India and the Central Asian dawn
By: M. K. Bhadrakumar
The politics of the vast deserts and steppes of Central Asia will significantly determine the contours of any durable Afghan settlement. The implications for South Asia’s security will be far-reaching, too.
Ibn Battuta, the 14th-century traveller, described the Hindu Kush ranges as the “slayer of the Indians,” as people from the “land of India” mostly perished in the snowy heights of extreme cold. The ranges that run through Afghanistan did indeed split the Indian historical consciousness about that country.
When policymakers in New Delhi grappled with the Mujahideen takeover in Afghanistan, it suddenly dawned on them how little they knew about the tribes that inhabited the northern side of the Hindu Kush. It was those tribes who won the tight race for Kabul against the Pashtun Mujahideen groups during the dramatic “transfer of power” in 1992 by the communist regime headed by Najibullah, and New Delhi had on its hands the unenviable “post-Soviet” task of establishing a narrative suitable for a new dawn in the region’s ancient history.
The point is, the geopolitics of Afghanistan always had two halves. Which, of course, posed a major challenge to U.S. President Barack Obama when he crafted the new Afghan strategy. Equally, for regional powers like India or Uzbekistan, the dichotomy came in the way of creating a common space that would open the vistas of a regional initiative. Viewed from Delhi and Tashkent, the “great game” in the Hindu Kush mountains assumed different shades. Some things do not easily change in life - even for an aspiring regional power. Even today, Indian discourses on Afghanistan run a predictable course. Has the U.S. administration finally woken up to the harsh reality of the Pakistani military’s doublespeak in the fight against terrorism? If so, will it turn the screw on its single most crucial partner in the fight? Period.
From this point, the angst deepens somewhat. Will the U.S. finally abandon the willing suspension of disbelief about the Pakistani military’s passion for its strategic asset, the Taliban, and realise instead that New Delhi is Washington’s sole “natural ally” in the region in the fight against terrorism? And, therefore, will the U.S. allow itself the privilege of India’s cooperation in “stabilising” Pakistan? This range of issues more or less hogs the quaint Indian approach toward the Afghan problem in the seminar circuits in Delhi where one hears the thesis being rolled out ad nauseam like a repeatedly-vulcanised rubber tyre not possessing its original tensile strength any more.
Meanwhile, the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush leading to the vast Central Asia are preparing for a new dawn in the region’s history. To be sure, the politics of the vast deserts and steppes of Central Asia that span the space between the Caucasus in the west and Xinjiang in the east will significantly determine the contours of any durable Afghan settlement. The downstream implications for South Asian security will be far-reaching too.
Three aspects to the emergent Central Asian security are of interest to India. One, China is venturing out as a provider of regional security and stability - supplementing Russia’s traditional role. The opening of the 1,833-km gas pipeline on December 14 connecting the energy fields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Xinjiang with an annual capacity of 40 billion cubic metres resets not only China but also the world community’s terms of engagement with the region. The pipeline becomes part of China’s 7,000-km long East-West trunk route that feeds its booming centres of production on the eastern seaboard and will provide half of China’s present gas consumption.
Such a vital economic lifeline requires security guarantee and China is going about that task in its usual way by creating “win-win” situations with its Central Asian partners. In sharp contrast to the predatory instincts of western companies that zero in on the region’s huge untapped mineral resources and rare earths, China is stepping in with a comprehensive engagement plan based on equity and mutual trust and partnership that promises uplift of the Central Asian economies from their post-Soviet trough.
From Beijing’s perspective, the security of Central Asia (and Afghanistan) becomes integral to Xinjiang’s stability, apart from China’s overall energy security, which heavily depends at present on the extended supply routes via the U.S-controlled Malacca Straits that can prove a choke point. Flush with surplus capital, China, therefore, is showing the will to invest in Central Asia’s prosperity and stability and thereby create a matrix of mutual dependence. The West cannot cope with this audacity. The London-based Economist Intelligence Unit estimates an 8 per cent growth rate for China’s economy, whereas overall contractions of 2 and 4 per cent are forecast for the U.S. and the eurozone economies.
Two, the West would have ideally liked a clash of interests between China and Russia in Central Asia. But the emerging paradigm is instead pointing in the direction of a convergence of mutual interests. With the global downturn and the deep economic recession plus the sharp fall in energy export revenues, Moscow is accepting China’s investments as the only realistic way out for the development of the vast Russian Far East and Siberia as well as Central Asia. In May, President Dmitry Medvedev openly called for a tandem approach by Moscow and Beijing to the RFE and Siberia’s development, on the one hand, and the resuscitation of China’s dilapidated northeastern industrial base, on the other.
Russia is pleased that Central Asia has no pressing need for alternative U.S.-backed gas pipelines headed for Europe. Russia and China have a shared interest in keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the U.S. out of Central Asia. Both harbour misgivings about a hidden U.S. agenda of keeping open-ended military presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan and of manipulating Islamist elements as instruments of geopolitics. Both search for ways to influence a swift “Afghanisation” of the war that paves the way for the vacation of foreign occupation.
Three, a U.S. attempt to draw the Central Asian states into the AfPak is indeed apparent. The day after the commissioning of China’s Central Asia pipeline, the U.S. State department stated in a testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “The [Central Asian] region is at the fulcrum of key U.S. security, economic, and political interests. It demands attention and respect and our most diligent efforts … any examination of U.S. policy towards Central Asia must start with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan … We [the Obama administration] have begun to establish high-level mechanisms with each country in Central Asia, featuring a structured annual dialogue to strengthen ties and build practical cooperation.”
Never before has the U.S. Central Asia policy been framed in such priority terms. It doesn’t need much ingenuity to estimate that the U.S. “surge” on Kandahar, which is projected in terms of the Taliban challenge, can be seen in a broader perspective. A recent study by the influential Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington says: “Kandahar is the key road connection between the new Pakistani port of Gwadar and Afghanistan and, beyond that, all Central Asia, Europe, and much of the Middle East. Pakistan began the development of Gwadar with aid from China and has now engaged Singapore for the second phase of work … On Gwadar, the interests of the U.S, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are aligned … With Kandahar now in its eye, the U.S. should plan to build on future success there by making the opening to Gwadar a high priority … Pentagon officials estimate the cost of upgrading this connection at about $1 billion.” Obviously, any U.S. contingency plan would need to overcome the regional powers’ “more specific interests and competitive inclinations that obstruct” the U.S. grand design. The CSIS report names China, India, Iran and Russia and flags the “sustained insecurity in Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and other parts of Eurasia” as the challenge to the overall U.S. strategy.
Clearly, these new templates in regional security underscore that India’s normalisation with China increasingly assumes a regional dimension. This needs to be seriously factored in as the two countries sit down for the next phase of relations. As the distinguished former Indian diplomat and respected China scholar, Ambassador C.V. Ranganathan, put it recently, “Our shared neighbourhood should come on the agenda of serious discussions extending to concentric circles of expanding the dialogue to include all the primary parties affected by the situation in the AfPak region.”
China has remarkably transformed in the past quarter century. All indications are that it has no inclination to fish in the troubled India-Pakistan waters. On the contrary, as a Xinhua commentary pointed out last week, “For solving the dispute over the Mumbai attacks [of 26 November 2008], India and Pakistan should count on bilateral efforts to reduce tension rather than allow the situation being further complicated by other issues such as the U.S.-led Afghan War.” Plainly put, the China discourses of our strategic community are caught in a time warp. Stereotyped thinking should not impede new pathways from being opened in strengthening regional security.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
Wednesday 30 December 2009
Tuesday 29 December 2009
RISE AND RISE OF CHINA
In the race of history used to judge the largest and most powerful of nations, growth has always been a key statistic.
And as this decade comes to a close, China is racing ahead of the competition.
News reports from last weekend suggest that China, which only in 2008 overtook Germany to become the world s third largest economy, may well have beaten Japan to take second place. For China, this takes into account both a recent upward revision of its 2008 gross domestic product (GDP) growth from 9% to 9.6% bringing its 2008 nominal GDP to $4.6 trillion and a government estimate that the economy will grow by 8% in 2009. For Japan, whose GDP at the end of 2008 stood at $4.9 trillion, this takes into account an estimated 6.6% contraction for 2009.
Yet, it was only 30 years ago that Deng Xiaoping ushered in economic reforms. This rapid ascendance gives much fodder for thought to the world economy.
China makes economists ask that perennial question again: What causes growth? Some of the factors that stimulated China s growth were textbook ones: high savings, a large labour build-up, and massive capital allocations. Yet, perhaps the key factor is one relatively unseen in the Asian Tigers growth postWorld War II: a large jump in productivity. As far as the growth rule book was set by the rise of, say, Korea, China s boom, stimulated by more than capital investment, has gone against the grain of traditional models.
China forces even those averse to state intervention to reconsider the extent of it. After all, China s policymaking has been far from convention for market economies whatever the world may think of it. Sometimes, this is simple mercantilism in the form of subsidies.
But, at other times, it s a gamechanging policy the creation, for instance, of special economic zones around coastal areas: low-tax, low regulatory environments where industries quickly thrived in the 1980s.
Such a rise may also alter how nations now compete for scarce resources. China suddenly finds itself in a dominant position few share, one that is self-reinforcing: This position makes it easier for Beijing, rather than New Delhi, to gain access to, say, oil.
Unconventional policies, combined with new resources, could give China a booster engine in this race. Consider that the 2003 Goldman Sachs Dreaming with BRICs report suggested that China would overtake Japan only in 2015.
That prediction was off by five years. So now, the US economy, whose dominance China was supposed to end only after 2040, had better start watching out.
In the race of history used to judge the largest and most powerful of nations, growth has always been a key statistic.
And as this decade comes to a close, China is racing ahead of the competition.
News reports from last weekend suggest that China, which only in 2008 overtook Germany to become the world s third largest economy, may well have beaten Japan to take second place. For China, this takes into account both a recent upward revision of its 2008 gross domestic product (GDP) growth from 9% to 9.6% bringing its 2008 nominal GDP to $4.6 trillion and a government estimate that the economy will grow by 8% in 2009. For Japan, whose GDP at the end of 2008 stood at $4.9 trillion, this takes into account an estimated 6.6% contraction for 2009.
Yet, it was only 30 years ago that Deng Xiaoping ushered in economic reforms. This rapid ascendance gives much fodder for thought to the world economy.
China makes economists ask that perennial question again: What causes growth? Some of the factors that stimulated China s growth were textbook ones: high savings, a large labour build-up, and massive capital allocations. Yet, perhaps the key factor is one relatively unseen in the Asian Tigers growth postWorld War II: a large jump in productivity. As far as the growth rule book was set by the rise of, say, Korea, China s boom, stimulated by more than capital investment, has gone against the grain of traditional models.
China forces even those averse to state intervention to reconsider the extent of it. After all, China s policymaking has been far from convention for market economies whatever the world may think of it. Sometimes, this is simple mercantilism in the form of subsidies.
But, at other times, it s a gamechanging policy the creation, for instance, of special economic zones around coastal areas: low-tax, low regulatory environments where industries quickly thrived in the 1980s.
Such a rise may also alter how nations now compete for scarce resources. China suddenly finds itself in a dominant position few share, one that is self-reinforcing: This position makes it easier for Beijing, rather than New Delhi, to gain access to, say, oil.
Unconventional policies, combined with new resources, could give China a booster engine in this race. Consider that the 2003 Goldman Sachs Dreaming with BRICs report suggested that China would overtake Japan only in 2015.
That prediction was off by five years. So now, the US economy, whose dominance China was supposed to end only after 2040, had better start watching out.
Powering a dynamic, multipolar Asia
Brahma Chellaney
Given that the balance of power in Asia will be determined by events as much in the Indian Ocean rim as in East Asia, India and Japan have to work together to promote peace and stability.
The visit of the new Japanese Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, is part of Japan’s growing economic and strategic engagement with India. Japan and India indeed are natural allies because they have no conflict of strategic interest and actually share common goals to build stability, power equilibrium and institutionalised multilateral cooperation in Asia. There is neither any negative historical legacy nor a single outstanding political issue between them. If anything, each country enjoys a high positive rating with the public in the other state.
Mr. Hatoyama’s year-end visit, fulfilling a bilateral commitment to hold an annual summit meeting, shows he is keen to maintain the priority on closer engagement with India that was set in motion by his predecessors, Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), now in the opposition. Mr. Hatoyama came to office vowing to reorient Japanese foreign policy and seek an “equal” relationship with the United States. But he and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) had said little on India.
Today, just when America’s Sino-centric Asia policy has became unmistakable, Mr. Hatoyama’s government has put Washington on notice that Japan cannot indefinitely remain a faithful servant of U.S. policies. With Tokyo seeking to rework a 2006 basing deal with the U.S., besides announcing an end to the eight-year-old Indian Ocean refuelling mission in support of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, Japan no longer can be regarded as a constant in America’s Asia policy. This has been further highlighted by Mr. Hatoyama’s re-examination of a secret agreement between the LDP and the U.S. over a subject that is highly sensitive in the only country to fall victim to nuclear attack — the storage or trans-shipment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan.
Against this background, New Delhi must be pleased that Mr. Hatoyama’s visit signals continuity in Tokyo’s India policy. It also shows that at a time when Asia is in transition, with the spectre of power disequilibrium looming large, Tokyo wishes to invest in closer economic and strategic bonds with India.
As Asia’s first modern economic success story, Japan has always inspired other Asian states. Now, with the emergence of new economic tigers and the ascent of China and India, Asia is collectively bouncing back from nearly two centuries of historical decline.
The most far-reaching but least-noticed development in Asia in the new century has been Japan’s political resurgence — a trend set in motion by Mr. Koizumi and expected to be accelerated by Mr. Hatoyama’s efforts to realign the relationship with the U.S. With Japanese pride and assertiveness rising, the nationalist impulse has become conspicuous at a time when China is headed to overtake Japan as the world’s second largest economy by the end of next year.
Long used to practising passive, cheque-book diplomacy, Tokyo now seems intent on influencing Asia’s power balance. A series of subtle moves has signalled Japan’s aim to break out of its post-war pacifist cocoon. One sign is the emphasis on defence modernisation. Japan’s navy, except in the nuclear sphere, is already the most sophisticated and powerful in Asia. China’s rise has prompted Japan to strengthen its military alliance with the U.S. But in the long run, Japan is likely to move to a more independent security posture.
Although the two demographic titans, China and India, loom large in popular perceptions on where Asia is headed economically, the much-smaller Japan is likely to remain a global economic powerhouse for the foreseeable future. Given the size of Japan’s economy — its GDP was just under $5 trillion in 2008 — annual Japanese growth of just 2 per cent translates into about $100 billion a year in additional output, or nearly the entire annual GDP of small economies like Singapore and the Philippines. Still, given China’s rapid economic strides, Japan has been readying itself for the day when it is eclipsed economically by its neighbour.
Leading-edge technologies and a commitment to craftsmanship are expected to power Japan’s future prosperity, just as they did its past growth. Its competitive edge, however, is threatened by the economic and social implications of a declining birth-rate and ageing population. With a fertility rate of just 1.37 babies per woman in 2008 — America’s is 2.12 — Japanese deaths have started surpassing births in recent years. Permitting immigration on a large scale is no easy task for the Japanese homogenised society. But just as Japan has come to live with the discomforting fact that today’s top sumo wrestlers are not Japanese, it will have to open its research institutions and factories to foreigners in order to raise productivity.
India and Japan, although dissimilar economically, have a lot in common politically. They are Asia’s largest democracies, but with messy politics and endemic scandals. Mr. Hatoyama, in office for just three months, has already come under pressure following the indictment of two former secretaries over a funding scandal. In both Japan and India, the Prime Minister is not the most powerful politician in his own party. Fractured politics in both countries crimps their ability to think and act long term. Yet, just as India has progressed from doctrinaire nonalignment to geopolitical pragmatism, Japan — the “Land of the Rising Sun” — is moving toward greater realism in its economic and foreign policies.
