab Mukherjee, the Defence Minister for a large part of the previous UPA Government, about infra-structural development along the LAC and inade-quacies of the armed forces. What has now prompted A.K. Antony and the Naval as well as Air Chiefs to admit serious drawbacks about India’s defence preparedness?
Let Manmohan Singh be reminded of a hilarious assumption by the people of Sikkim. The condition of the road from Gangtok to Nathu La is atrocious. But local drivers who ply their vehicles along this road proffer a different reason for this. In the event of a war in the Nathu La sector the Indian side will be vanquished and swept aside by the Chinese Army within a few days. The Indian Army and the Government of India know this. So they do not repair the road to Gangtok in the hope that bad roads might ultimately turn out to be the only defence against the might of Beijing, the drivers point out.
Showing posts with label sIKKIM. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sIKKIM. Show all posts
Monday, 12 October 2009
Sunday, 11 October 2009
WHY INDIA FEARS CHINA
By Jeremy Kahn | NEWSWEEK
Published Oct 10, 2009
From the magazine issue dated Oct 19, 2009
On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along the northwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China. India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game has played out on the 4,057-kilometer India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon." Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have dominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines.
China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months.
Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan.
The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.
Beijing appears increasingly concerned about the safe haven India provides to the Dalai Lama and to tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles, including increasingly militant supporters of Tibetan independence. These younger Tibetans, many born outside Tibet, are growing impatient with the Dalai Lama's "middle way" approach—a willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in return for true autonomy—and commitment to nonviolence. If these groups were to use India as a base for armed insurrection against China, as Tibetan exiles did throughout the 1960s, then China might retaliate against India. By force or demand, Beijing might also seek to gain possession of important Tibetan Buddhist monasteries that lie in Indian territory close to the border. Both politically and culturally, these monasteries are seen as key nodes in the Tibetan resistance to Chinese authority.
Already Beijing has launched a diplomatic offensive aimed at undercutting Indian sovereignty over the areas China claims, particularly the northeast state of Arunachal Pradesh and one of its key cities, Tawang, birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama in the 17th century and home to several important Tibetan monasteries. Tibet ceded Tawang and the area around it to British India in 1914. China has recently denied visas to the state's residents; lodged a formal complaint after Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the state in 2008; and tried to block a $2.9 billion Asian Development Bank loan to India because some of the money was earmarked for an irrigation project in the state. All these moves are best understood in the context of China's recent troubles in Tibet, with Beijing increasingly concerned that any acceptance of the 1914 border will amount to an implicit acknowledgment that Tibet was once independent of China—a serious blow to the legitimacy of China's control over the region and potentially other minority areas as well.
The reports of Chinese incursions can be read as a signal that it is deadly serious about its territorial claims. The exact border has never been mutually agreed on—meaning one side's incursion is another side's routine patrol—but the Chinese have clearly stepped up their activity along the frontier. The Indian military reported a record 270 Chinese border violations last year—nearly double the figure from the year before and more than three times the number of incidents in 2006, says Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic studies at New Delhi's Centre for Policy Research, an independent think tank. Noting that there was a reported incursion nearly every day this summer, Chellaney says this amounts to "a pattern of Chinese belligerence." In June the People's Daily criticized recent moves by India to strengthen its border defenses and declared: "China will not make any compromises in its border disputes with India." It asked if India had properly weighed "the consequences of a potential confrontation with China."
To many Indians, China is an expansionist power bent on thwarting India's rise as a serious challenge to Beijing's influence in Asia. They are haunted by memories of India's 1962 war with China, in which China launched a massive invasion along the length of the frontier, routing the Indians before unilaterally halting at what today remains the de facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They are fearful of China's expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean, seeing its widening network of naval bases as a noose that could be used to strangle India. They blast Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for alleged weakness in the face of this growing threat. Bharat Verma, editor of the Indian Defence Review, predicted in a widely publicized essay this summer that China would attack India sometime before 2012. With social unrest rising within China due to the worldwide economic slump, he says, the leadership in Beijing needs "a small military victory" to unify the nation, and India is "a soft target," due to Singh's fecklessness. In recent weeks India's defense minister and the heads of the Army and Air Force have felt compelled to reassure the public that "there will be no repeat of 1962."
These warnings completely misread China's intent. While India worries about the larger army and wealth of China, China worries about the larger military and economy of the United States. In Asia, its stated aim is to follow a "peaceful rise" that benefits all its neighbors, India included, and there's little reason to doubt this goal. Beijing is an insecure power, not an aggressive one, because of the real threat of social and economic unrest at home. China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean reflects a legitimate interest in protecting the sea lanes upon which Beijing depends for its supply of oil and natural resources from Africa and the Middle East. The border movements should be seen in the same light: it's not about an external threat from India per se, but India's relationship to the internal threat from Tibet.
Still, if Tibet is the new Taiwan, it requires extremely delicate diplomacy. If anything, the West tends to under-estimate China's willingness to fight independence moves in Taiwan—it has fired missile warning shots as recently as 1996—and the same may now be said of Tibet. Taiwan, however, has maintained the parlous status quo by arming itself to the teeth, while avoiding any rhetoric or action that crosses Beijing's red lines.
India is trying a similar approach. Last year it denied the Dalai Lama permission to visit Tawang—ostensibly because of parliamentary elections—and now he has scheduled another trip in November. It would be prudent for New Delhi—and perhaps others with influence on the Dalai Lama, such as the United States—to find a face-saving reason for the Dalai Lama to indefinitely postpone the trip. India needs to be especially vigilant against militant activity within the Tibetan exile community, the single most likely trigger for a Chinese attack, and it might be wise to end the policy of simply avoiding any discussion of Tibet in its dealings with China. "There are ways to highlight the centrality of Tibet without being provocative or confrontational," says Chellaney. "If New Delhi were to say in public that Tibet has ceased to be the political buffer between India and China, and India would like Tibet to be the political bridge between New Delhi and Beijing, that, in one stroke, would change the narrative fundamentally."
India's position in talks needs to be backed by strength in arms. New Delhi has already started repositioning border forces, launched a road-building program to match the roads and airfields that China has built on its side, and recently conducted a three-day combined air-and-land war game, seemingly designed to show that it is on guard. But India needs to be careful not to overreact: it views with alarm the tens of thousands of troops China has deployed to the border region since the 2008 Lhasa riots, but most of these moves are designed to reassert control over Tibet. M. Taylor Fravel, an MIT expert on the India-China border dispute, says many of the troops deployed in Tibet are internal-security forces, lacking heavy armor or artillery, representing less of a threat to India than Indian hawks believe.
India would be wise to invest in -longer-range weapons—such as missiles and advanced-strike aircraft—that allow it to maintain a standoff deterrent, without the need to go toe-to-toe with Chinese troops on the border. India has also begun deploying sophisticated radar systems along its frontier with China—a way to police inhospitable terrain while avoiding direct confrontation. India might also seek to share intelligence with other nations—such as the United States, Japan, and Taiwan—about China's actions and troop movements in Tibet, both to prevent being taken by surprise and to avoid an accidental conflict.
A final lesson from Taiwan is that New Delhi should pursue ways to open the border to commerce and communication, binding itself closer to China. Shirk says China is now opening ties to Taiwan, as part of an effort to "win the hearts and minds of the people," raising hopes that China may eventually pursue a more tolerant approach toward Tibet and other minority regions. Amid all the reports of border incursions, both India and China have sought to lower the volume. Chinese military officials invited Indian generals from all three of the regional commands that face off against it across the LAC to visit China for confidence-building measures, including a rare visit to Lhasa. Indian officials have pleaded with news organizations to tone down reporting on border incursions. Indian national-security adviser M. K. Narayanan warned that the beating of war drums might become a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading to "an unwarranted incident or accident" with China. This is now an issue that should be handled at the highest levels—not left to hotheads—on all sides.
Published Oct 10, 2009
From the magazine issue dated Oct 19, 2009
On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along the northwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China. India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game has played out on the 4,057-kilometer India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon." Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have dominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines.
China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months.
Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan.
The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.
Beijing appears increasingly concerned about the safe haven India provides to the Dalai Lama and to tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles, including increasingly militant supporters of Tibetan independence. These younger Tibetans, many born outside Tibet, are growing impatient with the Dalai Lama's "middle way" approach—a willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in return for true autonomy—and commitment to nonviolence. If these groups were to use India as a base for armed insurrection against China, as Tibetan exiles did throughout the 1960s, then China might retaliate against India. By force or demand, Beijing might also seek to gain possession of important Tibetan Buddhist monasteries that lie in Indian territory close to the border. Both politically and culturally, these monasteries are seen as key nodes in the Tibetan resistance to Chinese authority.
Already Beijing has launched a diplomatic offensive aimed at undercutting Indian sovereignty over the areas China claims, particularly the northeast state of Arunachal Pradesh and one of its key cities, Tawang, birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama in the 17th century and home to several important Tibetan monasteries. Tibet ceded Tawang and the area around it to British India in 1914. China has recently denied visas to the state's residents; lodged a formal complaint after Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the state in 2008; and tried to block a $2.9 billion Asian Development Bank loan to India because some of the money was earmarked for an irrigation project in the state. All these moves are best understood in the context of China's recent troubles in Tibet, with Beijing increasingly concerned that any acceptance of the 1914 border will amount to an implicit acknowledgment that Tibet was once independent of China—a serious blow to the legitimacy of China's control over the region and potentially other minority areas as well.
The reports of Chinese incursions can be read as a signal that it is deadly serious about its territorial claims. The exact border has never been mutually agreed on—meaning one side's incursion is another side's routine patrol—but the Chinese have clearly stepped up their activity along the frontier. The Indian military reported a record 270 Chinese border violations last year—nearly double the figure from the year before and more than three times the number of incidents in 2006, says Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic studies at New Delhi's Centre for Policy Research, an independent think tank. Noting that there was a reported incursion nearly every day this summer, Chellaney says this amounts to "a pattern of Chinese belligerence." In June the People's Daily criticized recent moves by India to strengthen its border defenses and declared: "China will not make any compromises in its border disputes with India." It asked if India had properly weighed "the consequences of a potential confrontation with China."
