A feud over water between India and Pakistan is threatening to derail peace talks between the two neighbors.
The countries have harmo- niously shared the waters of the Indus River for decades. A 50-year-old treaty regulating access to water from the river and its tributaries has been viewed as a bright spot for In- dia and Pakistan, which have gone to war three times since 1947.
Now, the Pakistanis com- plain that India is hogging wa- ter upstream, which is hurting Pakistani farmers down- stream. Pakistani officials say they will soon begin formal ar- bitration over a proposed Indi- an dam. At a meeting that started Sunday, Pakistan raised objections to new Indi- an dam projects on the Indus River and asked for satellite monitoring of river flows.
“Water I see emerging as a very serious source of tension between Pakistan and India,“ said Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Pakistan's foreign minister, in an interview Friday. He said he has raised the issue with Indi- an Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
A senior Indian government official denied India is violat- ing the treaty. He blamed Pa- kistan's water shortage on changing weather patterns and the country's poor water man- agement. He called the stri- dent rhetoric from Pakistani officials a “political gim- mick...designed to place yet one more agenda item in our already complex relationship.“ Indian officials declined com- ment on the record.
The latest dispute revolves around India's plans to build a 330-megawatt hydroelectric power project on the Kishen- ganga River, a tributary of the Indus. India says it is well within its rights to build the dam. The project has been on the drawing board since the late 1980s and is expected to cost about $800 million.
Pakistan says New Delhi's plans to divert the course of the river will reduce its flow by a third in the winter. That would make it unfeasible for Pakistan to move ahead with its own plans for a hydroelec- tric dam downstream.
Pakistan wants to put the Kishenganga project before an arbitration panel--the first time that mechanism of the treaty will have been used. If India agrees, a seven-person court of arbitration would in- clude two members appointed by each country, and three outsiders. India hasn't yet re- sponded formally to the pro- posal, according to the Pakis- tan delegation to the meeting.
“We're already a water- stressed country,“ Jamaat Ali Shah, Pakistan's Indus waters commissioner, said ahead of this week's meeting. India's construction of new dams is “aggravating the stresses.“
The water dispute comes as the relationship between the nuclear-armed neighbors is at an inflection point. India last month invited Pakistan to dis- cuss the resumption of regular peace talks, and the two countries' foreign secretaries met in Delhi February 25. A water squabble could upset those peace efforts.
That would deal a major blow to Indian Prime Minister Singh, who views engagement with Pakistan as the best way to contain terrorism. Mr. Singh wants Pakistan's aid in bring- ing to justice Pakistan-based militants that New Delhi be- lieves carried out the Novem- ber 2008 attacks in Mumbai, a bloody siege that killed 166 people.
Further deterioration of re- lations between New Delhi and Islamabad would also be a setback for Washington's ef- forts to stabilize the region.
Pakistan has told the U.S. that tensions with India on its east- ern border over the disputed territory of Kashmir have pre- vented it from cracking down more aggressively on Taliban and al Qaeda leaders directing the insurgency in Afghanistan.
Islamist groups in Pakistan have taken up the water issue as a new focus. “If our govern- ment doesn't act to resolve this issue then the people will take it in to their own hands. If water doesn't flow in to these rivers, then blood will,“ said Hafiz Khalid Waleed, the polit- ical affairs chief of Jamaat-ud- Dawah, an Islamic charity. In- dia and others call the charity a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba, the militant group it says or- chestrated the Mumbai terror- ist attacks in November 2008.
Mr. Waleed denies any link to terrorism, calling it “American propaganda.“
Water scarcity is a growing political issue across the globe, from the Middle East to the U.S. West. South Asia's wa- ter politics date back to Brit- ain's partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, when newly created nations India and Pakistan wrangled over how to divide resources.
The Indus River, whose wa- ters Britain had harnessed through a vast system of irriga- tion canals, was a crucial life- line to farmers in the Punjab region stretching across both countries. But India and Pakis- tan were fighting over control of Kashmir, where several In- dus tributaries begin.
After years of tense negotiations, India and Pakistan sign- ed the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 with the help of the World Bank. As part of the treaty--which is widely viewed by water experts as a model of how water conflicts can be managed--each side got unre- stricted use of three rivers and rights to use the others for nonconsumptive purposes such as flood control, naviga- tion and bathing. India was granted limited agricultural usage of Pakistan's rivers, plus the right to build hydroelectric projects, as long as they don't store or divert large amounts of water.
The treaty provides for bu- reaucrats appointed by both governments to meet regular- ly, exchange data, and resolve disputes. Commissioners have held more than 200 site in- spections and meetings since 1960, even during times of war.
Yet Pakistan's rows with In- dia have intensified as its wa- ter situation has worsened over the years. Water availabil- ity in Pakistan has fallen 70% since the early 1950s to 1,500 cubic meters per capita. It is expected to reach the 1,000-cubic-meter level con- sidered officially “scarce“ by international standards in 25 years, according to a report last year by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Pakistani officials acknowl- edge their water woes aren't caused by India's damming of rivers alone. Major reservoirs are filling with sediment picked up by the rivers on their routes to the sea. Canals are aging and breaking down.
The World Bank says soil ero- sion and poor irrigation are sapping roughly 1% from Pa- kistan's Gross Domestic Prod- uct growth.
Skeptics in India say Pakis- tan is simply looking for a scapegoat as it struggles to manage its internal water poli- tics.
The especially arid province of Sindh, for example, blames the powerful upstream prov- ince of Punjab for consuming too much.
“Their water management is in terrible shape, and it's con- venient to put the onus on In- dia,“ said G. Parthasarathy, a former Indian envoy to Pakis- tan.
But Pakistani officials say New Delhi's actions are ex- acerbating a precarious situa- tion.
This year the Pakistan prov- ince of Punjab--the political heartland of the nation and a major producer of wheat, rice, maize and sugar cane--is facing unprecedented water shortages. At harvest time in Mandi Bahauddin, an area in the north of Punjab province of relatively prosperous farm- land, the wheat still grows waist-high.
But farmers here complain that yields and incomes have dropped by a third in the past five years because of water shortages. In the past, canals used to supply water for irriga- tion year-round. They are now empty for about four months each year. That forces villagers to pump groundwater, which is fast turning brackish and causing diseases like hepatitis, said Tariq Mehmood Allowa- na, a local farmer and member of the provincial assembly.
In the past, the area's only problem was regular flooding.
India's dams stopped this, causing a dearth of water instead, says Mr. Allowana, who owns 25 acres of wheat fields.
The farmer represents the Pa- kistan Peoples Party of the late former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Farmers say they have stopped cultivating rice--a water-intensive crop--except for personal use. Nearby, more than half of the Chenab river bed has become a dusty plain where children play with the flow reduced to a trickle.
“India is engaged in an eco- nomic warfare against Pakis- tan. If the problem persists for another five years the whole area will become barren,“ said Mr. Allowana, as a group of farmers nearby filled irrigation channels from groundwater supplies using a diesel-fueled pump.
Over the years, tensions have built as Pakistan has ob- jected to the size and technical design of various Indian pro- jects. India says it has 33 In- dus-related hydrological pro- jects at various stages of im- plementation, and all have been contested in one way or another by Pakistan. India also says it has yet to make use of its limited rights to store water on Pakistan's rivers or use it for limited irrigation.
“We've found there's a pat- tern in Pakistan of raising technical issues ad nauseam to stall a project or delay a proj- ect indefinitely,“ the senior In- dian official said Friday.
In 2005 Pakistan raised is- sues with the Baglihar dam, an Indian power project on the Chenab river--one of those al- lotted to Pakistan--saying it would store too much water upstream and reduce down- stream flow to Pakistan.
The countries agreed in 2007 to let the World Bank appoint an independent expert, who ruled that India had to make minor modifications to the dam, such as lowering its height. Pakistan now contends the dam, which began opera- tions in 2008, is reducing the flow of the Chenab below lev- els stipulated in the treaty. In- dia denies this.
Pakistan wants Washington to play a mediating role with India--in the water dispute and wider issues like the Kash- mir conflict. The U.S. is push- ing for tighter relations with Pakistan as it steps up pres- sure on the Taliban in Afghan- istan but has to balance this with its close ties to India. For now, the U.S. is treading care- fully, offering Pakistan stepped-up economic aid and military hardware supplies.
Pakistan raised the water is- sue in Washington during an official visit last week. Secre- tary of State Hillary Clinton has signaled that Washington isn't interested in mediating on water issues.
A State Department spokes- person pointed to an interview Mrs. Clinton recently did with a Pakistani news channel in which she said it would be “sensible“ to stick to the Indus Waters Treaty for resolving disputes.
The Indian projects that Pa- kistan says are draining its wa- ter resources are primarily on Indus tributaries in Kashmir.
Some experts say the water is- sue is a back door way for Is- lamic militants to push their political agenda regarding Kashmir.
“They're saying, `We must liberate Kashmir to save our water,' “ said B.G. Verghese, a veteran journalist who has studied water issues closely and is a visiting professor at the Center for Policy Research, a New Delhi think tank.
--wsj@livemint.com
Wednesday 31 March 2010
India strengthens borders with friendly China
(TibetanReview.net, Mar31, 2010)
India said Mar 30 that it had initiated necessary steps to upgrade military infrastructure on its side of the northern borders in view of the rapid Chinese development and upgrade of facilities in occupied Tibet and East Turkestan. The Chinese military has upgraded its “force projection capability” along the northern borders, India’s Defence Ministry was quoted as saying in its annual report 2009-10.
The report was quoted as saying: “India also remains conscious and alert about the implications of China’s military modernisation. Rapid infrastructure development in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang province has considerably upgraded China’s military force projection capability and strategic operational flexibility.”
Regarding India’s efforts on its side of the border, the Hindu newspaper Mar 30 quoted the report as saying: “While efforts to build 73 roads near Sino-Indian border have been taken up with vigour, Indian Air Force upgraded advanced landing grounds, including at Daulat Beg Oldie, to facilitate landing of AN-32 transport aircraft while the Army is raising two Mountain Divisions in the north-east and plans to acquire ultra-light howitzers that can be dropped via helicopters at higher altitudes.”
The report was, however, said to be optimistic about Sino-India relations. It was cited as saying that based on strategic and cooperative partnership, relations with China had progressed well during the last year. There was convergence of views and actions on various issues in international fora and a regular mechanism for exchanges in military sphere has been established, it was cited as saying.
In another development, the Supreme Court of India on Mar 28 finally cleared the Army’s long-pending proposal to construct a strategic road near the trijunction of Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim. Among other things, the order mandates that 5percwent of the estimated project cost should be paid to the Sikkim government for undertaking compensatory afforestation.
The Indian Army is to construct two roads in the sensitive international border area in Sikkim, facilitating a strategic access route virtually overlooking occupied Tibet, a demand which had been pending clearance from the SC since 2005.]
The new road, to be built between Flag Hill and Dokala, passes through Pangolakha Wildlife Sanctuary. The Army had submitted to the court, ‘‘the road is required for operational purposes and to meet strategic requirement of the nation’’.
(TibetanReview.net, Mar31, 2010)
India said Mar 30 that it had initiated necessary steps to upgrade military infrastructure on its side of the northern borders in view of the rapid Chinese development and upgrade of facilities in occupied Tibet and East Turkestan. The Chinese military has upgraded its “force projection capability” along the northern borders, India’s Defence Ministry was quoted as saying in its annual report 2009-10.
The report was quoted as saying: “India also remains conscious and alert about the implications of China’s military modernisation. Rapid infrastructure development in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang province has considerably upgraded China’s military force projection capability and strategic operational flexibility.”
Regarding India’s efforts on its side of the border, the Hindu newspaper Mar 30 quoted the report as saying: “While efforts to build 73 roads near Sino-Indian border have been taken up with vigour, Indian Air Force upgraded advanced landing grounds, including at Daulat Beg Oldie, to facilitate landing of AN-32 transport aircraft while the Army is raising two Mountain Divisions in the north-east and plans to acquire ultra-light howitzers that can be dropped via helicopters at higher altitudes.”
The report was, however, said to be optimistic about Sino-India relations. It was cited as saying that based on strategic and cooperative partnership, relations with China had progressed well during the last year. There was convergence of views and actions on various issues in international fora and a regular mechanism for exchanges in military sphere has been established, it was cited as saying.
In another development, the Supreme Court of India on Mar 28 finally cleared the Army’s long-pending proposal to construct a strategic road near the trijunction of Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim. Among other things, the order mandates that 5percwent of the estimated project cost should be paid to the Sikkim government for undertaking compensatory afforestation.
The Indian Army is to construct two roads in the sensitive international border area in Sikkim, facilitating a strategic access route virtually overlooking occupied Tibet, a demand which had been pending clearance from the SC since 2005.]
The new road, to be built between Flag Hill and Dokala, passes through Pangolakha Wildlife Sanctuary. The Army had submitted to the court, ‘‘the road is required for operational purposes and to meet strategic requirement of the nation’’.
Sunday 28 March 2010
SC OKs building border road overlooking China
Dhananjay Mahapatra | The Times of India
28 March, NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court has finally cleared the Army’s long-pending proposal to construct a strategic road near the trijunction of Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim. The clearance comes with certain conditions including a payment of 5% of the estimated project cost to the Sikkim government, which would use the money for compensatory afforestation.
The Army will construct two roads in the sensitive international border area in Sikkim, facilitating a strategic access route virtually overlooking China, a demand which had been pending clearance from the SC since 2005.
A Central Empowered Committee (CEC), constituted by the SC, went into the proposal as it involved Border Road Organization (BRO) constructing a new road between Flag Hill and Dokala passing through Pangolakha Wildlife Sanctuary. The Army said ‘‘the road is required for operational purposes and to meet strategic requirement of the nation’’.
After a site inspection by CEC members M K Jiwrajika and Mahendra Vyas, and amicus curiae A D N Rao, a report was submitted to a bench comprising CJI K G Balakrishnan and Justices S H Kapadia and Aftab Alam.
The report said: ‘‘The entire alignment of the proposed road passes through the high altitude alpine areas of the sanctuary [Pangolakha Wildlife Sanctuary] and would involve felling of 3,042 trees, 9,769 shrubs, 14,018 herbs and about 5,000 bamboos.’’
Dhananjay Mahapatra | The Times of India
28 March, NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court has finally cleared the Army’s long-pending proposal to construct a strategic road near the trijunction of Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim. The clearance comes with certain conditions including a payment of 5% of the estimated project cost to the Sikkim government, which would use the money for compensatory afforestation.
The Army will construct two roads in the sensitive international border area in Sikkim, facilitating a strategic access route virtually overlooking China, a demand which had been pending clearance from the SC since 2005.
A Central Empowered Committee (CEC), constituted by the SC, went into the proposal as it involved Border Road Organization (BRO) constructing a new road between Flag Hill and Dokala passing through Pangolakha Wildlife Sanctuary. The Army said ‘‘the road is required for operational purposes and to meet strategic requirement of the nation’’.
After a site inspection by CEC members M K Jiwrajika and Mahendra Vyas, and amicus curiae A D N Rao, a report was submitted to a bench comprising CJI K G Balakrishnan and Justices S H Kapadia and Aftab Alam.
The report said: ‘‘The entire alignment of the proposed road passes through the high altitude alpine areas of the sanctuary [Pangolakha Wildlife Sanctuary] and would involve felling of 3,042 trees, 9,769 shrubs, 14,018 herbs and about 5,000 bamboos.’’
NEW DELHI: PARISANGH CHARTS OUT PROGRAMMES, ENOS DAS PRADHAN CHOSEN NEW WORKING PRESIDENT
New Delhi:At a special meeting of its National Executive in New Delhi on March , the Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh agreed on some nationwide annual programmes and also discussed important issues like Gorkhaland and the problems of the Gorkhas in the Northeast. Also putting an end to the situation arising out of the resignation of Working President CK Shrestha, Rev Dr Enos Das Pradhan was chosen to assume the position.
To bring the Gorkha community together, the Parisangh decided that besides the Balidaan Diwas it observed on August 25 to commemorate the sacrifice made by Gorkhas during the Freedom Struggle, it would also observe Urja Sanchay Diwas on the second Sunday of May as well as Gorkha Gaurav Diwas on the second Sunday of November. While one would create awareness about the need to conserve energy in the context of global warming, the other would recognise the achievement of Gorkhas, from young students to national heroes. A three-day Nepali Film Festival would be organised in New Delhi in the second weekend of January every year to showcase Nepali movies made in India. The month of March every year would be designated as a special period for recruiting new members.
Earlier, BGP President Mrs Dil Kumari Bhandari announced the assumption of the post of Working President by Rev Dr Enos Das Pradhan, till now the National Vice President of BGP. The incumbent, CK Shrestha, had resigned from the post and the National Executive held in Siliguri on January 30 and had resolved that his resignation would be deemed as accepted if he did not rescind it by the end of February.
Other important discussions revolved around the formation of a Bharatiya Gorkha Foundation as a charitable wing of the BGP. It would be run by a trust and would create a fund to assist meritorious Gorkha students in professional education and in preparing for the Public Service Commission. It would also come to the financial aid of Gorkhas who faced with dislocation due to their ethnicity. The meeting also discussed the formation of a public limited company that would run a Gorkha-centred, Nepali-language television channel. The modalities of how the Parisangh could be associated with the project was discussed by the members. A real-estate development company, whose shareholders comprise mostly Parisangh members, pledged to uphold the community’s interests in its dealings while assuring the Parisangh of financial aid as a percentage of its net profits. The meeting endorsed a donation-cum-lucky draw, with attractive prizes, to create a corpus fund. The draw would be held in December 2010 at Dehradun.
In a remarkably open and frank discussion on the issue of Gorkhaland, the meeting deliberated on various aspects of the current demand for a separate state for the Indian Gorkhas. While some expressed apprehensions about how it was not possible, due to social considerations, to open support the demand, others felt that the Parisangh should take on the role of a facilitator of discussions between various political parties involved in the movement. Yet others said that while the Parisangh as a non-political organisation could not agitate for Gorkhland, it could initiate talks with political parties in the 22 states where the Parisangh has units and encourage delegation by these parties to create an all-India pressure group. The convenor of the BGP’s Task Force on Gorkhaland reported that they had started work on creating Gorkhaland support groups among political parties and organisations in the theatre of the movement. The Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh was emphatic that a separate state was a means of gaining the Gorkhas their rightful national identity and no device or agency other than a state of Gorkhland seemed likely, under present circumstances, to serve that purpose.
Various representatives from places like Nagpur, the entire Northeast, Uttarakhand, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal presented their views and suggestions.
source: Shri Barun Roy
New Delhi:At a special meeting of its National Executive in New Delhi on March , the Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh agreed on some nationwide annual programmes and also discussed important issues like Gorkhaland and the problems of the Gorkhas in the Northeast. Also putting an end to the situation arising out of the resignation of Working President CK Shrestha, Rev Dr Enos Das Pradhan was chosen to assume the position.