Their growing congruence of strategic interests led to the 2008 Japan-India security agreement, a significant milestone in building Asian power stability. A constellation of Asian states linked by strategic cooperation and sharing common interests is becoming critical to ensuring equilibrium at a time when major shifts in economic and political power are accentuating Asia’s security challenges. After all, not only is Asia becoming the pivot of global geopolitical change, but Asian challenges are also playing into international strategic challenges.
The Indo-Japanese security agreement, signed when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Tokyo in October 2008, was modelled on the March 2007 Australia-Japan defence accord. Now the Indo-Japanese security agreement has spawned a similar Indo-Australian accord, signed when Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd came to New Delhi last month. As a result, the structure and even large parts of the content of the three security agreements — between Japan and Australia, India and Japan, and India and Australia — are alike.
Actually, all three are in the form of a joint declaration on security cooperation. And all of them, while recognising a common commitment to democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, obligate their signatories to work together to build not just bilateral defence cooperation, but also security in Asia. They are designed as agreements to enhance mutual security between equals. By contrast, the U.S.-India defence agreement, with its emphasis on arms sales, force interoperability and intelligence sharing — elements not found is Australia-Japan, India-Japan and India-Australia accords — is aimed more at undergirding U.S. interests.
The key point is that the path has been opened to adding strategic content to the Indo-Japanese relationship, underscored by the growing number of bilateral visits by top defence and military officials. As part of their “strategic and global partnership,” India and Japan are working on joint initiatives on maritime security, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, disaster prevention and management, and energy security. But they need to go much further.
India and Japan, for example, must co-develop defence systems. India and Japan have missile-defence cooperation with Israel and the U.S., respectively. There is no reason why they should not work together on missile defence and on other technologies for mutual defence. There is no ban on weapon exports in Japan’s U.S.-imposed Constitution, only a long-standing Cabinet decision. That ban has been loosened, with Tokyo in recent years inserting elasticity to export weapons for peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism and anti-piracy. The original Cabinet decision, in any event, relates to weapons, not technologies.
As two legitimate aspirants to new permanent seats at the U.N. Security Council, India and Japan should work together to persuade existing veto holders to allow the Council’s long-pending reform. They must try to convince China in particular that Asian peace and stability would be better served if all three major powers in Asia are in the Council as permanent members. Never before have China, Japan and India all been strong at the same time. Today, they need to find ways to reconcile their interests in Asia so that they can coexist peacefully and prosper.
(Brahma Chellaney is professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi and the author of Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan, with a new U.S. edition scheduled for release in March.)
Brahma Chellaney
Given that the balance of power in Asia will be determined by events as much in the Indian Ocean rim as in East Asia, India and Japan have to work together to promote peace and stability.
The visit of the new Japanese Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, is part of Japan’s growing economic and strategic engagement with India. Japan and India indeed are natural allies because they have no conflict of strategic interest and actually share common goals to build stability, power equilibrium and institutionalised multilateral cooperation in Asia. There is neither any negative historical legacy nor a single outstanding political issue between them. If anything, each country enjoys a high positive rating with the public in the other state.
Mr. Hatoyama’s year-end visit, fulfilling a bilateral commitment to hold an annual summit meeting, shows he is keen to maintain the priority on closer engagement with India that was set in motion by his predecessors, Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), now in the opposition. Mr. Hatoyama came to office vowing to reorient Japanese foreign policy and seek an “equal” relationship with the United States. But he and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) had said little on India.
Today, just when America’s Sino-centric Asia policy has became unmistakable, Mr. Hatoyama’s government has put Washington on notice that Japan cannot indefinitely remain a faithful servant of U.S. policies. With Tokyo seeking to rework a 2006 basing deal with the U.S., besides announcing an end to the eight-year-old Indian Ocean refuelling mission in support of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, Japan no longer can be regarded as a constant in America’s Asia policy. This has been further highlighted by Mr. Hatoyama’s re-examination of a secret agreement between the LDP and the U.S. over a subject that is highly sensitive in the only country to fall victim to nuclear attack — the storage or trans-shipment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan.
Against this background, New Delhi must be pleased that Mr. Hatoyama’s visit signals continuity in Tokyo’s India policy. It also shows that at a time when Asia is in transition, with the spectre of power disequilibrium looming large, Tokyo wishes to invest in closer economic and strategic bonds with India.
As Asia’s first modern economic success story, Japan has always inspired other Asian states. Now, with the emergence of new economic tigers and the ascent of China and India, Asia is collectively bouncing back from nearly two centuries of historical decline.
The most far-reaching but least-noticed development in Asia in the new century has been Japan’s political resurgence — a trend set in motion by Mr. Koizumi and expected to be accelerated by Mr. Hatoyama’s efforts to realign the relationship with the U.S. With Japanese pride and assertiveness rising, the nationalist impulse has become conspicuous at a time when China is headed to overtake Japan as the world’s second largest economy by the end of next year.
Long used to practising passive, cheque-book diplomacy, Tokyo now seems intent on influencing Asia’s power balance. A series of subtle moves has signalled Japan’s aim to break out of its post-war pacifist cocoon. One sign is the emphasis on defence modernisation. Japan’s navy, except in the nuclear sphere, is already the most sophisticated and powerful in Asia. China’s rise has prompted Japan to strengthen its military alliance with the U.S. But in the long run, Japan is likely to move to a more independent security posture.
Although the two demographic titans, China and India, loom large in popular perceptions on where Asia is headed economically, the much-smaller Japan is likely to remain a global economic powerhouse for the foreseeable future. Given the size of Japan’s economy — its GDP was just under $5 trillion in 2008 — annual Japanese growth of just 2 per cent translates into about $100 billion a year in additional output, or nearly the entire annual GDP of small economies like Singapore and the Philippines. Still, given China’s rapid economic strides, Japan has been readying itself for the day when it is eclipsed economically by its neighbour.
Leading-edge technologies and a commitment to craftsmanship are expected to power Japan’s future prosperity, just as they did its past growth. Its competitive edge, however, is threatened by the economic and social implications of a declining birth-rate and ageing population. With a fertility rate of just 1.37 babies per woman in 2008 — America’s is 2.12 — Japanese deaths have started surpassing births in recent years. Permitting immigration on a large scale is no easy task for the Japanese homogenised society. But just as Japan has come to live with the discomforting fact that today’s top sumo wrestlers are not Japanese, it will have to open its research institutions and factories to foreigners in order to raise productivity.
India and Japan, although dissimilar economically, have a lot in common politically. They are Asia’s largest democracies, but with messy politics and endemic scandals. Mr. Hatoyama, in office for just three months, has already come under pressure following the indictment of two former secretaries over a funding scandal. In both Japan and India, the Prime Minister is not the most powerful politician in his own party. Fractured politics in both countries crimps their ability to think and act long term. Yet, just as India has progressed from doctrinaire nonalignment to geopolitical pragmatism, Japan — the “Land of the Rising Sun” — is moving toward greater realism in its economic and foreign policies.
Their growing congruence of strategic interests led to the 2008 Japan-India security agreement, a significant milestone in building Asian power stability. A constellation of Asian states linked by strategic cooperation and sharing common interests is becoming critical to ensuring equilibrium at a time when major shifts in economic and political power are accentuating Asia’s security challenges. After all, not only is Asia becoming the pivot of global geopolitical change, but Asian challenges are also playing into international strategic challenges.
The Indo-Japanese security agreement, signed when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Tokyo in October 2008, was modelled on the March 2007 Australia-Japan defence accord. Now the Indo-Japanese security agreement has spawned a similar Indo-Australian accord, signed when Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd came to New Delhi last month. As a result, the structure and even large parts of the content of the three security agreements — between Japan and Australia, India and Japan, and India and Australia — are alike.
Actually, all three are in the form of a joint declaration on security cooperation. And all of them, while recognising a common commitment to democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, obligate their signatories to work together to build not just bilateral defence cooperation, but also security in Asia. They are designed as agreements to enhance mutual security between equals. By contrast, the U.S.-India defence agreement, with its emphasis on arms sales, force interoperability and intelligence sharing — elements not found is Australia-Japan, India-Japan and India-Australia accords — is aimed more at undergirding U.S. interests.
The key point is that the path has been opened to adding strategic content to the Indo-Japanese relationship, underscored by the growing number of bilateral visits by top defence and military officials. As part of their “strategic and global partnership,” India and Japan are working on joint initiatives on maritime security, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, disaster prevention and management, and energy security. But they need to go much further.
India and Japan, for example, must co-develop defence systems. India and Japan have missile-defence cooperation with Israel and the U.S., respectively. There is no reason why they should not work together on missile defence and on other technologies for mutual defence. There is no ban on weapon exports in Japan’s U.S.-imposed Constitution, only a long-standing Cabinet decision. That ban has been loosened, with Tokyo in recent years inserting elasticity to export weapons for peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism and anti-piracy. The original Cabinet decision, in any event, relates to weapons, not technologies.
As two legitimate aspirants to new permanent seats at the U.N. Security Council, India and Japan should work together to persuade existing veto holders to allow the Council’s long-pending reform. They must try to convince China in particular that Asian peace and stability would be better served if all three major powers in Asia are in the Council as permanent members. Never before have China, Japan and India all been strong at the same time. Today, they need to find ways to reconcile their interests in Asia so that they can coexist peacefully and prosper.
(Brahma Chellaney is professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi and the author of Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan, with a new U.S. edition scheduled for release in March.)
Internal Divisions and the Chinese Stimulus Plan
Source: STRATFOR Intelligence
January 23, 2009 |
By Rodger Baker and Jennifer Richmond
China’s Economic Imbalance
Due in large part to fears of dire consequences if nothing were done to tackle the economic crisis, China rushed through a 4 trillion yuan (US$586 billion) economic stimulus package in November 2008. The plan cobbled together existing and new initiatives focused on massive infrastructure development projects (designed, among other things, to soak up surplus steel, cement and labor capacity), tax cuts, green energy programs, and rural development.
Ever since the package was passed in November, Beijing has recited the mantra of the need to shift China’s economy from its heavy dependence on exports to one more driven by domestic consumption. But now that the sense of immediate crisis has passed, the stimulus policies are being rethought — and in an unusual development for China, they are being vigorously debated in the Chinese media.
Debating the Stimulus Package
In a country where media restrictions are tightening and private commentary on government officials and actions in blogs and online forums is being curtailed, it is quite remarkable that major Chinese newspaper editorials are taking the lead in questioning aspects of the stimulus package.
The question of stimulating rural consumption versus focusing the stimulus on the more economically active coastal regions has been the subject of particularly fierce debate. Some editorials have argued that encouraging rural consumption at a time of higher unemployment is building a bigger problem for the future. This argument maintains that rural laborers — particularly migrant workers — earn only a small amount of money, and that while having them spend their meager savings now might keep gross domestic product up in the short term, it will drain the laborers’ reserves and create a bigger social problem down the road. Others argue that the migrant and rural populations are underdeveloped and incapable of sustained spending, and that pumping stimulus yuan into the countryside is a misallocation of money that could be better spent supporting the urban middle class, in theory creating jobs through increased middle-class consumption of services.
The lack of restrictions on these types of discussions suggests that the debate is occurring with government approval, in a reflection of debates within the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the government itself. Despite debate in the Chinese press, Beijing continues to present a unified public face on the handling of the economic crisis, regardless of internal factional debates. Maintaining Party control remains the primary goal of Party officials; even if they disagree over policies, they recognize the importance of showing that the Party remains in charge.
But, as the dueling editorial pages reveal, the Party is not unified in its assessment of the economic crisis or the recovery program. The show of unity masks a power struggle raging between competing interests within the Party. In many ways, this is not a new struggle; there are always officials jockeying for power for themselves and for their protégés. But the depth of the economic crisis in China and the rising fears of social unrest — not only from the migrant laborers, but also from militants or separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang and from “hostile forces” like the Falun Gong, pro-Democracy advocates and foreign intelligence services — have added urgency to long-standing debates over economic and social policies.
In China, decision-making falls to the president and the premier, currently Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao respectively. They do not wield the power of past leaders like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, however, and instead are much more reliant on balancing competing interests than on dictating policy.
Party and Government Factions
Hu and Wen face numerous factions among the Chinese elite. Many officials are considered parts of several different factional affiliations based on age, background, education or family heritage. Boiled down, the struggle over the stimulus plan pits two competing views of the core of the Chinese economy. One sees economic strength and social stability centered on China’s massive rural population, while another sees China’s strength and future in the coastal urban areas, in manufacturing and global trade.
Two key figures in the Standing Committee of the Politburo (the center of political power in China), Vice President Xi Jinping and Vice Premier Li Keqiang, highlight this struggle. These two are considered the core of the fifth-generation leadership, and have been tapped to succeed Hu and Wen as China’s next leaders. They also represent radically different backgrounds.
Li is a protege of Hu and rose from the China Youth League, where Hu has built a strong support base. Li represents a newer generation of Chinese leaders, educated in economics and trained in less-developed provinces. (Li held key positions in Henan and Liaoning provinces.) Xi, on the other hand, is a “princeling.” The son of a former vice premier, he trained as an engineer and served primarily in the coastal export-oriented areas, including Hebei, Fujian and Zhejiang provinces and Shanghai.
In a way, Li and Xi represent different proposals for China’s economic recovery and future. Li is a stronger supporter of the recentralization of economic control sought by Hu, a weakening of the regional economic power bases, and a focus on consolidating Chinese industry in a centrally planned manner while spending government money on rural development and urbanization of China’s interior. Xi represents the view followed by former President Jiang Zemin and descended from the policies of Deng. Under that view, economic activity and growth should be encouraged and largely freed from central direction, and if the coastal provinces grow first and faster, that is just fine; eventually the money, technology and employment will move inland.
Inland vs. the Coast
In many ways, these two views reflect long-standing economic arguments in China — namely, the constant struggle to balance the coastal trade-based economy and the interior agriculture-dominated economy. The former is smaller but wealthier, with stronger ties abroad — and therefore more political power to lobby for preferential treatment. The latter is much larger, but more isolated from the international community — and in Chinese history, frequently the source of instability and revolt in times of stress. These tensions have contributed to the decline of dynasties in centuries past, opening the space for foreign interference in Chinese internal politics. China’s leaders are well aware of the constant stresses between rural and coastal China, but maintaining a balance has been an ongoing struggle.
Throughout Chinese history, there is a repeating pattern of dynastic rise and decline. Dynasties start strong and powerful, usually through conquest. They then consolidate power and exert strong control from the center. But due to the sheer size of China’s territory and population, maintaining central control requires the steady expansion of a bureaucracy that spreads from the center through the various administrative divisions down to the local villages. Over time, the bureaucracy itself begins to usurp power, as its serves as the collector of taxes, distributor of government funds and local arbiter of policy and rights. And as the bureaucracy grows stronger, the center weakens.
Regional differences in population, tax base and economic models start to fragment the bureaucracy, leading to economic (and at times military) fiefdoms. This triggers a strong response from the center as it tries to regain control. Following a period of instability, which often involves foreign interference and/or intervention, a new center is formed, once again exerting strong centralized authority.
This cycle played out in the mid-1600s, as the Ming Dynasty fell into decline and the Manchus (who took on the moniker Qing) swept in to create a new centralized authority. It played out again as the Qing Dynasty declined in the latter half of the 1800s and ultimately was replaced — after an extended period of instability — by the CPC in 1949, ushering in another period of strong centralized control. Once again, a more powerful regional bureaucracy is testing that centralized control.
The economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping at the end of the 1970s led to a three-decade decline of central authority, as economic decision-making and power devolved to the regional and local leadership and the export-oriented coastal provinces became the center of economic activity and power in China. Attempts by the central government to regain some authority over the direction of coastal authorities were repeatedly ignored (or worse), but so long as there was growth in China and relative social stability, this was tolerated.