To many Indians, China is an expansionist power bent on thwarting India's rise as a serious challenge to Beijing's influence in Asia. They are haunted by memories of India's 1962 war with China, in which China launched a massive invasion along the length of the frontier, routing the Indians before unilaterally halting at what today remains the de facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They are fearful of China's expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean, seeing its widening network of naval bases as a noose that could be used to strangle India. They blast Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for alleged weakness in the face of this growing threat. Bharat Verma, editor of the Indian Defence Review, predicted in a widely publicized essay this summer that China would attack India sometime before 2012. With social unrest rising within China due to the worldwide economic slump, he says, the leadership in Beijing needs "a small military victory" to unify the nation, and India is "a soft target," due to Singh's fecklessness. In recent weeks India's defense minister and the heads of the Army and Air Force have felt compelled to reassure the public that "there will be no repeat of 1962."
These warnings completely misread China's intent. While India worries about the larger army and wealth of China, China worries about the larger military and economy of the United States. In Asia, its stated aim is to follow a "peaceful rise" that benefits all its neighbors, India included, and there's little reason to doubt this goal. Beijing is an insecure power, not an aggressive one, because of the real threat of social and economic unrest at home. China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean reflects a legitimate interest in protecting the sea lanes upon which Beijing depends for its supply of oil and natural resources from Africa and the Middle East. The border movements should be seen in the same light: it's not about an external threat from India per se, but India's relationship to the internal threat from Tibet.
Still, if Tibet is the new Taiwan, it requires extremely delicate diplomacy. If anything, the West tends to under-estimate China's willingness to fight independence moves in Taiwan—it has fired missile warning shots as recently as 1996—and the same may now be said of Tibet. Taiwan, however, has maintained the parlous status quo by arming itself to the teeth, while avoiding any rhetoric or action that crosses Beijing's red lines.
India is trying a similar approach. Last year it denied the Dalai Lama permission to visit Tawang—ostensibly because of parliamentary elections—and now he has scheduled another trip in November. It would be prudent for New Delhi—and perhaps others with influence on the Dalai Lama, such as the United States—to find a face-saving reason for the Dalai Lama to indefinitely postpone the trip. India needs to be especially vigilant against militant activity within the Tibetan exile community, the single most likely trigger for a Chinese attack, and it might be wise to end the policy of simply avoiding any discussion of Tibet in its dealings with China. "There are ways to highlight the centrality of Tibet without being provocative or confrontational," says Chellaney. "If New Delhi were to say in public that Tibet has ceased to be the political buffer between India and China, and India would like Tibet to be the political bridge between New Delhi and Beijing, that, in one stroke, would change the narrative fundamentally."
India's position in talks needs to be backed by strength in arms. New Delhi has already started repositioning border forces, launched a road-building program to match the roads and airfields that China has built on its side, and recently conducted a three-day combined air-and-land war game, seemingly designed to show that it is on guard. But India needs to be careful not to overreact: it views with alarm the tens of thousands of troops China has deployed to the border region since the 2008 Lhasa riots, but most of these moves are designed to reassert control over Tibet. M. Taylor Fravel, an MIT expert on the India-China border dispute, says many of the troops deployed in Tibet are internal-security forces, lacking heavy armor or artillery, representing less of a threat to India than Indian hawks believe.
India would be wise to invest in -longer-range weapons—such as missiles and advanced-strike aircraft—that allow it to maintain a standoff deterrent, without the need to go toe-to-toe with Chinese troops on the border. India has also begun deploying sophisticated radar systems along its frontier with China—a way to police inhospitable terrain while avoiding direct confrontation. India might also seek to share intelligence with other nations—such as the United States, Japan, and Taiwan—about China's actions and troop movements in Tibet, both to prevent being taken by surprise and to avoid an accidental conflict.
A final lesson from Taiwan is that New Delhi should pursue ways to open the border to commerce and communication, binding itself closer to China. Shirk says China is now opening ties to Taiwan, as part of an effort to "win the hearts and minds of the people," raising hopes that China may eventually pursue a more tolerant approach toward Tibet and other minority regions. Amid all the reports of border incursions, both India and China have sought to lower the volume. Chinese military officials invited Indian generals from all three of the regional commands that face off against it across the LAC to visit China for confidence-building measures, including a rare visit to Lhasa. Indian officials have pleaded with news organizations to tone down reporting on border incursions. Indian national-security adviser M. K. Narayanan warned that the beating of war drums might become a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading to "an unwarranted incident or accident" with China. This is now an issue that should be handled at the highest levels—not left to hotheads—on all sides.
Saturday, 12 September 2009
NEPAL: First complete image created of Himalayan fault, subduction zone
An international team of researchers has created the most complete seismic image of the Earth’s crust and upper mantle beneath the rugged Himalaya Mountains, in the process discovering some unusual geologic features that may explain how the region has evolved.
Their findings, published this week in the journal Science, help explain the formation of the world’s largest mountain range, which is still growing.
The researchers discovered that as the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates collide, the Indian lower crust slides under the Tibetan crust, while the upper mantle peels away from the crust and drops down in a diffuse manner.
“The building of Tibet is not a simple process,” said John Nabelek, an Oregon State University geophysicist and lead author on the Science study. “In part, the mountain building is similar to pushing dirt with a bulldozer except in this case, the Indian sediments pile up into a wedge that is the lesser Himalayan mountains.
“However, an important component of the mass transfer from the upper crust of India to the Himalayas also occurs at depth through viscous processes, while the lower crust continues sliding intact farther north under the Tibet plateau,” Nabelek added.
The findings are important because there has been clear scientific consensus on the boundaries and processes for that region’s tectonic plates. In fact, the piecemeal images gathered by previous research have led to a series of conflicting models of the lithospheric structure and plate movement.
In this study, the international research team — called Hi-CLIMB (Himalayan-Tibetan Continental Lithosphere during Mountain Building) — was able to create new in-depth images of the Earth’s structure beneath the Himalayas.
The interface between the subducting Indian plate and the upper Himalayan and Tibetan crust is the Main Himalayan thrust fault, which reaches the surface in southern Nepal, Nabelek said. The new images show it extends from the surface to mid-crustal depths in central Tibet, but the shallow part of the fault sticks, leading to historically devastating mega-thrust earthquakes.
“The deep part is ductile,” Nabelek said, “and slips in a continuous fashion. Knowing the depth and geometry of this interface will advance research on a variety of fronts, including the interpretation of strain accumulation from GPS measurements prior to large earthquakes.”
Nabelek, an associate professor in OSU’s College of Oceanic and Atmospheric Sciences, said the lower part of the Indian crust slides about 450 kilometers under the southern Tibetan plate and the mantle appears to shear off and break into sub-parallel segments.
The researchers found evidence that subduction in the fault zone has been occurring from both the north and south sides ? likely at different times in its geologic history.
In this project, funded primarily by the National Science Foundation, the researchers deployed and monitored about 230 seismic stations for a period of three years, cutting across 800 kilometers of some of the most remote terrain in the world. The lowest-elevation station was at 12 meters above sea level in Nepal; the highest, nearly 5,500 meters in Tibet. In fact, 30 of the stations were higher than 5,000 meters, or 16,400 feet.
“The research took us from the jungles of Nepal, with its elephants, crocodiles and rhinos, to the barren, wind-swept heights of Tibet in areas where nothing grew for hundreds of miles and there were absolutely no humans around,” Nabelek said. “That remoteness is one reason this region had never previously been completely profiled.”
Other authors on the Science study include Gyorgy Hetenyi and Jerome Vergne of Ecole Normale Superieure in France; Soma Sapkota and Basant Kafle, Department of Mines and Geology in Kathmandu, Nepal; Mei Jiang and Heping Su, Chinese Academy of Geologic Sciences; John Chen, Peking University in Beijing; Bor-Shouh Huang, Academia Sinica in Taiwan; and the Hi-CLIMB Team.
Note to Editors: Photos are available to illustrate this release at the links below:
Soma Sapkota, of Nepal’s Department of Mines and Geology, at a seismic station in barren, wind-swept central Tibet. (photo courtesy of OSU’s John Nabelek) http://www.flickr.com/photos/oregonstateuniversity/3909284267/
The Hi-CLIMB (Himalayan-Tibetan Continental Lithosphere during Mountain Building) seismic station at the Mt. Everest base camp in Tibet. (photo courtesy of OSU’s John Nabelek) http://www.flickr.com/photos/oregonstateuniversity/3909288983/
The researchers go through Chitwan National Park in Nepal after completing the first phase of the network deployment. (photo courtesy of OSU’s John Nabelek) http://www.flickr.com/photos/oregonstateuniversity/3910077916
An international team of researchers has created the most complete seismic image of the Earth’s crust and upper mantle beneath the rugged Himalaya Mountains, in the process discovering some unusual geologic features that may explain how the region has evolved.
Their findings, published this week in the journal Science, help explain the formation of the world’s largest mountain range, which is still growing.
The researchers discovered that as the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates collide, the Indian lower crust slides under the Tibetan crust, while the upper mantle peels away from the crust and drops down in a diffuse manner.
“The building of Tibet is not a simple process,” said John Nabelek, an Oregon State University geophysicist and lead author on the Science study. “In part, the mountain building is similar to pushing dirt with a bulldozer except in this case, the Indian sediments pile up into a wedge that is the lesser Himalayan mountains.
“However, an important component of the mass transfer from the upper crust of India to the Himalayas also occurs at depth through viscous processes, while the lower crust continues sliding intact farther north under the Tibet plateau,” Nabelek added.
The findings are important because there has been clear scientific consensus on the boundaries and processes for that region’s tectonic plates. In fact, the piecemeal images gathered by previous research have led to a series of conflicting models of the lithospheric structure and plate movement.
In this study, the international research team — called Hi-CLIMB (Himalayan-Tibetan Continental Lithosphere during Mountain Building) — was able to create new in-depth images of the Earth’s structure beneath the Himalayas.
The interface between the subducting Indian plate and the upper Himalayan and Tibetan crust is the Main Himalayan thrust fault, which reaches the surface in southern Nepal, Nabelek said. The new images show it extends from the surface to mid-crustal depths in central Tibet, but the shallow part of the fault sticks, leading to historically devastating mega-thrust earthquakes.
“The deep part is ductile,” Nabelek said, “and slips in a continuous fashion. Knowing the depth and geometry of this interface will advance research on a variety of fronts, including the interpretation of strain accumulation from GPS measurements prior to large earthquakes.”
Nabelek, an associate professor in OSU’s College of Oceanic and Atmospheric Sciences, said the lower part of the Indian crust slides about 450 kilometers under the southern Tibetan plate and the mantle appears to shear off and break into sub-parallel segments.
The researchers found evidence that subduction in the fault zone has been occurring from both the north and south sides ? likely at different times in its geologic history.