To bring the Gorkha community together, the Parisangh decided that besides the Balidaan Diwas it observed on August 25 to commemorate the sacrifice made by Gorkhas during the Freedom Struggle, it would also observe Urja Sanchay Diwas on the second Sunday of May as well as Gorkha Gaurav Diwas on the second Sunday of November. While one would create awareness about the need to conserve energy in the context of global warming, the other would recognise the achievement of Gorkhas, from young students to national heroes. A three-day Nepali Film Festival would be organised in New Delhi in the second weekend of January every year to showcase Nepali movies made in India. The month of March every year would be designated as a special period for recruiting new members.
Earlier, BGP President Mrs Dil Kumari Bhandari announced the assumption of the post of Working President by Rev Dr Enos Das Pradhan, till now the National Vice President of BGP. The incumbent, CK Shrestha, had resigned from the post and the National Executive held in Siliguri on January 30 and had resolved that his resignation would be deemed as accepted if he did not rescind it by the end of February.
Other important discussions revolved around the formation of a Bharatiya Gorkha Foundation as a charitable wing of the BGP. It would be run by a trust and would create a fund to assist meritorious Gorkha students in professional education and in preparing for the Public Service Commission. It would also come to the financial aid of Gorkhas who faced with dislocation due to their ethnicity. The meeting also discussed the formation of a public limited company that would run a Gorkha-centred, Nepali-language television channel. The modalities of how the Parisangh could be associated with the project was discussed by the members. A real-estate development company, whose shareholders comprise mostly Parisangh members, pledged to uphold the community’s interests in its dealings while assuring the Parisangh of financial aid as a percentage of its net profits. The meeting endorsed a donation-cum-lucky draw, with attractive prizes, to create a corpus fund. The draw would be held in December 2010 at Dehradun.
In a remarkably open and frank discussion on the issue of Gorkhaland, the meeting deliberated on various aspects of the current demand for a separate state for the Indian Gorkhas. While some expressed apprehensions about how it was not possible, due to social considerations, to open support the demand, others felt that the Parisangh should take on the role of a facilitator of discussions between various political parties involved in the movement. Yet others said that while the Parisangh as a non-political organisation could not agitate for Gorkhland, it could initiate talks with political parties in the 22 states where the Parisangh has units and encourage delegation by these parties to create an all-India pressure group. The convenor of the BGP’s Task Force on Gorkhaland reported that they had started work on creating Gorkhaland support groups among political parties and organisations in the theatre of the movement. The Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh was emphatic that a separate state was a means of gaining the Gorkhas their rightful national identity and no device or agency other than a state of Gorkhland seemed likely, under present circumstances, to serve that purpose.
Various representatives from places like Nagpur, the entire Northeast, Uttarakhand, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal presented their views and suggestions.
source: Shri Barun Roy
Tuesday 23 March 2010
The Netanyahu-Obama Meeting in Strategic Context
March 23, 2010 | 0903 GMT
By George Friedman
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is scheduled to meet with U.S. President Barack Obama on March 23. The meeting follows the explosion in U.S.-Israeli relations after Israel announced it was licensing construction of homes in East Jerusalem while U.S. Vice President Joe Biden was in Israel. The United States wants Israel to stop all construction of new Jewish settlements. The Israelis argue that East Jerusalem is not part of the occupied territories, and hence, the U.S. demand doesn’t apply there. The Americans are not parsing their demand so finely and regard the announcement — timed as it was — as a direct affront and challenge. Israel’s response is that it is a sovereign state and so must be permitted to do as it wishes. The implicit American response is that the United States is also a sovereign state and will respond as it wishes.
The polemics in this case are not the point. The issue is more fundamental: namely, the degree to which U.S. and Israeli relations converge and diverge. This is not a matter of friendship but, as in all things geopolitical, of national interest. It is difficult to discuss U.S. and Israeli interests objectively, as the relationship is clouded with endless rhetoric and simplistic formulations. It is thus difficult to know where to start, but two points of entry into this controversy come to mind.
The first is the idea that anti-Americanism in the Middle East has its roots in U.S. support for Israel, a point made by those in the United States and abroad who want the United States to distance itself from Israel. The second is that the United States has a special strategic relationship with Israel and a mutual dependency. Both statements have elements of truth, but neither is simply true — and both require much more substantial analysis. In analyzing them, we begin the process of trying to disentangle national interests from rhetoric.
Anti-Americanism in the Middle East
Begin with the claim that U.S. support for Israel generates anti-Americanism in the Arab and Islamic world. While such support undoubtedly contributes to the phenomenon, it hardly explains it. The fundamental problem with the theory is that Arab anti-Americanism predates significant U.S. support for Israel. Until 1967, the United States gave very little aid to Israel. What aid Washington gave was in the form of very limited loans to purchase agricultural products from the United States — a program that many countries in the world participated in. It was France, not the United States, which was the primary supplier of weapons to Israeli.
In 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai while Britain and France seized the Suez Canal, which the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdul Nasser had nationalized. The Eisenhower administration intervened — against Israel and on the side of Egypt. Under U.S. pressure, the British, French and Israelis were forced to withdraw. There were widespread charges that the Eisenhower administration was pro-Arab and anti-Israeli; certainly no one could argue that Eisenhower was significantly pro-Israel.
In spite of this, Nasser entered into a series of major agreements with the Soviet Union. Egypt effectively became a Soviet ally, the recipient of massive Soviet aid and a center of anti-American rhetoric. Whatever his reasons — and they had to do with U.S. unwillingness to give Egypt massive aid — Egypt’s anti-American attitude had nothing to do with the Israelis, save perhaps that the United States was not prepared to join Egypt in trying to destroy Israel.
Two major political events took place in 1963: left-wing political coups in Syria and Iraq that brought the Baathist Party to power in both countries. Note that this took place pre-1967, i.e., before the United States became closely aligned with Israel. Both regimes were pro-Soviet and anti-American, but neither could have been responding to U.S. support for Israel because there wasn’t much.
In 1964, Washington gave Cairo the first significant U.S. military aid in the form of Hawk missiles, but it gave those to other Arab countries, too, in response to the coups in Iraq and Syria. The United States feared the Soviets would base fighters in those two countries, so it began installing anti-air systems to try to block potential Soviet airstrikes on Saudi Arabia.
In 1967, France broke with Israel over the Arab-Israeli conflict that year. The United States began significant aid to Israel. In 1973, after the Syrian and Egyptian attack on Israel, the U.S. began massive assistance. In 1974 this amounted to about 25 percent of Israeli gross domestic product (GDP). The aid has continued at roughly the same level, but given the massive growth of the Israeli economy, it now amounts to about 2.5 percent of Israeli GDP.
The point here is that the United States was not actively involved in supporting Israel prior to 1967, yet anti-Americanism in the Arab world was rampant. The Arabs might have blamed the United States for Israel, but there was little empirical basis for this claim. Certainly, U.S. aid commenced in 1967 and surged in 1974, but the argument that eliminating support for Israel would cause anti-Americanism to decline must first explain the origins of anti-Americanism, which substantially predated American support for Israel. In fact, it is not clear that Arab anti-Americanism was greater after the initiation of major aid to Israel than before. Indeed, Egypt, the most important Arab country, shifted its position to a pro-American stance after the 1973 war in the face of U.S. aid.
Israel’s Importance to the United States
Let’s now consider the assumption that Israel is a critical U.S. asset. American grand strategy has always been derived from British grand strategy. The United States seeks to maintain regional balances of power in order to avoid the emergence of larger powers that can threaten U.S. interests. The Cold War was a massive exercise in the balance of power, pitting an American-sponsored worldwide alliance system against one formed by the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has acted a number of times against regional hegemons: Iraq in 1990-91, Serbia in 1999 and so on.
In the area called generally the Middle East, but which we prefer to think of as the area between the Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush, there are three intrinsic regional balances. One is the Arab-Israeli balance of power. The second is the Iran-Iraq balance. The third is the Indo-Pakistani balance of power. The American goal in each balance is not so much stability as it is the mutual neutralization of local powers by other local powers.
Two of the three regional balances of power are collapsed or in jeopardy. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the failure to quickly put a strong, anti-Iranian government in place in Baghdad, has led to the collapse of the central balance of power — with little hope of resurrection. The eastern balance of power between Pakistan and India is also in danger of toppling. The Afghan war has caused profound stresses in Pakistan, and there are scenarios in which we can imagine Pakistan’s power dramatically weakening or even cracking. It is unclear how this will evolve, but what is clear is that it is not in the interest of the United States because it would destroy the native balance of power with India. The United States does not want to see India as the unchallenged power in the subcontinent any more than it wants to see Pakistan in that position. The United States needs a strong Pakistan to balance India, and its problem now is how to manage the Afghan war — a side issue strategically — without undermining the strategic interest of the United States, an Indo-Pakistani balance of power.
The western balance of power, Israel and the surrounding states, is relatively stable. What is most important to the United States at this point is that this balance of power also not destabilize. In this sense, Israel is an important strategic asset. But in the broader picture, where the United States is dealing with the collapse of the central balance of power and with the destabilization of the eastern balance of power, Washington does not want or need the destabilization of the western balance — between the Israelis and Arabs — at this time. U.S. “bandwidth” is already stretched to the limit. Washington does not need another problem. Nor does it need instability in this region complicating things in the other regions.
Note that the United States is interested in maintaining the balance of power. This means that the U.S. interest is in a stable set of relations, with no one power becoming excessively powerful and therefore unmanageable by the United States. Israel is already the dominant power in the region, and the degree to which Syria, Jordan and Egypt contain Israel is limited. Israel is moving from the position of an American ally maintaining a balance of power to a regional hegemon in its own right operating outside the framework of American interests.
The United States above all wants to ensure continuity after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak dies. It wants to ensure that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan remains stable. And in its attempts to manage the situation in the center and east, it wants to ensure that nothing happens in the west to further complicate an already-enormously complex situation.
There is very little Israel can do to help the United States in the center and eastern balances. On the other hand, if the western balance of power were to collapse — due to anything from a collapse of the Egyptian regime to a new Israeli war with Hezbollah — the United States might find itself drawn into that conflict, while a new intifada in the Palestinian territories would not help matters either. It is unknown what effect this would have in the other balances of power, but the United States is operating at the limits of its power to try to manage these situations. Israel cannot help there, but it could hurt, for example by initiating an attack on Iran outside the framework of American planning. Therefore, the United States wants one thing from Israel now: for Israel to do nothing that could possibly destabilize the western balance of power or make America’s task more difficult in the other regions.
Israel sees the American preoccupation in these other regions, along with the current favorable alignment of forces in its region, as an opportunity both to consolidate and expand its power and to create new realities on the ground. One of these is building in East Jerusalem, or more precisely, using the moment to reshape the demographics and geography of its immediate region. The Israeli position is that it has rights in East Jerusalem that the United States cannot intrude on. The U.S. position is that it has interests in the broader region that are potentially weakened by this construction at this time.
Israel’s desire to do so is understandable, but it runs counter to American interests. The United States, given its overwhelming challenges, is neither interested in Israel’s desire to reshape its region, nor can it tolerate any more risk deriving from Israel’s actions. However small the risks might be, the United States is maxed out on risk. Therefore, Israel’s interests and that of the United States diverge. Israel sees an opportunity; the United States sees more risk.
The problem Israel has is that, in the long run, its relationship to the United States is its insurance policy. Netanyahu appears to be calculating that given the U.S. need for a western balance of power, whatever Israel does now will be allowed because in the end the United States needs Israel to maintain that balance of power. Therefore, he is probing aggressively. Netanyahu also has domestic political reasons for proceeding with this construction. For him, this construction is a prudent and necessary step.
Obama’s task is to convince Netanyahu that Israel has strategic value for the United States, but only in the context of broader U.S. interests in the region. If Israel becomes part of the American problem rather than the solution, the United States will seek other solutions. That is a hard case to make but not an impossible one. The balance of power is in the eastern Mediterranean, and there is another democracy the United States could turn to: Turkey — which is more than eager to fulfill that role and exploit Israeli tensions with the United States.
It may not be the most persuasive threat, but the fact is that Israel cannot afford any threat from the United States, such as an end to the intense U.S.-Israeli bilateral relationship. While this relationship might not be essential to Israel at the moment, it is one of the foundations of Israeli grand strategy in the long run. Just as the United States cannot afford any more instability in the region at the moment, so Israel cannot afford any threat, however remote, to its relationship with the United States.
A More Complicated Relationship
What is clear in all this is that the statement that Israel and the United States are strategic partners is not untrue, it is just vastly more complicated than it appears. Similarly, the claim that American support for Israel fuels anti-Americans is both a true and insufficient statement.
Netanyahu is betting on Congress and political pressures to restrain U.S. responses to Israel. One of the arguments of geopolitics is that political advantage is insufficient in the face of geopolitical necessity. Pressure on Congress from Israel in order to build houses in Jerusalem while the United States is dealing with crises in the region could easily backfire.
The fact is that while the argument that U.S. Israel policy caused anti-Americanism in the region may not be altogether true, the United States does not need any further challenges or stresses. Nations overwhelmed by challenges can behave in unpredictable ways. Netanyahu’s decision to confront the United States at this time on this issue creates an unpredictability that would seem excessive to Israel’s long term interests. Expecting the American political process to protect Israel from the consequences is not necessarily gauging the American mood at the moment.
The national interest of both countries is to maximize their freedom to maneuver. The Israelis have a temporary advantage because of American interests elsewhere in the region. But that creates a long-term threat. With two wars going on and two regional balances in shambles or tottering, the United States does not need a new crisis in the third. Israel has an interest in housing in East Jerusalem. The United States does not. This frames the conversation between Netanyahu and Obama. The rest is rhetoric.
March 23, 2010 | 0903 GMT
By George Friedman
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is scheduled to meet with U.S. President Barack Obama on March 23. The meeting follows the explosion in U.S.-Israeli relations after Israel announced it was licensing construction of homes in East Jerusalem while U.S. Vice President Joe Biden was in Israel. The United States wants Israel to stop all construction of new Jewish settlements. The Israelis argue that East Jerusalem is not part of the occupied territories, and hence, the U.S. demand doesn’t apply there. The Americans are not parsing their demand so finely and regard the announcement — timed as it was — as a direct affront and challenge. Israel’s response is that it is a sovereign state and so must be permitted to do as it wishes. The implicit American response is that the United States is also a sovereign state and will respond as it wishes.
The polemics in this case are not the point. The issue is more fundamental: namely, the degree to which U.S. and Israeli relations converge and diverge. This is not a matter of friendship but, as in all things geopolitical, of national interest. It is difficult to discuss U.S. and Israeli interests objectively, as the relationship is clouded with endless rhetoric and simplistic formulations. It is thus difficult to know where to start, but two points of entry into this controversy come to mind.
The first is the idea that anti-Americanism in the Middle East has its roots in U.S. support for Israel, a point made by those in the United States and abroad who want the United States to distance itself from Israel. The second is that the United States has a special strategic relationship with Israel and a mutual dependency. Both statements have elements of truth, but neither is simply true — and both require much more substantial analysis. In analyzing them, we begin the process of trying to disentangle national interests from rhetoric.
Anti-Americanism in the Middle East
Begin with the claim that U.S. support for Israel generates anti-Americanism in the Arab and Islamic world. While such support undoubtedly contributes to the phenomenon, it hardly explains it. The fundamental problem with the theory is that Arab anti-Americanism predates significant U.S. support for Israel. Until 1967, the United States gave very little aid to Israel. What aid Washington gave was in the form of very limited loans to purchase agricultural products from the United States — a program that many countries in the world participated in. It was France, not the United States, which was the primary supplier of weapons to Israeli.
In 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai while Britain and France seized the Suez Canal, which the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdul Nasser had nationalized. The Eisenhower administration intervened — against Israel and on the side of Egypt. Under U.S. pressure, the British, French and Israelis were forced to withdraw. There were widespread charges that the Eisenhower administration was pro-Arab and anti-Israeli; certainly no one could argue that Eisenhower was significantly pro-Israel.
In spite of this, Nasser entered into a series of major agreements with the Soviet Union. Egypt effectively became a Soviet ally, the recipient of massive Soviet aid and a center of anti-American rhetoric. Whatever his reasons — and they had to do with U.S. unwillingness to give Egypt massive aid — Egypt’s anti-American attitude had nothing to do with the Israelis, save perhaps that the United States was not prepared to join Egypt in trying to destroy Israel.
Two major political events took place in 1963: left-wing political coups in Syria and Iraq that brought the Baathist Party to power in both countries. Note that this took place pre-1967, i.e., before the United States became closely aligned with Israel. Both regimes were pro-Soviet and anti-American, but neither could have been responding to U.S. support for Israel because there wasn’t much.
In 1964, Washington gave Cairo the first significant U.S. military aid in the form of Hawk missiles, but it gave those to other Arab countries, too, in response to the coups in Iraq and Syria. The United States feared the Soviets would base fighters in those two countries, so it began installing anti-air systems to try to block potential Soviet airstrikes on Saudi Arabia.
In 1967, France broke with Israel over the Arab-Israeli conflict that year. The United States began significant aid to Israel. In 1973, after the Syrian and Egyptian attack on Israel, the U.S. began massive assistance. In 1974 this amounted to about 25 percent of Israeli gross domestic product (GDP). The aid has continued at roughly the same level, but given the massive growth of the Israeli economy, it now amounts to about 2.5 percent of Israeli GDP.
The point here is that the United States was not actively involved in supporting Israel prior to 1967, yet anti-Americanism in the Arab world was rampant. The Arabs might have blamed the United States for Israel, but there was little empirical basis for this claim. Certainly, U.S. aid commenced in 1967 and surged in 1974, but the argument that eliminating support for Israel would cause anti-Americanism to decline must first explain the origins of anti-Americanism, which substantially predated American support for Israel. In fact, it is not clear that Arab anti-Americanism was greater after the initiation of major aid to Israel than before. Indeed, Egypt, the most important Arab country, shifted its position to a pro-American stance after the 1973 war in the face of U.S. aid.
Israel’s Importance to the United States
Let’s now consider the assumption that Israel is a critical U.S. asset. American grand strategy has always been derived from British grand strategy. The United States seeks to maintain regional balances of power in order to avoid the emergence of larger powers that can threaten U.S. interests. The Cold War was a massive exercise in the balance of power, pitting an American-sponsored worldwide alliance system against one formed by the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has acted a number of times against regional hegemons: Iraq in 1990-91, Serbia in 1999 and so on.
In the area called generally the Middle East, but which we prefer to think of as the area between the Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush, there are three intrinsic regional balances. One is the Arab-Israeli balance of power. The second is the Iran-Iraq balance. The third is the Indo-Pakistani balance of power. The American goal in each balance is not so much stability as it is the mutual neutralization of local powers by other local powers.
Two of the three regional balances of power are collapsed or in jeopardy. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the failure to quickly put a strong, anti-Iranian government in place in Baghdad, has led to the collapse of the central balance of power — with little hope of resurrection. The eastern balance of power between Pakistan and India is also in danger of toppling. The Afghan war has caused profound stresses in Pakistan, and there are scenarios in which we can imagine Pakistan’s power dramatically weakening or even cracking. It is unclear how this will evolve, but what is clear is that it is not in the interest of the United States because it would destroy the native balance of power with India. The United States does not want to see India as the unchallenged power in the subcontinent any more than it wants to see Pakistan in that position. The United States needs a strong Pakistan to balance India, and its problem now is how to manage the Afghan war — a side issue strategically — without undermining the strategic interest of the United States, an Indo-Pakistani balance of power.