With Hu’s rise to power, however, there was a new push from the center to rein in the worst of excesses by the coastal leaders and business interests and refocus attention on China’s rural population, which was growing increasingly disenfranchised due to the widening urban-rural economic gap. In 2007 and early 2008, Hu finally gained traction with his economic policies. The Chinese government subsequently sought to slow an overheating economy while focusing on the consolidation of industry and the establishment of “superministries” at the center to coordinate economic activity. It also intended to put inland rural interests on par with — if not above — coastal urban interests. When the superministries were formed in 2008, however, it became apparent that Hu was not omnipotent. Resistance to his plans was abundantly evident, illustrating the power of the entrenched bureaucratic interests.
Economic Crisis and the Stimulus Plan
The economic program of recentralization and the attempt to slow the overheating economy came to a screeching halt in July 2008, as skyrocketing commodity prices fueled inflation and strained government budgets. The first victim was China’s yuan policy. The steady, relatively predictable appreciation of the yuan came to a stop. Its value stagnated, and there is now pressure for a slight depreciation to encourage exports. But as Beijing began shaping its economic stimulus package, it became clear that the program would be a mix of policies, representing differing factions seeking to secure their own interests in the recovery plan.
The emerging program, then, revealed conflicting interests and policies. Money and incentives were offered to feed the low-skill export industry (located primarily in the southeastern coastal provinces) as well as to encourage a shift in production from the coast to the interior. A drive was initiated to reduce redundancies, particularly in heavy industries, and at the same time funding was increased to keep those often-bloated industrial sectors afloat. Overall, the stimulus represents a collection of competing initiatives, reflecting the differences among the factions. Entrenched princelings simply want to keep money moving and employment levels up in anticipation of a resurgence in global consumption and the revitalization of the export-based economic growth path. Meanwhile, the rural faction seeks to accelerate economic restructuring, reduce dependence on the export-oriented coastal provinces, and move economic activity and attention to the vastly underdeveloped interior.
Higher unemployment among the rural labor force is “proving” each faction’s case. To the princelings, it shows the importance of the export sector in maintaining social stability and economic growth. To the rural faction, it emphasizes the dangers of overreliance on a thin coastal strip of cheap, low-skill labor and a widening wealth gap.
Fighting it Out in the Media
With conflicting paths now running in tandem, competing Party officials are seeking traction and support for their programs without showing division within the core Party apparatus by turning to a traditional method: the media and editorials. During the Cultural Revolution, which itself was a violent debate about the fundamental economic policies of the People’s Republic of China, the Party core appeared united, despite major divisions. The debate played out not in the halls of the National People’s Congress or in press statements, but instead in big-character posters plastered around Beijing and other cities, promoting competing policies and criticizing others.
In modern China, big posters are a thing of the past, replaced by newspaper editorials. While the Party center appears united in this time of economic crisis, the divisions are seen more acutely in the competing editorials published in state and local newspapers and on influential blogs and Web discussion forums. It is here that the depth of competition and debate so well hidden among the members of the Politburo can be seen, and it is here that it becomes clear the Chinese are no more united in their policy approach than the leaders of more democratic countries, where policy debates are more public.
The current political crisis has certainly not reached the levels of the Cultural Revolution, and China no longer has a Mao — or even a Deng — to serve as a single pole around which to wage factional struggles. The current leadership is much more attuned to the need to cooperate and compromise — and even Mao’s methods would often include opportunities for “wayward” officials to come around and cooperate with Mao’s plans. But a recognition of the need to cooperate, and an agreement that the first priority is maintenance of the Party as the sole core of Chinese power (followed closely by the need to maintain social stability to ensure the primary goal), doesn’t guarantee that things can’t get out of control.
The sudden halt to various economic initiatives in July 2008 showed just how critical the emerging crisis was. If commodity prices had not started slacking off a month later, the political crisis in Beijing might have gotten much more intense. Despite competition, the various factions want the Party to remain in power as the sole authority, but their disagreements on how to do this become much clearer during a crisis. Currently, it is the question of China’s migrant labor force and the potential for social unrest that is both keeping the Party center united and causing the most confrontation over the best-path policies to be pursued. If the economic stimulus package fails to do its job, or if external factors leave China lagging and social problems rising, the internal party fighting could once again grow intense.
At present, there is a sense among China’s leaders that this crisis is manageable. If their attitude once again shifts to abject fear, the question may be less about how to compromise on economic strategy than how to stop a competing faction from bringing ruin to Party and country through ill-thought-out policies. Compromise is acceptable when it means the survival of the Party, but if one faction views the actions of another as fundamentally detrimental to the authority and strength of the Party, then a more active and decisive struggle becomes the ideal choice. After all, it is better to remove a gangrenous limb than to allow the infection to spread and kill the whole organism.
That crisis is not now upon China’s leaders, but things nearly reached that level last summer. There were numerous rumors from Beijing that Wen, who is responsible for China’s economic policies, was going to be sacked — an extreme move given his popularity with the common Chinese. This was staved off or delayed by the fortuitous timing of the rest of the global economic contraction, which brought commodity prices down. For now, China’s leaders will continue issuing competing and occasionally contradictory policies, and just as vigorously debating them through the nation’s editorials. The government is struggling with resolving the current economic crisis, as well as with the fundamental question of just what a new Chinese economy will look like. And that question goes deeper than money: It goes to the very role of the CPC in China’s system.
Source: STRATFOR Intelligence
January 23, 2009 |
By Rodger Baker and Jennifer Richmond
China’s Economic Imbalance
Due in large part to fears of dire consequences if nothing were done to tackle the economic crisis, China rushed through a 4 trillion yuan (US$586 billion) economic stimulus package in November 2008. The plan cobbled together existing and new initiatives focused on massive infrastructure development projects (designed, among other things, to soak up surplus steel, cement and labor capacity), tax cuts, green energy programs, and rural development.
Ever since the package was passed in November, Beijing has recited the mantra of the need to shift China’s economy from its heavy dependence on exports to one more driven by domestic consumption. But now that the sense of immediate crisis has passed, the stimulus policies are being rethought — and in an unusual development for China, they are being vigorously debated in the Chinese media.
Debating the Stimulus Package
In a country where media restrictions are tightening and private commentary on government officials and actions in blogs and online forums is being curtailed, it is quite remarkable that major Chinese newspaper editorials are taking the lead in questioning aspects of the stimulus package.
The question of stimulating rural consumption versus focusing the stimulus on the more economically active coastal regions has been the subject of particularly fierce debate. Some editorials have argued that encouraging rural consumption at a time of higher unemployment is building a bigger problem for the future. This argument maintains that rural laborers — particularly migrant workers — earn only a small amount of money, and that while having them spend their meager savings now might keep gross domestic product up in the short term, it will drain the laborers’ reserves and create a bigger social problem down the road. Others argue that the migrant and rural populations are underdeveloped and incapable of sustained spending, and that pumping stimulus yuan into the countryside is a misallocation of money that could be better spent supporting the urban middle class, in theory creating jobs through increased middle-class consumption of services.
The lack of restrictions on these types of discussions suggests that the debate is occurring with government approval, in a reflection of debates within the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the government itself. Despite debate in the Chinese press, Beijing continues to present a unified public face on the handling of the economic crisis, regardless of internal factional debates. Maintaining Party control remains the primary goal of Party officials; even if they disagree over policies, they recognize the importance of showing that the Party remains in charge.
But, as the dueling editorial pages reveal, the Party is not unified in its assessment of the economic crisis or the recovery program. The show of unity masks a power struggle raging between competing interests within the Party. In many ways, this is not a new struggle; there are always officials jockeying for power for themselves and for their protégés. But the depth of the economic crisis in China and the rising fears of social unrest — not only from the migrant laborers, but also from militants or separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang and from “hostile forces” like the Falun Gong, pro-Democracy advocates and foreign intelligence services — have added urgency to long-standing debates over economic and social policies.
In China, decision-making falls to the president and the premier, currently Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao respectively. They do not wield the power of past leaders like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, however, and instead are much more reliant on balancing competing interests than on dictating policy.
Party and Government Factions
Hu and Wen face numerous factions among the Chinese elite. Many officials are considered parts of several different factional affiliations based on age, background, education or family heritage. Boiled down, the struggle over the stimulus plan pits two competing views of the core of the Chinese economy. One sees economic strength and social stability centered on China’s massive rural population, while another sees China’s strength and future in the coastal urban areas, in manufacturing and global trade.
Two key figures in the Standing Committee of the Politburo (the center of political power in China), Vice President Xi Jinping and Vice Premier Li Keqiang, highlight this struggle. These two are considered the core of the fifth-generation leadership, and have been tapped to succeed Hu and Wen as China’s next leaders. They also represent radically different backgrounds.
Li is a protege of Hu and rose from the China Youth League, where Hu has built a strong support base. Li represents a newer generation of Chinese leaders, educated in economics and trained in less-developed provinces. (Li held key positions in Henan and Liaoning provinces.) Xi, on the other hand, is a “princeling.” The son of a former vice premier, he trained as an engineer and served primarily in the coastal export-oriented areas, including Hebei, Fujian and Zhejiang provinces and Shanghai.
In a way, Li and Xi represent different proposals for China’s economic recovery and future. Li is a stronger supporter of the recentralization of economic control sought by Hu, a weakening of the regional economic power bases, and a focus on consolidating Chinese industry in a centrally planned manner while spending government money on rural development and urbanization of China’s interior. Xi represents the view followed by former President Jiang Zemin and descended from the policies of Deng. Under that view, economic activity and growth should be encouraged and largely freed from central direction, and if the coastal provinces grow first and faster, that is just fine; eventually the money, technology and employment will move inland.
Inland vs. the Coast
In many ways, these two views reflect long-standing economic arguments in China — namely, the constant struggle to balance the coastal trade-based economy and the interior agriculture-dominated economy. The former is smaller but wealthier, with stronger ties abroad — and therefore more political power to lobby for preferential treatment. The latter is much larger, but more isolated from the international community — and in Chinese history, frequently the source of instability and revolt in times of stress. These tensions have contributed to the decline of dynasties in centuries past, opening the space for foreign interference in Chinese internal politics. China’s leaders are well aware of the constant stresses between rural and coastal China, but maintaining a balance has been an ongoing struggle.
Throughout Chinese history, there is a repeating pattern of dynastic rise and decline. Dynasties start strong and powerful, usually through conquest. They then consolidate power and exert strong control from the center. But due to the sheer size of China’s territory and population, maintaining central control requires the steady expansion of a bureaucracy that spreads from the center through the various administrative divisions down to the local villages. Over time, the bureaucracy itself begins to usurp power, as its serves as the collector of taxes, distributor of government funds and local arbiter of policy and rights. And as the bureaucracy grows stronger, the center weakens.
Regional differences in population, tax base and economic models start to fragment the bureaucracy, leading to economic (and at times military) fiefdoms. This triggers a strong response from the center as it tries to regain control. Following a period of instability, which often involves foreign interference and/or intervention, a new center is formed, once again exerting strong centralized authority.
This cycle played out in the mid-1600s, as the Ming Dynasty fell into decline and the Manchus (who took on the moniker Qing) swept in to create a new centralized authority. It played out again as the Qing Dynasty declined in the latter half of the 1800s and ultimately was replaced — after an extended period of instability — by the CPC in 1949, ushering in another period of strong centralized control. Once again, a more powerful regional bureaucracy is testing that centralized control.
The economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping at the end of the 1970s led to a three-decade decline of central authority, as economic decision-making and power devolved to the regional and local leadership and the export-oriented coastal provinces became the center of economic activity and power in China. Attempts by the central government to regain some authority over the direction of coastal authorities were repeatedly ignored (or worse), but so long as there was growth in China and relative social stability, this was tolerated.
With Hu’s rise to power, however, there was a new push from the center to rein in the worst of excesses by the coastal leaders and business interests and refocus attention on China’s rural population, which was growing increasingly disenfranchised due to the widening urban-rural economic gap. In 2007 and early 2008, Hu finally gained traction with his economic policies. The Chinese government subsequently sought to slow an overheating economy while focusing on the consolidation of industry and the establishment of “superministries” at the center to coordinate economic activity. It also intended to put inland rural interests on par with — if not above — coastal urban interests. When the superministries were formed in 2008, however, it became apparent that Hu was not omnipotent. Resistance to his plans was abundantly evident, illustrating the power of the entrenched bureaucratic interests.
Economic Crisis and the Stimulus Plan
The economic program of recentralization and the attempt to slow the overheating economy came to a screeching halt in July 2008, as skyrocketing commodity prices fueled inflation and strained government budgets. The first victim was China’s yuan policy. The steady, relatively predictable appreciation of the yuan came to a stop. Its value stagnated, and there is now pressure for a slight depreciation to encourage exports. But as Beijing began shaping its economic stimulus package, it became clear that the program would be a mix of policies, representing differing factions seeking to secure their own interests in the recovery plan.
The emerging program, then, revealed conflicting interests and policies. Money and incentives were offered to feed the low-skill export industry (located primarily in the southeastern coastal provinces) as well as to encourage a shift in production from the coast to the interior. A drive was initiated to reduce redundancies, particularly in heavy industries, and at the same time funding was increased to keep those often-bloated industrial sectors afloat. Overall, the stimulus represents a collection of competing initiatives, reflecting the differences among the factions. Entrenched princelings simply want to keep money moving and employment levels up in anticipation of a resurgence in global consumption and the revitalization of the export-based economic growth path. Meanwhile, the rural faction seeks to accelerate economic restructuring, reduce dependence on the export-oriented coastal provinces, and move economic activity and attention to the vastly underdeveloped interior.
Higher unemployment among the rural labor force is “proving” each faction’s case. To the princelings, it shows the importance of the export sector in maintaining social stability and economic growth. To the rural faction, it emphasizes the dangers of overreliance on a thin coastal strip of cheap, low-skill labor and a widening wealth gap.
Fighting it Out in the Media
With conflicting paths now running in tandem, competing Party officials are seeking traction and support for their programs without showing division within the core Party apparatus by turning to a traditional method: the media and editorials. During the Cultural Revolution, which itself was a violent debate about the fundamental economic policies of the People’s Republic of China, the Party core appeared united, despite major divisions. The debate played out not in the halls of the National People’s Congress or in press statements, but instead in big-character posters plastered around Beijing and other cities, promoting competing policies and criticizing others.
In modern China, big posters are a thing of the past, replaced by newspaper editorials. While the Party center appears united in this time of economic crisis, the divisions are seen more acutely in the competing editorials published in state and local newspapers and on influential blogs and Web discussion forums. It is here that the depth of competition and debate so well hidden among the members of the Politburo can be seen, and it is here that it becomes clear the Chinese are no more united in their policy approach than the leaders of more democratic countries, where policy debates are more public.
The current political crisis has certainly not reached the levels of the Cultural Revolution, and China no longer has a Mao — or even a Deng — to serve as a single pole around which to wage factional struggles. The current leadership is much more attuned to the need to cooperate and compromise — and even Mao’s methods would often include opportunities for “wayward” officials to come around and cooperate with Mao’s plans. But a recognition of the need to cooperate, and an agreement that the first priority is maintenance of the Party as the sole core of Chinese power (followed closely by the need to maintain social stability to ensure the primary goal), doesn’t guarantee that things can’t get out of control.
The sudden halt to various economic initiatives in July 2008 showed just how critical the emerging crisis was. If commodity prices had not started slacking off a month later, the political crisis in Beijing might have gotten much more intense. Despite competition, the various factions want the Party to remain in power as the sole authority, but their disagreements on how to do this become much clearer during a crisis. Currently, it is the question of China’s migrant labor force and the potential for social unrest that is both keeping the Party center united and causing the most confrontation over the best-path policies to be pursued. If the economic stimulus package fails to do its job, or if external factors leave China lagging and social problems rising, the internal party fighting could once again grow intense.
