NEPAL: I am getting married on June 19 but its not arranged marriage – Manisha Koirala
FROM INDIAROCKS.COM
BY SUBHASH K. JHA
After her marriage Manisha Koirala will now spend more time in her home-town Kathmandu than in Mumbai.
One of Bollywood’s most beautiful and footloose divas, Manisha Koirala is all set to get married finally. Just back in Mumbai after an extensive shoot in Kerala for Malayalam film Manisha can barely contain her excitement.
She says, “Yes, I’m getting married to Samrat. He’s from Nepal, like me. But please, it is not an arranged marriage. Yes, our families know one another for some years now. So there was a comfort level between me and Samrat for a very long time. Gradually the bonding grew from friendship to love. And when Samrat asked me to marry him I agreed.”
Manisha returned to Mumbai from Kerala on Wednesday morning to the news of her marriage all over the place.
She laughs, “I was totally cut off in Kerala shooting for Shayam Prasad’s Malayalam film. I had no idea my marriage plans were being discussed in my absence. Now I see dates and venue in the papers. Like I said the wedding is on June 19. It will take place in Kathmandu and will be attended by Samrat’s and my close family and friends.”
Manisha will now spend more time in Kathmandu. “That’s where Samrat is based. He is into many kind of business ventures including a project in alternate energy. So yes, one thing will change. Mumbai used to be my first home. Now Kathmandu will be my first home. But I’ll continue to be a Mumbai girl at heart and will have a home here.”
So is her dream of a home in Paris over? “No way!” says the fiery Nepali beauty. “My dream home in Paris has just been postponed for a while. Now instead of me alone it will be my husband and I sharing a Parisian home.”
In fact the couple plans to honeymoon in France.
Speaking on cutting down her work Manisha says, “I’ve been cutting down my assignments for a few years now. So it’s not as if I’ve been working frantically. I will continue to do selected films after marriage.”
As forthright as ever, Manisha volunteers the information that she broke up with her last boyfriend, the American Chris Dolan long ago. “We split quite some time ago. But we continue to be friends. That’s the way I like it in my life. Even when a relationships ends the friendship continues. I don’t like any negativity around me. I’d like all my friends to wish Samrat and me a happy married life.”
Samrat apparently is shy of the limelight. “He had his picture removed from a social networking website as soon as our marriage was announced. Samrat will have to get used to public attention after we get married.”
Saturday 10 April 2010
ESSAY: Tamangs are different
Subjugated and abused by Nepal’s first Hindu monarch, willfully referred to as ‘Tamangs’, this community has suffered much and continues to worry about what else must come, writes Furba Lama
MAHAYANA is one type of Buddhism and the other, Nyingmapa, was created by Gurupadmasamva, affectionately called Guru Rinpoche by Tibetans in Tibet, in the seventh century. Before this, there no Buddhism in Tibet and all Tibetan communities and sub-sects were followers of Bon Dharma. The Tamags were the first Tibetan sub-sect to embrace Nyingmapa Buddhism in Tibet at Palyul, where the first Nyingmapa Buddhist gompas (monasteries) were built. The word Tamang is wrong; neither is it a Nepali nor a Tibetan word. In fact, Tamag is the correct word and its pronounciation is correctly mentioned in the Tibetan-to-English dictionary (page 980) prepared and published by Sarat Chandra Das of Lhasa Villa, Darjeeling, in 1834 and it is also mentioned in the same dictionary (pages 780 and 781) that fifth Panchen Rinpoche invited Das to Tibet in 1879 and 1881. It also mentions that Panchen Rinpoche died of smallpox in 1882 and that the sixth Panchen Rinpoche took over as an infant in 1883.
The veracity of the word Tamag can be proven from its meaning: Ra-ta-ta=Ta; Dau-ma-ga-mag=Mag; therefore, the letter or word Ta, meaning horse, and Mag meaning army, gives the word Tamag, meaning Mounted Army (in Nepali Ghorchari Sena, Risalla, Aswarohi Sena). There were so many Tibetan sub-sects of which the Tamags were the main security and protection force of the palace and king. That is why Tamag is a Tibetan word that was willfully mispronounced and intentionally changed to Tamang by the so-called first Hindu monarch just after the creation of Nepal. Tamang is neither a Nepali word nor a Tibetan one.
Before the creation of Nepal, there were Tamags in the Temal Hill in the seventh century and since Nepal is not more than 244 years old, it means and proves that Nepal was created in 1767 after the tribal kings of different buffer states were subjugated by the so-called Hindu king who integrated their holdings into one nation called Nepal. But even after this unification, there was no common language in this newly created country. Of course, there were the Khas and Parbatay languages that were spoken by the Kamis, Damais and Sarkis, and even the Chettris, Bahoons and Thakuris spoke the Rajput and Rajasthani languages in 1767 when these were introduced in those buffer tribal states by the Rajasthani Rajput King of the Saha clan.
Nepali poet Bhanu Bhakta also belonged to the Bahoon community, also an intruder from Rajasthan, and the common mother tongue and language of these people were Rajasthani and Hindi. When these communities intruded into those tribal buffer states where the Khan and Parbatay languages were used by the Kamis, Damais and Sarkis, they introduced their languages which Bhanu Bhakta employed and translated the Ramayan in a very easy language which he called Nepali. Bhakta collected the script from Deonagari Lipi of Hindi and prepared the Nepali script and wrote on home-made Nepali paper. At the time that Bhakta created his language — called Nepali by the first Hindu king of the first Hindu country called Nepal 244 years ago — he was 29 years old. Therefore, from the 193rd birth anniversary celebrated by Nepalis all over the world on 13 July 2009 we can easily find that the age of the Nepali language is thus: 193-29 (Bhakta’s age at the time) = 164 years.
The Tamag community and their language is more than 1,067 years older than that of the Nepali/Gorkha community and their language, culture, costumes their religion. Therefore, this proves that the Tamags are a different tribal community, with their own spoken language and script that is approved by the Language Research Institute, government of India, at Mysore (Karnataka): Tamyig language. Since 2005 this language has been implemented in schools in Sikkim, and for which that state government has appointed Tamyig language teachers in different schools. Tamags have their own costumes, culture and eating habits. The community embraces and follows Nyingmapa Buddhism. In the seventh century, the Tamags were compelled by the so-called first Hindu king of “unified” Nepal in 1767 to give up their culture, costumes, language and main festivals (Sonam Lochar). Defiance invited severe punishment from the so-called Hindu King’s forces, who intruded from Kanauj (Rajasthan) and included the Rajputh communities of Chettris and Bahoons. This explains why the Tamags lost everything after the unification of Nepal.
Therefore, we still have doubts here in the Darjeeling Hill areas. Will the same be repeated here? Will Tamags be safe and secure, allowed to retain their culture, language, costumes, religions beliefs? The present Tamag generation is just uplifting itself, developing in Darjeeling, Sikkim, Assam, the Dooars and so many places elsewhere.
Tamags should come forward and do something about the preservation of Nyingpapa Buddhism and their culture, rituals and lifestyle. If these vanish, all Tamags will face an identity crisis. Each and every Tamag must keep in mind that they different than the other communities.
source; The Statesman
Subjugated and abused by Nepal’s first Hindu monarch, willfully referred to as ‘Tamangs’, this community has suffered much and continues to worry about what else must come, writes Furba Lama
MAHAYANA is one type of Buddhism and the other, Nyingmapa, was created by Gurupadmasamva, affectionately called Guru Rinpoche by Tibetans in Tibet, in the seventh century. Before this, there no Buddhism in Tibet and all Tibetan communities and sub-sects were followers of Bon Dharma. The Tamags were the first Tibetan sub-sect to embrace Nyingmapa Buddhism in Tibet at Palyul, where the first Nyingmapa Buddhist gompas (monasteries) were built. The word Tamang is wrong; neither is it a Nepali nor a Tibetan word. In fact, Tamag is the correct word and its pronounciation is correctly mentioned in the Tibetan-to-English dictionary (page 980) prepared and published by Sarat Chandra Das of Lhasa Villa, Darjeeling, in 1834 and it is also mentioned in the same dictionary (pages 780 and 781) that fifth Panchen Rinpoche invited Das to Tibet in 1879 and 1881. It also mentions that Panchen Rinpoche died of smallpox in 1882 and that the sixth Panchen Rinpoche took over as an infant in 1883.
The veracity of the word Tamag can be proven from its meaning: Ra-ta-ta=Ta; Dau-ma-ga-mag=Mag; therefore, the letter or word Ta, meaning horse, and Mag meaning army, gives the word Tamag, meaning Mounted Army (in Nepali Ghorchari Sena, Risalla, Aswarohi Sena). There were so many Tibetan sub-sects of which the Tamags were the main security and protection force of the palace and king. That is why Tamag is a Tibetan word that was willfully mispronounced and intentionally changed to Tamang by the so-called first Hindu monarch just after the creation of Nepal. Tamang is neither a Nepali word nor a Tibetan one.
Before the creation of Nepal, there were Tamags in the Temal Hill in the seventh century and since Nepal is not more than 244 years old, it means and proves that Nepal was created in 1767 after the tribal kings of different buffer states were subjugated by the so-called Hindu king who integrated their holdings into one nation called Nepal. But even after this unification, there was no common language in this newly created country. Of course, there were the Khas and Parbatay languages that were spoken by the Kamis, Damais and Sarkis, and even the Chettris, Bahoons and Thakuris spoke the Rajput and Rajasthani languages in 1767 when these were introduced in those buffer tribal states by the Rajasthani Rajput King of the Saha clan.
Nepali poet Bhanu Bhakta also belonged to the Bahoon community, also an intruder from Rajasthan, and the common mother tongue and language of these people were Rajasthani and Hindi. When these communities intruded into those tribal buffer states where the Khan and Parbatay languages were used by the Kamis, Damais and Sarkis, they introduced their languages which Bhanu Bhakta employed and translated the Ramayan in a very easy language which he called Nepali. Bhakta collected the script from Deonagari Lipi of Hindi and prepared the Nepali script and wrote on home-made Nepali paper. At the time that Bhakta created his language — called Nepali by the first Hindu king of the first Hindu country called Nepal 244 years ago — he was 29 years old. Therefore, from the 193rd birth anniversary celebrated by Nepalis all over the world on 13 July 2009 we can easily find that the age of the Nepali language is thus: 193-29 (Bhakta’s age at the time) = 164 years.