The western balance of power, Israel and the surrounding states, is relatively stable. What is most important to the United States at this point is that this balance of power also not destabilize. In this sense, Israel is an important strategic asset. But in the broader picture, where the United States is dealing with the collapse of the central balance of power and with the destabilization of the eastern balance of power, Washington does not want or need the destabilization of the western balance — between the Israelis and Arabs — at this time. U.S. “bandwidth” is already stretched to the limit. Washington does not need another problem. Nor does it need instability in this region complicating things in the other regions.
Note that the United States is interested in maintaining the balance of power. This means that the U.S. interest is in a stable set of relations, with no one power becoming excessively powerful and therefore unmanageable by the United States. Israel is already the dominant power in the region, and the degree to which Syria, Jordan and Egypt contain Israel is limited. Israel is moving from the position of an American ally maintaining a balance of power to a regional hegemon in its own right operating outside the framework of American interests.
The United States above all wants to ensure continuity after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak dies. It wants to ensure that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan remains stable. And in its attempts to manage the situation in the center and east, it wants to ensure that nothing happens in the west to further complicate an already-enormously complex situation.
There is very little Israel can do to help the United States in the center and eastern balances. On the other hand, if the western balance of power were to collapse — due to anything from a collapse of the Egyptian regime to a new Israeli war with Hezbollah — the United States might find itself drawn into that conflict, while a new intifada in the Palestinian territories would not help matters either. It is unknown what effect this would have in the other balances of power, but the United States is operating at the limits of its power to try to manage these situations. Israel cannot help there, but it could hurt, for example by initiating an attack on Iran outside the framework of American planning. Therefore, the United States wants one thing from Israel now: for Israel to do nothing that could possibly destabilize the western balance of power or make America’s task more difficult in the other regions.
Israel sees the American preoccupation in these other regions, along with the current favorable alignment of forces in its region, as an opportunity both to consolidate and expand its power and to create new realities on the ground. One of these is building in East Jerusalem, or more precisely, using the moment to reshape the demographics and geography of its immediate region. The Israeli position is that it has rights in East Jerusalem that the United States cannot intrude on. The U.S. position is that it has interests in the broader region that are potentially weakened by this construction at this time.
Israel’s desire to do so is understandable, but it runs counter to American interests. The United States, given its overwhelming challenges, is neither interested in Israel’s desire to reshape its region, nor can it tolerate any more risk deriving from Israel’s actions. However small the risks might be, the United States is maxed out on risk. Therefore, Israel’s interests and that of the United States diverge. Israel sees an opportunity; the United States sees more risk.
The problem Israel has is that, in the long run, its relationship to the United States is its insurance policy. Netanyahu appears to be calculating that given the U.S. need for a western balance of power, whatever Israel does now will be allowed because in the end the United States needs Israel to maintain that balance of power. Therefore, he is probing aggressively. Netanyahu also has domestic political reasons for proceeding with this construction. For him, this construction is a prudent and necessary step.
Obama’s task is to convince Netanyahu that Israel has strategic value for the United States, but only in the context of broader U.S. interests in the region. If Israel becomes part of the American problem rather than the solution, the United States will seek other solutions. That is a hard case to make but not an impossible one. The balance of power is in the eastern Mediterranean, and there is another democracy the United States could turn to: Turkey — which is more than eager to fulfill that role and exploit Israeli tensions with the United States.
It may not be the most persuasive threat, but the fact is that Israel cannot afford any threat from the United States, such as an end to the intense U.S.-Israeli bilateral relationship. While this relationship might not be essential to Israel at the moment, it is one of the foundations of Israeli grand strategy in the long run. Just as the United States cannot afford any more instability in the region at the moment, so Israel cannot afford any threat, however remote, to its relationship with the United States.
A More Complicated Relationship
What is clear in all this is that the statement that Israel and the United States are strategic partners is not untrue, it is just vastly more complicated than it appears. Similarly, the claim that American support for Israel fuels anti-Americans is both a true and insufficient statement.
Netanyahu is betting on Congress and political pressures to restrain U.S. responses to Israel. One of the arguments of geopolitics is that political advantage is insufficient in the face of geopolitical necessity. Pressure on Congress from Israel in order to build houses in Jerusalem while the United States is dealing with crises in the region could easily backfire.
The fact is that while the argument that U.S. Israel policy caused anti-Americanism in the region may not be altogether true, the United States does not need any further challenges or stresses. Nations overwhelmed by challenges can behave in unpredictable ways. Netanyahu’s decision to confront the United States at this time on this issue creates an unpredictability that would seem excessive to Israel’s long term interests. Expecting the American political process to protect Israel from the consequences is not necessarily gauging the American mood at the moment.
The national interest of both countries is to maximize their freedom to maneuver. The Israelis have a temporary advantage because of American interests elsewhere in the region. But that creates a long-term threat. With two wars going on and two regional balances in shambles or tottering, the United States does not need a new crisis in the third. Israel has an interest in housing in East Jerusalem. The United States does not. This frames the conversation between Netanyahu and Obama. The rest is rhetoric.
Saturday 20 March 2010
Koirala's death robs Nepali politics of its centre
Koirala's death robs Nepali politics of its centre
Prashant Jha
Girija Prasad Koirala's death on Saturday afternoon marks the end of an era in not only Nepali but also sub-continental politics. As a warrior for democracy over six decades, a five-time Prime Minister and architect of the ongoing peace process with the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Koirala was an integral part of Nepal's modern political history. But he has passed away at a time when the task of institutionalising the democracy he fought for remains incomplete.
G.P. Koirala, or GPK, was born in Bihar in 1925, where his father, Krishna Prasad Koirala, was in exile for defying the autocratic clan-based Rana regime. His father believed that Nepal could not be free of despotic Rana rule as long as their patrons, the British, ruled India. G.P. Koirala's elder brother, B.P. Koirala (also known as BP), was imprisoned in the Quit India Movement. In early 1947, Nepali exiles in India and Kathmandu-based dissenters formed the Nepali National Congress.
G.P. Koirala joined politics in this broader setting. In March 1947, he led Nepal's first workers strike at Biratnagar Jute Mills. Though firmly opposed to the use of violence, he accepted the party's decision to launch an insurrection against the Ranas in 1950. He served as the political commissar on the far-eastern front in the country's first democratic revolution.
But the tenuous democracy did not last. B.P. Koirala was sworn in as Nepal's first democratically elected Prime Minister in 1959 but King Mahendra engineered a royal coup soon after. Both BP and GPK were arrested and spent seven years in prison. They subsequently went back to live in exile in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and struggle for democracy from there.
In the early 1970s, the party decided to use violence against the autocratic regime. Under G.P. Koirala's leadership, NC hijacked a Nepali state-owned aircraft which was ferrying cash. Koirala also printed fake Indian currency, and procured weapons. But this phase did not last long. After emergency was declared in India in 1975, the Koiralas returned to Nepal and continued their movement in a non-violent manner.
Long seen as BP's ‘havaldar', Girija Koirala finally came into his own after his brother's death in the early 1980s. Along with Ganesh Man Singh and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, he became a part of the troika that constituted the Nepali Congress leadership. As general secretary, he tirelessly expanded the party organisation. Koirala accepted Ganesh Man's lead in forging an alliance with left groups against autocracy. With mass people's participation, and support of Indian politicians like Chandra Shekhar, democracy was restored in 1990. A new constitution was drafted instituting constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy.
The Nepali Congress won a majority in the 1991 elections. But senior leader and interim Prime Minister Bhattarai lost his seat. Koirala was the next natural candidate to lead the government. From fighting against the state, Koirala was now in charge of governance.
As Prime Minister, Koirala is credited with creating a democratic environment which enabled media and civil society to take roots. He opened up the economy, and expanded services outside Kathmandu. But he did little to ensure independence of public institutions and dumped the party's socialist commitment for a neo-liberal trajectory. He was blind to the nascent, but growing, assertion of marginalised ethnic communities. Koirala practised ‘coterie' politics; relatives and associates indulged in large-scale corruption; and he marginalised senior party leaders. He finally had to resign after an intra-party rebellion three years into his tenure.
This failure to institute democratic norms and political instability would cost Nepal dearly. The Maoist insurgency had picked up. Royalist forces became active. Koirala took over as Prime Minister twice again in 1998 and 2000. His stewardship of the country after the royal massacre in 2001, and willingness to stand up to the Royal Nepal Army's allegiance to the palace instead of the democratic government deserve appreciation. But his working style remained authoritarian and he paid little attention to key governance and policy issues.
The weaknesses and infighting of the democratic forces and growing Maoist violence allowed the new and ambitious monarch, Gyanendra, to assume an active role. He dismissed a democratic government in 2002 and appointed hand-picked nominees. To his credit, Koirala saw it as a ‘regressive' step and firmly opposed it. When Gyanendra assumed executive power through a coup in 2005, Koirala's instincts were proven right.
GPK was now back to doing what he knew best — fighting for democracy. Since 2002, he had also been talking to the Maoist chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda', to convince him to give up violence and concentrate on democratic politics. The royal regime created a context for the parliamentary parties to join hands with the Maoists. With Indian help, they signed the 12-point agreement in Delhi in November 2005. Older parties agreed to dump the monarchy and support the formation of a Constituent Assembly while the Maoists committed themselves to multiparty democracy.
This paved the way for the April 2006 People's Movement. The king was forced to concede that sovereignty rested with the people, and Girija Koirala became the Prime Minister one more time. This was truly Koirala's defining moment. All his sins of the 1990s seemed to be forgiven for his bold leadership in restoring peace and democracy in Nepal. He had stood firm against the right wing dictatorship, and had also helped a violent, ultra-left group accept the necessity of democracy. In November 2006, Koirala signed the peace agreement with Prachanda formally announcing the end of the civil war.
Though the Maoists unexpectedly won the Constituent Assembly elections, GPK expected to become Nepal's first president for his role in ensuring a smooth transition to a republic. But the Maoists did not support him, triggering a rupture that would later widen. His decision to foist his unpopular daughter, Sujata, as the NC's leader in the present government in 2009 eroded his credibility significantly. His party today is facing a deep existential and leadership crisis.
More crucially, the Maoist-non Maoist polarisation has increased. The peace process (which involves integrating and rehabilitating former Maoist combatants and addressing conflict crimes and justice) and constitution writing (for which the deadline is May 28, 2010) are in limbo. Realising the gravity of the situation, Koirala had recently taken a lead in setting up a High Level Political Mechanism which included the Maoists, who are otherwise in opposition, to address these issues.
Girija Prasad Koirala has left at a time when his centrist politics would have been a moderating influence on all sides. Only he could stand up to the spoilers — the right wing within his party, Nepal Army hawks, Maoist dogmatists and even Indian security hawks. The greatest tribute to him, and his six-decade-long political life, would be for Nepal to institutionalise peace and write a democratic constitution.
source: The Hindu
Prashant Jha
Girija Prasad Koirala's death on Saturday afternoon marks the end of an era in not only Nepali but also sub-continental politics. As a warrior for democracy over six decades, a five-time Prime Minister and architect of the ongoing peace process with the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Koirala was an integral part of Nepal's modern political history. But he has passed away at a time when the task of institutionalising the democracy he fought for remains incomplete.
G.P. Koirala, or GPK, was born in Bihar in 1925, where his father, Krishna Prasad Koirala, was in exile for defying the autocratic clan-based Rana regime. His father believed that Nepal could not be free of despotic Rana rule as long as their patrons, the British, ruled India. G.P. Koirala's elder brother, B.P. Koirala (also known as BP), was imprisoned in the Quit India Movement. In early 1947, Nepali exiles in India and Kathmandu-based dissenters formed the Nepali National Congress.
G.P. Koirala joined politics in this broader setting. In March 1947, he led Nepal's first workers strike at Biratnagar Jute Mills. Though firmly opposed to the use of violence, he accepted the party's decision to launch an insurrection against the Ranas in 1950. He served as the political commissar on the far-eastern front in the country's first democratic revolution.
But the tenuous democracy did not last. B.P. Koirala was sworn in as Nepal's first democratically elected Prime Minister in 1959 but King Mahendra engineered a royal coup soon after. Both BP and GPK were arrested and spent seven years in prison. They subsequently went back to live in exile in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and struggle for democracy from there.
In the early 1970s, the party decided to use violence against the autocratic regime. Under G.P. Koirala's leadership, NC hijacked a Nepali state-owned aircraft which was ferrying cash. Koirala also printed fake Indian currency, and procured weapons. But this phase did not last long. After emergency was declared in India in 1975, the Koiralas returned to Nepal and continued their movement in a non-violent manner.
Long seen as BP's ‘havaldar', Girija Koirala finally came into his own after his brother's death in the early 1980s. Along with Ganesh Man Singh and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, he became a part of the troika that constituted the Nepali Congress leadership. As general secretary, he tirelessly expanded the party organisation. Koirala accepted Ganesh Man's lead in forging an alliance with left groups against autocracy. With mass people's participation, and support of Indian politicians like Chandra Shekhar, democracy was restored in 1990. A new constitution was drafted instituting constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy.
The Nepali Congress won a majority in the 1991 elections. But senior leader and interim Prime Minister Bhattarai lost his seat. Koirala was the next natural candidate to lead the government. From fighting against the state, Koirala was now in charge of governance.
As Prime Minister, Koirala is credited with creating a democratic environment which enabled media and civil society to take roots. He opened up the economy, and expanded services outside Kathmandu. But he did little to ensure independence of public institutions and dumped the party's socialist commitment for a neo-liberal trajectory. He was blind to the nascent, but growing, assertion of marginalised ethnic communities. Koirala practised ‘coterie' politics; relatives and associates indulged in large-scale corruption; and he marginalised senior party leaders. He finally had to resign after an intra-party rebellion three years into his tenure.
This failure to institute democratic norms and political instability would cost Nepal dearly. The Maoist insurgency had picked up. Royalist forces became active. Koirala took over as Prime Minister twice again in 1998 and 2000. His stewardship of the country after the royal massacre in 2001, and willingness to stand up to the Royal Nepal Army's allegiance to the palace instead of the democratic government deserve appreciation. But his working style remained authoritarian and he paid little attention to key governance and policy issues.
The weaknesses and infighting of the democratic forces and growing Maoist violence allowed the new and ambitious monarch, Gyanendra, to assume an active role. He dismissed a democratic government in 2002 and appointed hand-picked nominees. To his credit, Koirala saw it as a ‘regressive' step and firmly opposed it. When Gyanendra assumed executive power through a coup in 2005, Koirala's instincts were proven right.
GPK was now back to doing what he knew best — fighting for democracy. Since 2002, he had also been talking to the Maoist chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda', to convince him to give up violence and concentrate on democratic politics. The royal regime created a context for the parliamentary parties to join hands with the Maoists. With Indian help, they signed the 12-point agreement in Delhi in November 2005. Older parties agreed to dump the monarchy and support the formation of a Constituent Assembly while the Maoists committed themselves to multiparty democracy.
This paved the way for the April 2006 People's Movement. The king was forced to concede that sovereignty rested with the people, and Girija Koirala became the Prime Minister one more time. This was truly Koirala's defining moment. All his sins of the 1990s seemed to be forgiven for his bold leadership in restoring peace and democracy in Nepal. He had stood firm against the right wing dictatorship, and had also helped a violent, ultra-left group accept the necessity of democracy. In November 2006, Koirala signed the peace agreement with Prachanda formally announcing the end of the civil war.
Though the Maoists unexpectedly won the Constituent Assembly elections, GPK expected to become Nepal's first president for his role in ensuring a smooth transition to a republic. But the Maoists did not support him, triggering a rupture that would later widen. His decision to foist his unpopular daughter, Sujata, as the NC's leader in the present government in 2009 eroded his credibility significantly. His party today is facing a deep existential and leadership crisis.
More crucially, the Maoist-non Maoist polarisation has increased. The peace process (which involves integrating and rehabilitating former Maoist combatants and addressing conflict crimes and justice) and constitution writing (for which the deadline is May 28, 2010) are in limbo. Realising the gravity of the situation, Koirala had recently taken a lead in setting up a High Level Political Mechanism which included the Maoists, who are otherwise in opposition, to address these issues.
Girija Prasad Koirala has left at a time when his centrist politics would have been a moderating influence on all sides. Only he could stand up to the spoilers — the right wing within his party, Nepal Army hawks, Maoist dogmatists and even Indian security hawks. The greatest tribute to him, and his six-decade-long political life, would be for Nepal to institutionalise peace and write a democratic constitution.
source: The Hindu
Scheduled Tribes Regional Identity of All Darjeeling Hill Peoples
BY DARJ MAN
The entire feature of the interim arrangement addressed to the Home Minister, P.Chidambaram by Roshan Giri, General Secretary GJMM is based on the ethnological history of Darjeeling District and the draft proposal tabled on the Tripartite meeting on 18 March 2010 is the step in the right direction.
To refer the Darjeeling hill peoples back to Census 1931 status identifying the entire population 3,19,635 (Area 1164 sq.miles) were ‘All Tribes’ as compared to Census 1941 total population 3,76,369 out of which only 1,41,301 (37.54%) retained tribal status whereas 2,35,068 (62.46%) were seemingly delisted for simply the latter population having declared their mother tongue as Nepali (originating from Sanskrit an Indo Aryan language considered spoken by the majority ethnic Indian community and accordingly considered a language of India than ethnic Nepal). According to United Nations recognition of country wise ethnic languages it is interesting to recall it is Newari script and language that is recognized and not Nepali.
It therefore follows from the above contention of thinking that the delisting of 62.46% of the Darjeeling hill peoples tribal identity was withdrawn simply because of the fact that Nepali was mentioned as the mother tongue. Based on this assumption it is only proper and justified that the wrong done then requires to be undone in relisting the Darjeeling hill peoples back to the tribal status as of Census 1931. So the conception of declaring All the Gorkhas as Scheduled Tribes as a precondition mentioned in the interim arrangement is not only necessary but an injustice carried on past 79 years. This is a very important issue relevant and connected to state formations considering the fact the right to self determination, as understood by the provisions of the Constitution, if at all the Govt. of India Act 1935 is to be considered the benchmark for state formations, seems the indigenous national minorities (ST) only has the right to statehood.
This being the Constitutional provision for state formation, Darjeeling District and its entire inhabitants have been described as “Backward Tracts” (now meaning ST) since the Scheduled Districts Act 1874, Govt. of India Act 1919 and eventually the Backward Tract designation changed to mean ‘Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas’. The former is said to have contained more than 60% ST population whereas the latter a minimum of 25%, on basis of which the Govt. of India Act 1935 prevailed. The inhabitants of such designated areas were administered as if it was a British dominion under the Crown than British Indian provinces.
The delisting of the majority Darjeeling hill tribes to non-tribes was significant and damaging to the political history of the District in the sense, the withdrawal of a large tribal population from the tribal list to non-tribals diminished the “actual” ‘Excluded’ features of the hill tribes to a ‘Partially Excluded’ disadvantageous climb-down adversely affecting the contents of the indigenous national minorities thereby marginalizing the aspects of self determination, to mean state formation, to a veritable large degree.