In this project, funded primarily by the National Science Foundation, the researchers deployed and monitored about 230 seismic stations for a period of three years, cutting across 800 kilometers of some of the most remote terrain in the world. The lowest-elevation station was at 12 meters above sea level in Nepal; the highest, nearly 5,500 meters in Tibet. In fact, 30 of the stations were higher than 5,000 meters, or 16,400 feet.
“The research took us from the jungles of Nepal, with its elephants, crocodiles and rhinos, to the barren, wind-swept heights of Tibet in areas where nothing grew for hundreds of miles and there were absolutely no humans around,” Nabelek said. “That remoteness is one reason this region had never previously been completely profiled.”
Other authors on the Science study include Gyorgy Hetenyi and Jerome Vergne of Ecole Normale Superieure in France; Soma Sapkota and Basant Kafle, Department of Mines and Geology in Kathmandu, Nepal; Mei Jiang and Heping Su, Chinese Academy of Geologic Sciences; John Chen, Peking University in Beijing; Bor-Shouh Huang, Academia Sinica in Taiwan; and the Hi-CLIMB Team.
Note to Editors: Photos are available to illustrate this release at the links below:
Soma Sapkota, of Nepal’s Department of Mines and Geology, at a seismic station in barren, wind-swept central Tibet. (photo courtesy of OSU’s John Nabelek) http://www.flickr.com/photos/oregonstateuniversity/3909284267/
The Hi-CLIMB (Himalayan-Tibetan Continental Lithosphere during Mountain Building) seismic station at the Mt. Everest base camp in Tibet. (photo courtesy of OSU’s John Nabelek) http://www.flickr.com/photos/oregonstateuniversity/3909288983/
The researchers go through Chitwan National Park in Nepal after completing the first phase of the network deployment. (photo courtesy of OSU’s John Nabelek) http://www.flickr.com/photos/oregonstateuniversity/3910077916
Saturday, 1 August 2009
REPORT CARD OF MHA-INDIA JULY 2009
Report Card of the Ministry of Home Affairs for July, 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16:54 IST
Shri P. Chidambaram presented the Report Card of the Ministry of Home Affairs for July, 2009 today. Following is the text of the Minister’s statement :
“July 2009 saw the Budget provide Rs.46,392.53 crore to the Ministry of Home Affairs under ten Demands for Grants. This represents an increase of Rs.10,770.51 crore over the Revised Estimate of 2008-09 (Rs.35,622.02 crore). The bulk of the provision is for Demand No.53 – Police. MHA is confident that with the increased allocation it would be in a position to fulfil most of the objectives set out in Action Plan II as well as Action Plan III that will be drawn up for the period 1.10.2009 to 31.3.2010.
2. The Demands for Grants of MHA were discussed in the Lok Sabha on 22nd July, 2009.
3. I responded to a Calling Attention Motion on ‘honour killings’.
Internal Security
4. Internal Security continues to receive the highest attention. The MAC – SMAC network will be deepened to connect the special branches at the district level. Work has begun on a pilot project to connect 40 districts in the North Eastern States to the MAC – SMAC network.
5. CCEA approved the proposal for establishing a Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS). Following the approval, the implementation guidelines and the system documents were released to the States and the States were requested to begin work towards establishing the system. Rs.89 crore has been allocated to the States and UTs.
6. A Special Tactics Wing has been established in the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy, Hyderabad. The Academy will now offer a course on tactical operations in militancy affected areas.
7. Although it is about seven weeks since the CPMFs were deployed in Lalgarh at the request of the Government of West Bengal, the situation has not still stablised. The CPI (Maoist) still continues to have pockets of influence and is suspected to be behind some recent acts of violence. We have made it clear to all States that while CPMFs will be available for deployment, such deployment cannot be for an indefinite period, and that State Police Forces would have to take over the responsibility of maintaining law and order as soon as possible.
8. I am happy that the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) heeded the advice of the Central Government and Government of West Bengal and withdrew their agitation and, in particular, the attempt to block National Highway 31A which is the lifeline to Sikkim. We have invited the GJM for tripartite talks on August 11, 2009 and I hope that the talks will be held with an open mind and explore all avenues towards a resolution of the issues raised.
9. I am happy that the issue of providing reservations for the Gurjar community in Rajasthan was resolved in the space of a few days.
10. I was pained by the developments in Jammu and Kashmir following certain allegations made in the J&K State Legislature. MHA put out the facts in the public domain and, I believe, that helped bring the controversy to an end. What Jammu and Kashmir needs is good and effective governance and I hope that all political parties will work with the State Government to provide good and effective governance in that State.
CPMFs
11. During July 2009, Rs.59 crore was sanctioned for various infrastructure works in the CPMFs.
12. Procurement for the CPMFs continues at an accelerated pace. Among the sanctions issued in July 2009 were:
(i) A contract for procurement of 10 nos. of 12-tonne interceptor boats for Andaman & Nicobar islands was signed on 31st July 2009.
(ii) Sanction was accorded to BSF to procure 1490 nos. of high frequency digital radio sets at a cost of Rs.78 crore.
(ii) Sanction was accorded to CRPF for procurement of 288 nos. of Boat Assault Universal Type (BAUT) at a cost of Rs.10 crore.
13. Nursing allowance to nursing personnel of CPMFs will now be at the same rate as applicable to nursing personnel of Central Government hospitals.
14. The first batch of women constables recruited in the BSF was inducted at a passing out parade at Kharkan, Punjab on 25th July, 2009.
15. Infosys Technologies Limited has become the first private sector establishment to be provided CISF cover.
States and UTs
16. MHA continues to provide help to the State Governments in tackling insurgency and left wing extremism. Some important measures were:
(i) Orders were issued for engagement of 6666 SPOs in the states of Andhra Pradesh (1630), Uttar Pradesh (203), Orissa (1480) and Bihar (3353).
(ii) Security Related Expenditure (SRE) work plans were approved for the states of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
17. New Governors were appointed for Haryana (Shri Jagannath Pahadia) and Uttarakhand (Smt. Margaret Alva). Shri Iqbal Singh was appointed as Lt. Governor of Puducherry.
18. President’s rule was extended in Jharkhand for a further period of six months. Shri K Sankaranarayanan was appointed as Governor of Jharkhand.
19. The Committee on Non-Plan Expenditure has approved the infusion of additional equity of Rs.74.36 crore over 3 years into REPCO Bank (Rs.48 crore this year).
20. Advance Releases made of Rs.81.40 crore to Assam, Rs.62.79 crore to Bihar, Rs.2.34 crore to Manipur and Rs.124.77 crore to UP (Total Rs.271.3 crore) as Centre's contribution to the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) during 2009-10.
Border and Coastal Security
21. Border fencing and road works continue to make progress. In July 2009, 12.30 kms. of fencing and 9.15 kms of road work were completed on the Indo-Bangladesh border. Besides, 17 kms of fencing was replaced. On the Indo-China border, 35.63 kms. of formation works and 2.82 kms. of surfacing works were completed.
22. Coastal security has been strengthened. In July 2009, 7 interceptor boats were delivered by two shipyards.
23. Immigration Control System (ICS) software was installed at Nagpur airport and Port Blair seaport. Three ICPs at Nagpur airport, Gaya airport and Port Blair seaport were connected with the network of Central Foreigners Bureau (CFB). Computer systems were upgraded in two ICPs at Nagpur airport and Port Blair seaport.
24. The Cabinet has approved the draft of the Land Ports Authority of India Bill, 2009. Subject to the orders of the Speaker, I intend to introduce the Bill in the current session of Parliament.
Response to Pakistan’s Questions
25. Yesterday, MHA finalised the response to the latest set of questions sent by the Government of Pakistan in connection with the investigations in Pakistan on the terror
26. attack in Mumbai on 26th November, 2008. A 7-page response with annexures has been handed over to the Ministry of External Affairs for transmission to the Government of Pakistan.
Census 2011 and National Population Register (NPR)
26. The preparatory work for collecting data for the National Population Register (NPR) of all usual residents in the coastal villages has been completed. Work orders have been issued to 3 Central PSEs, namely, BEL, ECIL and ITIL. The data collection will commence in the first week of August 2009.
27. The pre-test for Census 2011 commenced on 28th June 2009 in all the 35 States and Union Territories. The field work for the pre-test was completed on 31st July 2009. Orders for necessary hardware and software required for data processing were placed with NICSI at a cost of Rs.18.75 crore. Besides, approval was granted to procure ICR software for image processing at a cost of USD 400,000.
Section 377 IPC
28. The 3-Minister Group took note of the judgement of the High Court in the case of Naz Foundation and Others. Vs. UOI and Others and finalised its recommendation to the Cabinet”.
OK/RS/KKA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16:54 IST
Shri P. Chidambaram presented the Report Card of the Ministry of Home Affairs for July, 2009 today. Following is the text of the Minister’s statement :
“July 2009 saw the Budget provide Rs.46,392.53 crore to the Ministry of Home Affairs under ten Demands for Grants. This represents an increase of Rs.10,770.51 crore over the Revised Estimate of 2008-09 (Rs.35,622.02 crore). The bulk of the provision is for Demand No.53 – Police. MHA is confident that with the increased allocation it would be in a position to fulfil most of the objectives set out in Action Plan II as well as Action Plan III that will be drawn up for the period 1.10.2009 to 31.3.2010.
2. The Demands for Grants of MHA were discussed in the Lok Sabha on 22nd July, 2009.
3. I responded to a Calling Attention Motion on ‘honour killings’.
Internal Security
4. Internal Security continues to receive the highest attention. The MAC – SMAC network will be deepened to connect the special branches at the district level. Work has begun on a pilot project to connect 40 districts in the North Eastern States to the MAC – SMAC network.
5. CCEA approved the proposal for establishing a Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS). Following the approval, the implementation guidelines and the system documents were released to the States and the States were requested to begin work towards establishing the system. Rs.89 crore has been allocated to the States and UTs.
6. A Special Tactics Wing has been established in the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy, Hyderabad. The Academy will now offer a course on tactical operations in militancy affected areas.
7. Although it is about seven weeks since the CPMFs were deployed in Lalgarh at the request of the Government of West Bengal, the situation has not still stablised. The CPI (Maoist) still continues to have pockets of influence and is suspected to be behind some recent acts of violence. We have made it clear to all States that while CPMFs will be available for deployment, such deployment cannot be for an indefinite period, and that State Police Forces would have to take over the responsibility of maintaining law and order as soon as possible.
8. I am happy that the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) heeded the advice of the Central Government and Government of West Bengal and withdrew their agitation and, in particular, the attempt to block National Highway 31A which is the lifeline to Sikkim. We have invited the GJM for tripartite talks on August 11, 2009 and I hope that the talks will be held with an open mind and explore all avenues towards a resolution of the issues raised.