The Tamag community and their language is more than 1,067 years older than that of the Nepali/Gorkha community and their language, culture, costumes their religion. Therefore, this proves that the Tamags are a different tribal community, with their own spoken language and script that is approved by the Language Research Institute, government of India, at Mysore (Karnataka): Tamyig language. Since 2005 this language has been implemented in schools in Sikkim, and for which that state government has appointed Tamyig language teachers in different schools. Tamags have their own costumes, culture and eating habits. The community embraces and follows Nyingmapa Buddhism. In the seventh century, the Tamags were compelled by the so-called first Hindu king of “unified” Nepal in 1767 to give up their culture, costumes, language and main festivals (Sonam Lochar). Defiance invited severe punishment from the so-called Hindu King’s forces, who intruded from Kanauj (Rajasthan) and included the Rajputh communities of Chettris and Bahoons. This explains why the Tamags lost everything after the unification of Nepal.
Therefore, we still have doubts here in the Darjeeling Hill areas. Will the same be repeated here? Will Tamags be safe and secure, allowed to retain their culture, language, costumes, religions beliefs? The present Tamag generation is just uplifting itself, developing in Darjeeling, Sikkim, Assam, the Dooars and so many places elsewhere.
Tamags should come forward and do something about the preservation of Nyingpapa Buddhism and their culture, rituals and lifestyle. If these vanish, all Tamags will face an identity crisis. Each and every Tamag must keep in mind that they different than the other communities.
source; The Statesman
Friday 9 April 2010
SDF governement violated Article 371 F – SNPP
The Sikkim National People’s Party takes strong exception to the statement made by the Chief Minister that the provisions and safeguards of article 371F are fully protected despite the holding of the Municipal elections in Sikkim. The party draws the attention of the public to the fact that Clause (b)of Article 371F gives recognition to the Assembly of Sikkim elected in 1974 and reads as follows:
(b) as from the date of commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereafter in this article referred to as the appointed day)-
(i) the Assembly for Sikkim formed as a result of the elections held in Sikkim in April, 1974 with thirty-two members elected in the said elections (hereinafter referred to as the sitting members) shall be deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly constituted under this Constitution;
(ii) the sitting members shall be deemed to the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly elected under this Constitution; and
(iii) the said Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Legislative Assembly of a State under this Constitution;
The Party wishes to reiterate that this Assembly of 1974 was elected with seats reserved for the Sikkimese of Nepali Origin (SNO) and was recognized by the Indian Constitution. Despite this fact the seat reservations for the SNO’s were done away with fraudulently and against the objectives and spirit of the 8th May Agreement of 1973. Despite the fact that the Nepali seats were declared general, for the last three decades there was an “unwritten understanding” that these general seats were for the SNO’s and no political party had come forward to break this understanding. But today the SDF Government by officially giving party tickets to non-SNO’s has not only completely violated the spirit of Article 371F, which calls for equality of treatment among all Sikkimese, but also directly affected the sentiments of the SNO’s, of which the CM himself is a member. It can be seen that the Chief Minister has never taken up the issue of restoration of seat for the SNO’s in the past and now in one blow he has opened the floodgates for a period of turbulence in Sikkimese politics by making the SNO’s even more insecure..
The party has already condemned and boycotted the Municipal Elections due to the fact that Article 371F is being repeatedly violated both in letter and in spirit, and with the distribution of the party tickets by the ruling SDF, a new and dangerous twist has been introduced to the never ending attack on the identity of the Sikkimese with scant regards to the one and only agreement which the Sikkimese people have with the Government of India.
The party therefore resolves:
1. To condemn the recently held Municipal elections as a meaningless exercise and a direct attack on the identity of the Sikkimese of Nepali Origin and appeals to the people of Sikkim to boycott and not co-operate with these new institutions which have been thrust upon the people trampling their Constitutional Guarantees.
The Sikkim National People’s Party takes strong exception to the statement made by the Chief Minister that the provisions and safeguards of article 371F are fully protected despite the holding of the Municipal elections in Sikkim. The party draws the attention of the public to the fact that Clause (b)of Article 371F gives recognition to the Assembly of Sikkim elected in 1974 and reads as follows:
(b) as from the date of commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereafter in this article referred to as the appointed day)-
(i) the Assembly for Sikkim formed as a result of the elections held in Sikkim in April, 1974 with thirty-two members elected in the said elections (hereinafter referred to as the sitting members) shall be deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly constituted under this Constitution;
(ii) the sitting members shall be deemed to the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly elected under this Constitution; and
(iii) the said Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Legislative Assembly of a State under this Constitution;
The Party wishes to reiterate that this Assembly of 1974 was elected with seats reserved for the Sikkimese of Nepali Origin (SNO) and was recognized by the Indian Constitution. Despite this fact the seat reservations for the SNO’s were done away with fraudulently and against the objectives and spirit of the 8th May Agreement of 1973. Despite the fact that the Nepali seats were declared general, for the last three decades there was an “unwritten understanding” that these general seats were for the SNO’s and no political party had come forward to break this understanding. But today the SDF Government by officially giving party tickets to non-SNO’s has not only completely violated the spirit of Article 371F, which calls for equality of treatment among all Sikkimese, but also directly affected the sentiments of the SNO’s, of which the CM himself is a member. It can be seen that the Chief Minister has never taken up the issue of restoration of seat for the SNO’s in the past and now in one blow he has opened the floodgates for a period of turbulence in Sikkimese politics by making the SNO’s even more insecure..
The party has already condemned and boycotted the Municipal Elections due to the fact that Article 371F is being repeatedly violated both in letter and in spirit, and with the distribution of the party tickets by the ruling SDF, a new and dangerous twist has been introduced to the never ending attack on the identity of the Sikkimese with scant regards to the one and only agreement which the Sikkimese people have with the Government of India.
The party therefore resolves:
1. To condemn the recently held Municipal elections as a meaningless exercise and a direct attack on the identity of the Sikkimese of Nepali Origin and appeals to the people of Sikkim to boycott and not co-operate with these new institutions which have been thrust upon the people trampling their Constitutional Guarantees.
Thursday 8 April 2010
India and Iran's Afpak policy
BY Atul Aneja
How does India propose to get back into the game of realignments beginning to unfold in and around Afghanistan?
Iran's recent hyper-activism in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan has caused considerable consternation in large parts of the globe. In media circles, think-tanks and world chanceries, high-browed mandarins and their well-healed affiliates are trying to make sense of the latest, seemingly inscrutable piece of the Persian puzzle.
Yet Iran's deft moves in an area that the Persians have known well for thousands of years originate from deeply deliberated and well-grounded fundamentals. Ever since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has been ceaselessly battling the threat of a direct American attack or an invasion by a third country that is backed by the United States. The Iraq war of 2003 brought the American forces in an eyeball-to-eyeball face-off along Iran's western borders, while the entry of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan became a potential cross-border threat to Iran from the east.
Since 2003, the Iranians have been seeking the exit of American forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of their aspirations have a good chance of realisation, as the bulk of the forces are slated to leave Iraq next year. The U.S. exit from Afghanistan could begin in July 2011.
While the exit of foreign forces would mark a substantial advance, the Iranians have been looking further ahead to a post-exit scenario, in anticipation of a political vacuum that is likely to emerge once the American troops depart. Viscerally opposed to any repositioning by extra-regional players , Iran is working vigorously to establish a de facto alliance of regional countries that will dominate the geopolitical arena stretching from Turkey in the west to China in the east.
It is in this larger context of regionalising the geopolitical space that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set foot on Afghan soil on March 10. Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai — who fought running battles with the Americans who were more inclined to favour his rival Abdullah Abdullah during the recent Afghan elections — received the Iranian President warmly. Like the Iranians, Mr. Karzai has concluded that the Americans are tiring in Afghanistan and that the time has come to explore deeper alignments in an alternative camp that includes Iran, and has China, Pakistan, Central Asian republics and Russia as potential allies.
While engaging the Afghans on a new footing, the Iranians have also begun to cultivate Pakistan. A major shift in the contours of their relationship can be traced to October 2009, when the Pakistan-based Jundallah group, led by Abdolmalek Rigi, killed Nour-Ali Shoushtari, and other senior commanders of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). Incensed by these high-profile assassinations, in the Pishin area of the Sistan-Balochistan province, the Iranians sent a few days later their Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar to Islamabad, with the demand for Rigi's handover. Subsequently, Rigi was nabbed in a dramatic fashion when the Iranians forced a Kyrgyzstan airlines plane in which he was travelling from Dubai to Bishkek, to land in the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas. Influential voices in Pakistan say that Islamabad gave the vital tip off that led to Rigi's arrest. The Iranians, however, insist that the arrest was possible on account of their meticulous intelligence work, without any foreign involvement whatsoever.
Since the 2009-10 winter war in Gaza, during which Turkey openly distanced itself from Israel, the relationship between Tehran and Ankara has been warming up. Political goodwill is being translated into significant energy cooperation and both sides, despite resistance from several influential quarters, are looking at participating in the Nabucco pipeline, which will carry huge quantities of gas to Europe.
As the geopolitical alignments ahead of the U.S. pullout begin to emerge, India's absence is glaring. Piqued by India's high profile in Kabul, Pakistan's military establishment has been looking for openings that would allow it to achieve its maximalist objective of seeking India's hasty, and preferably unseemly, exit from Afghanistan.
However, two major hurdles have been impeding Pakistan's path so far. First, the rapid improvement in Indo-U.S. ties during the Bush presidency firmly deterred it from taking India head-on in Afghanistan. Second, the Afghan presidency, closely tied to New Delhi since 2001, was hostile to Islamabad.
However, the scenario changed dramatically with the exit of the Bush administration and the emergence of Barack Obama. Focussed on an exit strategy from Afghanistan, the Americans deepened their security dependence on the Pakistanis in the hope of achieving rapid success. As a result, the Indian fortress in Afghanistan which looked impregnable during the Bush era was breached. Pakistan utilised this opportunity to the hilt.
A staunch ally of India for several years, President Karzai after his re-election last year began to exhibit unusual warmth towards Pakistan. His description of India as a friend and Pakistan as a conjoined twin during his visit to Islamabad was widely seen as a demonstration of his waning affection towards New Delhi.
There has been a significant deterioration in India-Iran ties since New Delhi voted against Tehran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Iranian nuclear programme. In fact, the day India voted against Iran, it seriously jeopardised its project in Afghanistan. Without a geographically contiguous border, India can extend its reach into Afghanistan only through the Iranian corridor.
With its back to the wall, how does India propose to get back into the great game of realignments beginning to unfold in and around Afghanistan? It can draw some inspiration from its diplomatic conduct in the past — when it worked successfully with the Iranians, Russians and Central Asians, especially the Tajiks to unroll the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in 2001. With the recent visit of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to New Delhi where discussions on Afghanistan took place, India has taken its first major step in the right direction.