Another important aspect which requires enquiry and investigation is the fact, that the all tribal status of Census 1931 was reduced marginally, though unjustifiably in Census 1941 only. However what requires to be examined is, at the time the Govt. of India Act 1935 implied by the Govt. of India Order 1936 came into force, the Darjeeling hill peoples were already effected by the change of status of a major population on basis of which, the status of Darjeeling District had already undergone a change from ‘Backward Tracts’ (All Tribes) to mean fully ‘Excluded’ relegated to ‘Partially Excluded’. This is another damaging feature adversely affecting the fundamental rights of Darjeeling hill peoples to imply the right to self determination in demanding a state post the promulgation of the Constitution in 1950.
Had the 1935 Act contained Darjeeling District as an Excluded Area, based on Census 1931 and not on Census 1941, but on the estimated, with a majority reduced tribal population in 1935, is itself an issue which requires to be explained by the concerned Census authority. The idea to imagine is, had Census 1931 was taken into consideration in formulating the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936, Darjeeling District would rightly have been an Excluded Area and not Partially Excluded as was designated in the aforesaid Act and Order which markedly infringed the right of the Darjeeling hill peoples to a constitutional disadvantage unjustifiably.
The overall effect of the perceived discrimination was that the constitutional status of Darjeeling District instead of being incorporated in the Fifth Schedule (Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes) was marginalized to the Sixth Schedule (restricted to Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram) on basis of which in 2005 the Bill on Gorkha Hill Council Darjeeling in West Bengal remains pending in the Rajya Sabha as amended by the Parliamentary Standing Committee in 2007.
The drawback of the Bill is the territorial contents of the area, containing only the three subdivisions of the District in which Siliguri subdivision has been fragmented to exclude areas of Darjeeling District (Siliguri Municipal Corporation under the Siliguri District Parishad [Mahakuma] with all development projects contained in Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Corporation). Darjeeling District if at all the constitution is to be effectively implemented, cannot be fragmented from its area content, because in effect, which the ordinary ethnic majority community of the state is unable to accept the fact constitutionally Darjeeling District as a territorial area has never been part of erstwhile Bengal nor West Bengal State.
Hence the charge the statehood demand of the Darjeeling hill peoples will bifurcate West Bengal does not hold any water. On the contrary West Bengal should be grateful to the Darjeeling hill people for having allowed exploitation of resources to the coffers of Bengal since Darjeeling District was formed in 1866 partly out of Sikkim and Bhutan.
source:
THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE]
BY DARJ MAN
The entire feature of the interim arrangement addressed to the Home Minister, P.Chidambaram by Roshan Giri, General Secretary GJMM is based on the ethnological history of Darjeeling District and the draft proposal tabled on the Tripartite meeting on 18 March 2010 is the step in the right direction.
To refer the Darjeeling hill peoples back to Census 1931 status identifying the entire population 3,19,635 (Area 1164 sq.miles) were ‘All Tribes’ as compared to Census 1941 total population 3,76,369 out of which only 1,41,301 (37.54%) retained tribal status whereas 2,35,068 (62.46%) were seemingly delisted for simply the latter population having declared their mother tongue as Nepali (originating from Sanskrit an Indo Aryan language considered spoken by the majority ethnic Indian community and accordingly considered a language of India than ethnic Nepal). According to United Nations recognition of country wise ethnic languages it is interesting to recall it is Newari script and language that is recognized and not Nepali.
It therefore follows from the above contention of thinking that the delisting of 62.46% of the Darjeeling hill peoples tribal identity was withdrawn simply because of the fact that Nepali was mentioned as the mother tongue. Based on this assumption it is only proper and justified that the wrong done then requires to be undone in relisting the Darjeeling hill peoples back to the tribal status as of Census 1931. So the conception of declaring All the Gorkhas as Scheduled Tribes as a precondition mentioned in the interim arrangement is not only necessary but an injustice carried on past 79 years. This is a very important issue relevant and connected to state formations considering the fact the right to self determination, as understood by the provisions of the Constitution, if at all the Govt. of India Act 1935 is to be considered the benchmark for state formations, seems the indigenous national minorities (ST) only has the right to statehood.
This being the Constitutional provision for state formation, Darjeeling District and its entire inhabitants have been described as “Backward Tracts” (now meaning ST) since the Scheduled Districts Act 1874, Govt. of India Act 1919 and eventually the Backward Tract designation changed to mean ‘Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas’. The former is said to have contained more than 60% ST population whereas the latter a minimum of 25%, on basis of which the Govt. of India Act 1935 prevailed. The inhabitants of such designated areas were administered as if it was a British dominion under the Crown than British Indian provinces.
The delisting of the majority Darjeeling hill tribes to non-tribes was significant and damaging to the political history of the District in the sense, the withdrawal of a large tribal population from the tribal list to non-tribals diminished the “actual” ‘Excluded’ features of the hill tribes to a ‘Partially Excluded’ disadvantageous climb-down adversely affecting the contents of the indigenous national minorities thereby marginalizing the aspects of self determination, to mean state formation, to a veritable large degree.
Another important aspect which requires enquiry and investigation is the fact, that the all tribal status of Census 1931 was reduced marginally, though unjustifiably in Census 1941 only. However what requires to be examined is, at the time the Govt. of India Act 1935 implied by the Govt. of India Order 1936 came into force, the Darjeeling hill peoples were already effected by the change of status of a major population on basis of which, the status of Darjeeling District had already undergone a change from ‘Backward Tracts’ (All Tribes) to mean fully ‘Excluded’ relegated to ‘Partially Excluded’. This is another damaging feature adversely affecting the fundamental rights of Darjeeling hill peoples to imply the right to self determination in demanding a state post the promulgation of the Constitution in 1950.
Had the 1935 Act contained Darjeeling District as an Excluded Area, based on Census 1931 and not on Census 1941, but on the estimated, with a majority reduced tribal population in 1935, is itself an issue which requires to be explained by the concerned Census authority. The idea to imagine is, had Census 1931 was taken into consideration in formulating the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936, Darjeeling District would rightly have been an Excluded Area and not Partially Excluded as was designated in the aforesaid Act and Order which markedly infringed the right of the Darjeeling hill peoples to a constitutional disadvantage unjustifiably.
The overall effect of the perceived discrimination was that the constitutional status of Darjeeling District instead of being incorporated in the Fifth Schedule (Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes) was marginalized to the Sixth Schedule (restricted to Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram) on basis of which in 2005 the Bill on Gorkha Hill Council Darjeeling in West Bengal remains pending in the Rajya Sabha as amended by the Parliamentary Standing Committee in 2007.
The drawback of the Bill is the territorial contents of the area, containing only the three subdivisions of the District in which Siliguri subdivision has been fragmented to exclude areas of Darjeeling District (Siliguri Municipal Corporation under the Siliguri District Parishad [Mahakuma] with all development projects contained in Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Corporation). Darjeeling District if at all the constitution is to be effectively implemented, cannot be fragmented from its area content, because in effect, which the ordinary ethnic majority community of the state is unable to accept the fact constitutionally Darjeeling District as a territorial area has never been part of erstwhile Bengal nor West Bengal State.
Hence the charge the statehood demand of the Darjeeling hill peoples will bifurcate West Bengal does not hold any water. On the contrary West Bengal should be grateful to the Darjeeling hill people for having allowed exploitation of resources to the coffers of Bengal since Darjeeling District was formed in 1866 partly out of Sikkim and Bhutan.
source:
THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE]
Wednesday 17 March 2010
GJM ‘ST’ proposal rings alarm bells – Tribal Status only for ‘Economic Benefits’ for ‘all communities’ in the region – Dr Harka Bahadur Chettri
March 17, 2010 — himalgroup
BY ROMIT BAGCHI
The Statesman
SILIGURI, 16 MARCH: Alarmed over the GJMM proposal for a blanket conversion of the Gorkha community into the Scheduled Tribe status to avail of the expected Interim Council largesse, the non-Gorkha ethnic population in the Darjeeling hills, which includes the Bengalis and the Biharis among others, has started doubting the GJM leadership’s concern for them.
“Associated with the Darjeeling hills in weal and woe for generations, we are appealing to them to keep our interests in view while taking up the hill cause with the Centre and the state government at the 18 March tripartite dialogue,” they said.
According to Mr Subhamay Chatterjee, a fourth generation resident in Darjeeling and himself associated with the GJM movement since its inception, the party proposal, almost echoing the Subash Ghisingh rhetoric was a shock. “We have nothing to say about the demand to incorporate the Gorkha community in the Scheduled Tribe status. But what about us, the non-Gorkha ethnic population inhabiting the hills for generations? We expected at least a mention about us in the draft document sent to the Centre for consideration. Though there is a minority cell proposal in the communiqué sent by the Centre to the GJM we wonder if it alludes to the religious or the ethnic minorities. We appeal to the hill leadership not to give a short shrift to our interests while pursuing the Gorkha community cause at the 18 March three-way dialogue,” he said.
Echoing, another Darjeeling resident, Dr Pratapaditya Guha said that the GJM leadership seemed least bothered about the well being of the non-Gorkha ethnic population in the hills. “Being minority we have right to be safeguarded in the fast moving political trajectory in the hills. We hope that the GJM leadership would not show the same hauteur Mr Subash Ghisingh displayed towards us,” he said.
Expressing the same anguish, another resident Mr Nitin Prasad said that the non-Gorkha population had grown apprehensive of its ethnic security in the emerging scenario. “We are part and parcel of the Darjeeling tapestry and we are proud of its inclusive legacy. We deserve a modicum of understanding from those spearheading the statehood struggle,” he said.
Recounting a recent experience, a resident Ms Rina Dey, said that the primary school council authority had rejected her application for a teaching job because of her ethnic status. (A condition imposed by the West Bengal or Gorkha Government ?!!)
“The posts are reserved for the Nepali-speaking (Gorkha only ?!!) applicants. Is this instance a portent for what is awaiting us in post Interim Darjeeling?” she asked.
Allaying the fear, the GJM media secretary, Dr Harka Bahadur Chhetri said that the non-Gorkha minorities should also embrace the tribal status to avail of the facilities the party was striving to secure for the hills.
“We must understand that the tribal status has only economic implication. Embracing it does not rob one of cultural identity. We have proposed it only for fast economic uplift of the long neglected region. Nobody should read more into it,” Dr Chhetri said.
March 17, 2010 — himalgroup
BY ROMIT BAGCHI
The Statesman
SILIGURI, 16 MARCH: Alarmed over the GJMM proposal for a blanket conversion of the Gorkha community into the Scheduled Tribe status to avail of the expected Interim Council largesse, the non-Gorkha ethnic population in the Darjeeling hills, which includes the Bengalis and the Biharis among others, has started doubting the GJM leadership’s concern for them.
“Associated with the Darjeeling hills in weal and woe for generations, we are appealing to them to keep our interests in view while taking up the hill cause with the Centre and the state government at the 18 March tripartite dialogue,” they said.
According to Mr Subhamay Chatterjee, a fourth generation resident in Darjeeling and himself associated with the GJM movement since its inception, the party proposal, almost echoing the Subash Ghisingh rhetoric was a shock. “We have nothing to say about the demand to incorporate the Gorkha community in the Scheduled Tribe status. But what about us, the non-Gorkha ethnic population inhabiting the hills for generations? We expected at least a mention about us in the draft document sent to the Centre for consideration. Though there is a minority cell proposal in the communiqué sent by the Centre to the GJM we wonder if it alludes to the religious or the ethnic minorities. We appeal to the hill leadership not to give a short shrift to our interests while pursuing the Gorkha community cause at the 18 March three-way dialogue,” he said.
Echoing, another Darjeeling resident, Dr Pratapaditya Guha said that the GJM leadership seemed least bothered about the well being of the non-Gorkha ethnic population in the hills. “Being minority we have right to be safeguarded in the fast moving political trajectory in the hills. We hope that the GJM leadership would not show the same hauteur Mr Subash Ghisingh displayed towards us,” he said.
Expressing the same anguish, another resident Mr Nitin Prasad said that the non-Gorkha population had grown apprehensive of its ethnic security in the emerging scenario. “We are part and parcel of the Darjeeling tapestry and we are proud of its inclusive legacy. We deserve a modicum of understanding from those spearheading the statehood struggle,” he said.
Recounting a recent experience, a resident Ms Rina Dey, said that the primary school council authority had rejected her application for a teaching job because of her ethnic status. (A condition imposed by the West Bengal or Gorkha Government ?!!)
“The posts are reserved for the Nepali-speaking (Gorkha only ?!!) applicants. Is this instance a portent for what is awaiting us in post Interim Darjeeling?” she asked.
Allaying the fear, the GJM media secretary, Dr Harka Bahadur Chhetri said that the non-Gorkha minorities should also embrace the tribal status to avail of the facilities the party was striving to secure for the hills.
“We must understand that the tribal status has only economic implication. Embracing it does not rob one of cultural identity. We have proposed it only for fast economic uplift of the long neglected region. Nobody should read more into it,” Dr Chhetri said.
Tuesday 16 March 2010
India and its troublesome neighbours
by M. K. Bhadrakumar
Asking the right questions can be terribly important in most circumstances. Especially in the dry pitiless world of international politics littered with bleached bones, of angled skylights and twisting branches.
One of India's leading corporate newspapers reported that China has “opened another anti-India front — this time in Nepal … Besides acquiring major construction projects in Nepal, the Chinese are also opening language centres in Nepali cities … [the] underlying objective appears to be to unleash anti-India propaganda in that country.”
Past pattern shows that the report may well turn out to be the stuff for India's “China-watchers” to fill up their future columns.
A think-tanker or two may also wet his toes. In these salubrious autumn days in Delhi, a seminar may even be trumped up over high tea to discuss upcoming Chinese language centres in Nepal. However, questions must be asked. How is it that Chinese construction companies' remarkable success in winning projects in Nepal becomes an “anti-India” activity? Doesn't Nepal have a right to award contracts to Chinese companies — just as the Saudis, Iranians, Nigerians or Chileans are increasingly doing? Looking beyond, other questions arise including some troubling ones.
Why should China teach the Nepalese their ancient language if the intention is to disseminate invidious propaganda? Chinese, after all, is one of the most difficult languages to master. The Chinese are a practical people and it seems logical that Beijing's purpose will be is served quickly and most efficiently if its anti-India propaganda is dished out in Nepalese language. Virginia Woolf compared translations to a mangled train after the accident.
What is worrisome is why so many Hindi-knowing Nepalese would want to learn Chinese. Yes, the really troubling question ought to be why India's neighbours neighbouring countries are getting so manifestly attracted to fostering close ties with China.
It is up to us to find a logical answer, which of course is possible only in a full and free spirit of stocktaking. stock-taking. Clearly, for posing such difficult questions, a pre-requisite is that we must be a self-confident people. Equally, intellectual forays get delimited when there is a growing “militarisation” of the mind.
Lastly, for asking the correct questions, we must have a mind where, as Rabindranath Tagore famously taught us a long time ago, “the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into the dreary desert of dead habit.”
Alas, our China-watching has become pedestrian and cliché-ridden. We will pay a price for this since China is a very serious power and it is rapidly transforming. Even assuming that that adversarial instincts in inter-state relations could remain immutable, there is a strong case to be made in favour of applying reason while making judgment. What else could we have expected Beijing to do other than what it did when we posed a development project in Arunachal Pradesh to the Asian Development Bank for funding?
To frame the question differentially, why is every Indian ambassador expected to take up with maniacal zeal all instances of “cartographic aggression” — display of Indian boundaries other than ditto what India claims? The point is, under international law, precedents could constitute a needless vector. Which is why sometimes a country, rightly or wrongly, may feel compelled to act precisely against precedent-setting joyful mountaineering expeditions and proceed to create a fait accompli — as India probably did in Siachen in 1984. The ADB is a major international institution and Beijing acted in its best interests. There is enough professionalism in South Block to have anticipated the high probability bordering on the certainty that Beijing would act precisely in the fashion it did.
The question is, why then did North Block press its proposal to the ADB since, as it now transpires, India does have the capacity to mobilise “domestic” funds for the undertaking of development projects in its sensitive border regions? In retrospect, did South Block know at all what North Block was doing when the latter approached the ADB? Did the Department of Economic Affairs seek MEA's political clearance? These questions are extremely relevant since often enough the our right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing — including on highly sensitive issues involving relations with Pakistan or China — given the exasperating vanity fair going on all the time between the czars on Raisina Hill.
Indeed, our narrative on China gets muddied when we dwell on its dealings with India's neighbours. Our discourses are demanding the impossible — that if China develops friendly relations with its South Asian neighbours, it will be deemed as a hostile act. No doubt, India has a right to safeguard its interests against Chinese policies that are patently directed against its interests. Surely, India has the prerogative to build up its military sinews. the sinews of its military strength. But then, we should also have the intellectual clarity to frame our responses to the situations surrounding us. Whereas, what is often enough seen is the propensity to take shelter under a dubious thesis that was first propounded by a minor Pentagon analyst in her late 20s — who since moved on, unsurprisingly, to the Rand Corporation — known as the “string of pearls.”
The advocates of the thesis have vociferously portrayed the Chinese activities in the South Asian region as unalloyed acts of hostility directed against India with the grand design of creating an arc around India's neck that would stifle our performance as a regional power. A colossal amount of damage has been done by the Indian acolytes of the “string of pearls” thesis. Some dispassionate analysis will be is in order. Take the three big pearls for a good, close look — Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.
The recent developments in Myanmar show that not only have the Indian “experts” been completely off the mark in assuming that Yangon was about to become a Chinese pearl, China may actually be caught in a tangled web. Not only does Beijing lack the stranglehold over Myanmar, as our experts blithely believed, but the issue is more about how Beijing could easily extricate itself from supporting the isolated regime in Yangon. We are seeing a curious spectacle of Yangon taking full advantage of Beijing's predicament.
To cull out an expression from an American scholar, “Pulled from many directions, China's task resembles balancing a stool missing a leg.” Again, too many people in our strategic community seem not to care that Sri Lanka first offered the Hambantota port for development to India. New Delhi thumbed its nose at it, disdainfully showed its thumb up, whereupon Colombo turned to Beijing for help. We seemed to have forgotten that Sri Lanka was a sovereign country and wanted to exploit its unique factors to its advantage for economic development. We are no one to dictate whether it needs such modern facilities at Hambantota or has any right to make the port an important transportation hub in the Indian Ocean.
At any rate, we have nothing to fear about Sri Lanka becoming a pearl in a Chinese string, as there are very few people on this planet who treasure their autonomy of thinking and action as the Sinhalese do — and to boot, it, they are first-rate practitioners of the art of diplomacy. Again, reams and reams of paper have been wasted on the Chinese “presence” in Gwadar. But what is coolly overlooked is that China of its own volition turned down the Pakistani offer to run the Gwadar port after its development with considerable Chinese aid.