9. I am happy that the issue of providing reservations for the Gurjar community in Rajasthan was resolved in the space of a few days.
10. I was pained by the developments in Jammu and Kashmir following certain allegations made in the J&K State Legislature. MHA put out the facts in the public domain and, I believe, that helped bring the controversy to an end. What Jammu and Kashmir needs is good and effective governance and I hope that all political parties will work with the State Government to provide good and effective governance in that State.
CPMFs
11. During July 2009, Rs.59 crore was sanctioned for various infrastructure works in the CPMFs.
12. Procurement for the CPMFs continues at an accelerated pace. Among the sanctions issued in July 2009 were:
(i) A contract for procurement of 10 nos. of 12-tonne interceptor boats for Andaman & Nicobar islands was signed on 31st July 2009.
(ii) Sanction was accorded to BSF to procure 1490 nos. of high frequency digital radio sets at a cost of Rs.78 crore.
(ii) Sanction was accorded to CRPF for procurement of 288 nos. of Boat Assault Universal Type (BAUT) at a cost of Rs.10 crore.
13. Nursing allowance to nursing personnel of CPMFs will now be at the same rate as applicable to nursing personnel of Central Government hospitals.
14. The first batch of women constables recruited in the BSF was inducted at a passing out parade at Kharkan, Punjab on 25th July, 2009.
15. Infosys Technologies Limited has become the first private sector establishment to be provided CISF cover.
States and UTs
16. MHA continues to provide help to the State Governments in tackling insurgency and left wing extremism. Some important measures were:
(i) Orders were issued for engagement of 6666 SPOs in the states of Andhra Pradesh (1630), Uttar Pradesh (203), Orissa (1480) and Bihar (3353).
(ii) Security Related Expenditure (SRE) work plans were approved for the states of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
17. New Governors were appointed for Haryana (Shri Jagannath Pahadia) and Uttarakhand (Smt. Margaret Alva). Shri Iqbal Singh was appointed as Lt. Governor of Puducherry.
18. President’s rule was extended in Jharkhand for a further period of six months. Shri K Sankaranarayanan was appointed as Governor of Jharkhand.
19. The Committee on Non-Plan Expenditure has approved the infusion of additional equity of Rs.74.36 crore over 3 years into REPCO Bank (Rs.48 crore this year).
20. Advance Releases made of Rs.81.40 crore to Assam, Rs.62.79 crore to Bihar, Rs.2.34 crore to Manipur and Rs.124.77 crore to UP (Total Rs.271.3 crore) as Centre's contribution to the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) during 2009-10.
Border and Coastal Security
21. Border fencing and road works continue to make progress. In July 2009, 12.30 kms. of fencing and 9.15 kms of road work were completed on the Indo-Bangladesh border. Besides, 17 kms of fencing was replaced. On the Indo-China border, 35.63 kms. of formation works and 2.82 kms. of surfacing works were completed.
22. Coastal security has been strengthened. In July 2009, 7 interceptor boats were delivered by two shipyards.
23. Immigration Control System (ICS) software was installed at Nagpur airport and Port Blair seaport. Three ICPs at Nagpur airport, Gaya airport and Port Blair seaport were connected with the network of Central Foreigners Bureau (CFB). Computer systems were upgraded in two ICPs at Nagpur airport and Port Blair seaport.
24. The Cabinet has approved the draft of the Land Ports Authority of India Bill, 2009. Subject to the orders of the Speaker, I intend to introduce the Bill in the current session of Parliament.
Response to Pakistan’s Questions
25. Yesterday, MHA finalised the response to the latest set of questions sent by the Government of Pakistan in connection with the investigations in Pakistan on the terror
26. attack in Mumbai on 26th November, 2008. A 7-page response with annexures has been handed over to the Ministry of External Affairs for transmission to the Government of Pakistan.
Census 2011 and National Population Register (NPR)
26. The preparatory work for collecting data for the National Population Register (NPR) of all usual residents in the coastal villages has been completed. Work orders have been issued to 3 Central PSEs, namely, BEL, ECIL and ITIL. The data collection will commence in the first week of August 2009.
27. The pre-test for Census 2011 commenced on 28th June 2009 in all the 35 States and Union Territories. The field work for the pre-test was completed on 31st July 2009. Orders for necessary hardware and software required for data processing were placed with NICSI at a cost of Rs.18.75 crore. Besides, approval was granted to procure ICR software for image processing at a cost of USD 400,000.
Section 377 IPC
28. The 3-Minister Group took note of the judgement of the High Court in the case of Naz Foundation and Others. Vs. UOI and Others and finalised its recommendation to the Cabinet”.
OK/RS/KKA
Monday, 27 July 2009
T-72 TANKS MOVE TO CHINESE BORDER IN SIKKIM
SIKKIM: T-72 tanks moved to remote Sikkim area after China tests Indian defences
FROM INDIAN EXPRESS
27 jULY 2009
Chinese moves to test Indian control of the strategic Finger Area in North Sikkim last year have prompted the Army to deploy heavy tanks and armoured personnel carriers in the region and strengthen defensive positions.
In fact, the highest gallantry award to a Border Roads Organisation (BRO) personnel was conferred to a dozer operator, Zalim Singh, who cleared a strategic road near Theing village — he was decorated with a Bar to Shaurya Chakra — for a column of advancing tanks.
While the Army brought armoured vehicles to the North Sikkim plateau in the late 1980s, the small detachment has now been replaced by the heavier and more powerful T-72 Main Battle Tanks and modern BMP troop carriers.
Sources said the mobilisation took place after repeated Chinese transgressions last year in the Finger Area, a one kilometre stretch of land in the northern tip of Sikkim that overlooks a valley called the Sora Funnel and is considered a strong defensive position.
The T-72 tanks were inducted after a monumental effort by the BRO to widen roads, construct tracks and strengthen bridges leading to North Sikkim. The heavy tank column was taken up the high plateau partly by road-based carriers.
Sources said that while China too has tanks on its side of the border, they are deployed well inside its territory. “China does not need to deploy tanks on the border because the terrain and roads on its side makes it easy to bring them at short notice. India, on the other hand, has no option but to keep them on the border as it would take days to get the tanks up from the plains,” an expert pointed out.
Besides the tanks, the Army has strengthened other defences in the region, particularly around the Finger Area. Permanent posts have been set up on heights and bunkers have been strengthened. The Army has also increased surveillance capabilities in the region. At least two Long Range Observation Systems which can detect, record and transmit live images of an area under observation, have been set up in the Finger Area.
The strengthening of defences has taken place partly due to the re-induction of the 27 Mountain Division to North Sikkim. The Kalimpong-based Division, responsible for the defence of North Sikkim and the Finger Area, had been moved to Jammu and Kashmir in 2001 during the Op Parakram troop buildup along the Pakistan border.
The Finger Area entered controversy last year after the Chinese increased patrolling and even planned to built a road through it. While the area was always under Indian control, the Army used to send in regular patrols and held only a few traditional defensive positions.
India decided to strengthen defences after increased Chinese transgressions and the discovery last year that the alignment of a new East-West road being built by Beijing would pass thorough the Finger Area. Construction was put to a stop after New Delhi lodged a diplomatic complaint.
FROM INDIAN EXPRESS
27 jULY 2009
Chinese moves to test Indian control of the strategic Finger Area in North Sikkim last year have prompted the Army to deploy heavy tanks and armoured personnel carriers in the region and strengthen defensive positions.
In fact, the highest gallantry award to a Border Roads Organisation (BRO) personnel was conferred to a dozer operator, Zalim Singh, who cleared a strategic road near Theing village — he was decorated with a Bar to Shaurya Chakra — for a column of advancing tanks.
While the Army brought armoured vehicles to the North Sikkim plateau in the late 1980s, the small detachment has now been replaced by the heavier and more powerful T-72 Main Battle Tanks and modern BMP troop carriers.
Sources said the mobilisation took place after repeated Chinese transgressions last year in the Finger Area, a one kilometre stretch of land in the northern tip of Sikkim that overlooks a valley called the Sora Funnel and is considered a strong defensive position.
The T-72 tanks were inducted after a monumental effort by the BRO to widen roads, construct tracks and strengthen bridges leading to North Sikkim. The heavy tank column was taken up the high plateau partly by road-based carriers.
Sources said that while China too has tanks on its side of the border, they are deployed well inside its territory. “China does not need to deploy tanks on the border because the terrain and roads on its side makes it easy to bring them at short notice. India, on the other hand, has no option but to keep them on the border as it would take days to get the tanks up from the plains,” an expert pointed out.
Besides the tanks, the Army has strengthened other defences in the region, particularly around the Finger Area. Permanent posts have been set up on heights and bunkers have been strengthened. The Army has also increased surveillance capabilities in the region. At least two Long Range Observation Systems which can detect, record and transmit live images of an area under observation, have been set up in the Finger Area.
The strengthening of defences has taken place partly due to the re-induction of the 27 Mountain Division to North Sikkim. The Kalimpong-based Division, responsible for the defence of North Sikkim and the Finger Area, had been moved to Jammu and Kashmir in 2001 during the Op Parakram troop buildup along the Pakistan border.
The Finger Area entered controversy last year after the Chinese increased patrolling and even planned to built a road through it. While the area was always under Indian control, the Army used to send in regular patrols and held only a few traditional defensive positions.
India decided to strengthen defences after increased Chinese transgressions and the discovery last year that the alignment of a new East-West road being built by Beijing would pass thorough the Finger Area. Construction was put to a stop after New Delhi lodged a diplomatic complaint.
Wednesday, 22 July 2009
arm supplies to nepal by india
NEPAL: India promises to resume arms supplies to Nepal
Posted by barunroy on July 22, 2009
FROM TIMES OF INDIA
NEW DELHI: Eager to counter China’s strategic inroads into Nepal, India has promised to bolster defence cooperation with the Himalayan country, including resumption of arms supplies which had run into rough weather in recent times.
This came after visiting Nepal defence minister Bidya Devi Bhandari, leading a 10-member delegation, held talks with her Indian counterpart A K Antony and other top military brass on Tuesday.
The recruitment of Nepalis in Indian Army’s Gorkha Rifles also figured in the talks. The earlier strife engulfing Nepal ensured no recruitment rallies were held for the purpose since September 2006.
It was only in February-March this year that the Indian Army once again began the process, with rallies in Dharan (eastern Nepal) and Pokhara (central Nepal), attracting over 15,000 applicants.