At present, there is a sense among China’s leaders that this crisis is manageable. If their attitude once again shifts to abject fear, the question may be less about how to compromise on economic strategy than how to stop a competing faction from bringing ruin to Party and country through ill-thought-out policies. Compromise is acceptable when it means the survival of the Party, but if one faction views the actions of another as fundamentally detrimental to the authority and strength of the Party, then a more active and decisive struggle becomes the ideal choice. After all, it is better to remove a gangrenous limb than to allow the infection to spread and kill the whole organism.
That crisis is not now upon China’s leaders, but things nearly reached that level last summer. There were numerous rumors from Beijing that Wen, who is responsible for China’s economic policies, was going to be sacked — an extreme move given his popularity with the common Chinese. This was staved off or delayed by the fortuitous timing of the rest of the global economic contraction, which brought commodity prices down. For now, China’s leaders will continue issuing competing and occasionally contradictory policies, and just as vigorously debating them through the nation’s editorials. The government is struggling with resolving the current economic crisis, as well as with the fundamental question of just what a new Chinese economy will look like. And that question goes deeper than money: It goes to the very role of the CPC in China’s system.
Monday 28 December 2009
NEPAL: A Nepali passage to India
FROM MYREPUBLICA.COM
BY BISHNU SAPKOTA
English novelist EM Forster suggests in his celebrated novel A Passage to India that the Englishmen and the Indians can never be friends in the true sense. That was during the first decades of the twentieth century when the British still ruled India. It is now irrelevant whether or not the Britishers and Indians can be friends on a personal level. What is now relevant for us Nepalis is to reflect on whether or not Nepalis can be friends with Indians. Not that India has colonized Nepal like the British had colonized India. However, if colonialism is also a culturally-acquired attitude and not just a political method, drawing some parallel from Forster’s novel to talk about friendship between the citizens of the two nations may not look overstretched.
Despite what some people choose to believe on both the sides of the border, there have been problems between the two countries for long which date back to the days before India’s Independence in 1947. And the real nuances of the problems lie not on a political level as popularly analyzed but on a deep cultural level. I have my full pity and sympathy with the Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal who had to accept New Delhi as the real political master for Nepal one day and elaborate the same least satirical statement as a satire the very next day. This is fully understandable.
The analyses and study about Nepal-Indo relations have had only two (superficial) perspectives so far. The first perspective is: The two countries share unique historical and cultural (religious) ties and they have great relations. The second is political: India has always been an influential and dominating factor in Nepali politics. Maybe both these perspectives are valid in their own right but because they both miss the deep cultural perspective, they are not complete.
This cultural perspective involves a close look at how an ordinary Indian relates himself or herself to an ordinary Nepali. Such a look would examine the deep culturally-rooted codes in intimate inter-personal relationship between two individuals of the respective nations. Individual Nepalis who think their best friends of life are Indians would be better positioned to examine this provided they have the required cultural and intellectual framework of mind to do so.
An Indian from New Delhi with a humble economic and academic background meets a Nepali in London who has a relatively better social status in Kathmandu compared to his counterpart’s in New Delhi. But the respective nationalities of the two individuals clash in such a way that their comparatively different social statuses in their native places just vanish and a new hierarchy is created in the personal relations based on nationalities. Of course, such clash and vanishing statuses would happen at such a subtle level that it may often go unnoticed. The concerned individuals may not be aware of the cultural barrier created by their respective belongingness to nations big and small, and powerful and weak.
But, much like a white man has the inborn burden to civilize the rest of the world, the Indian would have the historical Indian burden to help the Nepali. Some people say nationalism is imaginary and abstract and maybe they are right. However, this abstract, imaginary nationalism interferes with the personal elements of relations and this is what I mean by deep cultural perspective to analyze the relations between the two nations.
Coming back to the political level of relations, I often pity the Nepali political leaders who have suffered so long for their cause, have been imprisoned for long in the prime of their youths and compromised on their family. Pity because, despite their sacrifice and contribution for politics in the country, if they are not favored by their “friends” in New Delhi, they do not have a stable political career in Nepal. What is the point of all the sacrifice and competence then? The irony is that every single leader in Nepal knows that if there is a strong national unity within the country and our own democracy is stable, Delhi would have much less influence in our internal matters than it has had so far. However, the fact is also that our leaders will not have this unity but rather will look for Delhi for personal political favors.
It is always hard to gauge how much of Delhi’s influence is real and how much perceived. And it is also hard to assess how Delhi works within each of the party and its leaders for its influence. But the perceived influence of Delhi is always giving India a much greater space to influence than it could actually have. The announcement of Dahal to hold direct talks with Delhi for power negotiations in Kathmandu is definitely going to increase the perceived influence of India. Due to the combined influence of the actual and the perceived, the relation between the individuals of the two nations will continue for long to be inferior for one side and superior for the other. This unequal relationship has a bearing on personal relations between the citizens of the two countries.
The subtle nuances that make up the huge cultural tensions in the relations between the citizens of the two nations are deeper and higher than the political tensions in diplomatic relations. It may therefore help a little bit to understand the complexity of relations if we had a reading of the personal relations at the citizens’ level between the two countries through a cultural perspective. Maybe, we would need a novelist for this, not a mere political analyst or a historian.
COURTESY: BARUN ROY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM MYREPUBLICA.COM
BY BISHNU SAPKOTA
English novelist EM Forster suggests in his celebrated novel A Passage to India that the Englishmen and the Indians can never be friends in the true sense. That was during the first decades of the twentieth century when the British still ruled India. It is now irrelevant whether or not the Britishers and Indians can be friends on a personal level. What is now relevant for us Nepalis is to reflect on whether or not Nepalis can be friends with Indians. Not that India has colonized Nepal like the British had colonized India. However, if colonialism is also a culturally-acquired attitude and not just a political method, drawing some parallel from Forster’s novel to talk about friendship between the citizens of the two nations may not look overstretched.
Despite what some people choose to believe on both the sides of the border, there have been problems between the two countries for long which date back to the days before India’s Independence in 1947. And the real nuances of the problems lie not on a political level as popularly analyzed but on a deep cultural level. I have my full pity and sympathy with the Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal who had to accept New Delhi as the real political master for Nepal one day and elaborate the same least satirical statement as a satire the very next day. This is fully understandable.
The analyses and study about Nepal-Indo relations have had only two (superficial) perspectives so far. The first perspective is: The two countries share unique historical and cultural (religious) ties and they have great relations. The second is political: India has always been an influential and dominating factor in Nepali politics. Maybe both these perspectives are valid in their own right but because they both miss the deep cultural perspective, they are not complete.
This cultural perspective involves a close look at how an ordinary Indian relates himself or herself to an ordinary Nepali. Such a look would examine the deep culturally-rooted codes in intimate inter-personal relationship between two individuals of the respective nations. Individual Nepalis who think their best friends of life are Indians would be better positioned to examine this provided they have the required cultural and intellectual framework of mind to do so.
An Indian from New Delhi with a humble economic and academic background meets a Nepali in London who has a relatively better social status in Kathmandu compared to his counterpart’s in New Delhi. But the respective nationalities of the two individuals clash in such a way that their comparatively different social statuses in their native places just vanish and a new hierarchy is created in the personal relations based on nationalities. Of course, such clash and vanishing statuses would happen at such a subtle level that it may often go unnoticed. The concerned individuals may not be aware of the cultural barrier created by their respective belongingness to nations big and small, and powerful and weak.
But, much like a white man has the inborn burden to civilize the rest of the world, the Indian would have the historical Indian burden to help the Nepali. Some people say nationalism is imaginary and abstract and maybe they are right. However, this abstract, imaginary nationalism interferes with the personal elements of relations and this is what I mean by deep cultural perspective to analyze the relations between the two nations.
Coming back to the political level of relations, I often pity the Nepali political leaders who have suffered so long for their cause, have been imprisoned for long in the prime of their youths and compromised on their family. Pity because, despite their sacrifice and contribution for politics in the country, if they are not favored by their “friends” in New Delhi, they do not have a stable political career in Nepal. What is the point of all the sacrifice and competence then? The irony is that every single leader in Nepal knows that if there is a strong national unity within the country and our own democracy is stable, Delhi would have much less influence in our internal matters than it has had so far. However, the fact is also that our leaders will not have this unity but rather will look for Delhi for personal political favors.
It is always hard to gauge how much of Delhi’s influence is real and how much perceived. And it is also hard to assess how Delhi works within each of the party and its leaders for its influence. But the perceived influence of Delhi is always giving India a much greater space to influence than it could actually have. The announcement of Dahal to hold direct talks with Delhi for power negotiations in Kathmandu is definitely going to increase the perceived influence of India. Due to the combined influence of the actual and the perceived, the relation between the individuals of the two nations will continue for long to be inferior for one side and superior for the other. This unequal relationship has a bearing on personal relations between the citizens of the two countries.
The subtle nuances that make up the huge cultural tensions in the relations between the citizens of the two nations are deeper and higher than the political tensions in diplomatic relations. It may therefore help a little bit to understand the complexity of relations if we had a reading of the personal relations at the citizens’ level between the two countries through a cultural perspective. Maybe, we would need a novelist for this, not a mere political analyst or a historian.
COURTESY: BARUN ROY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEPAL: Indian envoy meets Prachanda ahead of Delhi visit
FROM PRESS TRUST OF INDIA
BY SHIRISH B. PRADHAN
Kathmandu (PTI) Indian ambassador Rakesh Sood today met Maoists supremo Prachanda as the former rebels have blamed New Delhi for Nepal’s deepening political crisis.
During the meeting at Prachanda’s residence they discussed bilateral relations and the current political situation, according to sources at the Indian Embassy.
Addressing a rally in Kathmandu last week, Prachanda accused India of “naked interference” in the internal affairs of Nepal and expressed desire to hold “direct talks” with New Delhi, ignoring the “puppet government” here to end the deadlock in the country.
Prachanda also demanded the scrapping of the landmark 1950 Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty along with all other “unequal” pacts with India. The former rebel leader also called for the withdrawal of Indian troops from Kalapani, a disputed part of Nepal?s territory on the borders of India, Nepal and China.
FROM PRESS TRUST OF INDIA
BY SHIRISH B. PRADHAN
Kathmandu (PTI) Indian ambassador Rakesh Sood today met Maoists supremo Prachanda as the former rebels have blamed New Delhi for Nepal’s deepening political crisis.
During the meeting at Prachanda’s residence they discussed bilateral relations and the current political situation, according to sources at the Indian Embassy.
Addressing a rally in Kathmandu last week, Prachanda accused India of “naked interference” in the internal affairs of Nepal and expressed desire to hold “direct talks” with New Delhi, ignoring the “puppet government” here to end the deadlock in the country.
Prachanda also demanded the scrapping of the landmark 1950 Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty along with all other “unequal” pacts with India. The former rebel leader also called for the withdrawal of Indian troops from Kalapani, a disputed part of Nepal?s territory on the borders of India, Nepal and China.
NEPAL: Indian envoy meets Prachanda ahead of Delhi visit
FROM PRESS TRUST OF INDIA
BY SHIRISH B. PRADHAN
Kathmandu (PTI) Indian ambassador Rakesh Sood today met Maoists supremo Prachanda as the former rebels have blamed New Delhi for Nepal’s deepening political crisis.
During the meeting at Prachanda’s residence they discussed bilateral relations and the current political situation, according to sources at the Indian Embassy.
Addressing a rally in Kathmandu last week, Prachanda accused India of “naked interference” in the internal affairs of Nepal and expressed desire to hold “direct talks” with New Delhi, ignoring the “puppet government” here to end the deadlock in the country.
Prachanda also demanded the scrapping of the landmark 1950 Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty along with all other “unequal” pacts with India. The former rebel leader also called for the withdrawal of Indian troops from Kalapani, a disputed part of Nepal?s territory on the borders of India, Nepal and China.
FROM PRESS TRUST OF INDIA
BY SHIRISH B. PRADHAN
Kathmandu (PTI) Indian ambassador Rakesh Sood today met Maoists supremo Prachanda as the former rebels have blamed New Delhi for Nepal’s deepening political crisis.
During the meeting at Prachanda’s residence they discussed bilateral relations and the current political situation, according to sources at the Indian Embassy.
Addressing a rally in Kathmandu last week, Prachanda accused India of “naked interference” in the internal affairs of Nepal and expressed desire to hold “direct talks” with New Delhi, ignoring the “puppet government” here to end the deadlock in the country.
Prachanda also demanded the scrapping of the landmark 1950 Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty along with all other “unequal” pacts with India. The former rebel leader also called for the withdrawal of Indian troops from Kalapani, a disputed part of Nepal?s territory on the borders of India, Nepal and China.
South Asian agenda for Jammu & Kashmir
bY:Madanjeet Singh
The communal fanatics will not give up unless they are reduced to nonentities in a secular configuration of South Asia’s unity in diversity, as in the European Union.
The separatists’ bullet that killed the moderate Hurriyat leader, Fazl Haque Qureshi, also wounded Home Minister Chidambaram’s “quiet diplomacy” for settling the Kashmir problem by making the Line of Control between India and Pakistan “just lines on a map,” as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in Srinagar on March 24, 2006. The doubts about the government’s credibility aired by the Qureshi assassins was disproved by the withdrawal of two Army divisions (about 30,000 troops) from Jammu and Kashmir over the last year and there are plans to pull back more troops if the law and order situation continues to improve, according to a statement made by Defence Minister A.K. Antony on December 18, 2009 ( The Hindu, December 19, 2009).
A.G. Noorani’s article, “Agenda for Kashmir” ( Frontline, December 18, 2009), lays out the four main points on which an India-Pakistan consensus seems to exist. They are self-governance or self-rule for both the Indian and Pakistani parts of the State — “real empowerment of the people,” as the Prime Minister stated on February 25, 2006; making the LoC an open border for trade and commerce; a joint management mechanism for both parts; and demilitarisation. Mr. Noorani has proposed a draft for a new Article 370 of the Constitution that is in step with the fifth Working Group’s recommendations to let the people of Jammu & Kashmir decide on Article 370.
The “Agenda for Kashmir” is on the same wave length as my article published in The Times of India (March 6, 1999) — about which I was unaware until journalist N. Ram, whom I met for the first time in Khajuraho, informed me as we were going to attend the millennium celebration of the ancient Hindu temples, inaugurated by President K. R. Narayanan. Evidently the current Editor-in-Chief of The Hindu was in accord with what I had written, for he had heavily underlined most of the text, as I discovered from a copy of the newspaper slipped under the door of my hotel room. “Should common sense prevail,” I wrote in that piece, “the first step is obviously to solve the problem of Kashmir, which is difficult but not impossible if leaders on both sides realise the enormous human and material resources they would be saving for the economic benefit of their people by formally stabilising the present ‘line of control’ in Kashmir agreed upon in 1972.” I further pointed out that now that both India and Pakistan had openly become nuclear weapon powers, neither country could further its own interests in Kashmir by force of arms.
President Narayanan too was in agreement when France Marquet, a SAF trustee, and I called on him and his wife Usha the next morning. “There is no problem as far as India is concerned,” he remarked, pausing and adding: “It is the government of Pakistan that does not accept this solution.”
Indeed, soon after, General Pervez Musharraf’s Army and its ISI appendage surreptitiously plotted to infiltrate Pakistani insurgents in Kargil, repeating the folly of the 1948 Kabaili invasion of Kashmir. Greatly worried that India and Pakistan might start a nuclear war, I drafted an appeal signed by my 28 colleagues, the UNESCO Goodwill Ambassadors, and had it placed as a half-page advertisement in The International Herald Tribune. We appealed to the governments of the two countries “to heed the advice of the international community, and resolve their differences diplomatically in a spirit of the sub-continent’s traditional common culture of non-violence and tolerance.”