Arguably, China would benefit by out of a direct access to the Persian Gulf but it factored in that a managerial role in Gwadar was superfluous for achieving the purpose. Nor does China harbour rancour that Pakistan decided that Gwadar is best managed by a Singaporean firm with American links. (Curiously, Gwadar has become an American pearl — just as Myanmar too might, too, if the determined American diplomacy toward Yangon makes headway.) China-Pakistan relationship has literally become a no-go area for rational analysis in our country. Myths are galore, pride mixes with prejudice and self-righteousness. Take Chinese “military assistance” to Pakistan. Does China possess the technology, which the U.S. is systematically passing on to Pakistan? Izvestiya reported that during the visit by Defence Minister A.K. Antony to Moscow recently, the two sides discussed the development of a new supersonic missile “invincible to interception,” which “no army in the world possesses.” Has China, which faces a worldwide embargo, got any competing military technology to pass on to Pakistan? Also, let us not completely overlook that China is coping to balance its “all-weather friendship” when the U.S. is systematically tightening its vice-like AfPak grip.
In sum, we need to analyse why our neighbourhood diplomacy is faltering. Ask Bahadur why Maithili isn't good enough for him. The Myanmar regime offered a level-playing field for India. An Indian company could have undertaken Hambantota port development. The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project offered a rare enterprise for making Islamabad a stakeholder in good-neighbourly relations.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
by M. K. Bhadrakumar
Asking the right questions can be terribly important in most circumstances. Especially in the dry pitiless world of international politics littered with bleached bones, of angled skylights and twisting branches.
One of India's leading corporate newspapers reported that China has “opened another anti-India front — this time in Nepal … Besides acquiring major construction projects in Nepal, the Chinese are also opening language centres in Nepali cities … [the] underlying objective appears to be to unleash anti-India propaganda in that country.”
Past pattern shows that the report may well turn out to be the stuff for India's “China-watchers” to fill up their future columns.
A think-tanker or two may also wet his toes. In these salubrious autumn days in Delhi, a seminar may even be trumped up over high tea to discuss upcoming Chinese language centres in Nepal. However, questions must be asked. How is it that Chinese construction companies' remarkable success in winning projects in Nepal becomes an “anti-India” activity? Doesn't Nepal have a right to award contracts to Chinese companies — just as the Saudis, Iranians, Nigerians or Chileans are increasingly doing? Looking beyond, other questions arise including some troubling ones.
Why should China teach the Nepalese their ancient language if the intention is to disseminate invidious propaganda? Chinese, after all, is one of the most difficult languages to master. The Chinese are a practical people and it seems logical that Beijing's purpose will be is served quickly and most efficiently if its anti-India propaganda is dished out in Nepalese language. Virginia Woolf compared translations to a mangled train after the accident.
What is worrisome is why so many Hindi-knowing Nepalese would want to learn Chinese. Yes, the really troubling question ought to be why India's neighbours neighbouring countries are getting so manifestly attracted to fostering close ties with China.
It is up to us to find a logical answer, which of course is possible only in a full and free spirit of stocktaking. stock-taking. Clearly, for posing such difficult questions, a pre-requisite is that we must be a self-confident people. Equally, intellectual forays get delimited when there is a growing “militarisation” of the mind.
Lastly, for asking the correct questions, we must have a mind where, as Rabindranath Tagore famously taught us a long time ago, “the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into the dreary desert of dead habit.”
Alas, our China-watching has become pedestrian and cliché-ridden. We will pay a price for this since China is a very serious power and it is rapidly transforming. Even assuming that that adversarial instincts in inter-state relations could remain immutable, there is a strong case to be made in favour of applying reason while making judgment. What else could we have expected Beijing to do other than what it did when we posed a development project in Arunachal Pradesh to the Asian Development Bank for funding?
To frame the question differentially, why is every Indian ambassador expected to take up with maniacal zeal all instances of “cartographic aggression” — display of Indian boundaries other than ditto what India claims? The point is, under international law, precedents could constitute a needless vector. Which is why sometimes a country, rightly or wrongly, may feel compelled to act precisely against precedent-setting joyful mountaineering expeditions and proceed to create a fait accompli — as India probably did in Siachen in 1984. The ADB is a major international institution and Beijing acted in its best interests. There is enough professionalism in South Block to have anticipated the high probability bordering on the certainty that Beijing would act precisely in the fashion it did.
The question is, why then did North Block press its proposal to the ADB since, as it now transpires, India does have the capacity to mobilise “domestic” funds for the undertaking of development projects in its sensitive border regions? In retrospect, did South Block know at all what North Block was doing when the latter approached the ADB? Did the Department of Economic Affairs seek MEA's political clearance? These questions are extremely relevant since often enough the our right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing — including on highly sensitive issues involving relations with Pakistan or China — given the exasperating vanity fair going on all the time between the czars on Raisina Hill.
Indeed, our narrative on China gets muddied when we dwell on its dealings with India's neighbours. Our discourses are demanding the impossible — that if China develops friendly relations with its South Asian neighbours, it will be deemed as a hostile act. No doubt, India has a right to safeguard its interests against Chinese policies that are patently directed against its interests. Surely, India has the prerogative to build up its military sinews. the sinews of its military strength. But then, we should also have the intellectual clarity to frame our responses to the situations surrounding us. Whereas, what is often enough seen is the propensity to take shelter under a dubious thesis that was first propounded by a minor Pentagon analyst in her late 20s — who since moved on, unsurprisingly, to the Rand Corporation — known as the “string of pearls.”
The advocates of the thesis have vociferously portrayed the Chinese activities in the South Asian region as unalloyed acts of hostility directed against India with the grand design of creating an arc around India's neck that would stifle our performance as a regional power. A colossal amount of damage has been done by the Indian acolytes of the “string of pearls” thesis. Some dispassionate analysis will be is in order. Take the three big pearls for a good, close look — Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.
The recent developments in Myanmar show that not only have the Indian “experts” been completely off the mark in assuming that Yangon was about to become a Chinese pearl, China may actually be caught in a tangled web. Not only does Beijing lack the stranglehold over Myanmar, as our experts blithely believed, but the issue is more about how Beijing could easily extricate itself from supporting the isolated regime in Yangon. We are seeing a curious spectacle of Yangon taking full advantage of Beijing's predicament.
To cull out an expression from an American scholar, “Pulled from many directions, China's task resembles balancing a stool missing a leg.” Again, too many people in our strategic community seem not to care that Sri Lanka first offered the Hambantota port for development to India. New Delhi thumbed its nose at it, disdainfully showed its thumb up, whereupon Colombo turned to Beijing for help. We seemed to have forgotten that Sri Lanka was a sovereign country and wanted to exploit its unique factors to its advantage for economic development. We are no one to dictate whether it needs such modern facilities at Hambantota or has any right to make the port an important transportation hub in the Indian Ocean.
At any rate, we have nothing to fear about Sri Lanka becoming a pearl in a Chinese string, as there are very few people on this planet who treasure their autonomy of thinking and action as the Sinhalese do — and to boot, it, they are first-rate practitioners of the art of diplomacy. Again, reams and reams of paper have been wasted on the Chinese “presence” in Gwadar. But what is coolly overlooked is that China of its own volition turned down the Pakistani offer to run the Gwadar port after its development with considerable Chinese aid.
Arguably, China would benefit by out of a direct access to the Persian Gulf but it factored in that a managerial role in Gwadar was superfluous for achieving the purpose. Nor does China harbour rancour that Pakistan decided that Gwadar is best managed by a Singaporean firm with American links. (Curiously, Gwadar has become an American pearl — just as Myanmar too might, too, if the determined American diplomacy toward Yangon makes headway.) China-Pakistan relationship has literally become a no-go area for rational analysis in our country. Myths are galore, pride mixes with prejudice and self-righteousness. Take Chinese “military assistance” to Pakistan. Does China possess the technology, which the U.S. is systematically passing on to Pakistan? Izvestiya reported that during the visit by Defence Minister A.K. Antony to Moscow recently, the two sides discussed the development of a new supersonic missile “invincible to interception,” which “no army in the world possesses.” Has China, which faces a worldwide embargo, got any competing military technology to pass on to Pakistan? Also, let us not completely overlook that China is coping to balance its “all-weather friendship” when the U.S. is systematically tightening its vice-like AfPak grip.
In sum, we need to analyse why our neighbourhood diplomacy is faltering. Ask Bahadur why Maithili isn't good enough for him. The Myanmar regime offered a level-playing field for India. An Indian company could have undertaken Hambantota port development. The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project offered a rare enterprise for making Islamabad a stakeholder in good-neighbourly relations.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
Sunday 14 March 2010
OPINION: A question of assimilation
It cannot be gainsaid that the role of the Bengalis has much to answer for as far as the persistent demand for separation from West Bengal being raised in the hilly terrain is concerned. But perhaps it cannot explain the whole separatism syndrome reigning in the hills, writes Romit Bagchi
INDIA boasts of a hoary legacy of assimilation. History bears witness to the fact that innumerable ethnic communities and tribes came from all corners of the world, settled and were integrated into the national mainstream in course of time. No one was rejected and the flexibility of what was known as “Varna Dharma”, which later degenerated into the rigid caste system, is supposed to have played a crucial role in the process of assimilation.
And this has been possible because of the spiritual ethos embedded deep in the body of India’s thinking. Since time immemorial, this country has been preaching the unity of humankind in spirit — the spiritual essence being the deepest core of all that exists. Diversity on the surface, whatever its kind, is nothing but a veneer for the essential unity in the One, which only exists. The Varna system, which was, in its original form, an immensely flexible instrument, helped all to get not just a place but a rightful position in the socio-political hierarchy according to the collective propensity of each community and tribe.
And this assimilation is no insignificant achievement, keeping in view the tumultuous upheavals that the incursions often brought about in their wake in India’s socio-political landscape. Now it is said, and probably with some truth, that the spirit of assimilation keeps waning and India as a whole has slipped into a rut of bigotry. The wide expanse of the mental horizon, once deemed to be the quintessence of Indian originality, no longer holds its pre-eminence in the country’s general mode of reflection.
This charge has been levelled particularly against Bengalis in regard to the non- assimilation of the Gorkha community based in the Darjeeling hills into the socio-cultural mainstream. The typical Bengali snobbery is being put down as the principal impediment to the natural process of assimilation.
It is said that the Bengalis, being the ruling race, have not taken sufficient pains to bridge the gaping chasm between themselves and their under-developed Gorkha brethren. Separatism in the mental landscape of the marginalised community would not have taken such an inveterate turn had the Bengalis displayed even a modicum of tolerance and warmth, it is believed.
It cannot be gainsaid that the role of the Bengalis has much to answer for as far as the persistent demand for separation from West Bengal being raised in the hilly terrain is concerned. But perhaps it cannot explain the whole separatism syndrome reigning in the hills.
English authors W Brook Northey and CJ Morris, in their famous book, The Gurkhas, while dwelling on the incompatibility of Gorkhas in general to the typical Indian temperament, said, “The Gurkha differs from the people of India as much in appearance as he does in character. His Mongolian origin is responsible for a vein of humour and bonhomie that is not found in the more solemn and austere races of Aryan descent. Coming from a strange country, which though bordering on India, is so far removed from it in matters of language, customs and even thought that the young Gurkha, naturally, feels himself to be a stranger in a strange land when first he sets foot in India. His ignorance of the language, which, though naturally lessening in course of time, serves to accentuate his awkwardness and seeming inability to understand what is required of him, occasionally gives people who are unfamiliar with him and his ways the impression that he is inclined to be somewhat surly and aloof. Many years’ service even often seems to fail to create any desire in the Gurkha to interest himself in people, European or otherwise, with whom he is not directly concerned, or who are unable to speak or understand his language. Once his confidence is gained, however, he reveals, little by little, his true character and proves himself a staunch and faithful friend.”
This peculiar characteristic that caught the discerning eyes of the European researchers seems to hold still, though the development of mind and its resultant individualism in the community, whether in Nepal or in other parts where they are concentrated, seems to transform their attitudinal perceptions on life as a whole.
It should be remembered that Nepal happened to be a land-locked country, apparently shut off from the world for a long time in its history. It is said that there was a time when the people chanced to get acquainted with the world beyond their own land only through the yarns spun by those members of the government who trudged once every five years to Peking to offer tribute to the Chinese government as per the terms of a treaty completed between China and Nepal in 1793.
This apart, the farthest point in other directions which the affluent and hardy in the community reached was Benares, the most eminent among the places of pilgrimage for the Hindus across the region.
The situation somehow changed with the ascendancy of Jung Bahadur Rana, doubtless the most remarkable ruler in the political arena of the nation, in 1845. Overruling the long held prejudices against the outside world, he voyaged to England in 1850. This was indeed an epoch-making event, which later played a momentous role in bringing Nepal nearer to British India. Another descendent to the line, Sir Chandra Shamsher Bahadur Rana, a remarkable ruler again, by all accounts, carried things further, bringing about sweeping reforms in a nation that had remained veiled into an age-old gloom of ignorance and prejudice regarding the march of civilisation in several parts of the world. He too visited England and strove thereafter to remodel the socio-political structure of his country on the lines of the occidental ethos.
This being the situation, it is natural that the process of the development of mind and its resultant individualism has taken a long time in assuming concrete shape among a people completely shut out, as they were for a considerably long time, from the momentum of subjective transformation in consequence of the advent of occidental civilisation.
It might be said again that the political uncertainty haunting the Himalayan nation for some time, resulting in the ouster of the century-long system of monarchial despotism and the consequent experiments with myriad political views, signals the advent of the age of reason and individualism with its concomitant challenge to all those canons associated with the era of the symbolic conventions which held Nepal enthralled for ages.
And reverting back to the Gorkhaland tangle, one might say that the homeland movement in the Darjeeling hills has a far deeper connotation that gets swamped in the shrill cry for identity and development. Perhaps the deeper yearning is for assimilation in the Indian mainstream through collective assertiveness. The “homeland” cry might be a manifestation of the subjective urge among a growing number of individuals to step out of the rut of separatism and to carve a role for themselves in the national domain.
Nepalese settlers in India have been assimilated on the physical plane as far as possible in the course of time. But they are aware that they are far from being integrated mentally in the country they have accepted as their native land. And the Gorkhaland movement, when shorn of its xenophobic baggage, manifested in self-determined stridency, might reveal a deeper poignancy associated with the subjective craving for a rightful place in the national discourse.
( source:The Statesman)
It cannot be gainsaid that the role of the Bengalis has much to answer for as far as the persistent demand for separation from West Bengal being raised in the hilly terrain is concerned. But perhaps it cannot explain the whole separatism syndrome reigning in the hills, writes Romit Bagchi
INDIA boasts of a hoary legacy of assimilation. History bears witness to the fact that innumerable ethnic communities and tribes came from all corners of the world, settled and were integrated into the national mainstream in course of time. No one was rejected and the flexibility of what was known as “Varna Dharma”, which later degenerated into the rigid caste system, is supposed to have played a crucial role in the process of assimilation.
And this has been possible because of the spiritual ethos embedded deep in the body of India’s thinking. Since time immemorial, this country has been preaching the unity of humankind in spirit — the spiritual essence being the deepest core of all that exists. Diversity on the surface, whatever its kind, is nothing but a veneer for the essential unity in the One, which only exists. The Varna system, which was, in its original form, an immensely flexible instrument, helped all to get not just a place but a rightful position in the socio-political hierarchy according to the collective propensity of each community and tribe.
And this assimilation is no insignificant achievement, keeping in view the tumultuous upheavals that the incursions often brought about in their wake in India’s socio-political landscape. Now it is said, and probably with some truth, that the spirit of assimilation keeps waning and India as a whole has slipped into a rut of bigotry. The wide expanse of the mental horizon, once deemed to be the quintessence of Indian originality, no longer holds its pre-eminence in the country’s general mode of reflection.
This charge has been levelled particularly against Bengalis in regard to the non- assimilation of the Gorkha community based in the Darjeeling hills into the socio-cultural mainstream. The typical Bengali snobbery is being put down as the principal impediment to the natural process of assimilation.
It is said that the Bengalis, being the ruling race, have not taken sufficient pains to bridge the gaping chasm between themselves and their under-developed Gorkha brethren. Separatism in the mental landscape of the marginalised community would not have taken such an inveterate turn had the Bengalis displayed even a modicum of tolerance and warmth, it is believed.
It cannot be gainsaid that the role of the Bengalis has much to answer for as far as the persistent demand for separation from West Bengal being raised in the hilly terrain is concerned. But perhaps it cannot explain the whole separatism syndrome reigning in the hills.
English authors W Brook Northey and CJ Morris, in their famous book, The Gurkhas, while dwelling on the incompatibility of Gorkhas in general to the typical Indian temperament, said, “The Gurkha differs from the people of India as much in appearance as he does in character. His Mongolian origin is responsible for a vein of humour and bonhomie that is not found in the more solemn and austere races of Aryan descent. Coming from a strange country, which though bordering on India, is so far removed from it in matters of language, customs and even thought that the young Gurkha, naturally, feels himself to be a stranger in a strange land when first he sets foot in India. His ignorance of the language, which, though naturally lessening in course of time, serves to accentuate his awkwardness and seeming inability to understand what is required of him, occasionally gives people who are unfamiliar with him and his ways the impression that he is inclined to be somewhat surly and aloof. Many years’ service even often seems to fail to create any desire in the Gurkha to interest himself in people, European or otherwise, with whom he is not directly concerned, or who are unable to speak or understand his language. Once his confidence is gained, however, he reveals, little by little, his true character and proves himself a staunch and faithful friend.”
This peculiar characteristic that caught the discerning eyes of the European researchers seems to hold still, though the development of mind and its resultant individualism in the community, whether in Nepal or in other parts where they are concentrated, seems to transform their attitudinal perceptions on life as a whole.
It should be remembered that Nepal happened to be a land-locked country, apparently shut off from the world for a long time in its history. It is said that there was a time when the people chanced to get acquainted with the world beyond their own land only through the yarns spun by those members of the government who trudged once every five years to Peking to offer tribute to the Chinese government as per the terms of a treaty completed between China and Nepal in 1793.
This apart, the farthest point in other directions which the affluent and hardy in the community reached was Benares, the most eminent among the places of pilgrimage for the Hindus across the region.
The situation somehow changed with the ascendancy of Jung Bahadur Rana, doubtless the most remarkable ruler in the political arena of the nation, in 1845. Overruling the long held prejudices against the outside world, he voyaged to England in 1850. This was indeed an epoch-making event, which later played a momentous role in bringing Nepal nearer to British India. Another descendent to the line, Sir Chandra Shamsher Bahadur Rana, a remarkable ruler again, by all accounts, carried things further, bringing about sweeping reforms in a nation that had remained veiled into an age-old gloom of ignorance and prejudice regarding the march of civilisation in several parts of the world. He too visited England and strove thereafter to remodel the socio-political structure of his country on the lines of the occidental ethos.
This being the situation, it is natural that the process of the development of mind and its resultant individualism has taken a long time in assuming concrete shape among a people completely shut out, as they were for a considerably long time, from the momentum of subjective transformation in consequence of the advent of occidental civilisation.
It might be said again that the political uncertainty haunting the Himalayan nation for some time, resulting in the ouster of the century-long system of monarchial despotism and the consequent experiments with myriad political views, signals the advent of the age of reason and individualism with its concomitant challenge to all those canons associated with the era of the symbolic conventions which held Nepal enthralled for ages.