Mending fences with Iran has to be India's next major undertaking. However, in trying to rework its relations, India is left with only one weighty card, which it can play with good effect provided it begins to view its national interests independently and not through the tinted glasses of the U.S. With its huge requirements of energy, India needs to get back to the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project. But in doing so, it has to substantially modify the arrangement and turn it around to suit its core long-term interests.
Iran would, with considerable enthusiasm, welcome India's participation in this project, as is evident from the provisions included in the gas deal that was signed by Iran and Pakistan in Istanbul in March. Therein lies the opportunity for India to claw back into the arrangement and take it forward from there.
Instead of waiting for others like Pakistan to seize the initiative, India can benefit substantially by boldly and formally initiating the introduction of two significant players — Russia and China — into this tie up. The Russian gas giant Gazprom has already expressed its keen interest to participate in IPI. Gazprom's representative in Tehran, Abubakir Shomuzov, has called for the extension of IPI to China, in an arrangement that would tie Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran together in a giant project.
Russia's participation in the IPI would be crucial for India. With Russia firmly on its side, India can, with greater ease and confidence, engage with China in this cooperative enterprise. In the debate on the extension of IPI to China, the route that this pipeline can pursue would be of vital importance. If India has to take advantage of this extension, it has to insist that the pipeline passing through Iran and Pakistan should go through an Indian transit corridor and no other alternative route before entering China.
Such an arrangement would greatly help in making the IPI-plus arrangement more stable and workable. With China, Pakistan's all-weather friend as the final beneficiary, Islamabad would find it impossible to block supplies to India. In other words, the routing of the pipeline to China via India, and the interdependence that it would generate among the various stakeholders would become New Delhi's insurance policy for obtaining assured gas supplies from Iran via Pakistan.
There is a final diplomatic dimension which needs to be added if IPI-plus is to succeed. Critics of the IPI rightly point to the security problems that this project, in the current circumstances, is bound to encounter during the pipeline's passage through the turbulent province of Balochistan. A comprehensive dialogue may therefore be the way forward to resolve this problem. India, which in recent years has gone into a diplomatic shell, can take the high-ground and propose a comprehensive six-party process. Besides itself, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, China and Iran can become the core participants of this arrangement. Such a forum, carefully constructed, adequately resourced and energetically led can take head-on not only the question of Baluchistan, but all other issues that may stand in the way of a lasting trans-national energy partnership.
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Comments:
I beg to differ on this. First of all, Pakistan and Afganistan (AF-PAK/PAK-AF) is one region that's not going to stabilise now or ever. Pakistan was born with one thing in mind, "hate India" The jihad ideology will one day create civil unrest and mayhem in Pakistan, better not to get involved with a failed state and better to secure the borders.
from: sachin nair
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 01:18 IST
All issues considered, perhaps the shallow sea route through Pakistani waters on to mainland India and then on to China through Myanmar may be the best route for the pipeline. Of course, the pipeline would also involve passage through the shallow waters of Bangladesh. Bangladesh probably presents less of a hurdle to this route than Pakistan. The security aspects based on Pakistan's instability could thus be overcome by routing the Pakistani supply through an off-shoot from the main supply line from the sea.
from: Brahm Prasher
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 03:48 IST
Very good thought about having stability in Asia. I may also add, besides IPI+link there can ba a railway link among all Asean countries. Let the ancient civilisations come together so their populations could have better understaning of all the mythical cultures.
from: Kashmir Singh Bains
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 03:56 IST
The IPI pipeline is a non-starter in the short term, due to Pakistan's adverserial relationship. Though the pipeline extension from India to China sounds good in theory, there is no incentive for Pakistan or China to agree to this. They can go straight to China through Pakistan or the Wakhan corridor in Afghanistan, bypassing India. We still need to find ways to work with Iran and ensure the US plans of isolating it are unsuccessful, but just not through the IPI.
from: Venki
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 04:40 IST
This article is a nicely laid out analysis of ground realities of interdependent security/economic interests of multiple regional players. However,in giving a solution, the author is too optimistic in his expectation of cooperation amoung the participents. As an example,when it comes to implementation,China may not agree to depend on the pipeline transit through India, citing cost factor. Due to competing nature of the players involved,ultimately it may end up as series of BILATERAL pacts amoungst the nations involved. I hope I am wrong.
from: Vinod vinjamuri .
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 06:14 IST
I don't agree as IPI is more a headache than investment. Key for Iran lies in Russia and Israel.
from: raje
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 08:16 IST
There are interesting points in this article and I hope that in near future the union of Asian giants would happen to counter American and European influence in the world.
from: Varun Gaur
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 08:34 IST
A very good article. India's tendency to get itself tied to the apron string of US should be stopped. In the fight between US and Iran we need not tow the US line. We should have remained neutral. The IPI pipeline project is a good one but US will torpedo it somehow or other. It is already pressing Pakistan.
from: Guptan Veemboor
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 11:47 IST
The story is interesting but the analysis seems flawed. You forget the role of the US and our real long term ally, a natural one is the US not by any stretch of imagination the Islamic clergy run government. By ignoring US strategic interests we harm ourselves much more as the game plays out with Pakistan, who WE are joined at the hip with, being a major factor.
from: Varun Sood
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 12:28 IST
India should have a consistent policy towards Iran. It should not treat Iran as untouchable when it comes to the relation with US. India should back Iran in international fora such as UN and IAEA. There should be a great deal of cooperation between South Asian countries, China and Russia. If India still depends on Uncle Sam for its foreign policy issues and behaves as a regional big brother it will soon stand isolated in International area after being heavily exploited and let down by United States.
from: R. Mohanasundar
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 14:08 IST
Time and tide may change Iran's AfPak policy.India has to wait and watch and prepare its strategy in a balanced way.RADHA KUMUD DAS.
from: RADHA KUMUD DAS
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 14:11 IST
Interesting scenario! However, it is important not to abandon the links with the U.S. however tempting the Iranian pipeline is. In the final analysis, while Russia is a long time ally and a dependable one, China is not. And Iran is still under the control of extremists. Pakistan will fish in troubled waters as long as it can, but will be reined in by the U.S. who is its major donor. And Karzai can be brought back in once he realises that Pakistan is not a reliable entity.
The way to go forward is cautious diplomacy, no hasty moves.
from: Dr. Vijaya Rajiva
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 17:19 IST
IPI pipeline is a pipe dream whichever way you route it. Iran has plenty other takers for its gas. It would use the gas card to win concessions from Russia, Pak and even Afghanistan and finally in any non-nuclear energy discussions with USA too, just to keep its nuclear programme going.
Pak. has no interest in giving India what it needs - cheap energy and energy security
Similarly China has no interest and it can lay different Afghan routes.
USA has no interest either! It needs to sell all the nuclear reactor tech and some fuel too.
from: Kamesh
Posted on: Apr 8, 2010 at 05:19 IST
As an Iranian, I can assure you that Iran has not only been a threat to the world at large but a threat to Iranians. I suggest you first live with the regime in Tehran and then put out such theories.
from: Banafsheh
Posted on: Apr 8, 2010 at 09:06 IST
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SOURCE; THE HINDU
BY Atul Aneja
How does India propose to get back into the game of realignments beginning to unfold in and around Afghanistan?
Iran's recent hyper-activism in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan has caused considerable consternation in large parts of the globe. In media circles, think-tanks and world chanceries, high-browed mandarins and their well-healed affiliates are trying to make sense of the latest, seemingly inscrutable piece of the Persian puzzle.
Yet Iran's deft moves in an area that the Persians have known well for thousands of years originate from deeply deliberated and well-grounded fundamentals. Ever since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has been ceaselessly battling the threat of a direct American attack or an invasion by a third country that is backed by the United States. The Iraq war of 2003 brought the American forces in an eyeball-to-eyeball face-off along Iran's western borders, while the entry of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan became a potential cross-border threat to Iran from the east.
Since 2003, the Iranians have been seeking the exit of American forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of their aspirations have a good chance of realisation, as the bulk of the forces are slated to leave Iraq next year. The U.S. exit from Afghanistan could begin in July 2011.
While the exit of foreign forces would mark a substantial advance, the Iranians have been looking further ahead to a post-exit scenario, in anticipation of a political vacuum that is likely to emerge once the American troops depart. Viscerally opposed to any repositioning by extra-regional players , Iran is working vigorously to establish a de facto alliance of regional countries that will dominate the geopolitical arena stretching from Turkey in the west to China in the east.
It is in this larger context of regionalising the geopolitical space that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set foot on Afghan soil on March 10. Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai — who fought running battles with the Americans who were more inclined to favour his rival Abdullah Abdullah during the recent Afghan elections — received the Iranian President warmly. Like the Iranians, Mr. Karzai has concluded that the Americans are tiring in Afghanistan and that the time has come to explore deeper alignments in an alternative camp that includes Iran, and has China, Pakistan, Central Asian republics and Russia as potential allies.
While engaging the Afghans on a new footing, the Iranians have also begun to cultivate Pakistan. A major shift in the contours of their relationship can be traced to October 2009, when the Pakistan-based Jundallah group, led by Abdolmalek Rigi, killed Nour-Ali Shoushtari, and other senior commanders of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). Incensed by these high-profile assassinations, in the Pishin area of the Sistan-Balochistan province, the Iranians sent a few days later their Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar to Islamabad, with the demand for Rigi's handover. Subsequently, Rigi was nabbed in a dramatic fashion when the Iranians forced a Kyrgyzstan airlines plane in which he was travelling from Dubai to Bishkek, to land in the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas. Influential voices in Pakistan say that Islamabad gave the vital tip off that led to Rigi's arrest. The Iranians, however, insist that the arrest was possible on account of their meticulous intelligence work, without any foreign involvement whatsoever.
Since the 2009-10 winter war in Gaza, during which Turkey openly distanced itself from Israel, the relationship between Tehran and Ankara has been warming up. Political goodwill is being translated into significant energy cooperation and both sides, despite resistance from several influential quarters, are looking at participating in the Nabucco pipeline, which will carry huge quantities of gas to Europe.
As the geopolitical alignments ahead of the U.S. pullout begin to emerge, India's absence is glaring. Piqued by India's high profile in Kabul, Pakistan's military establishment has been looking for openings that would allow it to achieve its maximalist objective of seeking India's hasty, and preferably unseemly, exit from Afghanistan.
However, two major hurdles have been impeding Pakistan's path so far. First, the rapid improvement in Indo-U.S. ties during the Bush presidency firmly deterred it from taking India head-on in Afghanistan. Second, the Afghan presidency, closely tied to New Delhi since 2001, was hostile to Islamabad.