In the same issue of The Herald Tribune (June 12, 2002), Selig S. Harrison wrote a cutting edge article entitled, “Why India Dare Not Give Up Kashmir”: “While the world’s attention is riveted on Kashmir as the flashpoint of a possible India-Pakistan war, 120,000 Indian Muslims remain in Gujarat refugee camps — afraid to return to their villages, where they fear a resurgence of the Hindu mob attacks that left 1,200 dead in March. This festering challenge to India’s stability as a secular democracy explains what the Kashmir crisis is all about. The governing factor in the current confrontation between New Delhi and Islamabad is the danger of an uncontrollable chain reaction of Hindu reprisals against Muslims throughout India if the Muslims of Kashmir opt for independence or for accession to Pakistan.”
The veteran American journalist went on to say: “New Delhi is prepared to risk war not for the sake of retaining Kashmir as such but to ensure against the destabilising impact of a change in the status quo in India as a whole. The political heirs of Gandhi and Nehru in India believe that Kashmir, as the only Indian state with a Muslim majority ‘must remain in the Indian Union as proof that Hindus and Muslims can live together in a secular state’.”
That was the reason why Maulana Abul Kalam Azad never accepted the “disastrous Partition of India.” During his visit to Italy in the early 1950s, India’s Education Minister told me in superb Urdu that “one division leads to another in a chain reaction until the country is shredded into pieces.” These prophetic words anticipated the break-up of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in the 1970s. The present political clamour in India for creating more and more States, for whatever reasons, may turn out to be as dangerous.
The ‘Chenab Formula’ to partition Kashmir along the river Chenab was conceived by political leaders in India as well as Pakistan to promote a communal agenda. “Most of the districts in Jammu and on the left bank of the Chenab are Hindu majority in the state of Jammu and Kashmir while in most of the districts on the western side of the Chenab, the Muslims are predominant,” wrote Sartaj Aziz in his book Between Dreams and Reality (page 228). “In short, the River Chenab will form the separation line between the Pakistan and Indian held areas … Since India was no longer willing to go back to the concept of Hindu versus Muslim majority, the Chenab formula basically converted a communal formula into a geographic formula since most of the Hindu majority is east of Chenab and Muslim majority districts are west of Chenab.”
In Europe, too, a similar scenario of inter-state feuds had resulted in the devastating Second World War. In the early 1950s, I witnessed the unimaginable havoc it had caused as I arrived in Italy on a scholarship. At the time, six European leaders had the vision to sign the Treaty of Rome (on March 25, 1957), establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). They affirmed in its preamble that signatory states were “determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” They specifically affirmed its political and economic integration, creating a customs union, colloquially known as the “Common Market.”
I was elated when, in 1985, the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established and its charter contained several EEC ideas. I felt that a similar South Asian economic and political union and a common currency like the euro, which the EU officially adopted in 1999, would encourage India and Pakistan to cooperate like Germany and France who overcame their enmity after centuries of devastating wars. This notion appeared to provide the healing balm for the trauma of Partition I had personally suffered.
Since then, the euro has become the second largest reserve currency in the world after the U.S. dollar. As of October 2009, with more than €790 billion in circulation, the Eurozone is the second largest economy in the world. In principle, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agrees with the need for a common currency. He wrote the introduction to my book, The Sasia Story — ‘sasia’ (South-Asia) is the name I have coined in the hope that it would, like the euro, become the anchor of South Asia’s economic and political stability. At a recent meeting with Dr. Singh, I conveyed the view of President Mohamed Nasheed, whom I met earlier in Malé, that a common currency would accelerate trade and commerce worldwide and that he was in accord with Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s common currency proposal at the 2007 SAARC Summit in New Delhi.
Even if the “quiet diplomacy” in Kashmir succeeds in adopting a revised Article 370 and making the Line of Control between India and Pakistan “just lines on a map,” the prospects of jihadi suicide bombers changing their one-track mindset is bleak. This might even facilitate infiltration of Islamist militants across the 700-kilometre border between the two parts of Kashmir. On the other side of the U.N. ceasefire line imposed when the first Kashmir war ended in 1949, the anti-Muslim stand and policies of right-wing Hindutva represent a big problem.
Therefore, as in Europe where the Basque in Spain, the Italian Catalan, and the Irish IRA terrorists have been reduced to nonentities under the secular umbrella of the European Union, South Asia’s communal fanatics can be isolated in a larger configuration of a union or confederation of SAARC countries. The first step in this direction would be the introduction of a common currency that, like the euro, would accelerate trade and commerce and, more importantly, unleash the centripetal force to help consolidate economic, political, and cultural cooperation among South Asian countries. It is time India stopped dragging its feet even as ASEAN, African, Latin American, and Gulf countries are going ahead to introduce common currencies in their regions.
bY:Madanjeet Singh
The communal fanatics will not give up unless they are reduced to nonentities in a secular configuration of South Asia’s unity in diversity, as in the European Union.
The separatists’ bullet that killed the moderate Hurriyat leader, Fazl Haque Qureshi, also wounded Home Minister Chidambaram’s “quiet diplomacy” for settling the Kashmir problem by making the Line of Control between India and Pakistan “just lines on a map,” as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in Srinagar on March 24, 2006. The doubts about the government’s credibility aired by the Qureshi assassins was disproved by the withdrawal of two Army divisions (about 30,000 troops) from Jammu and Kashmir over the last year and there are plans to pull back more troops if the law and order situation continues to improve, according to a statement made by Defence Minister A.K. Antony on December 18, 2009 ( The Hindu, December 19, 2009).
A.G. Noorani’s article, “Agenda for Kashmir” ( Frontline, December 18, 2009), lays out the four main points on which an India-Pakistan consensus seems to exist. They are self-governance or self-rule for both the Indian and Pakistani parts of the State — “real empowerment of the people,” as the Prime Minister stated on February 25, 2006; making the LoC an open border for trade and commerce; a joint management mechanism for both parts; and demilitarisation. Mr. Noorani has proposed a draft for a new Article 370 of the Constitution that is in step with the fifth Working Group’s recommendations to let the people of Jammu & Kashmir decide on Article 370.
The “Agenda for Kashmir” is on the same wave length as my article published in The Times of India (March 6, 1999) — about which I was unaware until journalist N. Ram, whom I met for the first time in Khajuraho, informed me as we were going to attend the millennium celebration of the ancient Hindu temples, inaugurated by President K. R. Narayanan. Evidently the current Editor-in-Chief of The Hindu was in accord with what I had written, for he had heavily underlined most of the text, as I discovered from a copy of the newspaper slipped under the door of my hotel room. “Should common sense prevail,” I wrote in that piece, “the first step is obviously to solve the problem of Kashmir, which is difficult but not impossible if leaders on both sides realise the enormous human and material resources they would be saving for the economic benefit of their people by formally stabilising the present ‘line of control’ in Kashmir agreed upon in 1972.” I further pointed out that now that both India and Pakistan had openly become nuclear weapon powers, neither country could further its own interests in Kashmir by force of arms.
President Narayanan too was in agreement when France Marquet, a SAF trustee, and I called on him and his wife Usha the next morning. “There is no problem as far as India is concerned,” he remarked, pausing and adding: “It is the government of Pakistan that does not accept this solution.”
Indeed, soon after, General Pervez Musharraf’s Army and its ISI appendage surreptitiously plotted to infiltrate Pakistani insurgents in Kargil, repeating the folly of the 1948 Kabaili invasion of Kashmir. Greatly worried that India and Pakistan might start a nuclear war, I drafted an appeal signed by my 28 colleagues, the UNESCO Goodwill Ambassadors, and had it placed as a half-page advertisement in The International Herald Tribune. We appealed to the governments of the two countries “to heed the advice of the international community, and resolve their differences diplomatically in a spirit of the sub-continent’s traditional common culture of non-violence and tolerance.”
In the same issue of The Herald Tribune (June 12, 2002), Selig S. Harrison wrote a cutting edge article entitled, “Why India Dare Not Give Up Kashmir”: “While the world’s attention is riveted on Kashmir as the flashpoint of a possible India-Pakistan war, 120,000 Indian Muslims remain in Gujarat refugee camps — afraid to return to their villages, where they fear a resurgence of the Hindu mob attacks that left 1,200 dead in March. This festering challenge to India’s stability as a secular democracy explains what the Kashmir crisis is all about. The governing factor in the current confrontation between New Delhi and Islamabad is the danger of an uncontrollable chain reaction of Hindu reprisals against Muslims throughout India if the Muslims of Kashmir opt for independence or for accession to Pakistan.”
The veteran American journalist went on to say: “New Delhi is prepared to risk war not for the sake of retaining Kashmir as such but to ensure against the destabilising impact of a change in the status quo in India as a whole. The political heirs of Gandhi and Nehru in India believe that Kashmir, as the only Indian state with a Muslim majority ‘must remain in the Indian Union as proof that Hindus and Muslims can live together in a secular state’.”
That was the reason why Maulana Abul Kalam Azad never accepted the “disastrous Partition of India.” During his visit to Italy in the early 1950s, India’s Education Minister told me in superb Urdu that “one division leads to another in a chain reaction until the country is shredded into pieces.” These prophetic words anticipated the break-up of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in the 1970s. The present political clamour in India for creating more and more States, for whatever reasons, may turn out to be as dangerous.
The ‘Chenab Formula’ to partition Kashmir along the river Chenab was conceived by political leaders in India as well as Pakistan to promote a communal agenda. “Most of the districts in Jammu and on the left bank of the Chenab are Hindu majority in the state of Jammu and Kashmir while in most of the districts on the western side of the Chenab, the Muslims are predominant,” wrote Sartaj Aziz in his book Between Dreams and Reality (page 228). “In short, the River Chenab will form the separation line between the Pakistan and Indian held areas … Since India was no longer willing to go back to the concept of Hindu versus Muslim majority, the Chenab formula basically converted a communal formula into a geographic formula since most of the Hindu majority is east of Chenab and Muslim majority districts are west of Chenab.”
In Europe, too, a similar scenario of inter-state feuds had resulted in the devastating Second World War. In the early 1950s, I witnessed the unimaginable havoc it had caused as I arrived in Italy on a scholarship. At the time, six European leaders had the vision to sign the Treaty of Rome (on March 25, 1957), establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). They affirmed in its preamble that signatory states were “determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” They specifically affirmed its political and economic integration, creating a customs union, colloquially known as the “Common Market.”
I was elated when, in 1985, the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established and its charter contained several EEC ideas. I felt that a similar South Asian economic and political union and a common currency like the euro, which the EU officially adopted in 1999, would encourage India and Pakistan to cooperate like Germany and France who overcame their enmity after centuries of devastating wars. This notion appeared to provide the healing balm for the trauma of Partition I had personally suffered.
Since then, the euro has become the second largest reserve currency in the world after the U.S. dollar. As of October 2009, with more than €790 billion in circulation, the Eurozone is the second largest economy in the world. In principle, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agrees with the need for a common currency. He wrote the introduction to my book, The Sasia Story — ‘sasia’ (South-Asia) is the name I have coined in the hope that it would, like the euro, become the anchor of South Asia’s economic and political stability. At a recent meeting with Dr. Singh, I conveyed the view of President Mohamed Nasheed, whom I met earlier in Malé, that a common currency would accelerate trade and commerce worldwide and that he was in accord with Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s common currency proposal at the 2007 SAARC Summit in New Delhi.
Even if the “quiet diplomacy” in Kashmir succeeds in adopting a revised Article 370 and making the Line of Control between India and Pakistan “just lines on a map,” the prospects of jihadi suicide bombers changing their one-track mindset is bleak. This might even facilitate infiltration of Islamist militants across the 700-kilometre border between the two parts of Kashmir. On the other side of the U.N. ceasefire line imposed when the first Kashmir war ended in 1949, the anti-Muslim stand and policies of right-wing Hindutva represent a big problem.
Therefore, as in Europe where the Basque in Spain, the Italian Catalan, and the Irish IRA terrorists have been reduced to nonentities under the secular umbrella of the European Union, South Asia’s communal fanatics can be isolated in a larger configuration of a union or confederation of SAARC countries. The first step in this direction would be the introduction of a common currency that, like the euro, would accelerate trade and commerce and, more importantly, unleash the centripetal force to help consolidate economic, political, and cultural cooperation among South Asian countries. It is time India stopped dragging its feet even as ASEAN, African, Latin American, and Gulf countries are going ahead to introduce common currencies in their regions.
INDIA: RISING POWER
Nations take a long time to alter the parameters of their foreign and security policies. Often, mere decades are not enough. That's because a nation's foreign policy flows from several sources: from the international system to its domestic political imperatives to the cultural factors that underlie its society to the personal characteristics and perceptions of individual decisionmakers. This usually provides an essential continuity to a nation's foreign policy framework.
Like most nations, India's external outlook has also traditionally been a result of these varied factors interacting and transforming each other.
Yet there are times when nations are called upon to set their sights higher. The last decade was one such period in Indian history when the country was asked to respond to its political and economic rise and reshape its foreign policy accordingly. As a nation's weight in the global balance of power rises, it is confronted with the choice about whether to become a great power. However, a state's freedom to choose whether to achieve that status is, in reality, tightly constrained by structural factors. Eligible states that fail to attain great power status are predictably punished.
The last decade saw Indian foreign policy standing at such a crossroads, the foundations of which were laid at the end of the Cold War.
Throughout the Cold War period, India was concerned about getting entangled in the US-USSR superpower rivalry. It made sense to make a choice in favour of a non-aligned foreign policy posture that, at least in theory, preserved India's decision-making autonomy in the realm of international affairs. Behind all the rhetoric of the so-called Third World solidarity, there was a very cool-headed calculation that was aimed at protecting vital Indian interests. And these interests were fairly limited in scope, given India's relatively limited economic and military capabilities. Pakistan's security strategy was India's most immediate threat--India's obsession with Pakistan was not all that surprising.
But beyond Pakistan, there was little clarity--something that was vividly brought home in the stunning defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962. And even on Pakistan, there is little evidence to suggest that India had a coherent strategy. The wars with Pakistan kept coming and India continued to fight those wars without ever bothering to make an assessment if a policy can be evolved that would make these wars go away. The patting on the back that India didn't start any of these wars and that it fought only when provoked could not hide the fact that there was a big policy vacuum at the heart of Indian foreign and security policy. It is indeed instructive how India has failed to deal with the malevolence of a single hostile neighbour one-eighth its size for the last six decades.
The end of the Cold War came as a blessing in disguise as it forced Indian policymakers to adapt to the new global political and economic realities--it was a much-needed shock. Many of the central assumptions of Indian foreign policy had to be reviewed in light of the changed circumstances. The shape of the world changed, signalling the possibility of a new Indian foreign and national security strategy.
At this point, India's economic reforms put the nation on a high-growth trajectory, plunging it willy-nilly into the realm of great power politics. And as a new decade dawned at the beginning of a new millennium, India seemed poised on the threshold of achieving the status of a major global power, emerging as an indispensable, albeit reluctant, element of the new global order--exemplified not only by its growing economic and military might, but also the attraction of its political and cultural values.
By any objective measure of material capability, India today is a rising power in the international system--the consequences of which have been visible in the international system during the past decade. India's rising wealth and large population have enabled it to build up its military and diplomatic might. As a result, this decade saw India playing the balance-of-power game more effectively by courting the US to ward off an impending clash with the other Asian giant, China.
It also started engaging other East and South-East Asian countries to balance China's predominance in its vicinity. India has also commenced projecting its power more forcefully by sending its defence forces to train with other regional states as well as despatching its navy to tackle piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
The high point of India's diplomatic achievement this decade was its civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact with the US.