And reverting back to the Gorkhaland tangle, one might say that the homeland movement in the Darjeeling hills has a far deeper connotation that gets swamped in the shrill cry for identity and development. Perhaps the deeper yearning is for assimilation in the Indian mainstream through collective assertiveness. The “homeland” cry might be a manifestation of the subjective urge among a growing number of individuals to step out of the rut of separatism and to carve a role for themselves in the national domain.
Nepalese settlers in India have been assimilated on the physical plane as far as possible in the course of time. But they are aware that they are far from being integrated mentally in the country they have accepted as their native land. And the Gorkhaland movement, when shorn of its xenophobic baggage, manifested in self-determined stridency, might reveal a deeper poignancy associated with the subjective craving for a rightful place in the national discourse.
( source:The Statesman)
NEPAL: Nepal army refuses to induct Maoists
FROM GULF TIMES, DOHA, QATAR
Nepal Army chief General Chhatraman Singh Gurung has refused to hire fighters from the opposition Maoist party’s guerrilla army en masse.
Gurung, who became army chief last year after his predecessor, General Rookmangud Katawal, caused the collapse of the Maoist government, told visiting UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs B Lynn Pascoe that the fighters of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) should not be taken en masse in the Nepal Army.
The general’s stand goes against a peace pact signed between the Maoists and the ruling parties in 2006 that saw an end to a communist insurrection that had killed over 13,000 people.
It was also the stand adopted by Katawal that led to the Maoist government trying to sack him last year.
Gurung said the PLA could be accommodated in the police, border security forces and other non-military agencies. They could also be sent overseas for jobs or be rehabilitated with an economic incentive.
The general said some PLA combatants could be inducted in the army individually if they met the international yardsticks followed for recruitment. At his meeting with Pascoe Friday, Gurung also expressed concern at Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda giving training to the PLA in their cantonments and urging them to be ready for another revolution if the government failed to implement the new constitution by May 28.
The general has also negated a UN count that put the strength of the PLA at over 19,000, saying Prachanda had been caught admitting in a secretly taped video that there were only about 6,000-7,000 bona fide fighters. The army chief’s statement comes at a time the government is trying to slash the allowances to the PLA.
There is growing uncertainty over the fate of the fighters with their own leaders saying the new statute should be promulgated before they are disbanded while the ruling parties are demanding the discharge of the PLA first.
Gurung’s statement is bound to trigger Maoist anger. It has already been condemned by party spokesman Dinanath Sharma who said it was a political statement.
Sharma also said the integration of the PLA was a matter to be decided by the parties and not the army, which is bound to obey the government.
Pascoe is an envoy of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sent to assess Nepal’s fraying peace process. He has asked the coalition government to rehabilitate the guerrilla army of the Maoists and democratise the national army, warning that Nepal still had two armies though the communist uprising had ended four years ago.
“The question of the future of the two armies should not remain unresolved any longer,” said B Lynn Pascoe in a statement issued by the UN on Thursday.
“Unfortunately, Nepal today still has two armies, and no agreed strategy for what to do about this… We encourage leaders to engage in serious, good-faith discussions leading to agreements and actions.”
Pascoe, who arrived in Kathmandu on a three-day visit Wednesday, held talks with Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda and Girija Prasad Koirala, who heads the largest party in the government, the Nepali Congress. He is also expected to inspect the cantonment in Shaktikhor in southern Nepal where part of the 19,600-strong Maoist army – the People’s Liberation Army – has been confined since they ended their 10-year “People’s War” in 2006.
The peace pact signed by the ruling parties and the Maoists, which ended the insurrection, had agreed to induct the PLA combatants into the state army.
However, the merger is yet to take off due to opposition by senior army officials and now ruling party leaders who are accusing the Maoists of having inflated the strength of the PLA.
Pascoe said the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army personnel along with the democratisation of the Nepal army and the enforcement of a new constitution in May were the two major tasks before the government.
“The effective integration and rehabilitation of former combatants is one of the most important factors distinguishing those countries that successfully navigate these transitions to peace,” he said.
“Former combatants need to be afforded a real stake in the economic, political and institutional life of the country.”
The army, which had supported deposed king Gyanendra in seizing power in 2005 and was charged with gross violation of human rights, has refused to toe the line even after the fall of the royal regime and its pledge to obey the elected government.
Army personnel named in torture and extrajudicial killings have not been punished despite court orders for their arrest.
With the parties having failed 10 deadlines in the process of drafting the new constitution, Pascoe indicated the UN had realised that the May 28 deadline for the new constitution may also fail and recommended backup action in that case. “We strongly encourage that every effort be made to accelerate progress in the days and weeks ahead,” he said.
“At the same time, inclusive discussions are needed to prepare carefully for the possibility that a final draft of the constitution will not be completed by the deadline.” The Maoists, who went to war demanding the new constitution, have warned of a new revolt if the ruling parties fail the May 28 deadline.
There is also mounting anger and frustration among civil society members at the delay and many constitutional experts have warned that a failure to meet the deadline would see chaos and violence. IANS
FROM GULF TIMES, DOHA, QATAR
Nepal Army chief General Chhatraman Singh Gurung has refused to hire fighters from the opposition Maoist party’s guerrilla army en masse.
Gurung, who became army chief last year after his predecessor, General Rookmangud Katawal, caused the collapse of the Maoist government, told visiting UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs B Lynn Pascoe that the fighters of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) should not be taken en masse in the Nepal Army.
The general’s stand goes against a peace pact signed between the Maoists and the ruling parties in 2006 that saw an end to a communist insurrection that had killed over 13,000 people.
It was also the stand adopted by Katawal that led to the Maoist government trying to sack him last year.
Gurung said the PLA could be accommodated in the police, border security forces and other non-military agencies. They could also be sent overseas for jobs or be rehabilitated with an economic incentive.
The general said some PLA combatants could be inducted in the army individually if they met the international yardsticks followed for recruitment. At his meeting with Pascoe Friday, Gurung also expressed concern at Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda giving training to the PLA in their cantonments and urging them to be ready for another revolution if the government failed to implement the new constitution by May 28.
The general has also negated a UN count that put the strength of the PLA at over 19,000, saying Prachanda had been caught admitting in a secretly taped video that there were only about 6,000-7,000 bona fide fighters. The army chief’s statement comes at a time the government is trying to slash the allowances to the PLA.
There is growing uncertainty over the fate of the fighters with their own leaders saying the new statute should be promulgated before they are disbanded while the ruling parties are demanding the discharge of the PLA first.
Gurung’s statement is bound to trigger Maoist anger. It has already been condemned by party spokesman Dinanath Sharma who said it was a political statement.
Sharma also said the integration of the PLA was a matter to be decided by the parties and not the army, which is bound to obey the government.
Pascoe is an envoy of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sent to assess Nepal’s fraying peace process. He has asked the coalition government to rehabilitate the guerrilla army of the Maoists and democratise the national army, warning that Nepal still had two armies though the communist uprising had ended four years ago.
“The question of the future of the two armies should not remain unresolved any longer,” said B Lynn Pascoe in a statement issued by the UN on Thursday.
“Unfortunately, Nepal today still has two armies, and no agreed strategy for what to do about this… We encourage leaders to engage in serious, good-faith discussions leading to agreements and actions.”
Pascoe, who arrived in Kathmandu on a three-day visit Wednesday, held talks with Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda and Girija Prasad Koirala, who heads the largest party in the government, the Nepali Congress. He is also expected to inspect the cantonment in Shaktikhor in southern Nepal where part of the 19,600-strong Maoist army – the People’s Liberation Army – has been confined since they ended their 10-year “People’s War” in 2006.
The peace pact signed by the ruling parties and the Maoists, which ended the insurrection, had agreed to induct the PLA combatants into the state army.
However, the merger is yet to take off due to opposition by senior army officials and now ruling party leaders who are accusing the Maoists of having inflated the strength of the PLA.
Pascoe said the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army personnel along with the democratisation of the Nepal army and the enforcement of a new constitution in May were the two major tasks before the government.
“The effective integration and rehabilitation of former combatants is one of the most important factors distinguishing those countries that successfully navigate these transitions to peace,” he said.
“Former combatants need to be afforded a real stake in the economic, political and institutional life of the country.”
The army, which had supported deposed king Gyanendra in seizing power in 2005 and was charged with gross violation of human rights, has refused to toe the line even after the fall of the royal regime and its pledge to obey the elected government.
Army personnel named in torture and extrajudicial killings have not been punished despite court orders for their arrest.
With the parties having failed 10 deadlines in the process of drafting the new constitution, Pascoe indicated the UN had realised that the May 28 deadline for the new constitution may also fail and recommended backup action in that case. “We strongly encourage that every effort be made to accelerate progress in the days and weeks ahead,” he said.
“At the same time, inclusive discussions are needed to prepare carefully for the possibility that a final draft of the constitution will not be completed by the deadline.” The Maoists, who went to war demanding the new constitution, have warned of a new revolt if the ruling parties fail the May 28 deadline.
There is also mounting anger and frustration among civil society members at the delay and many constitutional experts have warned that a failure to meet the deadline would see chaos and violence. IANS
Saturday 13 March 2010
NEPAL: Nepal to push for zero tariff facility
FROM SOUTH ASIAN MEDIA NET / MY REPUBLICA
KATHMANDU: A government delegation led by Commerce Secretary Purushottam Ojha is visiting the United States in the first week of April to push for special bilateral trading arrangement, seeking zero tariff facility for Nepal´s key exports and support for infrastructure development.
Previously, Ministry of Commerce and Supplies (MoCS) had planned the visit under the leadership of Minister Rajendra Mahato, but the visit was postponed after Nepali Embassy sought additional time to confirm appointments with the US officials concerned.
The team will mainly discuss on Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), a pact that US Trade Representative (USTR) Office has prescribed for Nepal to win special market access facility in the world´s largest economy.
“It will also push for zero duty for Nepal´s dying readymade garment industry, apprise investors and officials there about investment avenues and opportunities here and seek assistance for trade related infrastructure development,” Ojha told myrepublica.com.
For the purpose, the team will hold talks with senior officials of Department of Commerce, US Trade Representative, senators and congressmen. The delegation will also meet with the officials of the State Department, seeking assistance to develop trade related infrastructure.
It will also interact with US business organizations, and work for establishing a reliable and workable private-private ties — a mechanism that could help investors on the other side of the Atlantic to know and update on business and investment opportunities here.
To foster such ties, MoCS has included chiefs of Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI), Confederation of Nepalese Industries (CNI) and Garment Association Nepal (GAN) in the delegation.
“The main objective of the visit is to get a tangible and formal public and private links established so that economic engagements between the two countries could be rejuvenated,” said Ojha.
Amid political turmoil and instability, Nepal´s trade and economic relations with the largest economy of the world have faded in recent years. In recent years, Nepal has received almost nil US investment and its major exports like readymade garment have also collapsed.
As a result, bilateral trade between Nepal and the US stands very nominal with Nepal enjoying trade surplus of Rs 180 million. In such a situation, officials believe that the signing of TIFA and acquisition of special preferences will give new impetus to bilateral trade and investment.
Traders too argue that the facility will instantly give boost to Nepal´s exports like handmade woolen carpet, pashmina and other items that are barely covered under GSP (generalized system of preferences).
As a response to Nepal´s past efforts to win zero tariff facility for readymade garments, USTR had forwarded the text of TIFA to the Commerce Ministry a few months ago. The ministry had instantly responded positively to the offer, suggesting certain changes in the text.
source: Barun Roy
FROM SOUTH ASIAN MEDIA NET / MY REPUBLICA
KATHMANDU: A government delegation led by Commerce Secretary Purushottam Ojha is visiting the United States in the first week of April to push for special bilateral trading arrangement, seeking zero tariff facility for Nepal´s key exports and support for infrastructure development.
Previously, Ministry of Commerce and Supplies (MoCS) had planned the visit under the leadership of Minister Rajendra Mahato, but the visit was postponed after Nepali Embassy sought additional time to confirm appointments with the US officials concerned.
The team will mainly discuss on Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), a pact that US Trade Representative (USTR) Office has prescribed for Nepal to win special market access facility in the world´s largest economy.
“It will also push for zero duty for Nepal´s dying readymade garment industry, apprise investors and officials there about investment avenues and opportunities here and seek assistance for trade related infrastructure development,” Ojha told myrepublica.com.
For the purpose, the team will hold talks with senior officials of Department of Commerce, US Trade Representative, senators and congressmen. The delegation will also meet with the officials of the State Department, seeking assistance to develop trade related infrastructure.
It will also interact with US business organizations, and work for establishing a reliable and workable private-private ties — a mechanism that could help investors on the other side of the Atlantic to know and update on business and investment opportunities here.
To foster such ties, MoCS has included chiefs of Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI), Confederation of Nepalese Industries (CNI) and Garment Association Nepal (GAN) in the delegation.
“The main objective of the visit is to get a tangible and formal public and private links established so that economic engagements between the two countries could be rejuvenated,” said Ojha.
Amid political turmoil and instability, Nepal´s trade and economic relations with the largest economy of the world have faded in recent years. In recent years, Nepal has received almost nil US investment and its major exports like readymade garment have also collapsed.
As a result, bilateral trade between Nepal and the US stands very nominal with Nepal enjoying trade surplus of Rs 180 million. In such a situation, officials believe that the signing of TIFA and acquisition of special preferences will give new impetus to bilateral trade and investment.
Traders too argue that the facility will instantly give boost to Nepal´s exports like handmade woolen carpet, pashmina and other items that are barely covered under GSP (generalized system of preferences).
As a response to Nepal´s past efforts to win zero tariff facility for readymade garments, USTR had forwarded the text of TIFA to the Commerce Ministry a few months ago. The ministry had instantly responded positively to the offer, suggesting certain changes in the text.
source: Barun Roy
Thursday 11 March 2010
Domicile certificates must be properly scrutinized: ASYA
GANGTOK, March 10: All Sikkim Youth Association (ASYA) has reiterated that the people of Sikkim will ‘continue to face injustice’ until and unless the Sikkim Subject Certificates or Certificate of Identifications issued to the people here are not properly scrutinized.
There has been no proper scrutiny of the above domicile certificates even after 35 years of democracy in Sikkim, said the ASYA in a press statement today. The government had on occasions formed committees to look into this issue but their reports have never been disclosed resulting in waste of public money, it said.
The association expressed its fears that if the identification papers are not scrutinized by a committee then a person with fake documents could reach the Assembly in future. The ASYA also slammed certain organizations trying to raise the merger issue.
source; sikkim express
GANGTOK, March 10: All Sikkim Youth Association (ASYA) has reiterated that the people of Sikkim will ‘continue to face injustice’ until and unless the Sikkim Subject Certificates or Certificate of Identifications issued to the people here are not properly scrutinized.
There has been no proper scrutiny of the above domicile certificates even after 35 years of democracy in Sikkim, said the ASYA in a press statement today. The government had on occasions formed committees to look into this issue but their reports have never been disclosed resulting in waste of public money, it said.
The association expressed its fears that if the identification papers are not scrutinized by a committee then a person with fake documents could reach the Assembly in future. The ASYA also slammed certain organizations trying to raise the merger issue.
source; sikkim express
India needs real time decision support system to nab criminals: Chidambaram
PTI
Home Minister P. Chidambaram on Thursday advocated a robust real time decision support system to track down terrorists and organised criminals who have developed various channels of communication with the help of technology.
“The terrorists and organised criminals have developed overt and covert technologies including Information Communication Technology. This has made the job of law and order professionals far more challenging than ever before,” he said addressing the Silver Jubilee function of National Crime Record Bureau.
The Home Minister said the country needs solutions that can offer robust, real-time and validated decision support systems for the police leadership to evolve remedial and pro-active strategies.
“The sheer magnitude of crime in a federal polity of our geographical size makes this task a really challenging one,” he said.
Mr. Chidambaram said the challenges posed by criminality in general and other more serious manifestations of crime in particular like terrorism, insurgency, left wing extremism, trans-national crimes, drugs and arms trafficking, cyber crimes tend to establish that war against the Indian state is being fought more in the hinterland than on the borders.
“Today, we are fighting our battles on individual pitches. We need to connect, coordinate and supplement our efforts both at micro and macro levels,” he said.
Referring to the Home Ministry’s Rs 2,000 crore ambitious Crime, Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) project, the Home Minister said a conscious decision has been taken to mandate the NCRB to roll out the CCTNS.
“Through the CCTNS, we intend to create a national databank of crime and criminals and their biometric profiles,” he said.
This database will have a handshake with databases of 21 other agencies of the criminal justice system like courts, jails, immigration and passport authorities, and subsequently, be extended to other national agencies through the NATGRID so that terror and crime could be fought more professionally.
“It will also create a mechanism to provide public services like registration of online complaints, ascertaining the status of case registered at the police station, verification of persons etc,” he said.
Mr. Chidambaram, however, expressed disappointment over the initial delay in implementation of the CCTNS project. “If we remain firm, determined and have complete control, it is possible to limit the slippage in some stages“.
The Home Minister said though the initial easy tasks of the CCTNS project has been completed, the key works were yet to be done and hoped that the NCRB would be able to do it efficiently and in time.
PTI
Home Minister P. Chidambaram on Thursday advocated a robust real time decision support system to track down terrorists and organised criminals who have developed various channels of communication with the help of technology.
“The terrorists and organised criminals have developed overt and covert technologies including Information Communication Technology. This has made the job of law and order professionals far more challenging than ever before,” he said addressing the Silver Jubilee function of National Crime Record Bureau.
The Home Minister said the country needs solutions that can offer robust, real-time and validated decision support systems for the police leadership to evolve remedial and pro-active strategies.
“The sheer magnitude of crime in a federal polity of our geographical size makes this task a really challenging one,” he said.
Mr. Chidambaram said the challenges posed by criminality in general and other more serious manifestations of crime in particular like terrorism, insurgency, left wing extremism, trans-national crimes, drugs and arms trafficking, cyber crimes tend to establish that war against the Indian state is being fought more in the hinterland than on the borders.
“Today, we are fighting our battles on individual pitches. We need to connect, coordinate and supplement our efforts both at micro and macro levels,” he said.
Referring to the Home Ministry’s Rs 2,000 crore ambitious Crime, Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) project, the Home Minister said a conscious decision has been taken to mandate the NCRB to roll out the CCTNS.
“Through the CCTNS, we intend to create a national databank of crime and criminals and their biometric profiles,” he said.
This database will have a handshake with databases of 21 other agencies of the criminal justice system like courts, jails, immigration and passport authorities, and subsequently, be extended to other national agencies through the NATGRID so that terror and crime could be fought more professionally.
“It will also create a mechanism to provide public services like registration of online complaints, ascertaining the status of case registered at the police station, verification of persons etc,” he said.
Mr. Chidambaram, however, expressed disappointment over the initial delay in implementation of the CCTNS project. “If we remain firm, determined and have complete control, it is possible to limit the slippage in some stages“.
The Home Minister said though the initial easy tasks of the CCTNS project has been completed, the key works were yet to be done and hoped that the NCRB would be able to do it efficiently and in time.