There are over 30,000 Nepali Gorkhas currently serving in Indian Army’s seven Gorkha Rifles (Ist, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th and 11th), each of which has five to six battalions, and some paramilitary forces.
India, of course, had been caught off-balance after the Maoists emerged victorious in Nepal’s constituent assembly elections and Pushpa Kamal Dahal `Prachanda’ was sworn in as the PM last year.
With the Maoists tilting clearly towards China, India had to then scramble to engage them in `a constructive manner’. The situation, of course, is yet to settle down fully in Kathmandu following Prachanda’s resignation after failing to sack Nepal Army chief General Rookmangud Katawal in a power struggle with President Ram Baran Yadav
Posted by barunroy on July 22, 2009
FROM TIMES OF INDIA
NEW DELHI: Eager to counter China’s strategic inroads into Nepal, India has promised to bolster defence cooperation with the Himalayan country, including resumption of arms supplies which had run into rough weather in recent times.
This came after visiting Nepal defence minister Bidya Devi Bhandari, leading a 10-member delegation, held talks with her Indian counterpart A K Antony and other top military brass on Tuesday.
The recruitment of Nepalis in Indian Army’s Gorkha Rifles also figured in the talks. The earlier strife engulfing Nepal ensured no recruitment rallies were held for the purpose since September 2006.
It was only in February-March this year that the Indian Army once again began the process, with rallies in Dharan (eastern Nepal) and Pokhara (central Nepal), attracting over 15,000 applicants.
There are over 30,000 Nepali Gorkhas currently serving in Indian Army’s seven Gorkha Rifles (Ist, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th and 11th), each of which has five to six battalions, and some paramilitary forces.
India, of course, had been caught off-balance after the Maoists emerged victorious in Nepal’s constituent assembly elections and Pushpa Kamal Dahal `Prachanda’ was sworn in as the PM last year.
With the Maoists tilting clearly towards China, India had to then scramble to engage them in `a constructive manner’. The situation, of course, is yet to settle down fully in Kathmandu following Prachanda’s resignation after failing to sack Nepal Army chief General Rookmangud Katawal in a power struggle with President Ram Baran Yadav
Tuesday, 9 June 2009
TERROISM IN NORTH EAST INDIA
Terrorism in North East India(Article)
New Delhi, June 9(ANI)Book Review: Assam:Terrorism And The Demographic challenge, by Col. Anil Bhat
Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. K.W. Publishers. Price Rs. 195/
It has been reported that the notorious United Liberation Front of Assam militant Paresh Baruah has been seen in China looking for arms and to have a respite from the pressure that he was facing in Bangladesh by the Sheikh Hasina government, which was cracking down on anti-India groups.
That Paresh Baruah will feel at ‘home’ in China should not surprise anyone in India. The Chinese have provided shelter to many insurgent groups functioning in northeast India since the sixties.
India has been fighting an insurgency in the northeast for nearly five decades. Initially it started in Nagaland with the support of the Baptist Church. Christian Missionaries were active in the what was then known as the Naga Hills and Tuensang Area, and they were telling tribal Nagas that they did not belong to India .
A. Z. Phizo led the first groups of Naga ‘underground’ militants. Initially, the Government of India deployed the Assam Rifles to contain the Naga militants and later sent out regular Army units.
Following the Sino-India War of 1962, the government cracked down on Naga militants. Talks were held with underground Nagas with the help of Reverend Michael Scott and an accord was reached with prominent Naga leaders.
Underground Nagas who decided to give up their quest for ‘independence’ were inducted into the security forces. A separate Naga Regiment was formed, and the underground Nagas were given training at the Kumaon Regimental Centre in Ranikhet. The Naga Regiment has been participating in regular operations of the Indian Army, winning accolades.
The success of the Indian Army in the fight against Pakistan in 1971 alerted the adversaries of the country to fan anti-Indian elements in the northeast. While the initial problem was confined to the border areas of East Pakistan, the trouble extended to the whole of the northeast in the late seventies.
The northeast covers an area of 262,170 square kilometers and includes states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim
The area, as pointed out by Col Anil Bhat in his book ‘Assam, Terrorism And The Demographic Challenge’, has a 4,500 kilometre long international border with five foreign countries - Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma(Mynmar), China and Nepal. India had assumed that the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 had strengthened security in the area, but the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in August 1975 and the coming into power of a military ruler (Zia-ur-Rahman) changed the whole situation.
The Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan and the Chinese extended support to the militant groups in Assam, Nagaland , Manipur and Tripura. A ‘Peoples Liberation Army’ came into being in Manipur, and in Assam, trouble erupted with the influx of people from Bangladesh.
The discontent in Assam over the influx from Bangladesh saw the emergence of the All Assam Students Union and the Assam Agitation. . It also saw the setting up of a militant force in the form of the United Liberation Front of Assam in 1979. Following the signing of the Assam Accord by Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, efforts were made to get the cadres of the ULFA to surrender. It saw the creation of SULFA or Surrendered ULFA. The militant group by then had found patrons across the border and continued to survive and grow.
Manipur saw the emergence of militant groups, having tribal loyalties. The Meiteis, who are against Nagas , formed their own militant groups. They have been receiving arms from forces in China. Addiction to drugs is one of the highest in the country in Manipur.
Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya have also been affected by militancy at some time or the other. The Mizo Accord brought peace to the state, and firm action by the local government, has contained militancy. Meghalaya, which has a porous border with Bangladesh, has been at the receiving end of infiltration, the scale of trouble depending on the nature of the Government in Dacca.
Anil Bhat has pointed out how the militancy has survived in the northeast because of the indecisiveness of the Central and State governments. Operation Bajrang was launched in 1990 and when it was almost succeeding, a cease-fire came into being. The ULFA militants fled to Bangladesh and reorganized their forces. Paresh Baruah as been in touch with the ISI ever since.
Similar has been the fate of Operation Rhino launched on September 15 1991. The practice of giving grants to ULFA militants when they surrender has given rise to groups who style themselves as ULFA militants only to surrender and get the grants.
The State governments in Assam have been reluctant to hand over the operations against the ULFA to the Army. When the situation deteriorated, a ‘unified command’ was put in operation.. The action against the ULFA terrorists have always been executed with the security forces fighting with one hand tied behind their back.
It is a fact that people in the northeast have many grievances. The militants are exploiting the grievances. There are human rights groups and elements who press for a ‘peaceful solution’, through dialogue. Pressures from activists like Indira Goswami made the Government of India offer amnesty to terrorists if they agreed to come for talks.
As pointed out in the monograph it has been ‘all dialogues-no peace’.
Col Anil Bhat functioned for nearly a decade as the spokesperson for the Security Forces in the northeast and in the Capital and has been a witness to the unfinished national agenda in the northeast. The present monograph he has authored for the Centre for Land Warfare Studies has held a mirror to the situation in the northeast.
Dr Manmohan Singh, who is a Member of Parliament from Assam, has indicated that the Centre is keen to ensure that problems faced by India’s ‘Land of the Rising Sun’. The new Government has declared its determination to take firm action against the terrorists operating in the area.
People in the north- east have high hopes terrorism would soon face a ’sun-set’ there. By I. Ramamohan Rao
New Delhi, June 9(ANI)Book Review: Assam:Terrorism And The Demographic challenge, by Col. Anil Bhat
Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. K.W. Publishers. Price Rs. 195/
It has been reported that the notorious United Liberation Front of Assam militant Paresh Baruah has been seen in China looking for arms and to have a respite from the pressure that he was facing in Bangladesh by the Sheikh Hasina government, which was cracking down on anti-India groups.
That Paresh Baruah will feel at ‘home’ in China should not surprise anyone in India. The Chinese have provided shelter to many insurgent groups functioning in northeast India since the sixties.
India has been fighting an insurgency in the northeast for nearly five decades. Initially it started in Nagaland with the support of the Baptist Church. Christian Missionaries were active in the what was then known as the Naga Hills and Tuensang Area, and they were telling tribal Nagas that they did not belong to India .
A. Z. Phizo led the first groups of Naga ‘underground’ militants. Initially, the Government of India deployed the Assam Rifles to contain the Naga militants and later sent out regular Army units.
Following the Sino-India War of 1962, the government cracked down on Naga militants. Talks were held with underground Nagas with the help of Reverend Michael Scott and an accord was reached with prominent Naga leaders.
Underground Nagas who decided to give up their quest for ‘independence’ were inducted into the security forces. A separate Naga Regiment was formed, and the underground Nagas were given training at the Kumaon Regimental Centre in Ranikhet. The Naga Regiment has been participating in regular operations of the Indian Army, winning accolades.
The success of the Indian Army in the fight against Pakistan in 1971 alerted the adversaries of the country to fan anti-Indian elements in the northeast. While the initial problem was confined to the border areas of East Pakistan, the trouble extended to the whole of the northeast in the late seventies.
The northeast covers an area of 262,170 square kilometers and includes states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim
The area, as pointed out by Col Anil Bhat in his book ‘Assam, Terrorism And The Demographic Challenge’, has a 4,500 kilometre long international border with five foreign countries - Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma(Mynmar), China and Nepal. India had assumed that the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 had strengthened security in the area, but the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in August 1975 and the coming into power of a military ruler (Zia-ur-Rahman) changed the whole situation.
The Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan and the Chinese extended support to the militant groups in Assam, Nagaland , Manipur and Tripura. A ‘Peoples Liberation Army’ came into being in Manipur, and in Assam, trouble erupted with the influx of people from Bangladesh.
The discontent in Assam over the influx from Bangladesh saw the emergence of the All Assam Students Union and the Assam Agitation. . It also saw the setting up of a militant force in the form of the United Liberation Front of Assam in 1979. Following the signing of the Assam Accord by Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, efforts were made to get the cadres of the ULFA to surrender. It saw the creation of SULFA or Surrendered ULFA. The militant group by then had found patrons across the border and continued to survive and grow.
Manipur saw the emergence of militant groups, having tribal loyalties. The Meiteis, who are against Nagas , formed their own militant groups. They have been receiving arms from forces in China. Addiction to drugs is one of the highest in the country in Manipur.
Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya have also been affected by militancy at some time or the other. The Mizo Accord brought peace to the state, and firm action by the local government, has contained militancy. Meghalaya, which has a porous border with Bangladesh, has been at the receiving end of infiltration, the scale of trouble depending on the nature of the Government in Dacca.
Anil Bhat has pointed out how the militancy has survived in the northeast because of the indecisiveness of the Central and State governments. Operation Bajrang was launched in 1990 and when it was almost succeeding, a cease-fire came into being. The ULFA militants fled to Bangladesh and reorganized their forces. Paresh Baruah as been in touch with the ISI ever since.