However, the scenario changed dramatically with the exit of the Bush administration and the emergence of Barack Obama. Focussed on an exit strategy from Afghanistan, the Americans deepened their security dependence on the Pakistanis in the hope of achieving rapid success. As a result, the Indian fortress in Afghanistan which looked impregnable during the Bush era was breached. Pakistan utilised this opportunity to the hilt.
A staunch ally of India for several years, President Karzai after his re-election last year began to exhibit unusual warmth towards Pakistan. His description of India as a friend and Pakistan as a conjoined twin during his visit to Islamabad was widely seen as a demonstration of his waning affection towards New Delhi.
There has been a significant deterioration in India-Iran ties since New Delhi voted against Tehran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Iranian nuclear programme. In fact, the day India voted against Iran, it seriously jeopardised its project in Afghanistan. Without a geographically contiguous border, India can extend its reach into Afghanistan only through the Iranian corridor.
With its back to the wall, how does India propose to get back into the great game of realignments beginning to unfold in and around Afghanistan? It can draw some inspiration from its diplomatic conduct in the past — when it worked successfully with the Iranians, Russians and Central Asians, especially the Tajiks to unroll the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in 2001. With the recent visit of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to New Delhi where discussions on Afghanistan took place, India has taken its first major step in the right direction.
Mending fences with Iran has to be India's next major undertaking. However, in trying to rework its relations, India is left with only one weighty card, which it can play with good effect provided it begins to view its national interests independently and not through the tinted glasses of the U.S. With its huge requirements of energy, India needs to get back to the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project. But in doing so, it has to substantially modify the arrangement and turn it around to suit its core long-term interests.
Iran would, with considerable enthusiasm, welcome India's participation in this project, as is evident from the provisions included in the gas deal that was signed by Iran and Pakistan in Istanbul in March. Therein lies the opportunity for India to claw back into the arrangement and take it forward from there.
Instead of waiting for others like Pakistan to seize the initiative, India can benefit substantially by boldly and formally initiating the introduction of two significant players — Russia and China — into this tie up. The Russian gas giant Gazprom has already expressed its keen interest to participate in IPI. Gazprom's representative in Tehran, Abubakir Shomuzov, has called for the extension of IPI to China, in an arrangement that would tie Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran together in a giant project.
Russia's participation in the IPI would be crucial for India. With Russia firmly on its side, India can, with greater ease and confidence, engage with China in this cooperative enterprise. In the debate on the extension of IPI to China, the route that this pipeline can pursue would be of vital importance. If India has to take advantage of this extension, it has to insist that the pipeline passing through Iran and Pakistan should go through an Indian transit corridor and no other alternative route before entering China.
Such an arrangement would greatly help in making the IPI-plus arrangement more stable and workable. With China, Pakistan's all-weather friend as the final beneficiary, Islamabad would find it impossible to block supplies to India. In other words, the routing of the pipeline to China via India, and the interdependence that it would generate among the various stakeholders would become New Delhi's insurance policy for obtaining assured gas supplies from Iran via Pakistan.
There is a final diplomatic dimension which needs to be added if IPI-plus is to succeed. Critics of the IPI rightly point to the security problems that this project, in the current circumstances, is bound to encounter during the pipeline's passage through the turbulent province of Balochistan. A comprehensive dialogue may therefore be the way forward to resolve this problem. India, which in recent years has gone into a diplomatic shell, can take the high-ground and propose a comprehensive six-party process. Besides itself, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, China and Iran can become the core participants of this arrangement. Such a forum, carefully constructed, adequately resourced and energetically led can take head-on not only the question of Baluchistan, but all other issues that may stand in the way of a lasting trans-national energy partnership.
===================================================================================
Comments:
I beg to differ on this. First of all, Pakistan and Afganistan (AF-PAK/PAK-AF) is one region that's not going to stabilise now or ever. Pakistan was born with one thing in mind, "hate India" The jihad ideology will one day create civil unrest and mayhem in Pakistan, better not to get involved with a failed state and better to secure the borders.
from: sachin nair
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 01:18 IST
All issues considered, perhaps the shallow sea route through Pakistani waters on to mainland India and then on to China through Myanmar may be the best route for the pipeline. Of course, the pipeline would also involve passage through the shallow waters of Bangladesh. Bangladesh probably presents less of a hurdle to this route than Pakistan. The security aspects based on Pakistan's instability could thus be overcome by routing the Pakistani supply through an off-shoot from the main supply line from the sea.
from: Brahm Prasher
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 03:48 IST
Very good thought about having stability in Asia. I may also add, besides IPI+link there can ba a railway link among all Asean countries. Let the ancient civilisations come together so their populations could have better understaning of all the mythical cultures.
from: Kashmir Singh Bains
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 03:56 IST
The IPI pipeline is a non-starter in the short term, due to Pakistan's adverserial relationship. Though the pipeline extension from India to China sounds good in theory, there is no incentive for Pakistan or China to agree to this. They can go straight to China through Pakistan or the Wakhan corridor in Afghanistan, bypassing India. We still need to find ways to work with Iran and ensure the US plans of isolating it are unsuccessful, but just not through the IPI.
from: Venki
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 04:40 IST
This article is a nicely laid out analysis of ground realities of interdependent security/economic interests of multiple regional players. However,in giving a solution, the author is too optimistic in his expectation of cooperation amoung the participents. As an example,when it comes to implementation,China may not agree to depend on the pipeline transit through India, citing cost factor. Due to competing nature of the players involved,ultimately it may end up as series of BILATERAL pacts amoungst the nations involved. I hope I am wrong.
from: Vinod vinjamuri .
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 06:14 IST
I don't agree as IPI is more a headache than investment. Key for Iran lies in Russia and Israel.
from: raje
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 08:16 IST
There are interesting points in this article and I hope that in near future the union of Asian giants would happen to counter American and European influence in the world.
from: Varun Gaur
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 08:34 IST
A very good article. India's tendency to get itself tied to the apron string of US should be stopped. In the fight between US and Iran we need not tow the US line. We should have remained neutral. The IPI pipeline project is a good one but US will torpedo it somehow or other. It is already pressing Pakistan.
from: Guptan Veemboor
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 11:47 IST
The story is interesting but the analysis seems flawed. You forget the role of the US and our real long term ally, a natural one is the US not by any stretch of imagination the Islamic clergy run government. By ignoring US strategic interests we harm ourselves much more as the game plays out with Pakistan, who WE are joined at the hip with, being a major factor.
from: Varun Sood
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 12:28 IST
India should have a consistent policy towards Iran. It should not treat Iran as untouchable when it comes to the relation with US. India should back Iran in international fora such as UN and IAEA. There should be a great deal of cooperation between South Asian countries, China and Russia. If India still depends on Uncle Sam for its foreign policy issues and behaves as a regional big brother it will soon stand isolated in International area after being heavily exploited and let down by United States.
from: R. Mohanasundar
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 14:08 IST
Time and tide may change Iran's AfPak policy.India has to wait and watch and prepare its strategy in a balanced way.RADHA KUMUD DAS.
from: RADHA KUMUD DAS
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 14:11 IST
Interesting scenario! However, it is important not to abandon the links with the U.S. however tempting the Iranian pipeline is. In the final analysis, while Russia is a long time ally and a dependable one, China is not. And Iran is still under the control of extremists. Pakistan will fish in troubled waters as long as it can, but will be reined in by the U.S. who is its major donor. And Karzai can be brought back in once he realises that Pakistan is not a reliable entity.
The way to go forward is cautious diplomacy, no hasty moves.
from: Dr. Vijaya Rajiva
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 17:19 IST
IPI pipeline is a pipe dream whichever way you route it. Iran has plenty other takers for its gas. It would use the gas card to win concessions from Russia, Pak and even Afghanistan and finally in any non-nuclear energy discussions with USA too, just to keep its nuclear programme going.
Pak. has no interest in giving India what it needs - cheap energy and energy security
Similarly China has no interest and it can lay different Afghan routes.
USA has no interest either! It needs to sell all the nuclear reactor tech and some fuel too.
from: Kamesh
Posted on: Apr 8, 2010 at 05:19 IST
As an Iranian, I can assure you that Iran has not only been a threat to the world at large but a threat to Iranians. I suggest you first live with the regime in Tehran and then put out such theories.
from: Banafsheh
Posted on: Apr 8, 2010 at 09:06 IST
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE; THE HINDU
Monday 5 April 2010
Behind China's India policy, a growing debate
BY Ananth Krishnan
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi at a meeting in Bangalore.
Beyond the expected statements Chinese officials will exchange with External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna in Beijing this week, there is little consensus among different policymakers in Beijing on how to engage with a rising India.
Earlier this year, the United States' decision to approve a $ 6.4-billion arms sale to Taiwan sparked a series of agitated commentaries in China's military journals. The tone will sound somewhat familiar to an Indian audience: it reflected a growing anxiety among strategists that the U.S. was building a “crescent-shaped ring” to encircle and contain China. Interestingly, much of the debate focussed on what role India would — or would not — play in a supposed U.S.-led “encirclement.” Some strategists expressed concern that an eventual “integration of India” into an American alliance “would profoundly affect China's security,” as the official China Daily reported. Dai Xu, an Air Force Colonel of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), warned that China needed to be vigilant against this growing network running “from Japan to India” that would suffocate China.
Others, however, were not so convinced, and instead sought to calm the tensions. Pei Yuanying, former Chinese Ambassador to India, said India, as “an independent international power in the international arena,” was “unlikely to be part of any such U.S. scheme.” Shen Dingli, one of the leading voices in the strategic community in Beijing, also disagreed with Dai's views in an interview with The Hindu, suggesting that the current relationship was sound enough for China to have no reason to worry about India's ties with the U.S.
These differing views point to an ongoing debate in Beijing on a question that many policymakers are grappling with: how should China engage with a rising India? On one side of the debate are voices from the PLA, who are pressing Beijing to take a harder line with India and who see little room for cooperation between two rivals. On the other are voices in the Hu Jintao government and official think tanks, which are pushing for a more moderate and non-confrontational foreign policy line, one which they see as crucial to China's own self-interest and continued development.
The military view
The appearance of a number of articles and commentaries last year in military journals and official Communist Party-run newspapers has led some to suggest that the first group is increasingly beginning to have its voice heard. In recent months, articles in influential publications like the People's Daily, have taken a noticeably harder line on India, accusing New Delhi of “arrogance” and calling on China to take a stronger position on the border dispute. The People's Daily, in particular, has also begun to devote extensive coverage to India's military build-up, frequently speaking of an “India threat.”