Though first proposed by the US, the way in which India negotiated the highly contentious deal epitomized the new confidence in India about its own ability to shape global trends. The pact is as remarkable for the way it signals a revolutionary transformation in US-India relations as it is for the manner in which it transforms the global nuclear discourse. This has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India's credentials as a responsible nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order, though it did take India more than three years to conclude this pact, underlining the political divide in the nation on fundamental foreign policy choices facing it.
This political drift has resulted in a situation where India has found it difficult to adequately respond to the rising prowess of China. Even as China has grown aggressive in pursuing its interests vis-à-vis India, India has been meek to the point of obsequiousness in demanding respect from its neighbour. Though SinoIndian ties have improved over the last decade, with China now India's largest trading partner, the asymmetry in this relationship is more palpable than ever.
One of the most significant challenges facing Indian foreign policy today is this inability of its decisionmakers to leverage the existing structure of the international system to further their nation's strategic interests, and its relations with China showcase this. India can keep propounding the desirability of a multipolar world order, but for all the talk of a "post-American" international system, US primacy is not going anywhere in a hurry in the short to medium term. It is important, therefore, for India to develop a partnership with the US that can serve not only their mutual interests, but also specific Indian interests. This is especially important because, while the US is unlikely to face a peer competitor at the global level, the emergence of China as a major power in the Asia-Pacific is already changing the strategic reality in the region.
Recognizing the shifting balance of power in Asia-Pacific produced by China's rise, the George W. Bush administration was prescient to embrace India as a counterweight. No country will be as significantly affected by China's regional rise as India. India needs to focus on redressing the balance of power and developing leverage over China--and the most effective way of doing it is to learn how to play the balance-ofpower game from China.
There are also tensions between India's purported role on the world stage and the challenges it faces in its own neighbourhood. Admittedly, South Asia remains a difficult neighbourhood and India's strategic periphery continues to witness turmoil and uncertainty. The instability in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar is a major inhibiting factor for India to realize its dream of becoming a major global player. India is surrounded by several weak states that view New Delhi's hegemonic status in the region with suspicion.
And that's the conundrum India faces. While it is seen as unresponsive to the concerns of its neighbours, any diplomatic aggressiveness on its part is also viewed with suspicion and often resentment. The structural position of India in the region makes it highly likely that its predominance will continue to be resented by its smaller neighbours, even as instability nearby continues to have the potential of upsetting its own delicate political balance.
However, a policy of "splendid isolation"--which Britain used to its advantage in the 19th century--is not an option today. India's desire to emerge as a major global player will remain just that--a desire--unless it engages its immediate neighbourhood more meaningfully and emerges as a net provider of regional peace and stability. In this context, India's inability to articulate a credible alternative to the US-led Western policy in Af-Pak does not augur well for its leadership role in the region.
As the recent debate on the 1998 thermonuclear tests shows, the Indian elite remains obsessed with nuclear weapons. These weapons do retain their relevance in international politics, but it is increasingly a very limited one.
Major global powers will keep nuclear weapons in their arsenal for the foreseeable future, but there's a clear realization that they are primarily political instruments, not actual weapons of war. India's nuclear doctrine of credible minimum deterrence serves its interests well in the near to medium term and any over-investment, either intellectual or financial, in this realm might even be counterproductive.
Moreover, the full benefits of the nuclear pact can only be realized by India if it takes appropriate follow-up measures--creating a regulatory framework that enables the nuclear industry to expand; nurturing the indigenous scientific establishment; enunciating a comprehensive energy policy; and calibrating the nation's broader foreign policy in line with global changes. After having played its cards effectively by preserving its nuclear autonomy in negotiations with the US over the nuclear pact, the time has now come for India to move on and focus on the broader strategic realities confronting the nation at a time when it is being seen as rising rapidly in the global interstate hierarchy.
Finally, India does not yet have the capacity to project what it stands for. The French philosopher Raymond Aron has suggested that the legitimacy of a great power diminishes if that power is not associated with a vibrant set of ideas. The global reassessment of India is primarily predicated on its recent economic rise. But India's rise will remain incomplete in the absence of a credible vision with a larger purpose. India not only appears to be devoid of big ideas backed by assertive political conviction, but also continues to lack the intellectual infrastructure essential to debate and achieve clarity on what being a great power means for India.
India has always been a nation of great ambition, but today more than ever it needs to answer the question: What is the purpose behind its ambition? India wants to rise, but what for? It's not clear if India's elite understands the implications of its nation's rise.
Even as India's rise in the interstate global hierarchy continues steadily, its policymakers still act in the international arena as if India can continue to afford the luxury of responding to foreign policy challenges on a case-bycase basis without any requirement for a long-term strategic policy framework. The same ad hocism that had characterized Indian foreign policy in the past lingers. The problem, however, is India no longer has the luxury of time on its side and the issues that have gone unresolved since Independence need a long-term resolution. One can only hope that the new decade will force India to make certain policy choices that are long overdue.
(Harsh Pant teaches at King's College, London, and is currently a visiting professor at the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore.)
Nations take a long time to alter the parameters of their foreign and security policies. Often, mere decades are not enough. That's because a nation's foreign policy flows from several sources: from the international system to its domestic political imperatives to the cultural factors that underlie its society to the personal characteristics and perceptions of individual decisionmakers. This usually provides an essential continuity to a nation's foreign policy framework.
Like most nations, India's external outlook has also traditionally been a result of these varied factors interacting and transforming each other.
Yet there are times when nations are called upon to set their sights higher. The last decade was one such period in Indian history when the country was asked to respond to its political and economic rise and reshape its foreign policy accordingly. As a nation's weight in the global balance of power rises, it is confronted with the choice about whether to become a great power. However, a state's freedom to choose whether to achieve that status is, in reality, tightly constrained by structural factors. Eligible states that fail to attain great power status are predictably punished.
The last decade saw Indian foreign policy standing at such a crossroads, the foundations of which were laid at the end of the Cold War.
Throughout the Cold War period, India was concerned about getting entangled in the US-USSR superpower rivalry. It made sense to make a choice in favour of a non-aligned foreign policy posture that, at least in theory, preserved India's decision-making autonomy in the realm of international affairs. Behind all the rhetoric of the so-called Third World solidarity, there was a very cool-headed calculation that was aimed at protecting vital Indian interests. And these interests were fairly limited in scope, given India's relatively limited economic and military capabilities. Pakistan's security strategy was India's most immediate threat--India's obsession with Pakistan was not all that surprising.
But beyond Pakistan, there was little clarity--something that was vividly brought home in the stunning defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962. And even on Pakistan, there is little evidence to suggest that India had a coherent strategy. The wars with Pakistan kept coming and India continued to fight those wars without ever bothering to make an assessment if a policy can be evolved that would make these wars go away. The patting on the back that India didn't start any of these wars and that it fought only when provoked could not hide the fact that there was a big policy vacuum at the heart of Indian foreign and security policy. It is indeed instructive how India has failed to deal with the malevolence of a single hostile neighbour one-eighth its size for the last six decades.
The end of the Cold War came as a blessing in disguise as it forced Indian policymakers to adapt to the new global political and economic realities--it was a much-needed shock. Many of the central assumptions of Indian foreign policy had to be reviewed in light of the changed circumstances. The shape of the world changed, signalling the possibility of a new Indian foreign and national security strategy.
At this point, India's economic reforms put the nation on a high-growth trajectory, plunging it willy-nilly into the realm of great power politics. And as a new decade dawned at the beginning of a new millennium, India seemed poised on the threshold of achieving the status of a major global power, emerging as an indispensable, albeit reluctant, element of the new global order--exemplified not only by its growing economic and military might, but also the attraction of its political and cultural values.
By any objective measure of material capability, India today is a rising power in the international system--the consequences of which have been visible in the international system during the past decade. India's rising wealth and large population have enabled it to build up its military and diplomatic might. As a result, this decade saw India playing the balance-of-power game more effectively by courting the US to ward off an impending clash with the other Asian giant, China.
It also started engaging other East and South-East Asian countries to balance China's predominance in its vicinity. India has also commenced projecting its power more forcefully by sending its defence forces to train with other regional states as well as despatching its navy to tackle piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
The high point of India's diplomatic achievement this decade was its civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact with the US.
Though first proposed by the US, the way in which India negotiated the highly contentious deal epitomized the new confidence in India about its own ability to shape global trends. The pact is as remarkable for the way it signals a revolutionary transformation in US-India relations as it is for the manner in which it transforms the global nuclear discourse. This has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India's credentials as a responsible nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order, though it did take India more than three years to conclude this pact, underlining the political divide in the nation on fundamental foreign policy choices facing it.
This political drift has resulted in a situation where India has found it difficult to adequately respond to the rising prowess of China. Even as China has grown aggressive in pursuing its interests vis-à-vis India, India has been meek to the point of obsequiousness in demanding respect from its neighbour. Though SinoIndian ties have improved over the last decade, with China now India's largest trading partner, the asymmetry in this relationship is more palpable than ever.
One of the most significant challenges facing Indian foreign policy today is this inability of its decisionmakers to leverage the existing structure of the international system to further their nation's strategic interests, and its relations with China showcase this. India can keep propounding the desirability of a multipolar world order, but for all the talk of a "post-American" international system, US primacy is not going anywhere in a hurry in the short to medium term. It is important, therefore, for India to develop a partnership with the US that can serve not only their mutual interests, but also specific Indian interests. This is especially important because, while the US is unlikely to face a peer competitor at the global level, the emergence of China as a major power in the Asia-Pacific is already changing the strategic reality in the region.
Recognizing the shifting balance of power in Asia-Pacific produced by China's rise, the George W. Bush administration was prescient to embrace India as a counterweight. No country will be as significantly affected by China's regional rise as India. India needs to focus on redressing the balance of power and developing leverage over China--and the most effective way of doing it is to learn how to play the balance-ofpower game from China.
There are also tensions between India's purported role on the world stage and the challenges it faces in its own neighbourhood. Admittedly, South Asia remains a difficult neighbourhood and India's strategic periphery continues to witness turmoil and uncertainty. The instability in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar is a major inhibiting factor for India to realize its dream of becoming a major global player. India is surrounded by several weak states that view New Delhi's hegemonic status in the region with suspicion.
And that's the conundrum India faces. While it is seen as unresponsive to the concerns of its neighbours, any diplomatic aggressiveness on its part is also viewed with suspicion and often resentment. The structural position of India in the region makes it highly likely that its predominance will continue to be resented by its smaller neighbours, even as instability nearby continues to have the potential of upsetting its own delicate political balance.
However, a policy of "splendid isolation"--which Britain used to its advantage in the 19th century--is not an option today. India's desire to emerge as a major global player will remain just that--a desire--unless it engages its immediate neighbourhood more meaningfully and emerges as a net provider of regional peace and stability. In this context, India's inability to articulate a credible alternative to the US-led Western policy in Af-Pak does not augur well for its leadership role in the region.
As the recent debate on the 1998 thermonuclear tests shows, the Indian elite remains obsessed with nuclear weapons. These weapons do retain their relevance in international politics, but it is increasingly a very limited one.
Major global powers will keep nuclear weapons in their arsenal for the foreseeable future, but there's a clear realization that they are primarily political instruments, not actual weapons of war. India's nuclear doctrine of credible minimum deterrence serves its interests well in the near to medium term and any over-investment, either intellectual or financial, in this realm might even be counterproductive.
Moreover, the full benefits of the nuclear pact can only be realized by India if it takes appropriate follow-up measures--creating a regulatory framework that enables the nuclear industry to expand; nurturing the indigenous scientific establishment; enunciating a comprehensive energy policy; and calibrating the nation's broader foreign policy in line with global changes. After having played its cards effectively by preserving its nuclear autonomy in negotiations with the US over the nuclear pact, the time has now come for India to move on and focus on the broader strategic realities confronting the nation at a time when it is being seen as rising rapidly in the global interstate hierarchy.
Finally, India does not yet have the capacity to project what it stands for. The French philosopher Raymond Aron has suggested that the legitimacy of a great power diminishes if that power is not associated with a vibrant set of ideas. The global reassessment of India is primarily predicated on its recent economic rise. But India's rise will remain incomplete in the absence of a credible vision with a larger purpose. India not only appears to be devoid of big ideas backed by assertive political conviction, but also continues to lack the intellectual infrastructure essential to debate and achieve clarity on what being a great power means for India.
India has always been a nation of great ambition, but today more than ever it needs to answer the question: What is the purpose behind its ambition? India wants to rise, but what for? It's not clear if India's elite understands the implications of its nation's rise.
Even as India's rise in the interstate global hierarchy continues steadily, its policymakers still act in the international arena as if India can continue to afford the luxury of responding to foreign policy challenges on a case-bycase basis without any requirement for a long-term strategic policy framework. The same ad hocism that had characterized Indian foreign policy in the past lingers. The problem, however, is India no longer has the luxury of time on its side and the issues that have gone unresolved since Independence need a long-term resolution. One can only hope that the new decade will force India to make certain policy choices that are long overdue.
(Harsh Pant teaches at King's College, London, and is currently a visiting professor at the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore.)
ESSAY: The Legend of Gurkha
FROM SEMESTAINDONESIA.COM
Gurkha, also spelt as Gorkha, are people from Nepal who take their name from the eighth century Hindu warrior-saint Guru Gorakhnath. His disciple Bappa Rawal, born Prince Kalbhoj, founded the house of Mewar. Later descendants of Bappa Rawal moved further east to found the house of Gorkha, which in turn founded the Kingdom of Nepal. Gurkhas are most well-known for their history of service as foreign soldiers in the British Army and the Indian Army.
Gurkha – History
Gurkhas claim descent from the Hindu Rajputs and Brahmins of Northern India, who entered modern Nepal from the west. Guru Gorkhanath had a Rajput Prince-disciple, the legendary Bappa Rawal, born Prince Kalbhoj, founder of the house of Mewar, who became the first Gurkha and is said to be the ancestor of the present Royal family of Nepal as well as the Rana dynasty of Nepal.
The legend states that Bappa Rawal was a teenager in hiding, when he came upon the warrior saint while on a hunting expedition with friends in the jungles of Rajasthan. Bappa Rawal chose to stay behind, and care for the warrior saint, who was in deep meditation. When Guru Gorkhanath awoke, he was pleased with the devotion of Bappa Rawal. The Guru gave him the Khukri sword, the famous curved dagger of the present day Gurkhas. The legend continues that he told Bappa that he and his people would henceforth be called Gurkhas, the disciples of the Guru Gorkhanath, and their bravery would become world famous. He then instructed Bappa Rawal, and his Gorkhas to stop the advance of the Muslims, who were invading Afghanistan (which at that time was a Hindu/Buddhist nation), and converting the masses at the edge of the sword to their religion, slaughtering those who refused to convert and destroying many Hindu/Buddhist temples and shrines. Bappa Rawal took his Gurkhas and liberated Afghanistan – originally named Ghandhar, from which the present day Kandahar derives its name. He and his Gorkhas stopped the initial Islamic advance of the 8th century in the Indian subcontinent for the time being.
There are legends that Bappa Rawal (Kalbhoj) went further conquering Iran and Iraq before he retired as an ascetic at the feet of Mt. Meru, having conquered all invaders and enemies of his faith.
It is a misconception that the Gurkhas took their name from the Gorkha region of Nepal. The region was given its name after the Gurkhas had established their control of these areas. In the early 1500s some of Bappa Rawal’s descendants went further east, and conquered a small state in present-day Nepal, which they named Gorkha in honour of their patron saint. By 1769, through the leadership of Maharaj Dhiraj Prithvi Narayan Shahdev (1769-1775), the Gorkha dynasty had taken over the area of modern Nepal. They made Hinduism the state religion, although with distinct Rajput warrior and Gorkhanath influences.