Wednesday 10 March 2010
Dams in Sikkim: – Blessing or curse
With reference to your article dated March 3, 10 titled “Precarious Gangtok if earthquake hits” regarding the assessment of NMID is timely. The people in the State are living in a fool’s paradise. It is a disaster waiting to happen.
The disastrous situation is compounded by the fact that all the 30 or more odd dams already constructed, under construction or on the anvil for tendering or negotiations with construction companies are concentrated in an area of 70 kms by 40 kms which is high density of dams per square kilometer.
Also, it is true that dams are required for power generation and would contribute to revenue generation to this revenue starved state. And on the positive side dams are relatively less polluting than thermal and coal power plants. However dams are environmentally damaging and also leave carbon footprints.
On the other hand such huge number of dams in such small geographical area in a geologically fragile area of young mountains like the Himalayas could pose a serious risk. Also, it is an established fact that Sikkim falls in high seismic zone 4 and dams are known to increase the seismicity of the areas in which they are located.
The presence of dams are known to cause local climatic changes, ecological damage, harm the river based biosphere and its diversity. The local population could be affected adversely in terms of demography and if it is a primitive tribe than negative acculturation could occur.
The Chief Minister of the State is forward-looking and development oriented and does talk of sustainable development. However, the State policy for power development to go for maximum power generation of 5000 Megawatts in a short period of time could spell disaster in the long term for state and does not appear to be balanced. Maybe he is ill advised in the matter. Even Ministry of Environment based on study of Teesta River by an independent study group has kept in abeyance six dam proposals. Further, the long term values of dams are doubtful as Himalayan Glaciers are receding at an alarming pace.
Also, recently in the papers there was a news item of loss of more than Rs. 80 crores due to non-construction of one dam and the State Government standing as guarantor. Such allegations are serious matter and have to be clarified.
Most saddening is the efforts made by Lepchas of Dzongu and elsewhere to preserve the sanctity of the Holy place of Dzongu where Panam and Teesta Projects are coming up. They have been labeled as anti-development and anti-progressive. It is a fact that Dzongu is a Buddhist sacred place as well. Just because you act out of your deep faith and reverence you should not be condemned. Even the Chogyals, the past rulers of the erstwhile Kingdom of Sikkim had made a law to ensure the sanctity of the place. For the Lepchas and all Himalayan Buddhists this making of dams in the holy land of Dzongu is a sacrilege and pains their hearts. It is similar to Ram setu or Ayodhya or Mecca or Jerusalem. All arguments of development and economics are subsidiary to human faith and values.
There are enough number of dams in East and South Sikkim for economic and revenue purposes. It would keep with the green image of Chief Minister to leave North and West Districts for pristine aesthetics for preservation of environment for the future generations of Sikkim and the entire country. Here in these two Districts the focus could be on ecotourism, educational institutions, hospital tourism, knowledge based and software enterprises. The climate and environment are eminently suitable for such enterprises. Our youths and younger generation could be easily absorbed into such knowledge based enterprises without harming the environment.
Therefore in the public interest the State Government should have a moratorium on new dams and take out a white paper on the dams under construction and also those dams which are under proposal or consideration. The white paper should clearly highlight the cost benefit analysis, agreements drawn so far, potential environmental costs and means of damage mitigation due to dams. Failure to do so would reflect badly on the attitude and integrity of the State Government.
ST Gyaltsen,
Gangtok
APPEARED IN VOICE OF SIKKIM
With reference to your article dated March 3, 10 titled “Precarious Gangtok if earthquake hits” regarding the assessment of NMID is timely. The people in the State are living in a fool’s paradise. It is a disaster waiting to happen.
The disastrous situation is compounded by the fact that all the 30 or more odd dams already constructed, under construction or on the anvil for tendering or negotiations with construction companies are concentrated in an area of 70 kms by 40 kms which is high density of dams per square kilometer.
Also, it is true that dams are required for power generation and would contribute to revenue generation to this revenue starved state. And on the positive side dams are relatively less polluting than thermal and coal power plants. However dams are environmentally damaging and also leave carbon footprints.
On the other hand such huge number of dams in such small geographical area in a geologically fragile area of young mountains like the Himalayas could pose a serious risk. Also, it is an established fact that Sikkim falls in high seismic zone 4 and dams are known to increase the seismicity of the areas in which they are located.
The presence of dams are known to cause local climatic changes, ecological damage, harm the river based biosphere and its diversity. The local population could be affected adversely in terms of demography and if it is a primitive tribe than negative acculturation could occur.
The Chief Minister of the State is forward-looking and development oriented and does talk of sustainable development. However, the State policy for power development to go for maximum power generation of 5000 Megawatts in a short period of time could spell disaster in the long term for state and does not appear to be balanced. Maybe he is ill advised in the matter. Even Ministry of Environment based on study of Teesta River by an independent study group has kept in abeyance six dam proposals. Further, the long term values of dams are doubtful as Himalayan Glaciers are receding at an alarming pace.
Also, recently in the papers there was a news item of loss of more than Rs. 80 crores due to non-construction of one dam and the State Government standing as guarantor. Such allegations are serious matter and have to be clarified.
Most saddening is the efforts made by Lepchas of Dzongu and elsewhere to preserve the sanctity of the Holy place of Dzongu where Panam and Teesta Projects are coming up. They have been labeled as anti-development and anti-progressive. It is a fact that Dzongu is a Buddhist sacred place as well. Just because you act out of your deep faith and reverence you should not be condemned. Even the Chogyals, the past rulers of the erstwhile Kingdom of Sikkim had made a law to ensure the sanctity of the place. For the Lepchas and all Himalayan Buddhists this making of dams in the holy land of Dzongu is a sacrilege and pains their hearts. It is similar to Ram setu or Ayodhya or Mecca or Jerusalem. All arguments of development and economics are subsidiary to human faith and values.
There are enough number of dams in East and South Sikkim for economic and revenue purposes. It would keep with the green image of Chief Minister to leave North and West Districts for pristine aesthetics for preservation of environment for the future generations of Sikkim and the entire country. Here in these two Districts the focus could be on ecotourism, educational institutions, hospital tourism, knowledge based and software enterprises. The climate and environment are eminently suitable for such enterprises. Our youths and younger generation could be easily absorbed into such knowledge based enterprises without harming the environment.
Therefore in the public interest the State Government should have a moratorium on new dams and take out a white paper on the dams under construction and also those dams which are under proposal or consideration. The white paper should clearly highlight the cost benefit analysis, agreements drawn so far, potential environmental costs and means of damage mitigation due to dams. Failure to do so would reflect badly on the attitude and integrity of the State Government.
ST Gyaltsen,
Gangtok
APPEARED IN VOICE OF SIKKIM
Sikkim:Governor inaugurates seminar on Social Violence and Police
Gangtok: “A relatively stable society has less chaos and more order while a society in transition experiences breakdown of transitional norms, and customary checks and balances on human behaviors, and hence greater incidence of unruly behavior. Causes of violence as well as the means to deal with them, must be sought in the totality of human environment – Physical, economic, political, socio-cultural and technological”. This is said by Governor of Sikkim, Mr. Balmiki Prasad Singh.
The Governor was speaking as chief guest at the inauguration of an international seminar on Tuesday, March 9, organized by Sikkim University in collaboration with Centre for Public Affairs, New Delhi, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi Groupe Europeen de Recherche sur les Normativites, Paris. Theme of the two-day seminar is Social violence and Police: Cross-national experiences”. Inaugurated by the Governor at a local hotel, the day’s programme was presided by Mr Ved Marwah, Chairman, Centre for Public Affairs and former governor of Jharkhand and Manipur.
Governor Mr. Singh said that social violence is an inevitable aspect of almost all societies. However, its nature and extent varies across societies and cultures.
Violence is a complex phenomenon because of its multiple causes. Various theories have tried to explain the causes of violence, ranging from political, economic, socio-cultural, ethnic, developmental and so on. He said, “we are living in an era of political, social and religious turbulence”.
The police including the paramilitary units, Mr. Singh said, are the principal agents of the State’s internal sovereignty. “Should the police retain its old structure or make a transition and device new structures congruent with democratic polity with economic and scientific advancement, or there is any need to divide police functions into sub categories like law and order maintenance and crime investigations”, the Governor asked. On the occasion the Governor released an annual report of Sikkim University.
Mr. Marwah, Prof. Ajay Mehra, Director, Centre for Public Affairs, Prof. Rene Levy Director, Groupe European de Recherche sur les Normatives (GREN), Paris, and Prof. Mahendra P. Lama, Vice Chancellor , Sikkim University, also deliberated on the seminar topic.
The programme was attended by Mr. S.M Limboo, Dy. Chairman of Planning Commission of Sikkim, Mr. Sonam Tshering Bhutia, Member of the Commission, delegates from France, Delhi and other parts of the country, members of Non Government Organizations, Professors and Lecturers, officials and staff of Sikkim University.
SOURCE:SIKKIM REPORTER
Gangtok: “A relatively stable society has less chaos and more order while a society in transition experiences breakdown of transitional norms, and customary checks and balances on human behaviors, and hence greater incidence of unruly behavior. Causes of violence as well as the means to deal with them, must be sought in the totality of human environment – Physical, economic, political, socio-cultural and technological”. This is said by Governor of Sikkim, Mr. Balmiki Prasad Singh.
The Governor was speaking as chief guest at the inauguration of an international seminar on Tuesday, March 9, organized by Sikkim University in collaboration with Centre for Public Affairs, New Delhi, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi Groupe Europeen de Recherche sur les Normativites, Paris. Theme of the two-day seminar is Social violence and Police: Cross-national experiences”. Inaugurated by the Governor at a local hotel, the day’s programme was presided by Mr Ved Marwah, Chairman, Centre for Public Affairs and former governor of Jharkhand and Manipur.
Governor Mr. Singh said that social violence is an inevitable aspect of almost all societies. However, its nature and extent varies across societies and cultures.
Violence is a complex phenomenon because of its multiple causes. Various theories have tried to explain the causes of violence, ranging from political, economic, socio-cultural, ethnic, developmental and so on. He said, “we are living in an era of political, social and religious turbulence”.
The police including the paramilitary units, Mr. Singh said, are the principal agents of the State’s internal sovereignty. “Should the police retain its old structure or make a transition and device new structures congruent with democratic polity with economic and scientific advancement, or there is any need to divide police functions into sub categories like law and order maintenance and crime investigations”, the Governor asked. On the occasion the Governor released an annual report of Sikkim University.
Mr. Marwah, Prof. Ajay Mehra, Director, Centre for Public Affairs, Prof. Rene Levy Director, Groupe European de Recherche sur les Normatives (GREN), Paris, and Prof. Mahendra P. Lama, Vice Chancellor , Sikkim University, also deliberated on the seminar topic.
The programme was attended by Mr. S.M Limboo, Dy. Chairman of Planning Commission of Sikkim, Mr. Sonam Tshering Bhutia, Member of the Commission, delegates from France, Delhi and other parts of the country, members of Non Government Organizations, Professors and Lecturers, officials and staff of Sikkim University.
SOURCE:SIKKIM REPORTER
Sunday 7 March 2010
Pakistan Army: the struggle within
by Praveen Swami
Early last month, Pakistan's army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani, outlined a rather different vision. In a presentation to the media, he asserted that the Pakistan army was an “India-centric institution,” adding this “reality will not change in any significant way until the Kashmir issue and water disputes are resolved.” His words were not dissimilar in substance from the language used by jihadists such as Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Mohammad Saeed in recent speeches.
Later this year, President Zardari will make a decision that could force open the faultlines between the military-led establishment and the Pakistan People's Party. Gen. Kayani is scheduled to retire in November 2010. Mr. Zardari, as the commander-in-chief, holds the power to appoint his successor.
Ever since Gen. Kayani — a former Inter-Services Intelligence chief — took office, the Pakistani state has set out on escalating tensions along its eastern frontier. Fighting along the Line of Control has increased, and jihadist infiltration escalated reversing an eight-year trend. Last week, Jammu and Kashmir secessionists were told by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir that his country had reverted to its traditional policies on the state — policies that included unconcealed support for jihadists. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's secret envoy Satinder Lambah, who has been holding secret meetings with his Pakistani counterpart Riaz Mohammad Khan, has discovered that Islamabad no longer appears interested in pursuing a five-principles path to peace advocated by the former President, Pervez Musharraf.
The army, it has long been evident, loathes its commander-in-chief: Mr. Zardari, for example, is never invited to address the staff at military installations.
Last year, Mr. Zardari was forced to hand over control of the National Command Authority, which controls Pakistan's nuclear assets, to Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani. The military also appears to have been working hard to strip Mr. Zardari of his sole source of authority over the army. In January, Parliament's constitutions reforms committee unanimously agreed that Article 243 be amended to give the Prime Minister—rather than the President — effective power to appoint the services chiefs. Even as things stand, Mr. Zardari could face resistance if he picks a chief of his choice. Defence Secretary Syed Athar Ali is a former Lieutenant-General; his predecessor in office, retired Lieutenant-General Iftikhar Ali Khan, refused to sign on the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's orders sacking the then army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.
But come November, Mr. Zardari will likely hold the ace in his hand — and a bitter struggle could break out if he chooses to play it.
Gen. Kayani's three years in office have enabled him to build a substantial constituency within the army. For a variety of reasons, the army chief was able to promote a record number of top officers, and give others coveted positions. In 2008, Gen. Kayani promoted six officers to the rank of Lieutenant-General, and assigned several other Lieutenants-General and Major-Generals to prestigious offices. Last year, four more officers were promoted Lieutenants-General. From March onwards, eight Lieutenants-General will retire — including ISI Director-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Chief of General Staff Muhammad Mustafa Khan, Quartermaster General Zahid Hussain, and commander of the Karachi-based V Corps Shahid Iqbal. New opportunities will thus arise for Gen. Kayani to dispense patronage.
Islamabad military gossip has it that Gen. Kayani may use his goodwill within the army to lobby for a further year in office, as part of a deal which would also secure Mr. Zardari's position. Gen. Kayani may also attempt to have himself selected chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. General Tariq Majeed, head of the JCSC, is due to retire just days before Gen. Kayani — a coincidence that could ease the move. If that indeed is Gen. Kayani's intention, though, he will unlikely be satisfied with the largely ceremonial position of JCSC chief. He could lobby for supervisory powers over top appointments — a move that would likely have President Zardari's support, since it would create tensions between the JCSC and the new army chief.
Gen. Kayani's own favoured choice for his successor, should he not secure an extension for himself, is the current ISI chief, Gen. Pasha, who is due to retire on March 18, 2010. However, Gen. Pasha has had a relatively brief tenure as Pakistan's spymaster — a fact which, read along with the critical state of affairs in the country, could justify an extension. Lieutenant-General Masood Alam, who heads the critical Peshawar-based XI Corps, was recently given an extension on just these grounds. However, Gen. Pasha has never commanded a Corps — normally a prerequisite for the top job.
Lieutenant-General Nadeem Taj will likely be the second in line for the army's top job, if Gen. Pasha's extension does not come through early in March. Now serving as commander of the Gujranwala-based XXX Corps, Gen. Taj is scheduled to retire only in April 2011 — and thus has time on his side. Long a key Musharraf aide, Gen. Taj was appointed Director-General of Military Intelligence, a position he held until February 2005. Later, he commanded the Lahore-based 11 Infantry Division, and served as commandant of the Pakistan Military Academy.
But any move to appoint Gen. Taj is likely to encounter intense resistance from the United States — and with some reason. Gen. Taj was made ISI Director-General in September 2007, just before Gen. Kayani replaced Gen. Musharraf as army chief. By late that year — as Gen. Kayani brought about changes in policy that the army saw as more consonant with its interests than the pro-western position of President Musharraf — Gen. Taj found himself in trouble with the U.S. In August 2008, President George W. Bush was reported to have complained that it had become “impossible to share intelligence on the al-Qaeda and the Taliban with Pakistan because it goes straight back to the militants.” Eventually, in October 2008, Gen. Taj was moved out of the ISI — but rewarded with charge of a prestigious Corps.
Khalid Shameem Wynne, Lieutenant-General who leads the Quetta-based XII corps and the army's southern command, appears the third in line for the top job — and least contentious among those in the race. From a family with a long military tradition — his father, Colonel Arshad Wynne, served during the India-Pakistan war of 1971— Gen. Wynne started his career in the 20 Punjab Regiment. He held several important posts, notably serving as Deputy Chief of General Staff, and commanding the prestigious Siachen-focussed 323 Infantry Brigade. Little is known about Gen. Wynne's political affiliations, perhaps because he has none. Notably, Gen. Wynne has had no tenure at the ISI, unlike both his rivals for the top job — and, of course, Gen. Kayani himself.
Wars of succession in the Pakistan army have often had significant political outcomes. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's October 1999 appointment of Lieutenant-General Ziauddin Butt — an engineering officer — precipitated the coup which led to Gen. Musharraf taking charge as President. President and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto picked the junior-most — and supposedly most subservient — candidate for the army chief's job. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who Bhutto described as “my monkey,” returned the compliment first by naming the Prime Minister Colonel-in-Chief of the Armoured Corps — and then sending him to the gallows. General Abdul Waheed Kakkar, appointed army chief by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in the course of a bitter power struggle with Mr. Sharif, forced both politicians to resign.
Popular consensus has it that the Pakistan army is a battleground between Islamists and pro-western professionals. In fact, as scholars like Ayesha Siddiqa have shown us, the military is an independent political actor, representing a set of concrete interests: the military is, after all, Pakistan's largest owner of land and custodian of an industrial empire that runs everything from breakfast-cereal plants to banks. The army, thus, is not just the custodian of the ideological and territorial boundaries of the state; it is, in key senses, the state itself.
Gen. Musharraf was reviled by the army for having allowed Pakistan to be drawn into a war that threatens its primacy. Gen. Kayani has responded by seeking to repair the army's relationship with its long-standing Islamist allies —and by seeking to find a way out of the war in Pakistan's northwest by escalating tensions along its eastern border. It is no coincidence that jihadist operations like the November 2008 attack on Mumbai took place soon after Gen. Kayani took office. His successor will have to decide if the army's interests lie in this direction, or in charting a new course.
India has enormous equities in the looming struggle for control of the Pakistan army — and must watch its course with great care.
by Praveen Swami
Early last month, Pakistan's army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani, outlined a rather different vision. In a presentation to the media, he asserted that the Pakistan army was an “India-centric institution,” adding this “reality will not change in any significant way until the Kashmir issue and water disputes are resolved.” His words were not dissimilar in substance from the language used by jihadists such as Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Mohammad Saeed in recent speeches.
Later this year, President Zardari will make a decision that could force open the faultlines between the military-led establishment and the Pakistan People's Party. Gen. Kayani is scheduled to retire in November 2010. Mr. Zardari, as the commander-in-chief, holds the power to appoint his successor.