Similar has been the fate of Operation Rhino launched on September 15 1991. The practice of giving grants to ULFA militants when they surrender has given rise to groups who style themselves as ULFA militants only to surrender and get the grants.
The State governments in Assam have been reluctant to hand over the operations against the ULFA to the Army. When the situation deteriorated, a ‘unified command’ was put in operation.. The action against the ULFA terrorists have always been executed with the security forces fighting with one hand tied behind their back.
It is a fact that people in the northeast have many grievances. The militants are exploiting the grievances. There are human rights groups and elements who press for a ‘peaceful solution’, through dialogue. Pressures from activists like Indira Goswami made the Government of India offer amnesty to terrorists if they agreed to come for talks.
As pointed out in the monograph it has been ‘all dialogues-no peace’.
Col Anil Bhat functioned for nearly a decade as the spokesperson for the Security Forces in the northeast and in the Capital and has been a witness to the unfinished national agenda in the northeast. The present monograph he has authored for the Centre for Land Warfare Studies has held a mirror to the situation in the northeast.
Dr Manmohan Singh, who is a Member of Parliament from Assam, has indicated that the Centre is keen to ensure that problems faced by India’s ‘Land of the Rising Sun’. The new Government has declared its determination to take firm action against the terrorists operating in the area.
People in the north- east have high hopes terrorism would soon face a ’sun-set’ there. By I. Ramamohan Rao
Saturday, 31 January 2009
HANDLING OF CHINA BY INDIA
Rajnath flays Centre over handling of China
Itanagar (PTI): BJP President Rajnath Singh on Friday accused China of having an "aggressive" and "expansionist" agenda to encircle India which was reflected in its claim over Arunachal Pradesh and deployment of massive forces along the border.
Addressing press persons here on his maiden visit to this Himalayan state, Singh said the Congress-led UPA government lacked diplomatic acumen to exert pressure on China to give up its claim over Arunachal.
"Once the BJP-led NDA comes back to power at the Centre it will make China accept Arunachal as an integral part of India through diplomatic skill as was done in case of Sikkim during the NDA rule," he said.
Asked if External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukharjee's reported November 9 statement at Tawang that no power could snatch Arunachal or any part of it from India suffice, Singh said only statement would not do.
"China has already built the Beijing-Tibet railway line up to Arunachal border with massive deployment of forces, developed Yunan (China)-Erabadi sea port (Myanmar) route and under the China-Bangladesh strategic treaty it reached the Chittagong Port in Bay of Bengal, and had installed signal collection facility at Kokobir to collect India's sensitive data," he alleged.
Singh said China had also threatened to demolish the stone demarcation at Finger Nail on Sikkim border and already had demolished some army bunkers.
With a Naval fleet of 860 ships including 68 submarines, China had made great stride in its plan to encirlce India and Mukharjee's statement was of no use, Singh alleged.
Terming the country's foreign policy as "directionless", Singh said when Pakistani elements attacked Mumbai, India's Foreign Secretary rushed to Washington to submit proof which showed the weakness of the present government.
"Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once announced to turn Mumbai into Shanghai within five years but it has became actually a Baghdad," he said.
Asked about the prospect of NDA returning to power, the saffron party leader said since 2004, 22 states went to polls and BJP and its allies captured power in 17 and BJP did well in the recent by-elections in Karnataka which indicated voters' choice for NDA in the next general elections.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Itanagar (PTI): BJP President Rajnath Singh on Friday accused China of having an "aggressive" and "expansionist" agenda to encircle India which was reflected in its claim over Arunachal Pradesh and deployment of massive forces along the border.
Addressing press persons here on his maiden visit to this Himalayan state, Singh said the Congress-led UPA government lacked diplomatic acumen to exert pressure on China to give up its claim over Arunachal.
"Once the BJP-led NDA comes back to power at the Centre it will make China accept Arunachal as an integral part of India through diplomatic skill as was done in case of Sikkim during the NDA rule," he said.
Asked if External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukharjee's reported November 9 statement at Tawang that no power could snatch Arunachal or any part of it from India suffice, Singh said only statement would not do.
"China has already built the Beijing-Tibet railway line up to Arunachal border with massive deployment of forces, developed Yunan (China)-Erabadi sea port (Myanmar) route and under the China-Bangladesh strategic treaty it reached the Chittagong Port in Bay of Bengal, and had installed signal collection facility at Kokobir to collect India's sensitive data," he alleged.
Singh said China had also threatened to demolish the stone demarcation at Finger Nail on Sikkim border and already had demolished some army bunkers.
With a Naval fleet of 860 ships including 68 submarines, China had made great stride in its plan to encirlce India and Mukharjee's statement was of no use, Singh alleged.
Terming the country's foreign policy as "directionless", Singh said when Pakistani elements attacked Mumbai, India's Foreign Secretary rushed to Washington to submit proof which showed the weakness of the present government.
"Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once announced to turn Mumbai into Shanghai within five years but it has became actually a Baghdad," he said.
Asked about the prospect of NDA returning to power, the saffron party leader said since 2004, 22 states went to polls and BJP and its allies captured power in 17 and BJP did well in the recent by-elections in Karnataka which indicated voters' choice for NDA in the next general elections.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Friday, 2 January 2009
THE SIKKIM INITIATIVE
The Sikkim Initiative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KP Vasudevan Nair
OVER the past six weeks four international conferences were held on issues directly concerning regionalism and sub-regionalism in the contemporary Asian context.
The first, in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh, on how the Asian regions should face the challenges posed by globalisation was indeed the most international of all of these, with high-level participation by ministers and congressmen from several Asian countries, scholars from Europe, Asia and Australia and, adding to its weight and glory, even Lord George Carey, former Archbishop of Canterbury.
The second, at the Chinese heritage city of Dali in Yunnan, deliberated on the prospects of socio-economic cooperation between southwest China and eastern India with special focus on West Bengal and Yunnan. It received wide media attention from within China and even Hong Kong and was followed by a high profile visit of a 30-member delegation headed by the governor of Yunnan to Kolkata to work out details of cooperation in various fields.
The third, a low-profile but meaningful exercise, was held at the Asiatic Society, Kolkata, with an India-China Interface in the aftermath of opening Nathu-la for border trade that was to have been inaugurated by Union external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee but he could not attend. Chinese Consul General Mao Siwei was chief guest and there were a number of specialists from Delhi and Canada. A new sub-regional Silk Route from Nathu-la to Namyung was conceived among other things.
The fourth, the immediate reason for this article, concluded on 21 December at Sikkim University, Gangtok. Titled “International Conference on Sub-regionalism Approach to Regional Integration in South Asia”, this was also to have been inaugurated by Pranab Mukherjee but again he could not make it under circumstances understandable to Indians. Sikkim governor BP Singh delivered the presidential address. Pranab Mukherjee’s speech was read out and it contained significant messages to Pakistan on the issue of terrorism, reflecting the prevailing mood.
That his message found prominent place in the regular newscast from Delhi made it clear that it was not meant only for those at “Chintan Bhawan” of the University. The need for a peaceful periphery which Mukherjee often emphasises during his speeches is, it seems, not different from “the need for a rise in harmony” that Chinese leaders also seek in their neighbourhood. That the foreign minister dealt with policy aspects of India’s current relations with almost every country in the region indicates his approval of the concept on which the conference was held, the first of its kind in a North-eastern border state.
A quick look at the concept note prepared by vice-chancellor Mahendra Lama with emphasis on the urgent need for a new sub-regional approach, has enormous logic behind it, for no one can dispute that in effect the regional approach in the shape of Saarc has not brought about the expected gains to the region. Boastful claims made at Saarc summits made the region almost a laughing stock in the eyes of even small Asean countries.
Have we forgotten the assurance our leaders gave at the Colombo meet in 1999 that poverty would be totally eradicated from the region within three years? Leaders of the same countries at the last summit in the same city this year sheepishly admitted over 25 per cent of the region still survived on less than a dollar a day! The major share of the responsibility for this pathetic situation rests with the two larger countries, India and Pakistan. India’s literacy rate is lower than that of most of the countries and so is the human development index. More alarming, there is still no serious attempt to correct the situation. No wonder the smaller members do not find Saarc a sustainable mechanism and are resorting to multilateralism, following, interestingly, India and Pakistan!
In the field of tourism, the recent gains look impressive only because of the low base which it rose from. Small Cambodia, with 12 million population, receives two million tourists a year, and India with a population nearly 100 times larger still has not reached five million!
From an Indian perspective, a new sub-regional approach seems necessary since the existing ones, some of them like Mekong Ganga, have been week-kneed reactions to successful initiatives like the Greater Mekong Sub-regional Cooperation and the gains, if any, have been negligible. New geographical configuration cannot be avoided when a fresh effort is being made and this justifies the Sikkim Initiative’s inclusion of Bhutan and the whole of southwest China, including Tibet, although there is scepticism among some observers about effectively including Bangladesh and Nepal. This view is endorsed by the fact that official representation was absent at the conference from these two countries, unlike Bhutan which sent an official.
As it happened at the Margherita (Assam) conference three years ago, two important officials, one from the Yunnan Development Research Centre and the other from Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, could not attend due to a procedural delay in receiving their visas, but an academic from Sichuan made it to Gangtok, perhaps the first Chinese national to be present at an international conference there.
Among the participants were some who could not help wondering whether this Sikkim Initiative was anything more than “Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Plus Two” — the plus two being Bhutan and Nepal. Having been a participant at the last few BCIM meetings, this writer is not too optimistic of the BCIM, at least in the short term. For instance, a Kunming-Kolkata car rally, which was agreed upon at the 2007 Dhaka meeting, has not yet materialised due to problems now linked to Bangladesh.
Even in its eighth year, the BCIM remains non-institutionalised with a poor progress report. Coming from India as it does, the new Sikkim Initiative will have a freshness of its own and could convert Sikkim with its unique location into a new and commonly acceptable economic and cultural hub. Only those who spend some time in Sikkim and closely interact with its people will know how great its attractions are. Participants from “mainland” India were also astonished at the high intellectual level of the young professors and the cool efficiency of the executives of the university which is not even two years old. One major omission noticed at the seminars was the apparent absence of participants with adequate practical experience, especially in the case of trade and tourism. The involvement of the chambers of commerce may be considered in future deliberations.