In the Gurkha War (1814–1816) they waged war against the British East India Company army. The British were impressed by the Gurkha soldiers and after defeating the ghurkas and making Nepal a protectorate they were granted the right to hire them as mercenaries organised in Gurkha regiments in the East India Company army with the permission of then prime minister, Shree Teen (3) Maharaja (Maharana) Jung Bahadur Rana, the first Rana Prime-minister and “Father” of modern Nepal.
The “original” Gurkhas who were descended from the Rajputs refused to enter as mere soldiers and were instead given positions as officers in the British-Indian armed forces. The Indo-Tibeto-Mongolian Gurkhas entered as soldiers. The Thakur/Rajput Gurkhas were entered as officers, one of whom, (retired) General Narendra Bir Singh, Gurkha Rifles, rose to become aide-de-camp (A.D.C.) to Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India. After the British left India Gorkhalis continued seeking employment in British and Indian forces, as officers and soldiers. However, it should be noted that due to the mixing of blood over the centuries many Thakurs/Rajputs of Nepal may have Mongolian features and not appear Indian, while many Indo-Tibeto-Mongolian Gurkhas may have Rajput blood, an example of this being the surname Thapa.
Under international law present-day British Gurkhas are not treated as mercenaries but are fully integrated soldiers of the British Army, operate in formed units of the Brigade of Gurkhas, and abide by the rules and regulations under which all British soldiers serve. Similar rules apply for Gurkhas serving in the Indian Army.
Gurkha – East India Company army
Gurkhas served as troops under contract to the East India Company in the Pindaree War of 1817, in Bhurtbore (Present day Bharatpur) in 1826 and the First and Second Sikh Wars in 1846 and 1848. During the Indian Mutiny in 1857, Gurkhas fought on the British side, and became part of the British Indian Army on its formation. The 2nd Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles) defended Hindu Rao’s house for over three months, losing 327 out of 490 men. The 60th Rifles (later the Royal Green Jackets) fought alongside the Sirmoor Rifles and were so impressed that following the mutiny they insisted 2nd Gurkhas be awarded the honours of adopting their distinctive rifle green uniforms with scarlet edgings and rifle regiment traditions and that they should hold the title of riflemen rather than sepoys. Twelve Nepalese regiments also took part in the relief of Lucknow under the command of Shri Teen (3)Maharaja Maharana Jung Bahadur of Nepal.
Gurkha – British Indian Army
From the end of the Indian Mutiny until the start of the First World War the Gurkha Regiments saw active service in Burma, Afghanistan, the North-East and the North-West Frontiers of India, Malta (the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78), Cyprus, Malaya, China (the Boxer Rebellion of 1900) and Tibet (Younghusband’s Expedition of 1903).
Between 1901 and 1906, the Gurkha regiments were renumbered from the 1st to the 11th and redesignated as Gurkha Rifles. One hundred thousand Gurkhas fought in the First World War. They served in the battlefields of France in the Loos, Givenchy, Neuve Chapelle and Ypres; in Mesopotamia, Persia, Suez Canal and Palestine against Turkish advance, Gallipoli and Salonika. One detachment served with Lawrence of Arabia.
During the Battle of Loos the 8th Gurkhas fought to the last, and in the words of the Indian Corps Commander, “found its Valhalla”. During the Gallipoli Campaign the 6th Gurkhas captured a feature later known as “Gurkha Bluff”. At Sari Bair they were the only troops in the whole campaign to reach and hold the crest line and look down on the Straits which was the ultimate objective. Second Battalion of the 3rd Gurkha Rifles was involved in the conquest of Baghdad.
In the interwar years, Gurkhas fought in the Third Afghan War in 1919 followed by numerous campaigns on the North-West Frontier, particularly in Waziristan.
During World War II, the Nepalese crown let the British recruit 20 extra battalions — 40 in total — and let them serve everywhere in the world. In addition to keeping peace in India, Gurkhas fought in Syria, North Africa, Italy, Greece and against the Japanese in Singapore and in the jungles of Burma. The 4th battalion of the 10th Gurkha Rifles became a nucleus for the Chindits. They fought in the Battle of Imphal.
Gurkha – Gurkha military rank system in the British Indian Army
British Indian Army and Current Indian Army /Current British Army Equivalence
Subedar Major/ Major (Queen’s Gurkha Officer)
Subedar/ Captain (Queen’s Gurkha Officer)
Jemadar (now Naib Subedar)/ Lieutenant (Queen’s Gurkha Officer)
Company Havildar Major/ Company Sergeant Major
Company Quartermaster Havildar/ Company Quartermaster Sergeant
Havildar/ Sergeant
Naik/ Corporal
Lance Naik/ Lance Corporal
Rifleman
Note:
As opposed to British army officers who received regular Queen’s or King’s Commissions, Gurkha officers in this system would receive the Viceroy’s Commission. After Indian Independence, Gurkha officers in those regiments which became part of the British Army were known as King’s Gurkha Officers and later Queen’s Gurkha Officers (QGOs), receiving the King’s and later Queen’s Gurkha Commission. This distinction implied that Gurkha officers had no authority to command troops of British regiments.
The equivalent ranks in the post 1947 Indian Army were (and are) known as Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs). They retained the traditional rank titles used in the British Indian Army – Jemadar (later Naib Subedar), Subedar and Subedar Major.
While in principle any British subject may apply for a commission without having served in the ranks previously, the same cannot be said about Gurkha officers. It was customary for a Gurkha soldier to rise through the ranks and prove his ability before his regiment would consider offering him a commission.
From the 1920s, Gurkhas could also receive King’s Indian Commissions, and later full King’s or Queen’s Commissions, which put them on a par with British officers. This was rare until after the Second World War.
Gurkha – Gurkha Rifle Regiments ca.1800-1946
1st King George V’s Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment) (raised 1815, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
2nd King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles) (raised 1815, allocated to British Army in 1948)
3rd Queen Alexandra’s Own Gurkha Rifles (raised 1815, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
4th Prince of Wales’s Own Gurkha Rifles (raised 1857, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force) (raised 1858, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
6th Gurkha Rifles, renamed 6th Queen Elizabeth’s Own Gurkha Rifles in 1959 (raised 1817, allocated to British Army in 1948)
7th Gurkha Rifles, renamed 7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles in 1959 (raised 1902, allocated to British Army in 1948)
8th Gurkha Rifles (raised 1824, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
9th Gurkha Rifles (raised 1817, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
10th Princess Mary’s Own Gurkha Rifles (raised 1890, allocated to British Army in 1948)
11th Gorkha Rifles (1918-1922; raised again by India following independence in 1947)
14th Gurkha Rifles (1942-1946)
25th Gurkha Rifles (1942-1946)
26th Gurkha Rifles (1943-1946)
29th Gurkha Rifles (1943-1946)
38th Gurkha Rifles (1943-1946)
42nd Gurkha Rifles (raised 1817 as the Cuttack Legion, renamed 6th Gurkha Rifles in 1903)
44th Gurkha Rifles (raised 1824 as the 16th (Sylhet) Local Battalion, renamed 8th Gorkha Rifles in 1903)
56th Gurkha Rifles (1943-1946)
710th Gurkha Rifles (1943-1946)
Gurkha – Post independence
After Indian independence – and partition – in 1947 and under the Tripartite Agreement, six Gurkha regiments joined the post-independence India Army. Four Gurkha regiments joined the British Army.
Gurkha – British Army Gurkhas
Four Gurkha regiments joined the British Army on January 1 1948:
2nd King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles)
6th Queen Elizabeth’s Own Gurkha Rifles
7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles
10th Princess Mary’s Own Gurkha Rifles
They formed the Brigade of Gurkhas and were initially stationed in Malaya. See the Brigade of Gurkhas for details of British Gurkha activities since 1948.
Gurkha – Indian Army Gorkhas
Following Indian independence in 1947, six Gurkha regiments remained with the Indian Army:
1st King George V’s Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment)
3rd Queen Alexandra’s Own Gurkha Rifles
4th Prince of Wales’s Own Gurkha Rifles
5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force)
8th Gurkha Rifles
9th Gurkha Rifles
Upon independence, the spelling was changed to Gorkha. In addition, a further regiment, 11th Gorkha Rifles, was raised. Upon India becoming a republic in 1950, all royal titles were dropped.
The 1st Battalion of the 11th Gorkha Regiment fought in the 1999 Kargil Conflict for India. In 1999 5/8 Gorkha Rifles were sent as part of the Indian Army UN contingent of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to secure the diamond fields against the Revolutionary United Front.
Gurkha – Singapore Gurkhas Contingent
The Gurkha Contingent (GC) of the Singapore Police Force was formed on 9th April 1949 from selected ex-British Army Gurkhas. It was raised to replace a Sikh unit which had disintegrated during the Second World War and is an integral part of the Police Force.
The GC is a well trained, dedicated and disciplined body whose principal role is as a specialist guard force. In time of crisis it can be deployed as an impartial reaction force. During the turbulent years before and after independence the GC acquitted itself well a number of times during outbreaks of civil disorder. The Gurkhas displayed the courage, self restraint and professionalism for which they are famous and earned the respect of the society at large.
The picture shows troopers of the Gurkha Contingent, guarding a car park entrance to Raffles City where the 117th IOC Session was held in Singapore in July 2005. Dressed in the combat uniform, but with elements borrowed from the no. 3 dress, the officer in the foreground was armed with a shotgun while the other handles a Heckler & Koch MP5.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the GC can be seen patrolling the streets and replacing local policemen to guard key installations. Before the incident, they were seldom seen in public.
Gurkha – Other
Gurkha soldiers have won 13 Victoria Crosses, all but one (Rambahadur Limbu) were won when all Gurkha regiments were still part of the Indian Army. An additional 13 VCs have been awarded to British Officers in Gurkha regiments. Since Indian independence, Gurkhas have also won 3 Param Vir Chakras.
Ethnically, Gurkhas who are presently serving in the British armed forces are Indo-Tibeto-Mongolians. Gurkhas serving in the Indian Armed Forces are of both groups, Indo-Tibeto-Mongolian and Rajput stock. Gurkhas of Indo-Tibeto-Mongolian origin mostly belong to the Gurung, Magar, Tamang, Khasa and Kiranti origin, many of whom are adherents of Tibetan Buddhism and Shamanism. [1]
Since the original Gurkhas were Rajput warriors from Rajasthan, all gurkhas, regardless of ethnic origin, speak a Rajasthani dialect. They are also famous for their large knife called the kukri.
In the mid 1980s some Nepali speaking groups in West Bengal began to organize under the Gorkhaland National Liberation Front, calling for their own Gurkha state. In 1988 they were given broader autonomy as the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council.
The treatment of Gurkhas and their families has been the subject of controversy in the United Kingdom following revelations that Gurkhas receive smaller pensions than their British equivalents.
The nationality status of Gurkhas and their families has also been in dispute, with claims that some ex-army Nepalese families are being denied residency and forced to leave Britain.
(Source: http://www.experiencefestival.com/a/Gurkha/id/1895301; image: http://theselvedgeyard.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/c2.jpeg)
coutsey: Barun Roy
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM SEMESTAINDONESIA.COM
Gurkha, also spelt as Gorkha, are people from Nepal who take their name from the eighth century Hindu warrior-saint Guru Gorakhnath. His disciple Bappa Rawal, born Prince Kalbhoj, founded the house of Mewar. Later descendants of Bappa Rawal moved further east to found the house of Gorkha, which in turn founded the Kingdom of Nepal. Gurkhas are most well-known for their history of service as foreign soldiers in the British Army and the Indian Army.
Gurkha – History
Gurkhas claim descent from the Hindu Rajputs and Brahmins of Northern India, who entered modern Nepal from the west. Guru Gorkhanath had a Rajput Prince-disciple, the legendary Bappa Rawal, born Prince Kalbhoj, founder of the house of Mewar, who became the first Gurkha and is said to be the ancestor of the present Royal family of Nepal as well as the Rana dynasty of Nepal.
The legend states that Bappa Rawal was a teenager in hiding, when he came upon the warrior saint while on a hunting expedition with friends in the jungles of Rajasthan. Bappa Rawal chose to stay behind, and care for the warrior saint, who was in deep meditation. When Guru Gorkhanath awoke, he was pleased with the devotion of Bappa Rawal. The Guru gave him the Khukri sword, the famous curved dagger of the present day Gurkhas. The legend continues that he told Bappa that he and his people would henceforth be called Gurkhas, the disciples of the Guru Gorkhanath, and their bravery would become world famous. He then instructed Bappa Rawal, and his Gorkhas to stop the advance of the Muslims, who were invading Afghanistan (which at that time was a Hindu/Buddhist nation), and converting the masses at the edge of the sword to their religion, slaughtering those who refused to convert and destroying many Hindu/Buddhist temples and shrines. Bappa Rawal took his Gurkhas and liberated Afghanistan – originally named Ghandhar, from which the present day Kandahar derives its name. He and his Gorkhas stopped the initial Islamic advance of the 8th century in the Indian subcontinent for the time being.
There are legends that Bappa Rawal (Kalbhoj) went further conquering Iran and Iraq before he retired as an ascetic at the feet of Mt. Meru, having conquered all invaders and enemies of his faith.
It is a misconception that the Gurkhas took their name from the Gorkha region of Nepal. The region was given its name after the Gurkhas had established their control of these areas. In the early 1500s some of Bappa Rawal’s descendants went further east, and conquered a small state in present-day Nepal, which they named Gorkha in honour of their patron saint. By 1769, through the leadership of Maharaj Dhiraj Prithvi Narayan Shahdev (1769-1775), the Gorkha dynasty had taken over the area of modern Nepal. They made Hinduism the state religion, although with distinct Rajput warrior and Gorkhanath influences.
In the Gurkha War (1814–1816) they waged war against the British East India Company army. The British were impressed by the Gurkha soldiers and after defeating the ghurkas and making Nepal a protectorate they were granted the right to hire them as mercenaries organised in Gurkha regiments in the East India Company army with the permission of then prime minister, Shree Teen (3) Maharaja (Maharana) Jung Bahadur Rana, the first Rana Prime-minister and “Father” of modern Nepal.
The “original” Gurkhas who were descended from the Rajputs refused to enter as mere soldiers and were instead given positions as officers in the British-Indian armed forces. The Indo-Tibeto-Mongolian Gurkhas entered as soldiers. The Thakur/Rajput Gurkhas were entered as officers, one of whom, (retired) General Narendra Bir Singh, Gurkha Rifles, rose to become aide-de-camp (A.D.C.) to Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India. After the British left India Gorkhalis continued seeking employment in British and Indian forces, as officers and soldiers. However, it should be noted that due to the mixing of blood over the centuries many Thakurs/Rajputs of Nepal may have Mongolian features and not appear Indian, while many Indo-Tibeto-Mongolian Gurkhas may have Rajput blood, an example of this being the surname Thapa.
Under international law present-day British Gurkhas are not treated as mercenaries but are fully integrated soldiers of the British Army, operate in formed units of the Brigade of Gurkhas, and abide by the rules and regulations under which all British soldiers serve. Similar rules apply for Gurkhas serving in the Indian Army.
Gurkha – East India Company army
Gurkhas served as troops under contract to the East India Company in the Pindaree War of 1817, in Bhurtbore (Present day Bharatpur) in 1826 and the First and Second Sikh Wars in 1846 and 1848. During the Indian Mutiny in 1857, Gurkhas fought on the British side, and became part of the British Indian Army on its formation. The 2nd Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles) defended Hindu Rao’s house for over three months, losing 327 out of 490 men. The 60th Rifles (later the Royal Green Jackets) fought alongside the Sirmoor Rifles and were so impressed that following the mutiny they insisted 2nd Gurkhas be awarded the honours of adopting their distinctive rifle green uniforms with scarlet edgings and rifle regiment traditions and that they should hold the title of riflemen rather than sepoys. Twelve Nepalese regiments also took part in the relief of Lucknow under the command of Shri Teen (3)Maharaja Maharana Jung Bahadur of Nepal.