Ever since Gen. Kayani — a former Inter-Services Intelligence chief — took office, the Pakistani state has set out on escalating tensions along its eastern frontier. Fighting along the Line of Control has increased, and jihadist infiltration escalated reversing an eight-year trend. Last week, Jammu and Kashmir secessionists were told by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir that his country had reverted to its traditional policies on the state — policies that included unconcealed support for jihadists. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's secret envoy Satinder Lambah, who has been holding secret meetings with his Pakistani counterpart Riaz Mohammad Khan, has discovered that Islamabad no longer appears interested in pursuing a five-principles path to peace advocated by the former President, Pervez Musharraf.
The army, it has long been evident, loathes its commander-in-chief: Mr. Zardari, for example, is never invited to address the staff at military installations.
Last year, Mr. Zardari was forced to hand over control of the National Command Authority, which controls Pakistan's nuclear assets, to Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani. The military also appears to have been working hard to strip Mr. Zardari of his sole source of authority over the army. In January, Parliament's constitutions reforms committee unanimously agreed that Article 243 be amended to give the Prime Minister—rather than the President — effective power to appoint the services chiefs. Even as things stand, Mr. Zardari could face resistance if he picks a chief of his choice. Defence Secretary Syed Athar Ali is a former Lieutenant-General; his predecessor in office, retired Lieutenant-General Iftikhar Ali Khan, refused to sign on the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's orders sacking the then army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.
But come November, Mr. Zardari will likely hold the ace in his hand — and a bitter struggle could break out if he chooses to play it.
Gen. Kayani's three years in office have enabled him to build a substantial constituency within the army. For a variety of reasons, the army chief was able to promote a record number of top officers, and give others coveted positions. In 2008, Gen. Kayani promoted six officers to the rank of Lieutenant-General, and assigned several other Lieutenants-General and Major-Generals to prestigious offices. Last year, four more officers were promoted Lieutenants-General. From March onwards, eight Lieutenants-General will retire — including ISI Director-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Chief of General Staff Muhammad Mustafa Khan, Quartermaster General Zahid Hussain, and commander of the Karachi-based V Corps Shahid Iqbal. New opportunities will thus arise for Gen. Kayani to dispense patronage.
Islamabad military gossip has it that Gen. Kayani may use his goodwill within the army to lobby for a further year in office, as part of a deal which would also secure Mr. Zardari's position. Gen. Kayani may also attempt to have himself selected chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. General Tariq Majeed, head of the JCSC, is due to retire just days before Gen. Kayani — a coincidence that could ease the move. If that indeed is Gen. Kayani's intention, though, he will unlikely be satisfied with the largely ceremonial position of JCSC chief. He could lobby for supervisory powers over top appointments — a move that would likely have President Zardari's support, since it would create tensions between the JCSC and the new army chief.
Gen. Kayani's own favoured choice for his successor, should he not secure an extension for himself, is the current ISI chief, Gen. Pasha, who is due to retire on March 18, 2010. However, Gen. Pasha has had a relatively brief tenure as Pakistan's spymaster — a fact which, read along with the critical state of affairs in the country, could justify an extension. Lieutenant-General Masood Alam, who heads the critical Peshawar-based XI Corps, was recently given an extension on just these grounds. However, Gen. Pasha has never commanded a Corps — normally a prerequisite for the top job.
Lieutenant-General Nadeem Taj will likely be the second in line for the army's top job, if Gen. Pasha's extension does not come through early in March. Now serving as commander of the Gujranwala-based XXX Corps, Gen. Taj is scheduled to retire only in April 2011 — and thus has time on his side. Long a key Musharraf aide, Gen. Taj was appointed Director-General of Military Intelligence, a position he held until February 2005. Later, he commanded the Lahore-based 11 Infantry Division, and served as commandant of the Pakistan Military Academy.
But any move to appoint Gen. Taj is likely to encounter intense resistance from the United States — and with some reason. Gen. Taj was made ISI Director-General in September 2007, just before Gen. Kayani replaced Gen. Musharraf as army chief. By late that year — as Gen. Kayani brought about changes in policy that the army saw as more consonant with its interests than the pro-western position of President Musharraf — Gen. Taj found himself in trouble with the U.S. In August 2008, President George W. Bush was reported to have complained that it had become “impossible to share intelligence on the al-Qaeda and the Taliban with Pakistan because it goes straight back to the militants.” Eventually, in October 2008, Gen. Taj was moved out of the ISI — but rewarded with charge of a prestigious Corps.
Khalid Shameem Wynne, Lieutenant-General who leads the Quetta-based XII corps and the army's southern command, appears the third in line for the top job — and least contentious among those in the race. From a family with a long military tradition — his father, Colonel Arshad Wynne, served during the India-Pakistan war of 1971— Gen. Wynne started his career in the 20 Punjab Regiment. He held several important posts, notably serving as Deputy Chief of General Staff, and commanding the prestigious Siachen-focussed 323 Infantry Brigade. Little is known about Gen. Wynne's political affiliations, perhaps because he has none. Notably, Gen. Wynne has had no tenure at the ISI, unlike both his rivals for the top job — and, of course, Gen. Kayani himself.
Wars of succession in the Pakistan army have often had significant political outcomes. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's October 1999 appointment of Lieutenant-General Ziauddin Butt — an engineering officer — precipitated the coup which led to Gen. Musharraf taking charge as President. President and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto picked the junior-most — and supposedly most subservient — candidate for the army chief's job. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who Bhutto described as “my monkey,” returned the compliment first by naming the Prime Minister Colonel-in-Chief of the Armoured Corps — and then sending him to the gallows. General Abdul Waheed Kakkar, appointed army chief by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in the course of a bitter power struggle with Mr. Sharif, forced both politicians to resign.
Popular consensus has it that the Pakistan army is a battleground between Islamists and pro-western professionals. In fact, as scholars like Ayesha Siddiqa have shown us, the military is an independent political actor, representing a set of concrete interests: the military is, after all, Pakistan's largest owner of land and custodian of an industrial empire that runs everything from breakfast-cereal plants to banks. The army, thus, is not just the custodian of the ideological and territorial boundaries of the state; it is, in key senses, the state itself.
Gen. Musharraf was reviled by the army for having allowed Pakistan to be drawn into a war that threatens its primacy. Gen. Kayani has responded by seeking to repair the army's relationship with its long-standing Islamist allies —and by seeking to find a way out of the war in Pakistan's northwest by escalating tensions along its eastern border. It is no coincidence that jihadist operations like the November 2008 attack on Mumbai took place soon after Gen. Kayani took office. His successor will have to decide if the army's interests lie in this direction, or in charting a new course.
India has enormous equities in the looming struggle for control of the Pakistan army — and must watch its course with great care.
Saturday 6 March 2010
Bangladesh perspective
Air Cdre (Retd) Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury, ndc, psc
BANGLADESH, lying between the Himalayas in the north and the Bay of Bengal in the south, offers the only land route connecting South and Southeast Asia. Any invasion into South Asia from the East must pass through Bangladesh; the Japanese tried to do just that in the World War II. The British colonization of India also started from Bengal when the Bay of Bengal became the point of ingress. Bangladesh's close proximity to both India and China, two rising power in the 21st century, adds to its geographic importance.
India shares more than 3000 km of border with Bangladesh. The border is well demarcated except few stretches totalling about 9 km that remains unresolved due mainly to lack of political will. India envelops Bangladesh on three sides; similarly, Bangladesh almost dissects the north-eastern India from the heartland.
Lying only 30 miles north of Bangladesh is the strategically important Nathu La pass that connects India with China through Tibet. Despite rapprochement with India, the Chinese have not recognized the so-called “McMahon Line” or renounced claim on the Indian state of Arunachal. Thus, in the unlikely event of an India-China conflict, the access to or denial of the use of Bangladesh territory to the belligerent forces will be of utmost strategic importance. As India becomes an economic powerhouse its need for shorter, faster, and more diverse means of communication between the northeast and the rest of India becomes more urgent and therefore, the need to transit across Bangladesh.
Although Bangladesh-Myanmar land border is demarcated, inflow of minority Arakanese refugees has been a source of tension for many years. The Bay of Bengal spans the vital maritime route between SE Asia and ME. Bangladesh has vital interest in the Bay, but its neighbours - India and Myanmar - dispute its maritime boundary claim. Unless resolved amicably, the maritime boundary issue could be a serious irritant in inter-state relations.
Water and Energy: Bangladesh's primary strategic concerns
While the demand for fresh water continues to rise in Bangladesh, as elsewhere in the world, its supply dwindles. Some of the major rivers are being diverted upstream in India. The Ganges or Tista, once mighty rivers, have reduced to trickles. Lack of information from India regarding proposed Tipaimukh dam over the Barak has been a concern for Bangladesh.
The Chinese government's plan to divert the Brahmaputra could be a major issue affecting millions in India and Bangladesh. Unless the riparian countries join together to ensure optimum use of water, there is the likelihood of conflict and tension in the region in future. Our industrial growth continues to suffer due to shortage of electricity. Meanwhile, a regional power grid could be established to import power from countries such as India, Nepal and Bhutan, which have great potential for hydroelectricity.
Water and energy could be the two most important areas of regional cooperation or confrontation.
Bangladesh's national security priorities
Based on the discussion so far, it can be concluded that the danger of Bangladesh getting involved in an armed conflict with either India or Myanmar or with a country beyond the border is remote. Bangladesh's grievances with India could be addressed if the Mujib-Indira Pact of 1973 is implemented. Although the Maritime boundary has not yet been demarcated, the negotiation is already on with Myanmar and India, the prognosis so far is that a negotiated settlement will be arrived at with the spirit of compromise and cooperation. It is important for us to remember that rivers are the common heritage of mankind and an equitable share of the resources would benefit us all.
On the non-traditional front, however, there are quite a few challenges. The first is the threat of terrorist activities inside the country and across the border. All the SAARC countries have recognized this and they have signed a number of protocols to that effect. In the past, the Indians alleged that separatists from NE states used Bangladesh territory as sanctuary and even used our territory to smuggle in arms and ammunition. Bangladesh continued to deny their presence here. It is now alleged that some top-ranking security officials of Bangladesh were involved in the process. That is indeed deplorable, if true. These are the issues that we need to take care of for the future. In this respect the suggestion put forward by our PM to create a Counter Terrorism Task Force manned by security personnel from all South Asian countries will be a step in the right direction.
The neighbours have viewed Bangladesh's population as a possible security concern. But the good news here is that as the economy prospered and education spread, the population growth reduced. Since 1971, the population has doubled but per capita income has gone up nearly seven times. Instead of being afraid of hungry mass migrating across the border, our neighbours, India and Myanmar should invest here and enter into greater economic activities to the mutual benefit of all so that the people have no incentive to leave. One of our biggest security insurance would be to turn Bangladesh into a regional hub of transportation, transhipment, and transit that would attract investment and boost national economy. A powerful economy means a robust national security.
Bangladesh military and national security
Bangladesh armed forces are to provide a robust response to traditional security threats whenever and from whatever sources those appear. Building up an army, air or naval force is a long drawn out affair. Just because we do not have a threat in sight does not mean we have no need of an armed force. The purpose of the military is to ensure that the threat is not allowed to develop and nipped in the bud. A standing military provides quick response to crush the threat before it gains an upper hand. Our armed forces must be able to inflict sufficient damage to an aggressor to deter him from launching an attack in the first place, what is called deterrence capability. Given the financial resources that are made available now for the military, we would be able to further develop our forces to meet the challenges that might appear.
In the non-traditional sphere, we already have the threat of religious extremists who want to establish an Islamic state by violent means. We also have the extreme leftists who in the name of establishing a classless society are in fact, looting the countryside. Coupled with these are the separatist elements from across the border trying to use Bangladesh as sanctuary; arms and drug smugglers use Bangladesh as a conduit. The armed forces would be called upon to help the law enforcing agencies whenever required. Military's training and operational doctrine, force structuring and equipment procurement should reflect these urgent security imperatives.
Bangladesh armed forces had done a great job in peacekeeping missions worldwide. Although these do not contribute directly to national security, the goodwill that they earn in the international arena helps us boost our national image. Moreover, exposure to international arena, dangers and hazards of operations under different climatic, cultural and operational conditions enhances military professionalism, thus helping national security posture. Employment of armed forces in nation building works such as construction projects, disaster management, medical emergencies not only enhance the forces' professional capability but also contributes directly towards mitigating comprehensive security besides bettering civil-military relations.
Conclusion
National security is a vital issue for the nation, yet it is not often discussed in public. It is considered to be a classified matter best left to the military; ordinary citizen would not be privy to it. In the developed world research, debates and discussions are carried out in the universities and national security issues are in the open for all to participate. Thanks to organization such as Dhaka University, BIISS, BEI etc., we now have a pool of experts who could make important contribution in the security debate. While the issues are debated in civil society, media and on the floor of the parliament, the military and other security agencies would provide vital inputs so that a correct judgment could be arrived at. As the theoretical structure of the national security undergoes revision, we need to focus on the security challenges of Bangladesh, now and in the future, and prepare ourselves to face those challenges
source:The Daily Star
Air Cdre (Retd) Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury, ndc, psc
BANGLADESH, lying between the Himalayas in the north and the Bay of Bengal in the south, offers the only land route connecting South and Southeast Asia. Any invasion into South Asia from the East must pass through Bangladesh; the Japanese tried to do just that in the World War II. The British colonization of India also started from Bengal when the Bay of Bengal became the point of ingress. Bangladesh's close proximity to both India and China, two rising power in the 21st century, adds to its geographic importance.
India shares more than 3000 km of border with Bangladesh. The border is well demarcated except few stretches totalling about 9 km that remains unresolved due mainly to lack of political will. India envelops Bangladesh on three sides; similarly, Bangladesh almost dissects the north-eastern India from the heartland.
Lying only 30 miles north of Bangladesh is the strategically important Nathu La pass that connects India with China through Tibet. Despite rapprochement with India, the Chinese have not recognized the so-called “McMahon Line” or renounced claim on the Indian state of Arunachal. Thus, in the unlikely event of an India-China conflict, the access to or denial of the use of Bangladesh territory to the belligerent forces will be of utmost strategic importance. As India becomes an economic powerhouse its need for shorter, faster, and more diverse means of communication between the northeast and the rest of India becomes more urgent and therefore, the need to transit across Bangladesh.
Although Bangladesh-Myanmar land border is demarcated, inflow of minority Arakanese refugees has been a source of tension for many years. The Bay of Bengal spans the vital maritime route between SE Asia and ME. Bangladesh has vital interest in the Bay, but its neighbours - India and Myanmar - dispute its maritime boundary claim. Unless resolved amicably, the maritime boundary issue could be a serious irritant in inter-state relations.
Water and Energy: Bangladesh's primary strategic concerns
While the demand for fresh water continues to rise in Bangladesh, as elsewhere in the world, its supply dwindles. Some of the major rivers are being diverted upstream in India. The Ganges or Tista, once mighty rivers, have reduced to trickles. Lack of information from India regarding proposed Tipaimukh dam over the Barak has been a concern for Bangladesh.
The Chinese government's plan to divert the Brahmaputra could be a major issue affecting millions in India and Bangladesh. Unless the riparian countries join together to ensure optimum use of water, there is the likelihood of conflict and tension in the region in future. Our industrial growth continues to suffer due to shortage of electricity. Meanwhile, a regional power grid could be established to import power from countries such as India, Nepal and Bhutan, which have great potential for hydroelectricity.
Water and energy could be the two most important areas of regional cooperation or confrontation.
Bangladesh's national security priorities
Based on the discussion so far, it can be concluded that the danger of Bangladesh getting involved in an armed conflict with either India or Myanmar or with a country beyond the border is remote. Bangladesh's grievances with India could be addressed if the Mujib-Indira Pact of 1973 is implemented. Although the Maritime boundary has not yet been demarcated, the negotiation is already on with Myanmar and India, the prognosis so far is that a negotiated settlement will be arrived at with the spirit of compromise and cooperation. It is important for us to remember that rivers are the common heritage of mankind and an equitable share of the resources would benefit us all.
On the non-traditional front, however, there are quite a few challenges. The first is the threat of terrorist activities inside the country and across the border. All the SAARC countries have recognized this and they have signed a number of protocols to that effect. In the past, the Indians alleged that separatists from NE states used Bangladesh territory as sanctuary and even used our territory to smuggle in arms and ammunition. Bangladesh continued to deny their presence here. It is now alleged that some top-ranking security officials of Bangladesh were involved in the process. That is indeed deplorable, if true. These are the issues that we need to take care of for the future. In this respect the suggestion put forward by our PM to create a Counter Terrorism Task Force manned by security personnel from all South Asian countries will be a step in the right direction.
The neighbours have viewed Bangladesh's population as a possible security concern. But the good news here is that as the economy prospered and education spread, the population growth reduced. Since 1971, the population has doubled but per capita income has gone up nearly seven times. Instead of being afraid of hungry mass migrating across the border, our neighbours, India and Myanmar should invest here and enter into greater economic activities to the mutual benefit of all so that the people have no incentive to leave. One of our biggest security insurance would be to turn Bangladesh into a regional hub of transportation, transhipment, and transit that would attract investment and boost national economy. A powerful economy means a robust national security.
Bangladesh military and national security
Bangladesh armed forces are to provide a robust response to traditional security threats whenever and from whatever sources those appear. Building up an army, air or naval force is a long drawn out affair. Just because we do not have a threat in sight does not mean we have no need of an armed force. The purpose of the military is to ensure that the threat is not allowed to develop and nipped in the bud. A standing military provides quick response to crush the threat before it gains an upper hand. Our armed forces must be able to inflict sufficient damage to an aggressor to deter him from launching an attack in the first place, what is called deterrence capability. Given the financial resources that are made available now for the military, we would be able to further develop our forces to meet the challenges that might appear.
In the non-traditional sphere, we already have the threat of religious extremists who want to establish an Islamic state by violent means. We also have the extreme leftists who in the name of establishing a classless society are in fact, looting the countryside. Coupled with these are the separatist elements from across the border trying to use Bangladesh as sanctuary; arms and drug smugglers use Bangladesh as a conduit. The armed forces would be called upon to help the law enforcing agencies whenever required. Military's training and operational doctrine, force structuring and equipment procurement should reflect these urgent security imperatives.
Bangladesh armed forces had done a great job in peacekeeping missions worldwide. Although these do not contribute directly to national security, the goodwill that they earn in the international arena helps us boost our national image. Moreover, exposure to international arena, dangers and hazards of operations under different climatic, cultural and operational conditions enhances military professionalism, thus helping national security posture. Employment of armed forces in nation building works such as construction projects, disaster management, medical emergencies not only enhance the forces' professional capability but also contributes directly towards mitigating comprehensive security besides bettering civil-military relations.
Conclusion
National security is a vital issue for the nation, yet it is not often discussed in public. It is considered to be a classified matter best left to the military; ordinary citizen would not be privy to it. In the developed world research, debates and discussions are carried out in the universities and national security issues are in the open for all to participate. Thanks to organization such as Dhaka University, BIISS, BEI etc., we now have a pool of experts who could make important contribution in the security debate. While the issues are debated in civil society, media and on the floor of the parliament, the military and other security agencies would provide vital inputs so that a correct judgment could be arrived at. As the theoretical structure of the national security undergoes revision, we need to focus on the security challenges of Bangladesh, now and in the future, and prepare ourselves to face those challenges
source:The Daily Star
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