The articles more or less reflected the “PLA view” of Sino-Indian ties, according to Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University who studies the Chinese military. According to him and other analysts, this view is predicated on three basic policy positions on India. The first assumes that India is seeking to become a great power. The policy response is to support Pakistan, which China continues to do, and confine India's influence to South Asia. The second, he says, assumes that India has “hegemonic ambitions in South Asia” — a phrase often used by the People's Daily last year. The policy response in China is to “oppose hegemony” by supporting smaller states in South Asia, like Nepal and Bangladesh. The third is on India's presence in the Indian Ocean, and the policy response is to strengthen China's naval capabilities.
The other view
Much as the PLA is influential, its view by no means reflects a consensus opinion among the highest policymakers. Besides the PLA, there are at least three groups which have a role in shaping China's India policy, including commercial lobbies, retired officials and a select group of India scholars in official think tanks. This section tends to view the relationship beyond the narrow military paradigm of the PLA. It argues that despite the persisting mistrust between the countries, it is in China's own interest, both from the point of view of sustaining its economic development and its standing as a responsible world power, to have harmonious relations with India and a peaceful periphery.
“Many people in the Chinese government realise that despite historical differences, there are growing commonalities in relations between the two countries and their positions on international issues,” says Ma Jiali, a leading South Asia scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), who advises the government on its India policy. “There is also the common goal that both countries do not want to see a unipolar world.” He considers “four roles” India plays in shaping his policy view — “a close neighbour, a developing country with common goals, a rising power and an increasingly important international player.” “The basic fact is,” he continues, “we must have good relations with India, or our national interest will be damaged.”
His view is echoed by Sun Shihai, another influential ‘India hand' at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He says he “completely disagrees” with the policy views voiced by the nationalistic commentaries in much of the official media last year. “Many of those reports misperceived India very deeply,” says Professor Sun. “Among most scholars at least, there is a growing awareness that India's power is rising, its international status is rising, and these facts are a reality that cannot be altered.” He believes that it is in China's self-interest to work with India on issues in which the countries have a common stake such as climate change and combating terrorism. “China has more respect [now] for India's rise, and it is in our interest to co-operate where we can, as we did so effectively last year at Copenhagen [on climate change],” he says. “But as two rising powers with growing international roles and strategic weight, cooperation and competition will be natural. What the governments need to do is manage the competition and avoid conflict. Most serious scholars are of this view.”
Reading the debate
Do these different views matter to India? Chinese foreign policy is ultimately decided at the highest levels of the ruling Communist Party's Central Committee using these various inputs. But how these inputs get used is “an extremely complicated process,” says Prof. Kondapalli. “Various groups put out their agenda to try and have their opinions heard, but what is eventually decided depends on who has greater influence at a given moment in time.” For now though, the outcome of this debate still seems uncertain. “The academic community appears to follow a soft and co-operative line while the PLA maintains its stridency to keep India on tenterhooks,” says Brigadier (retd.) Arun Sahgal of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
Until there is greater clarity on its outcome, the mistrust between the countries will likely persist. For usually, it is only the harder “PLA view” of India that gets covered in the media, serving as fodder for the often over-hyped ‘China threat' perspectives dished out by strategic analysts. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that these views are more “newsworthy” than balanced views from the government and other scholars. But another factor behind misperceptions is the continuing opacity in China's own government, in both policy-making and the state's control of the media.
“The main problem in understanding China's policies is the lack of transparency, which often leads to misperceptions” Prof. Kondapalli says. Consequently, even extreme opinions, from any media outlet, often tend to be regarded as Beijing's official line, and drown out other views even if they are no more than voices in an ongoing debate. And until China becomes more transparent, analysts say, external observers will likely continue to imagine the worst when reading the tea leaves.
sOURCE: tHE hINDU
BY Ananth Krishnan
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi at a meeting in Bangalore.
Beyond the expected statements Chinese officials will exchange with External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna in Beijing this week, there is little consensus among different policymakers in Beijing on how to engage with a rising India.
Earlier this year, the United States' decision to approve a $ 6.4-billion arms sale to Taiwan sparked a series of agitated commentaries in China's military journals. The tone will sound somewhat familiar to an Indian audience: it reflected a growing anxiety among strategists that the U.S. was building a “crescent-shaped ring” to encircle and contain China. Interestingly, much of the debate focussed on what role India would — or would not — play in a supposed U.S.-led “encirclement.” Some strategists expressed concern that an eventual “integration of India” into an American alliance “would profoundly affect China's security,” as the official China Daily reported. Dai Xu, an Air Force Colonel of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), warned that China needed to be vigilant against this growing network running “from Japan to India” that would suffocate China.
Others, however, were not so convinced, and instead sought to calm the tensions. Pei Yuanying, former Chinese Ambassador to India, said India, as “an independent international power in the international arena,” was “unlikely to be part of any such U.S. scheme.” Shen Dingli, one of the leading voices in the strategic community in Beijing, also disagreed with Dai's views in an interview with The Hindu, suggesting that the current relationship was sound enough for China to have no reason to worry about India's ties with the U.S.
These differing views point to an ongoing debate in Beijing on a question that many policymakers are grappling with: how should China engage with a rising India? On one side of the debate are voices from the PLA, who are pressing Beijing to take a harder line with India and who see little room for cooperation between two rivals. On the other are voices in the Hu Jintao government and official think tanks, which are pushing for a more moderate and non-confrontational foreign policy line, one which they see as crucial to China's own self-interest and continued development.
The military view
The appearance of a number of articles and commentaries last year in military journals and official Communist Party-run newspapers has led some to suggest that the first group is increasingly beginning to have its voice heard. In recent months, articles in influential publications like the People's Daily, have taken a noticeably harder line on India, accusing New Delhi of “arrogance” and calling on China to take a stronger position on the border dispute. The People's Daily, in particular, has also begun to devote extensive coverage to India's military build-up, frequently speaking of an “India threat.”
The articles more or less reflected the “PLA view” of Sino-Indian ties, according to Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University who studies the Chinese military. According to him and other analysts, this view is predicated on three basic policy positions on India. The first assumes that India is seeking to become a great power. The policy response is to support Pakistan, which China continues to do, and confine India's influence to South Asia. The second, he says, assumes that India has “hegemonic ambitions in South Asia” — a phrase often used by the People's Daily last year. The policy response in China is to “oppose hegemony” by supporting smaller states in South Asia, like Nepal and Bangladesh. The third is on India's presence in the Indian Ocean, and the policy response is to strengthen China's naval capabilities.
The other view
Much as the PLA is influential, its view by no means reflects a consensus opinion among the highest policymakers. Besides the PLA, there are at least three groups which have a role in shaping China's India policy, including commercial lobbies, retired officials and a select group of India scholars in official think tanks. This section tends to view the relationship beyond the narrow military paradigm of the PLA. It argues that despite the persisting mistrust between the countries, it is in China's own interest, both from the point of view of sustaining its economic development and its standing as a responsible world power, to have harmonious relations with India and a peaceful periphery.
“Many people in the Chinese government realise that despite historical differences, there are growing commonalities in relations between the two countries and their positions on international issues,” says Ma Jiali, a leading South Asia scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), who advises the government on its India policy. “There is also the common goal that both countries do not want to see a unipolar world.” He considers “four roles” India plays in shaping his policy view — “a close neighbour, a developing country with common goals, a rising power and an increasingly important international player.” “The basic fact is,” he continues, “we must have good relations with India, or our national interest will be damaged.”
His view is echoed by Sun Shihai, another influential ‘India hand' at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He says he “completely disagrees” with the policy views voiced by the nationalistic commentaries in much of the official media last year. “Many of those reports misperceived India very deeply,” says Professor Sun. “Among most scholars at least, there is a growing awareness that India's power is rising, its international status is rising, and these facts are a reality that cannot be altered.” He believes that it is in China's self-interest to work with India on issues in which the countries have a common stake such as climate change and combating terrorism. “China has more respect [now] for India's rise, and it is in our interest to co-operate where we can, as we did so effectively last year at Copenhagen [on climate change],” he says. “But as two rising powers with growing international roles and strategic weight, cooperation and competition will be natural. What the governments need to do is manage the competition and avoid conflict. Most serious scholars are of this view.”
Reading the debate
Do these different views matter to India? Chinese foreign policy is ultimately decided at the highest levels of the ruling Communist Party's Central Committee using these various inputs. But how these inputs get used is “an extremely complicated process,” says Prof. Kondapalli. “Various groups put out their agenda to try and have their opinions heard, but what is eventually decided depends on who has greater influence at a given moment in time.” For now though, the outcome of this debate still seems uncertain. “The academic community appears to follow a soft and co-operative line while the PLA maintains its stridency to keep India on tenterhooks,” says Brigadier (retd.) Arun Sahgal of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
Until there is greater clarity on its outcome, the mistrust between the countries will likely persist. For usually, it is only the harder “PLA view” of India that gets covered in the media, serving as fodder for the often over-hyped ‘China threat' perspectives dished out by strategic analysts. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that these views are more “newsworthy” than balanced views from the government and other scholars. But another factor behind misperceptions is the continuing opacity in China's own government, in both policy-making and the state's control of the media.
“The main problem in understanding China's policies is the lack of transparency, which often leads to misperceptions” Prof. Kondapalli says. Consequently, even extreme opinions, from any media outlet, often tend to be regarded as Beijing's official line, and drown out other views even if they are no more than voices in an ongoing debate. And until China becomes more transparent, analysts say, external observers will likely continue to imagine the worst when reading the tea leaves.
sOURCE: tHE hINDU
SIBLAC demands Census to accord separate constitutional category
SOURCE:VoiceofSikkim
SIBLAC demands Census to accord separate constitutional category
01 April, Gangtok: Highlighting the distinct political identity awarded to the Bhutia lepcha (BL) community of Sikkimese origin by Article 371 (F) of Indian Constitution which ad beend endorsed by the Supreme Copurt, the Sikkim Bhutia Lepcha Apex Commitee (SIBLAC) has demanded the Census authorities to recognize the two communities as ‘separate constitutional category unlike the Schedule Tribes and Scheduled Castes’.
Copy of letter to the Director, Census-Operations follows below
To
Director,
Census Operations- Sikkim
Gangtok,
East Sikkim
Sir,
This has reference to the inauguration of conducting National Census 2011 to be carried out by your Directorate in Sikkim.
I would like to submit the following constitutional complexities and parameters to be observed while conducting and preparing the final report on Sikkim’s census for the year 2011.
1. Though a part of the Indian Union, Sikkim is principally governed by Article 371 F of the Indian Constitution, which infact is Sikkim’s First Constitution that bestows Sikkim with special status within the Union, an assertion authenticated and upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (RC Poudyal Vs Union of India and others).