Detailed presentations on forests and other bioresources by the Sikkim forest department officials brought to light the immense natural wealth waiting to be exploited. From an academic angle, it may not be out of place to suggest that Sikkim University, with its sub-regional aspirations, joins the trilateral academic projects initiated by the New York-based India-China Institute involving New School University, Yunnan University and Calcutta University, the details of which will soon be finalised in Kunming, capital of Yunnan.
(The author is Director, Asia Centre, and Honorary Fellow, Maulana Abul Kalam Institute of Asian Studies. The views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at kpv@asiacentre.org)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KP Vasudevan Nair
OVER the past six weeks four international conferences were held on issues directly concerning regionalism and sub-regionalism in the contemporary Asian context.
The first, in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh, on how the Asian regions should face the challenges posed by globalisation was indeed the most international of all of these, with high-level participation by ministers and congressmen from several Asian countries, scholars from Europe, Asia and Australia and, adding to its weight and glory, even Lord George Carey, former Archbishop of Canterbury.
The second, at the Chinese heritage city of Dali in Yunnan, deliberated on the prospects of socio-economic cooperation between southwest China and eastern India with special focus on West Bengal and Yunnan. It received wide media attention from within China and even Hong Kong and was followed by a high profile visit of a 30-member delegation headed by the governor of Yunnan to Kolkata to work out details of cooperation in various fields.
The third, a low-profile but meaningful exercise, was held at the Asiatic Society, Kolkata, with an India-China Interface in the aftermath of opening Nathu-la for border trade that was to have been inaugurated by Union external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee but he could not attend. Chinese Consul General Mao Siwei was chief guest and there were a number of specialists from Delhi and Canada. A new sub-regional Silk Route from Nathu-la to Namyung was conceived among other things.
The fourth, the immediate reason for this article, concluded on 21 December at Sikkim University, Gangtok. Titled “International Conference on Sub-regionalism Approach to Regional Integration in South Asia”, this was also to have been inaugurated by Pranab Mukherjee but again he could not make it under circumstances understandable to Indians. Sikkim governor BP Singh delivered the presidential address. Pranab Mukherjee’s speech was read out and it contained significant messages to Pakistan on the issue of terrorism, reflecting the prevailing mood.
That his message found prominent place in the regular newscast from Delhi made it clear that it was not meant only for those at “Chintan Bhawan” of the University. The need for a peaceful periphery which Mukherjee often emphasises during his speeches is, it seems, not different from “the need for a rise in harmony” that Chinese leaders also seek in their neighbourhood. That the foreign minister dealt with policy aspects of India’s current relations with almost every country in the region indicates his approval of the concept on which the conference was held, the first of its kind in a North-eastern border state.
A quick look at the concept note prepared by vice-chancellor Mahendra Lama with emphasis on the urgent need for a new sub-regional approach, has enormous logic behind it, for no one can dispute that in effect the regional approach in the shape of Saarc has not brought about the expected gains to the region. Boastful claims made at Saarc summits made the region almost a laughing stock in the eyes of even small Asean countries.
Have we forgotten the assurance our leaders gave at the Colombo meet in 1999 that poverty would be totally eradicated from the region within three years? Leaders of the same countries at the last summit in the same city this year sheepishly admitted over 25 per cent of the region still survived on less than a dollar a day! The major share of the responsibility for this pathetic situation rests with the two larger countries, India and Pakistan. India’s literacy rate is lower than that of most of the countries and so is the human development index. More alarming, there is still no serious attempt to correct the situation. No wonder the smaller members do not find Saarc a sustainable mechanism and are resorting to multilateralism, following, interestingly, India and Pakistan!
In the field of tourism, the recent gains look impressive only because of the low base which it rose from. Small Cambodia, with 12 million population, receives two million tourists a year, and India with a population nearly 100 times larger still has not reached five million!
From an Indian perspective, a new sub-regional approach seems necessary since the existing ones, some of them like Mekong Ganga, have been week-kneed reactions to successful initiatives like the Greater Mekong Sub-regional Cooperation and the gains, if any, have been negligible. New geographical configuration cannot be avoided when a fresh effort is being made and this justifies the Sikkim Initiative’s inclusion of Bhutan and the whole of southwest China, including Tibet, although there is scepticism among some observers about effectively including Bangladesh and Nepal. This view is endorsed by the fact that official representation was absent at the conference from these two countries, unlike Bhutan which sent an official.
As it happened at the Margherita (Assam) conference three years ago, two important officials, one from the Yunnan Development Research Centre and the other from Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, could not attend due to a procedural delay in receiving their visas, but an academic from Sichuan made it to Gangtok, perhaps the first Chinese national to be present at an international conference there.
Among the participants were some who could not help wondering whether this Sikkim Initiative was anything more than “Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Plus Two” — the plus two being Bhutan and Nepal. Having been a participant at the last few BCIM meetings, this writer is not too optimistic of the BCIM, at least in the short term. For instance, a Kunming-Kolkata car rally, which was agreed upon at the 2007 Dhaka meeting, has not yet materialised due to problems now linked to Bangladesh.
Even in its eighth year, the BCIM remains non-institutionalised with a poor progress report. Coming from India as it does, the new Sikkim Initiative will have a freshness of its own and could convert Sikkim with its unique location into a new and commonly acceptable economic and cultural hub. Only those who spend some time in Sikkim and closely interact with its people will know how great its attractions are. Participants from “mainland” India were also astonished at the high intellectual level of the young professors and the cool efficiency of the executives of the university which is not even two years old. One major omission noticed at the seminars was the apparent absence of participants with adequate practical experience, especially in the case of trade and tourism. The involvement of the chambers of commerce may be considered in future deliberations.
Detailed presentations on forests and other bioresources by the Sikkim forest department officials brought to light the immense natural wealth waiting to be exploited. From an academic angle, it may not be out of place to suggest that Sikkim University, with its sub-regional aspirations, joins the trilateral academic projects initiated by the New York-based India-China Institute involving New School University, Yunnan University and Calcutta University, the details of which will soon be finalised in Kunming, capital of Yunnan.
(The author is Director, Asia Centre, and Honorary Fellow, Maulana Abul Kalam Institute of Asian Studies. The views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at kpv@asiacentre.org)
Sunday, 9 November 2008
371 F IN THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
THE CONSTITUTION (THIRTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1975
Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution
(Thirty-eighth Amendment) Bill, 1975 which was enacted as
the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975
STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
The Sikkim Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on the 10th
April, 1975 which, inter alia, noted the persistent harmful activities
of the Chogyal which were aimed at undermining the responsible
democratic Government set up under the provisions of the May 8
Agreement of 1973 and the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974. The
Resolution declared that the Assembly had satisfied itself that these
activities of the Chogyal not only violated the objectives of the
Agreement of May 8, 1973, but also ran counter to the wishes of the
people of Sikkim and impeded their democratic development and
participation in the political and economic life of India.
Accordingly the Assembly solemnly declared and resolved that "The
institution of the Chogyal is hereby abolished and Sikkim shall
henceforth be a constituent unit of India, enjoying a democratic and
fully responsible Government".
2. The Assembly also resolved that this Resolution be submitted to
the people of Sikkim forthwith for their approval. A special opinion
poll conducted by the Government of Sikkim on the 14th April, 1975
resulted in a total of 59,637 votes in favour and 1,496 votes against
the Resolution out of a total electorate of approximately 97,000.
3. The result of this poll was communicated to the Government of
India by the Chief Minister of Sikkim on the 15th April, 1975. The
Chief Minister on behalf of the Council of Ministers strongly
requested the Government of India to make an immediate response and
accept the above decision, taking, as has been requested in the
Assembly Resolution of the 10th April, 1975, such measures as may be
necessary and appropriate to implement the decision as early as
possible.
4. The Chief Minister and other Ministers of Sikkim also visited New
Delhi on the 16th-17th April, 1975 and urged the Government of India
to take immediate action in this behalf.
5. Accordingly, it is proposed to include Sikkim as a full-fledged
State in the First Schedule to the Constitution and to allot to Sikkim
one seat in the Council of States and one seat in the House of the
People. It is also proposed to insert a new article containing the
provisions considered necessary to meet the special circumstances and
needs of Sikkim.
6. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.
NEW DELHI; Y. B. CHAVAN.
The 19th April, 1975.
THE CONSTITUTION (THIRTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1975
[16th May, 1975.]
An Act further to amend the Constitution of India.
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-sixth Year of the Republic
of India as follows:-
1. Short title and commencement.-(1) This Act may be called the
Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975.
(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the date_668 on
which the Bill for this Act [introduced in the House of the People as
the Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Bill, 1975], as passed by
the House of the People, is passed by the Council of States.
2. Amendment of First Schedule.-In the First Schedule to the
Constitution, under the heading "I. THE STATES", after entry 21, the
following entry shall be inserted namely:-
"22. Sikkim The territories which immediately before the
commencement of the Constitution
(Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, were
comprised in Sikkim.".