2. Article 371 F of the Constitution recognizes the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a distinct political entity extending them with political rights that is reserved and recognized specifically as Bhutia Lepchas (BL) and not under any other category (s) whatsoever, including the Scheduled Tribes. The political rights of the BLs including the 12 seats and one for the Sikkimese Sanghas reserved in the Sikkim Assembly as BL reserved as been upheld and validated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the above cited case.
3. The Election Commission of India has mandated in its Chapter II Clause 3 (4) (c) as “if you are a candidate for a reserved seat for Sikkimese of Bhutia Lepcha origin in the Legislative Assembly of Sikkim, then you must be a person either of Bhutia or Lepcha origin, and in addition you must also be an elector or any assembly constituency in that State” (Annex I).
4. Despite, even the Government of Sikkim has accorded separate reservations for this distinct constitutional group for different purpose such as reservations in the Government employments (Annex II) and the civic bodies (Panchayats & Municipalities) (Annex III)
The rationale behind narrating all these constitutional complexities becomes noteworthy here since your organization is undertaking this ambitious periodical exercise which in the long-run would become the founding-base in determining the governmental policies, be it political-economic-social-cultural, or any other aspects concerning the human development.
It becomes question of first magnitude that the exercise of your regular decadal census must extend deserving recognition to the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a separate constitutional group. It is a matter of general fact that your census make classification on the basis of the recognition accorded to such sections by the Government of India as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Similarly, the BLs are also recognized as a distinct constitutional group by the Indian Constitution vide Article 371 F for all such purposes including Socio-Politico-Economic, whatsoever, as far as Sikkim’s special status is concerned as also guaranteed by Part XXI of the Constitution of India.
It is relevant to mention here that the BLs were included in the list of the Scheduled Tribes under Sikkim (Constitutional) Scheduled Tribes Order of 1978 for the purpose of economic upliftment. Some more sections were included in the Scheduled Tribe list in the year 2003. Given the current trend of political activism, more other additional section or sections of the population may be accorded with similar listings with the category and hence such practice in essence would keep on ever increasing. Therefore the constitutionally distinct category of the BLs cannot be mixed or parallel with any other category, be it the Scheduled Tribes or the Scheduled Castes.
At this backdrop, the clubbing of BLs with other communities under a single Scheduled Tribe category through your conventional method of census shall go detrimental to all the constitutional provisions as it stands now. Apart from generating constitutional complexities, such clubbing would yield instability to the constitutional provisions and recognition extended to the BLs of Sikkimese origin thus far since the formulations of policies of any Government would rely on the findings of this periodical census, be it political-social-economic-cultural.
Under the circumstances, we insist and claim that the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin are recognized as separate constitutional category unlike the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes or may be, as an alternative, provided in separate sub-class within the Scheduled Tribe category as being authenticated and practiced by the Election Commission of India, in the ensuing census report, keeping in consideration of all the constitutional provisions and its obligations with regard to Article 371 F and all the existing practices and precedence of the Government of Sikkim, without being prejudice to any.
Thank you very much,
Yours faithfully,
Tseten Tashi Bhutia
Dated:Gangtok,April1,2010
SOURCE:VoiceofSikkim
SIBLAC demands Census to accord separate constitutional category
01 April, Gangtok: Highlighting the distinct political identity awarded to the Bhutia lepcha (BL) community of Sikkimese origin by Article 371 (F) of Indian Constitution which ad beend endorsed by the Supreme Copurt, the Sikkim Bhutia Lepcha Apex Commitee (SIBLAC) has demanded the Census authorities to recognize the two communities as ‘separate constitutional category unlike the Schedule Tribes and Scheduled Castes’.
Copy of letter to the Director, Census-Operations follows below
To
Director,
Census Operations- Sikkim
Gangtok,
East Sikkim
Sir,
This has reference to the inauguration of conducting National Census 2011 to be carried out by your Directorate in Sikkim.
I would like to submit the following constitutional complexities and parameters to be observed while conducting and preparing the final report on Sikkim’s census for the year 2011.
1. Though a part of the Indian Union, Sikkim is principally governed by Article 371 F of the Indian Constitution, which infact is Sikkim’s First Constitution that bestows Sikkim with special status within the Union, an assertion authenticated and upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (RC Poudyal Vs Union of India and others).
2. Article 371 F of the Constitution recognizes the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a distinct political entity extending them with political rights that is reserved and recognized specifically as Bhutia Lepchas (BL) and not under any other category (s) whatsoever, including the Scheduled Tribes. The political rights of the BLs including the 12 seats and one for the Sikkimese Sanghas reserved in the Sikkim Assembly as BL reserved as been upheld and validated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the above cited case.
3. The Election Commission of India has mandated in its Chapter II Clause 3 (4) (c) as “if you are a candidate for a reserved seat for Sikkimese of Bhutia Lepcha origin in the Legislative Assembly of Sikkim, then you must be a person either of Bhutia or Lepcha origin, and in addition you must also be an elector or any assembly constituency in that State” (Annex I).
4. Despite, even the Government of Sikkim has accorded separate reservations for this distinct constitutional group for different purpose such as reservations in the Government employments (Annex II) and the civic bodies (Panchayats & Municipalities) (Annex III)
The rationale behind narrating all these constitutional complexities becomes noteworthy here since your organization is undertaking this ambitious periodical exercise which in the long-run would become the founding-base in determining the governmental policies, be it political-economic-social-cultural, or any other aspects concerning the human development.
It becomes question of first magnitude that the exercise of your regular decadal census must extend deserving recognition to the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a separate constitutional group. It is a matter of general fact that your census make classification on the basis of the recognition accorded to such sections by the Government of India as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Similarly, the BLs are also recognized as a distinct constitutional group by the Indian Constitution vide Article 371 F for all such purposes including Socio-Politico-Economic, whatsoever, as far as Sikkim’s special status is concerned as also guaranteed by Part XXI of the Constitution of India.
It is relevant to mention here that the BLs were included in the list of the Scheduled Tribes under Sikkim (Constitutional) Scheduled Tribes Order of 1978 for the purpose of economic upliftment. Some more sections were included in the Scheduled Tribe list in the year 2003. Given the current trend of political activism, more other additional section or sections of the population may be accorded with similar listings with the category and hence such practice in essence would keep on ever increasing. Therefore the constitutionally distinct category of the BLs cannot be mixed or parallel with any other category, be it the Scheduled Tribes or the Scheduled Castes.
At this backdrop, the clubbing of BLs with other communities under a single Scheduled Tribe category through your conventional method of census shall go detrimental to all the constitutional provisions as it stands now. Apart from generating constitutional complexities, such clubbing would yield instability to the constitutional provisions and recognition extended to the BLs of Sikkimese origin thus far since the formulations of policies of any Government would rely on the findings of this periodical census, be it political-social-economic-cultural.
Under the circumstances, we insist and claim that the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin are recognized as separate constitutional category unlike the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes or may be, as an alternative, provided in separate sub-class within the Scheduled Tribe category as being authenticated and practiced by the Election Commission of India, in the ensuing census report, keeping in consideration of all the constitutional provisions and its obligations with regard to Article 371 F and all the existing practices and precedence of the Government of Sikkim, without being prejudice to any.
Thank you very much,
Yours faithfully,
Tseten Tashi Bhutia
Dated:Gangtok,April1,2010
Saturday 3 April 2010
BENGAL: Work on relics, 80 yrs on – Traces of centuries-old Buddhist settlement
BY SEBANTI SARKAR
Excavation under way on the mound of Rakshashi Danga. Picture by Siharan Nandi
Calcutta, April 2: The Archaeological Survey of India and the West Bengal State Archaeology Department have started excavating what could be a sixth or seventh-century Buddhist settlement in Murshidabad over 80 years after its discovery.
Rakshashi Danga or the Devil’s Mound is about 35km from Deka-Bichkandi, the state’s oldest Buddhist site dating back to the sixth century and discovered last year. The Rakshashi Danga site, where the ASI and the state’s archaeology department have been carrying out joint excavations since March 22, is at Chandpara mouza in a village called Pratappur in Murshidabad. The site was discovered by A.N. Dikshit in 1928-29.
The mound is probably connected to Deka-Bichkandi as some of the objects unearthed are similar. “The Deka site, now known to date from the sixth century, is 35km from the Rakshashi Danga site. The surrounding area has more mounds — Rajbari Danga (officially recognised as the Raktamrittika Mahavihara mentioned by Hiuen Tsang), Sanyasi Danga, Bhimki Tala and Nilkuthi Mound. None of them has been fully explored,” said Amal Roy, the superintendent of the state archaeology department team camping at Rakshashi Danga.
Several wall segments forming three-room units that measure about 10mx8m each, a narrow passage and signs of an entrance have been uncovered.
The bricks are hand-made, about 30-36cm long, 26cm wide and 5-6cm thick, such as those used in the pre-Pala era. One brick has a lotus design on its surface.
Roy said no figures had been found yet, but the excavation has already yielded a rich haul of dull red pottery, objects of shell, iron nails and pieces of stucco. “We have to wait for more extensive excavations to draw conclusions. But the objects certainly resemble other finds from the early medieval or pre-Pala period (approximately the seventh century),” he said.
Rakshashi Danga, about 200km from Calcutta, is about four to five metres high, higher than Rajbari Danga. “The ASI had taken it under its protection, but neither the state nor the Centre tried to find out what lies beneath the surface,” Roy said.
Work is on in six trenches with depths varying between 3 feet and 5 feet.
The walls indicate three rooms and suggest the presence of a large complex, only a corner of which has been revealed. There is not so much black ware as was found in Deka-Bichkandi.
The dull red pottery fragments are not decorative and mostly are home utensils like woks and bowls.
“The objects resemble the finds at Deka. Taken together the area could grow into a tourist hotspot once we manage to uncover it fully,” Roy, who had discovered the Deka site and pushed for its excavation, said.
“Another 80 per cent of the mound remains to be excavated. It is high and has remained undisturbed. Maybe we can find structures that have remained less broken. Work will continue till the first week of May.”
The archaeologists working at the site in Deka-Bichkandi had initially estimated the ruins to be closer to the age of the nearby monastery at Karna Suvarna, Chiruti. The seventh century monastery was the oldest known Buddhist relic in Bengal till Deka-Bichkandi was unearthed.
The monastery dates back to the time when Hiuen Tsang visited India. His writings mentioned a Mahavihara (monastery) close to the Karna Suvarna Nagari, but there is no mention of other monasteries or stupas. So the archaeologists at Rakshashi Danga may be rewriting history in many ways.
Gautam Sengupta, the director-general of the ASI, had earlier as the director of state archaeology initiated major excavations in this area and eased formalities for the effort.
source: The Telegraph
courtsey: Shri Barun Roy
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BY SEBANTI SARKAR
Excavation under way on the mound of Rakshashi Danga. Picture by Siharan Nandi
Calcutta, April 2: The Archaeological Survey of India and the West Bengal State Archaeology Department have started excavating what could be a sixth or seventh-century Buddhist settlement in Murshidabad over 80 years after its discovery.
Rakshashi Danga or the Devil’s Mound is about 35km from Deka-Bichkandi, the state’s oldest Buddhist site dating back to the sixth century and discovered last year. The Rakshashi Danga site, where the ASI and the state’s archaeology department have been carrying out joint excavations since March 22, is at Chandpara mouza in a village called Pratappur in Murshidabad. The site was discovered by A.N. Dikshit in 1928-29.
The mound is probably connected to Deka-Bichkandi as some of the objects unearthed are similar. “The Deka site, now known to date from the sixth century, is 35km from the Rakshashi Danga site. The surrounding area has more mounds — Rajbari Danga (officially recognised as the Raktamrittika Mahavihara mentioned by Hiuen Tsang), Sanyasi Danga, Bhimki Tala and Nilkuthi Mound. None of them has been fully explored,” said Amal Roy, the superintendent of the state archaeology department team camping at Rakshashi Danga.
Several wall segments forming three-room units that measure about 10mx8m each, a narrow passage and signs of an entrance have been uncovered.
The bricks are hand-made, about 30-36cm long, 26cm wide and 5-6cm thick, such as those used in the pre-Pala era. One brick has a lotus design on its surface.
Roy said no figures had been found yet, but the excavation has already yielded a rich haul of dull red pottery, objects of shell, iron nails and pieces of stucco. “We have to wait for more extensive excavations to draw conclusions. But the objects certainly resemble other finds from the early medieval or pre-Pala period (approximately the seventh century),” he said.
Rakshashi Danga, about 200km from Calcutta, is about four to five metres high, higher than Rajbari Danga. “The ASI had taken it under its protection, but neither the state nor the Centre tried to find out what lies beneath the surface,” Roy said.
Work is on in six trenches with depths varying between 3 feet and 5 feet.
The walls indicate three rooms and suggest the presence of a large complex, only a corner of which has been revealed. There is not so much black ware as was found in Deka-Bichkandi.
The dull red pottery fragments are not decorative and mostly are home utensils like woks and bowls.
“The objects resemble the finds at Deka. Taken together the area could grow into a tourist hotspot once we manage to uncover it fully,” Roy, who had discovered the Deka site and pushed for its excavation, said.
“Another 80 per cent of the mound remains to be excavated. It is high and has remained undisturbed. Maybe we can find structures that have remained less broken. Work will continue till the first week of May.”
The archaeologists working at the site in Deka-Bichkandi had initially estimated the ruins to be closer to the age of the nearby monastery at Karna Suvarna, Chiruti. The seventh century monastery was the oldest known Buddhist relic in Bengal till Deka-Bichkandi was unearthed.
The monastery dates back to the time when Hiuen Tsang visited India. His writings mentioned a Mahavihara (monastery) close to the Karna Suvarna Nagari, but there is no mention of other monasteries or stupas. So the archaeologists at Rakshashi Danga may be rewriting history in many ways.
Gautam Sengupta, the director-general of the ASI, had earlier as the director of state archaeology initiated major excavations in this area and eased formalities for the effort.
source: The Telegraph
courtsey: Shri Barun Roy
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SIBLAC demands Census to accord separate constitutional category
source:VoiceofSikkim
SIBLAC demands Census to accord separate constitutional category
01 April, Gangtok: Highlighting the distinct political identity awarded to the Bhutia lepcha (BL) community of Sikkimese origin by Article 371 (F) of Indian Constitution which ad beend endorsed by the Supreme Copurt, the Sikkim Bhutia Lepcha Apex Commitee (SIBLAC) has demanded the Census authorities to recognize the two communities as ‘separate constitutional category unlike the Schedule Tribes and Scheduled Castes’.
Copy of letter to the Director, Census-Operations follows below
To
Director,
Census Operations- Sikkim
Gangtok,
East Sikkim
Sir,
This has reference to the inauguration of conducting National Census 2011 to be carried out by your Directorate in Sikkim.
I would like to submit the following constitutional complexities and parameters to be observed while conducting and preparing the final report on Sikkim’s census for the year 2011.
1. Though a part of the Indian Union, Sikkim is principally governed by Article 371 F of the Indian Constitution, which infact is Sikkim’s First Constitution that bestows Sikkim with special status within the Union, an assertion authenticated and upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (RC Poudyal Vs Union of India and others).
2. Article 371 F of the Constitution recognizes the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a distinct political entity extending them with political rights that is reserved and recognized specifically as Bhutia Lepchas (BL) and not under any other category (s) whatsoever, including the Scheduled Tribes. The political rights of the BLs including the 12 seats and one for the Sikkimese Sanghas reserved in the Sikkim Assembly as BL reserved as been upheld and validated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the above cited case.
3. The Election Commission of India has mandated in its Chapter II Clause 3 (4) (c) as “if you are a candidate for a reserved seat for Sikkimese of Bhutia Lepcha origin in the Legislative Assembly of Sikkim, then you must be a person either of Bhutia or Lepcha origin, and in addition you must also be an elector or any assembly constituency in that State” (Annex I).
4. Despite, even the Government of Sikkim has accorded separate reservations for this distinct constitutional group for different purpose such as reservations in the Government employments (Annex II) and the civic bodies (Panchayats & Municipalities) (Annex III)
The rationale behind narrating all these constitutional complexities becomes noteworthy here since your organization is undertaking this ambitious periodical exercise which in the long-run would become the founding-base in determining the governmental policies, be it political-economic-social-cultural, or any other aspects concerning the human development.
It becomes question of first magnitude that the exercise of your regular decadal census must extend deserving recognition to the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a separate constitutional group. It is a matter of general fact that your census make classification on the basis of the recognition accorded to such sections by the Government of India as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Similarly, the BLs are also recognized as a distinct constitutional group by the Indian Constitution vide Article 371 F for all such purposes including Socio-Politico-Economic, whatsoever, as far as Sikkim’s special status is concerned as also guaranteed by Part XXI of the Constitution of India.
It is relevant to mention here that the BLs were included in the list of the Scheduled Tribes under Sikkim (Constitutional) Scheduled Tribes Order of 1978 for the purpose of economic upliftment. Some more sections were included in the Scheduled Tribe list in the year 2003. Given the current trend of political activism, more other additional section or sections of the population may be accorded with similar listings with the category and hence such practice in essence would keep on ever increasing. Therefore the constitutionally distinct category of the BLs cannot be mixed or parallel with any other category, be it the Scheduled Tribes or the Scheduled Castes.
At this backdrop, the clubbing of BLs with other communities under a single Scheduled Tribe category through your conventional method of census shall go detrimental to all the constitutional provisions as it stands now. Apart from generating constitutional complexities, such clubbing would yield instability to the constitutional provisions and recognition extended to the BLs of Sikkimese origin thus far since the formulations of policies of any Government would rely on the findings of this periodical census, be it political-social-economic-cultural.
Under the circumstances, we insist and claim that the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin are recognized as separate constitutional category unlike the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes or may be, as an alternative, provided in separate sub-class within the Scheduled Tribe category as being authenticated and practiced by the Election Commission of India, in the ensuing census report, keeping in consideration of all the constitutional provisions and its obligations with regard to Article 371 F and all the existing practices and precedence of the Government of Sikkim, without being prejudice to any.
Thank you very much,
Yours faithfully,
Tseten Tashi Bhutia
Dated:Gangtok,April1,2010
source:VoiceofSikkim
SIBLAC demands Census to accord separate constitutional category
01 April, Gangtok: Highlighting the distinct political identity awarded to the Bhutia lepcha (BL) community of Sikkimese origin by Article 371 (F) of Indian Constitution which ad beend endorsed by the Supreme Copurt, the Sikkim Bhutia Lepcha Apex Commitee (SIBLAC) has demanded the Census authorities to recognize the two communities as ‘separate constitutional category unlike the Schedule Tribes and Scheduled Castes’.
Copy of letter to the Director, Census-Operations follows below
To
Director,
Census Operations- Sikkim
Gangtok,
East Sikkim
Sir,
This has reference to the inauguration of conducting National Census 2011 to be carried out by your Directorate in Sikkim.
I would like to submit the following constitutional complexities and parameters to be observed while conducting and preparing the final report on Sikkim’s census for the year 2011.
1. Though a part of the Indian Union, Sikkim is principally governed by Article 371 F of the Indian Constitution, which infact is Sikkim’s First Constitution that bestows Sikkim with special status within the Union, an assertion authenticated and upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (RC Poudyal Vs Union of India and others).
2. Article 371 F of the Constitution recognizes the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a distinct political entity extending them with political rights that is reserved and recognized specifically as Bhutia Lepchas (BL) and not under any other category (s) whatsoever, including the Scheduled Tribes. The political rights of the BLs including the 12 seats and one for the Sikkimese Sanghas reserved in the Sikkim Assembly as BL reserved as been upheld and validated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the above cited case.
3. The Election Commission of India has mandated in its Chapter II Clause 3 (4) (c) as “if you are a candidate for a reserved seat for Sikkimese of Bhutia Lepcha origin in the Legislative Assembly of Sikkim, then you must be a person either of Bhutia or Lepcha origin, and in addition you must also be an elector or any assembly constituency in that State” (Annex I).
4. Despite, even the Government of Sikkim has accorded separate reservations for this distinct constitutional group for different purpose such as reservations in the Government employments (Annex II) and the civic bodies (Panchayats & Municipalities) (Annex III)
The rationale behind narrating all these constitutional complexities becomes noteworthy here since your organization is undertaking this ambitious periodical exercise which in the long-run would become the founding-base in determining the governmental policies, be it political-economic-social-cultural, or any other aspects concerning the human development.
It becomes question of first magnitude that the exercise of your regular decadal census must extend deserving recognition to the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a separate constitutional group. It is a matter of general fact that your census make classification on the basis of the recognition accorded to such sections by the Government of India as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Similarly, the BLs are also recognized as a distinct constitutional group by the Indian Constitution vide Article 371 F for all such purposes including Socio-Politico-Economic, whatsoever, as far as Sikkim’s special status is concerned as also guaranteed by Part XXI of the Constitution of India.
It is relevant to mention here that the BLs were included in the list of the Scheduled Tribes under Sikkim (Constitutional) Scheduled Tribes Order of 1978 for the purpose of economic upliftment. Some more sections were included in the Scheduled Tribe list in the year 2003. Given the current trend of political activism, more other additional section or sections of the population may be accorded with similar listings with the category and hence such practice in essence would keep on ever increasing. Therefore the constitutionally distinct category of the BLs cannot be mixed or parallel with any other category, be it the Scheduled Tribes or the Scheduled Castes.