3. Insertion of new article 371F.-After article 371E of the
Constitution, the following article shall be inserted, namely:-
"371F. Special provisions with respect to the State of Sikkim.-
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-
(a) the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall consist of
not less than thirty members;
(b) as from the date of commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereafter in this article referred to as the
appointed day)-
(i) the Assembly for Sikkim formed as a result of the elections held
in Sikkim in April, 1974 with thirty-two members elected in the said
elections (hereinafter referred to as the sitting members) shall be
deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly
constituted under this Constitution;
(ii) the sitting members shall be deemed to the members of the
Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly elected under this
Constitution; and
(iii) the said Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall
exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Legislative
Assembly of a State under this Constitution;
(c) in the case of the Assembly deemed to be the Legislative Assembly
of the State of Sikkim under clause (b), the references to the period
of five years in clause (1) of article 172 shall be construed as
references to a period of four years and the said period of four years
shall be deemed to commence from the appointed day;
(d) until other provisions are made by Parliament by law, there shall
be allotted to the State of Sikkim one seat in the House of the People
and the State of Sikkim shall form one parliamentary constituency to
be called the parliamentary constituency for Sikkim;
(e) the representative of the State of Sikkim in the House of the
People in existence on the appointed day shall be elected by the
members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim;
(f) Parliament may, for the purpose of protecting the rights and
interests of the different sections of the population of Sikkim make
provision for the number of seats in the Legislative Assembly of the
State of Sikkim which may be filled by candidates belonging to such
sections and for the delimitation of the assembly constituencies from
which candidates belonging to such sections alone may stand for
election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim;
(g) the Governor of Sikkim shall have special responsibility for peace
and for an equitable arrangement for ensuring the social and economic
advancement of different sections of the population of Sikkim and in
the discharge of his special responsibility under this clause, the
Governor of Sikkim shall, subject to such directions as the President
may, from time to time, deem fit to issue, act in his discretion;
(h) all property and assets (whether within or outside the territories
comprised in the State of Sikkim) which immediately before the
appointed day were vested in the Government of Sikkim or in any other
authority or in any person for the purposes of the Government of
Sikkim shall, as from the appointed day, vest in the Government of the
State of Sikkim;
(i) the High Court functioning as such immediately before the
appointed day in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim
shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed to be the High Court
for the State of Sikkim;
(j) all courts of civil, criminal and revenue jurisdiction, all
authorities and all officers, judicial, executive and ministerial,
throughout the territory of the State of Sikkim shall continue on and
from the appointed day to exercise their respective functions subject
to the provisions of this Constitution;
(k) all laws in force immediately before the appointed day in the
territories comprised in the State of Sikkim or any part thereof shall
continue to be in force therein until amended or repealed by a
competent Legislature or other competent authority;
(l) for the purpose of facilitating the application of any such law as
is referred to in clause (k) in relation to the administration of the
State of Sikkim and for the purpose of bringing the provisions of any
such law into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the
President may, within two years from the appointed day, by order, make
such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of
repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon,
every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and
modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall
not be questioned in any court of law;
(m) neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have
jurisdiction in respect of any dispute or other matter arising out of
any treaty, agreement, engagement or other similar instrument relating
to Sikkim which was entered into or executed before the appointed day
and to which the Government of India or any of its predecessor
Governments was a party, but nothing in this clause shall be construed
to derogate from the provisions of article 143;
(n) the President may, by public notification, extend with such
restrictions or modifications as he thinks fit to the State of Sikkim
any enactment which is in force in a State in India at the date of the
notification;
(o) if any difficulty arises in giving effect to any of the foregoing
provisions of this article, the President may, by order, do anything
(including any adaptation or modification of any other article) which
appears to him to be necessary for the purpose of removing that
difficulty:
Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of two
years from the appointed day;
(p) all things done and all actions taken in or in relation to the
State of Sikkim or the territories comprised therein during the period
commencing on the appointed day and ending immediately before the date
on which the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, receives
the assent of the President shall, in so far as they are in conformity
with the provisions of this Constitution as amended by the
Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, be deemed for all
purposes to have been validly done or taken under this Constitution as
so amended.".
4. Amendment of Fourth Schedule.-In the Fourth Schedule to the
Constitution, in the Table,-
(a) after entry 21, the following entry shall be inserted, namely:---
"22. Sikkim 1";
(b) existing entries 22 to 25 shall be renumbered as entries 23 to 26
respectively;
(c) for the figures "231", the figures "232" shall be substituted.
5. Consequential amendments.-The following consequential amendments
shall be made in the Constitution, namely:-
(a) article 2A shall be omitted;
(b) in article 80, in clause (1), the words and figure "Subject to the
provisions of paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule," shall be omitted;
(c) in article 81, in clause (1), the words and figure "and paragraph
4 of the Tenth Schedule" shall be omitted;
(d) the Tenth Schedule shall be omitted.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution
(Thirty-eighth Amendment) Bill, 1975 which was enacted as
the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975
STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
The Sikkim Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on the 10th
April, 1975 which, inter alia, noted the persistent harmful activities
of the Chogyal which were aimed at undermining the responsible
democratic Government set up under the provisions of the May 8
Agreement of 1973 and the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974. The
Resolution declared that the Assembly had satisfied itself that these
activities of the Chogyal not only violated the objectives of the
Agreement of May 8, 1973, but also ran counter to the wishes of the
people of Sikkim and impeded their democratic development and
participation in the political and economic life of India.
Accordingly the Assembly solemnly declared and resolved that "The
institution of the Chogyal is hereby abolished and Sikkim shall
henceforth be a constituent unit of India, enjoying a democratic and
fully responsible Government".
2. The Assembly also resolved that this Resolution be submitted to
the people of Sikkim forthwith for their approval. A special opinion
poll conducted by the Government of Sikkim on the 14th April, 1975
resulted in a total of 59,637 votes in favour and 1,496 votes against
the Resolution out of a total electorate of approximately 97,000.
3. The result of this poll was communicated to the Government of
India by the Chief Minister of Sikkim on the 15th April, 1975. The
Chief Minister on behalf of the Council of Ministers strongly
requested the Government of India to make an immediate response and
accept the above decision, taking, as has been requested in the
Assembly Resolution of the 10th April, 1975, such measures as may be
necessary and appropriate to implement the decision as early as
possible.
4. The Chief Minister and other Ministers of Sikkim also visited New
Delhi on the 16th-17th April, 1975 and urged the Government of India
to take immediate action in this behalf.
5. Accordingly, it is proposed to include Sikkim as a full-fledged
State in the First Schedule to the Constitution and to allot to Sikkim
one seat in the Council of States and one seat in the House of the
People. It is also proposed to insert a new article containing the
provisions considered necessary to meet the special circumstances and
needs of Sikkim.
6. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.
NEW DELHI; Y. B. CHAVAN.
The 19th April, 1975.
THE CONSTITUTION (THIRTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1975
[16th May, 1975.]
An Act further to amend the Constitution of India.
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-sixth Year of the Republic
of India as follows:-
1. Short title and commencement.-(1) This Act may be called the
Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975.
(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the date_668 on
which the Bill for this Act [introduced in the House of the People as
the Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Bill, 1975], as passed by
the House of the People, is passed by the Council of States.
2. Amendment of First Schedule.-In the First Schedule to the
Constitution, under the heading "I. THE STATES", after entry 21, the
following entry shall be inserted namely:-
"22. Sikkim The territories which immediately before the
commencement of the Constitution
(Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, were
comprised in Sikkim.".
3. Insertion of new article 371F.-After article 371E of the
Constitution, the following article shall be inserted, namely:-
"371F. Special provisions with respect to the State of Sikkim.-
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-
(a) the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall consist of
not less than thirty members;
(b) as from the date of commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereafter in this article referred to as the
appointed day)-
(i) the Assembly for Sikkim formed as a result of the elections held
in Sikkim in April, 1974 with thirty-two members elected in the said
elections (hereinafter referred to as the sitting members) shall be
deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly
constituted under this Constitution;
(ii) the sitting members shall be deemed to the members of the
Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly elected under this
Constitution; and
(iii) the said Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall
exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Legislative
Assembly of a State under this Constitution;
(c) in the case of the Assembly deemed to be the Legislative Assembly
of the State of Sikkim under clause (b), the references to the period
of five years in clause (1) of article 172 shall be construed as
references to a period of four years and the said period of four years
shall be deemed to commence from the appointed day;
(d) until other provisions are made by Parliament by law, there shall
be allotted to the State of Sikkim one seat in the House of the People
and the State of Sikkim shall form one parliamentary constituency to
be called the parliamentary constituency for Sikkim;
(e) the representative of the State of Sikkim in the House of the
People in existence on the appointed day shall be elected by the
members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim;
(f) Parliament may, for the purpose of protecting the rights and
interests of the different sections of the population of Sikkim make
provision for the number of seats in the Legislative Assembly of the
State of Sikkim which may be filled by candidates belonging to such
sections and for the delimitation of the assembly constituencies from
which candidates belonging to such sections alone may stand for
election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim;
(g) the Governor of Sikkim shall have special responsibility for peace
and for an equitable arrangement for ensuring the social and economic
advancement of different sections of the population of Sikkim and in
the discharge of his special responsibility under this clause, the
Governor of Sikkim shall, subject to such directions as the President
may, from time to time, deem fit to issue, act in his discretion;
(h) all property and assets (whether within or outside the territories
comprised in the State of Sikkim) which immediately before the
appointed day were vested in the Government of Sikkim or in any other
authority or in any person for the purposes of the Government of
Sikkim shall, as from the appointed day, vest in the Government of the
State of Sikkim;
(i) the High Court functioning as such immediately before the
appointed day in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim
shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed to be the High Court
for the State of Sikkim;
(j) all courts of civil, criminal and revenue jurisdiction, all
authorities and all officers, judicial, executive and ministerial,
throughout the territory of the State of Sikkim shall continue on and
from the appointed day to exercise their respective functions subject
to the provisions of this Constitution;
(k) all laws in force immediately before the appointed day in the
territories comprised in the State of Sikkim or any part thereof shall
continue to be in force therein until amended or repealed by a
competent Legislature or other competent authority;
(l) for the purpose of facilitating the application of any such law as
is referred to in clause (k) in relation to the administration of the
State of Sikkim and for the purpose of bringing the provisions of any
such law into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the
President may, within two years from the appointed day, by order, make
such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of
repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon,
every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and
modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall
not be questioned in any court of law;
(m) neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have
jurisdiction in respect of any dispute or other matter arising out of
any treaty, agreement, engagement or other similar instrument relating
to Sikkim which was entered into or executed before the appointed day
and to which the Government of India or any of its predecessor
Governments was a party, but nothing in this clause shall be construed
to derogate from the provisions of article 143;
(n) the President may, by public notification, extend with such
restrictions or modifications as he thinks fit to the State of Sikkim
any enactment which is in force in a State in India at the date of the
notification;
(o) if any difficulty arises in giving effect to any of the foregoing
provisions of this article, the President may, by order, do anything
(including any adaptation or modification of any other article) which
appears to him to be necessary for the purpose of removing that
difficulty:
Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of two
years from the appointed day;
(p) all things done and all actions taken in or in relation to the
State of Sikkim or the territories comprised therein during the period
commencing on the appointed day and ending immediately before the date
on which the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, receives
the assent of the President shall, in so far as they are in conformity
with the provisions of this Constitution as amended by the
Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, be deemed for all
purposes to have been validly done or taken under this Constitution as
so amended.".
4. Amendment of Fourth Schedule.-In the Fourth Schedule to the
Constitution, in the Table,-
(a) after entry 21, the following entry shall be inserted, namely:---
"22. Sikkim 1";
(b) existing entries 22 to 25 shall be renumbered as entries 23 to 26
respectively;
(c) for the figures "231", the figures "232" shall be substituted.
5. Consequential amendments.-The following consequential amendments
shall be made in the Constitution, namely:-
(a) article 2A shall be omitted;
(b) in article 80, in clause (1), the words and figure "Subject to the
provisions of paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule," shall be omitted;
(c) in article 81, in clause (1), the words and figure "and paragraph
4 of the Tenth Schedule" shall be omitted;
(d) the Tenth Schedule shall be omitted.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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