At this backdrop, the clubbing of BLs with other communities under a single Scheduled Tribe category through your conventional method of census shall go detrimental to all the constitutional provisions as it stands now. Apart from generating constitutional complexities, such clubbing would yield instability to the constitutional provisions and recognition extended to the BLs of Sikkimese origin thus far since the formulations of policies of any Government would rely on the findings of this periodical census, be it political-social-economic-cultural.
Under the circumstances, we insist and claim that the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin are recognized as separate constitutional category unlike the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes or may be, as an alternative, provided in separate sub-class within the Scheduled Tribe category as being authenticated and practiced by the Election Commission of India, in the ensuing census report, keeping in consideration of all the constitutional provisions and its obligations with regard to Article 371 F and all the existing practices and precedence of the Government of Sikkim, without being prejudice to any.
Thank you very much,
Yours faithfully,
Tseten Tashi Bhutia
Dated:Gangtok,April1,2010
Friday 2 April 2010
Flood of fears over China's projects
by Ananth Krishnan
China's dam-building spree along the Mekong river in south-western Yunnan province has raised fears among several of its neighbours, who say the dams have led to shrinking levels of water downstream.
Officials from Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, countries which lie in the Mekong basin, will on Sunday voice their concerns over eight dams that China is building along the Mekong, in talks with Chinese officials in Thailand.
The four countries in 1995 set up the Mekong River Commission (MRC) to facilitate joint management and water-sharing in the Mekong region, though China and Myanmar have so far refused to formally join the body. The Mekong runs almost half of its 4,400 km course in China's south-west, where it is known as the Lancang, before entering Myanmar and Laos.
The MRC's concerns closely echo those voiced by India in the past over China's plans to build dams along the Brahmaputra, or the Yarlung Tsangpo as it is known in Tibet. In both cases, China's position as an upper riparian or upstream-lying state has given it an advantage in controlling the rivers' resources, say experts. International laws allow China to build hydropower projects that do not divert or substantially alter the course of the rivers, though the absence of robust water-sharing arrangements has led to persisting concerns in several downstream countries, including India, over the future of their water security.
“We can see the level of the water is getting lower,” said Abhisit Vejjajiva, Prime Minister, of Thailand, last month. “We will ask the Foreign Ministry to talk with a representative from China in terms of co-operation and in terms of management systems in the region.”
An estimated 60 million people depend on the Mekong river in the five countries that lie downstream. China has already built three dams in Yunnan. Five more are in the works, including the massive $4-billion Xiaowan dam, scheduled to open in 2012, which is the world's highest dam.
But whether the dams are behind the Mekong's shrinking levels downstream still remains a much-contested question.
In May, the United Nations Environment Programme warned of a “considerable threat” the dams posed to water management in areas downstream, though China says the course and flow of the Mekong have been unaffected by its projects.
Speaking ahead of Sunday's talks, Chen Mingzhong, deputy Director-General of the Department of International Cooperation at China's Water Resources Ministry, said on Friday the dry weather in the lower Mekong areas was the “root cause” of the reduced run-off water downstream, and that the dams would help, not hinder, water management. Officials say the river's flow in China only accounts for 13.5 per cent of its net flow, according to their data.
The Chinese government views the dams as crucial to maintaining water security in its south-west, which is currently facing its worst drought in five decades, affecting more than 24 million people. The government has allocated 27 billion Yuan ($4 billion) to build more reservoirs and dams in Yunnan alone.
“The hydropower stations built on the Lancang River will not increase the chance of flood and drought disasters in the downstream. Instead, it will considerably enhance the capacity of flood control, drought relief, irrigation and water supply for the downstream countries,” Mr. Chen argued.
But his country's neighbours, however, remain unconvinced.
by Ananth Krishnan
China's dam-building spree along the Mekong river in south-western Yunnan province has raised fears among several of its neighbours, who say the dams have led to shrinking levels of water downstream.
Officials from Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, countries which lie in the Mekong basin, will on Sunday voice their concerns over eight dams that China is building along the Mekong, in talks with Chinese officials in Thailand.
The four countries in 1995 set up the Mekong River Commission (MRC) to facilitate joint management and water-sharing in the Mekong region, though China and Myanmar have so far refused to formally join the body. The Mekong runs almost half of its 4,400 km course in China's south-west, where it is known as the Lancang, before entering Myanmar and Laos.
The MRC's concerns closely echo those voiced by India in the past over China's plans to build dams along the Brahmaputra, or the Yarlung Tsangpo as it is known in Tibet. In both cases, China's position as an upper riparian or upstream-lying state has given it an advantage in controlling the rivers' resources, say experts. International laws allow China to build hydropower projects that do not divert or substantially alter the course of the rivers, though the absence of robust water-sharing arrangements has led to persisting concerns in several downstream countries, including India, over the future of their water security.
“We can see the level of the water is getting lower,” said Abhisit Vejjajiva, Prime Minister, of Thailand, last month. “We will ask the Foreign Ministry to talk with a representative from China in terms of co-operation and in terms of management systems in the region.”
An estimated 60 million people depend on the Mekong river in the five countries that lie downstream. China has already built three dams in Yunnan. Five more are in the works, including the massive $4-billion Xiaowan dam, scheduled to open in 2012, which is the world's highest dam.
But whether the dams are behind the Mekong's shrinking levels downstream still remains a much-contested question.
In May, the United Nations Environment Programme warned of a “considerable threat” the dams posed to water management in areas downstream, though China says the course and flow of the Mekong have been unaffected by its projects.
Speaking ahead of Sunday's talks, Chen Mingzhong, deputy Director-General of the Department of International Cooperation at China's Water Resources Ministry, said on Friday the dry weather in the lower Mekong areas was the “root cause” of the reduced run-off water downstream, and that the dams would help, not hinder, water management. Officials say the river's flow in China only accounts for 13.5 per cent of its net flow, according to their data.
The Chinese government views the dams as crucial to maintaining water security in its south-west, which is currently facing its worst drought in five decades, affecting more than 24 million people. The government has allocated 27 billion Yuan ($4 billion) to build more reservoirs and dams in Yunnan alone.
“The hydropower stations built on the Lancang River will not increase the chance of flood and drought disasters in the downstream. Instead, it will considerably enhance the capacity of flood control, drought relief, irrigation and water supply for the downstream countries,” Mr. Chen argued.
But his country's neighbours, however, remain unconvinced.
Thursday 1 April 2010
The letter Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal wrote to Indira Gandhi when Sikkim Royal Palace was attacked by the Indian Army
source:Shital Pradhan
I believe this piece of article was more of a documentary as the title suggest "The Story of Sikkim". A part of a many story in opinions24x7 blog. The article gives a simple narration about Sikkim in brief. What i liked the most was the annexation part and as in my part what i see i share. So this interesting piece of extract is provided here which did touched my heart especially the "letter" send by our Chogyal (King) to Indira Gandhi when Sikkim Royal Palace was attacked by the Indian Army .
""Finally, in 1975, the Kazi (Prime Minister) of Sikkim went against the Chogyal and appealed to the Indian Parliament to change Sikkim's status to a full state of India. His appeal was approved. In April 1975, a 5,000-strong contingent of the Indian Army invaded Sikkim and surrounded the Chogyal's palace. His 300 bodyguards, who were themselves trained by the Indian Army, were caught and driven away, while one of them was shot. The Chogyal was arrested. In his last letter to Indira Gandhi, he wrote:
"I have no words when the Indian army was sent today in a surprise attack on Sikkim Guards who are less than 300 strong and were trained, equipped and officered by the Indian army who looked upon each other as comrades. This is a most treacherous and black day in the history of democratic India in solving the survival of our little country by use of arms."
The Chogyal died under Indian surveillance, supposedly of a weak heart. The Sikkim National Flag was lowered and subsequently banned, being replaced by the Indian Tricolour. A referendum was held under which 59% of the electorate came out to vote. Of them, 97.5% approved a merger with India. However, historians strongly dispute the statistics provided by the Indian Government as well as the fairness of the referendum, which was conducted by the Indian Army. Nonetheless, Sikkim was merged with the Indian Union as its 22nd State.
Interestingly, the treaty which enabled the merger had a special clause inserted into it by India: the merger of Sikkim and India could never be disputed in any court of the land, including the Supreme Court. Of all the instruments of accession signed between various Princely States and the Indian Union, only this one contains this special clause. Details of what actions Indian Intelligence agencies took before the annexation, including the accession of Bhutan to the United Nations, remain sketchy, mostly because the Government classifies it as a state secret."
source:Shital Pradhan
I believe this piece of article was more of a documentary as the title suggest "The Story of Sikkim". A part of a many story in opinions24x7 blog. The article gives a simple narration about Sikkim in brief. What i liked the most was the annexation part and as in my part what i see i share. So this interesting piece of extract is provided here which did touched my heart especially the "letter" send by our Chogyal (King) to Indira Gandhi when Sikkim Royal Palace was attacked by the Indian Army .
""Finally, in 1975, the Kazi (Prime Minister) of Sikkim went against the Chogyal and appealed to the Indian Parliament to change Sikkim's status to a full state of India. His appeal was approved. In April 1975, a 5,000-strong contingent of the Indian Army invaded Sikkim and surrounded the Chogyal's palace. His 300 bodyguards, who were themselves trained by the Indian Army, were caught and driven away, while one of them was shot. The Chogyal was arrested. In his last letter to Indira Gandhi, he wrote:
"I have no words when the Indian army was sent today in a surprise attack on Sikkim Guards who are less than 300 strong and were trained, equipped and officered by the Indian army who looked upon each other as comrades. This is a most treacherous and black day in the history of democratic India in solving the survival of our little country by use of arms."
The Chogyal died under Indian surveillance, supposedly of a weak heart. The Sikkim National Flag was lowered and subsequently banned, being replaced by the Indian Tricolour. A referendum was held under which 59% of the electorate came out to vote. Of them, 97.5% approved a merger with India. However, historians strongly dispute the statistics provided by the Indian Government as well as the fairness of the referendum, which was conducted by the Indian Army. Nonetheless, Sikkim was merged with the Indian Union as its 22nd State.
Interestingly, the treaty which enabled the merger had a special clause inserted into it by India: the merger of Sikkim and India could never be disputed in any court of the land, including the Supreme Court. Of all the instruments of accession signed between various Princely States and the Indian Union, only this one contains this special clause. Details of what actions Indian Intelligence agencies took before the annexation, including the accession of Bhutan to the United Nations, remain sketchy, mostly because the Government classifies it as a state secret."
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