Gurkha – British Indian Army
From the end of the Indian Mutiny until the start of the First World War the Gurkha Regiments saw active service in Burma, Afghanistan, the North-East and the North-West Frontiers of India, Malta (the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78), Cyprus, Malaya, China (the Boxer Rebellion of 1900) and Tibet (Younghusband’s Expedition of 1903).
Between 1901 and 1906, the Gurkha regiments were renumbered from the 1st to the 11th and redesignated as Gurkha Rifles. One hundred thousand Gurkhas fought in the First World War. They served in the battlefields of France in the Loos, Givenchy, Neuve Chapelle and Ypres; in Mesopotamia, Persia, Suez Canal and Palestine against Turkish advance, Gallipoli and Salonika. One detachment served with Lawrence of Arabia.
During the Battle of Loos the 8th Gurkhas fought to the last, and in the words of the Indian Corps Commander, “found its Valhalla”. During the Gallipoli Campaign the 6th Gurkhas captured a feature later known as “Gurkha Bluff”. At Sari Bair they were the only troops in the whole campaign to reach and hold the crest line and look down on the Straits which was the ultimate objective. Second Battalion of the 3rd Gurkha Rifles was involved in the conquest of Baghdad.
In the interwar years, Gurkhas fought in the Third Afghan War in 1919 followed by numerous campaigns on the North-West Frontier, particularly in Waziristan.
During World War II, the Nepalese crown let the British recruit 20 extra battalions — 40 in total — and let them serve everywhere in the world. In addition to keeping peace in India, Gurkhas fought in Syria, North Africa, Italy, Greece and against the Japanese in Singapore and in the jungles of Burma. The 4th battalion of the 10th Gurkha Rifles became a nucleus for the Chindits. They fought in the Battle of Imphal.
Gurkha – Gurkha military rank system in the British Indian Army
British Indian Army and Current Indian Army /Current British Army Equivalence
Subedar Major/ Major (Queen’s Gurkha Officer)
Subedar/ Captain (Queen’s Gurkha Officer)
Jemadar (now Naib Subedar)/ Lieutenant (Queen’s Gurkha Officer)
Company Havildar Major/ Company Sergeant Major
Company Quartermaster Havildar/ Company Quartermaster Sergeant
Havildar/ Sergeant
Naik/ Corporal
Lance Naik/ Lance Corporal
Rifleman
Note:
As opposed to British army officers who received regular Queen’s or King’s Commissions, Gurkha officers in this system would receive the Viceroy’s Commission. After Indian Independence, Gurkha officers in those regiments which became part of the British Army were known as King’s Gurkha Officers and later Queen’s Gurkha Officers (QGOs), receiving the King’s and later Queen’s Gurkha Commission. This distinction implied that Gurkha officers had no authority to command troops of British regiments.
The equivalent ranks in the post 1947 Indian Army were (and are) known as Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs). They retained the traditional rank titles used in the British Indian Army – Jemadar (later Naib Subedar), Subedar and Subedar Major.
While in principle any British subject may apply for a commission without having served in the ranks previously, the same cannot be said about Gurkha officers. It was customary for a Gurkha soldier to rise through the ranks and prove his ability before his regiment would consider offering him a commission.
From the 1920s, Gurkhas could also receive King’s Indian Commissions, and later full King’s or Queen’s Commissions, which put them on a par with British officers. This was rare until after the Second World War.
Gurkha – Gurkha Rifle Regiments ca.1800-1946
1st King George V’s Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment) (raised 1815, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
2nd King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles) (raised 1815, allocated to British Army in 1948)
3rd Queen Alexandra’s Own Gurkha Rifles (raised 1815, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
4th Prince of Wales’s Own Gurkha Rifles (raised 1857, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force) (raised 1858, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
6th Gurkha Rifles, renamed 6th Queen Elizabeth’s Own Gurkha Rifles in 1959 (raised 1817, allocated to British Army in 1948)
7th Gurkha Rifles, renamed 7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles in 1959 (raised 1902, allocated to British Army in 1948)
8th Gurkha Rifles (raised 1824, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
9th Gurkha Rifles (raised 1817, allocated to Indian Army at independence in 1947)
10th Princess Mary’s Own Gurkha Rifles (raised 1890, allocated to British Army in 1948)
11th Gorkha Rifles (1918-1922; raised again by India following independence in 1947)
14th Gurkha Rifles (1942-1946)
25th Gurkha Rifles (1942-1946)
26th Gurkha Rifles (1943-1946)
29th Gurkha Rifles (1943-1946)
38th Gurkha Rifles (1943-1946)
42nd Gurkha Rifles (raised 1817 as the Cuttack Legion, renamed 6th Gurkha Rifles in 1903)
44th Gurkha Rifles (raised 1824 as the 16th (Sylhet) Local Battalion, renamed 8th Gorkha Rifles in 1903)
56th Gurkha Rifles (1943-1946)
710th Gurkha Rifles (1943-1946)
Gurkha – Post independence
After Indian independence – and partition – in 1947 and under the Tripartite Agreement, six Gurkha regiments joined the post-independence India Army. Four Gurkha regiments joined the British Army.
Gurkha – British Army Gurkhas
Four Gurkha regiments joined the British Army on January 1 1948:
2nd King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles)
6th Queen Elizabeth’s Own Gurkha Rifles
7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles
10th Princess Mary’s Own Gurkha Rifles
They formed the Brigade of Gurkhas and were initially stationed in Malaya. See the Brigade of Gurkhas for details of British Gurkha activities since 1948.
Gurkha – Indian Army Gorkhas
Following Indian independence in 1947, six Gurkha regiments remained with the Indian Army:
1st King George V’s Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment)
3rd Queen Alexandra’s Own Gurkha Rifles
4th Prince of Wales’s Own Gurkha Rifles
5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force)
8th Gurkha Rifles
9th Gurkha Rifles
Upon independence, the spelling was changed to Gorkha. In addition, a further regiment, 11th Gorkha Rifles, was raised. Upon India becoming a republic in 1950, all royal titles were dropped.
The 1st Battalion of the 11th Gorkha Regiment fought in the 1999 Kargil Conflict for India. In 1999 5/8 Gorkha Rifles were sent as part of the Indian Army UN contingent of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to secure the diamond fields against the Revolutionary United Front.
Gurkha – Singapore Gurkhas Contingent
The Gurkha Contingent (GC) of the Singapore Police Force was formed on 9th April 1949 from selected ex-British Army Gurkhas. It was raised to replace a Sikh unit which had disintegrated during the Second World War and is an integral part of the Police Force.
The GC is a well trained, dedicated and disciplined body whose principal role is as a specialist guard force. In time of crisis it can be deployed as an impartial reaction force. During the turbulent years before and after independence the GC acquitted itself well a number of times during outbreaks of civil disorder. The Gurkhas displayed the courage, self restraint and professionalism for which they are famous and earned the respect of the society at large.
The picture shows troopers of the Gurkha Contingent, guarding a car park entrance to Raffles City where the 117th IOC Session was held in Singapore in July 2005. Dressed in the combat uniform, but with elements borrowed from the no. 3 dress, the officer in the foreground was armed with a shotgun while the other handles a Heckler & Koch MP5.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the GC can be seen patrolling the streets and replacing local policemen to guard key installations. Before the incident, they were seldom seen in public.
Gurkha – Other
Gurkha soldiers have won 13 Victoria Crosses, all but one (Rambahadur Limbu) were won when all Gurkha regiments were still part of the Indian Army. An additional 13 VCs have been awarded to British Officers in Gurkha regiments. Since Indian independence, Gurkhas have also won 3 Param Vir Chakras.
Ethnically, Gurkhas who are presently serving in the British armed forces are Indo-Tibeto-Mongolians. Gurkhas serving in the Indian Armed Forces are of both groups, Indo-Tibeto-Mongolian and Rajput stock. Gurkhas of Indo-Tibeto-Mongolian origin mostly belong to the Gurung, Magar, Tamang, Khasa and Kiranti origin, many of whom are adherents of Tibetan Buddhism and Shamanism. [1]
Since the original Gurkhas were Rajput warriors from Rajasthan, all gurkhas, regardless of ethnic origin, speak a Rajasthani dialect. They are also famous for their large knife called the kukri.
In the mid 1980s some Nepali speaking groups in West Bengal began to organize under the Gorkhaland National Liberation Front, calling for their own Gurkha state. In 1988 they were given broader autonomy as the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council.
The treatment of Gurkhas and their families has been the subject of controversy in the United Kingdom following revelations that Gurkhas receive smaller pensions than their British equivalents.
The nationality status of Gurkhas and their families has also been in dispute, with claims that some ex-army Nepalese families are being denied residency and forced to leave Britain.
(Source: http://www.experiencefestival.com/a/Gurkha/id/1895301; image: http://theselvedgeyard.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/c2.jpeg)
coutsey: Barun Roy
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Sunday 27 December 2009
SIKKIM OF YESTERDAY
June 09,2007
Sikkim, an Indian State on the Eastern Himalayan ranges, is counted among stateswith Buddhist followers, which had strong cultural ties with the Tibetan regionof the Peoples’ Republic of China. Because of its past feudal history, it was one of the three ‘States’ along with Nepal and Bhutan which were known as ‘the Himalayan Kingdoms’ till 1975, the year of its merger with the Indian Union.It is a small state with 2, 818 sq. m. (7, 096 sq. km.) between 27 deg. 4’ North to28 deg 7’ North latitude between 80 deg. East 4’ and 88deg. 58’ East longitude.This 113 kilometre long and 64 kilometre wide undulating topography is locatedabove 300 to 7,00 metres above sea level. Its known earliest settlers, the Lepchas,termed it as Neliang, the country of the caverns that gave them shelter. Bhotias,the Tibetan migrants, called it lho’mon, ‘the land of the southern (Himalayan)slop’. As rice plays important part in Buddhist rituals in Tibet, which they used toprocure from India, they began calling it ‘Denjong’ (the valley of rice). Folktraditions inform us that it was also the land of mythical ‘Kiratas’ of Indian classics. The people of Kirati origin (Lepcha, Limbu, Rai and possibly Magar)used to marry among themselves in the hoary past. As the saying goes, a newlywedded Limbu bride on her arrival to her groom’s newly constructed house,exclaimed, “Su-khim” -- the new house. This word not only got currency, but alsogot anglicized into Sikkim (Basnet 1974).Sikkim claims that it had an extensive territory in the past. The Shah rulers ofNepal invaded Sikkim from 1770 to 1810 and came to the river Tista.Subsequently Sikkim lost the region known as Limbuan in Nepal. Up to the lastdecade of 19thcentury, Chumbi valley was a part of Sikkim. Between 1817 to1861, Sikkim lost its foothills and Darjeeling hills in the south to British India.Succession disputes in the ruling family in Sikkim gave Bhutan the chance tointerfere with its internal affairs and it lost land on its eastern frontiers to Bhutan.
Land and People
Lepchas -It is clamed that the Lepchas, who call themselves ‘Rong’ , the people living inravines, migrated to the present site from Assam hills, are the earliest settlers ofland. They have elaborate terms for rivers, water lives, flora and fauna of Sikkimunlike any community found in the country. However, their current name itself, is a gift of the Nepali language, “Lapcho’, cairn, the residents of the heap of stone, or the stone house. It is claimed that Rongs were organized by Turve Panu, theirking or chief, in the hoary past After some generations, kingship came to an endand the tribe switched off to a system of chieftainship. It is said that Thokeng Tek,the Lechpa chief, was instrumental in installing the Bhotia rule in Sikkim byassociating himself with the Tibetan migrants. Accordingly, a dozen of Lepchachiefs were accorded with the status of Dzongpens, or regional rulers or thegovernors, by the first Bhotia theocrat, Phuntso Namgyal (1642 –1670). These Dzongpens along with another dozen of Bhotia Councillors came to be known asthe qazis or kazis, the Sikkimese aristocrats, in course of time .These two dozen qazis inter-married among themselves and many of the Lepchasbecame Buddhists. However, the Lepcha qazis came to be known as the ‘createdor the fashioned’ ones (‘A-den’) against the Bhotia (‘Bar fung-mo’) ‘t he flowing from on high’; the lower and the higher order respectively of the qazis.Ethnological literature on the Lepchas suggests that it is a community of ‘mild,timid, and peaceful persons who are devoid of all sort of conflict’. It is said thatthere is no word for violence and conflict in their language. By tradition, they areinhabitants of Inner Himalayan highland and they lived in Zongu Lepcha reserve, a preserve of the former royal family. BhotiasBhotia herdsmen moved in search of pasture grounds as per seasonalrequirements without any consideration to the geographical divides. They used tocamp in high Himalayas during the summer and Chumbi valley in the harsh winter. It appears that the Bhotia herdsmen were already there in Sikkim during the period of Guru Padama Sambhava (eight century A D), who is credited tohave preached an early form of Buddhism. It is said that some Bhotia patriarchsof Namgyal dynasty came to Sikkim in 13 the century along with their cattle wealth. Khye-Bumsa was one, whose descendants would play significant role in
history of Sikkim, who had settled down in Chumbi valley. Some four hundredyears after that date, three monks from Tibet met at Yoksom near Gangtok andstaked their claim to rule over Sikkim, but they failed to settle their conflicting claims. At long last, they appeared to have postponed their quarrel and decided toexplore more for a better choice. As the myth goes, they chanced upon Phuntso Namgyal , a well-establishedpatriarch from Khye-Bumsa’stock, who also happened to be close to the localLepcha. The three holy men took Phuntso to Yoksom, where he was consecratedas the ruler of Denjong in 1642. The Bhotias follow polyandry as well aspolygamy. Apart from the newly chosen king, the Bhotia kalons ( Councillors) were encouraged to marry Lepcha and Limbu ladies besides their Bhotiaconsorts. The monks were also instrumental in creating an ethnic common wealthof lho’+mon+Tshongs ( Lhomontshong= lho-Bhotia ( father), +mon-Lepcha(mother)+ Tshong-Limbu ( the child), an organic family of three ethnic stocksresiding in Sikkim at the time .A ritual of blood brother hoodamong three tribes was claimed to be solemnized, in which apart from Buddhistpractices shamanistic rituals were also enacted. LimbusLimbus are one of the indigenous communities of Sikkm, residing there evenbefore the Namgyal dynasty was established in 1642. It is a community divided into three gotras (clan): Bhiphuta (the animists), Kashi Gotra (those, who are underHindu fold) and Lhasa Gotra or the Tshongs (the Buddhists). Myth suggests thatwhile the first clan claims to have sprung up from earth right in Limbuan and theyhave their own system of belief. The second one are said to have come fromVaranasi (Kashi on river Ganges in India) and they appear to be sanskritisedLimbus, who are under Hindu fold. Lastly, the Lhasa clan is said to have migrated from Lhasa, Tibet and are Lamaists. So much so that last Chogyal ofSikkim had introduced a separate reserve seat in Sikkim State Council for theTshongs. However, once the system of ethnic parity was done away with in 1979, this provision was with drawn. Right now Limbus are counted among the OtherBackward Castes (OBCs) since 1994. And since then, it was the Limbus (Sanchman Limbu), Now, Pawan Kumar Chamling is who ruling the State.
Nepale or the Paharias (NEPAMUL) A new power emerged in Nepal in the form of Prithvi Narayan Shah in mid-19thcentury, who consolidated his kingdom in Nepal and his successors tried toextend its boundaries in the East and West of the country. Gorkha generalsvanquished the weak Namgyal authority in Sikkim. Gorkha generals Kazi Damodar Pande and Jahar Singh Thapa crossed in to Sikkim and capturedterritories west of river Tista in 1789. The king of Sikkim, Tenzing Namgyal (1780-1793), ran away to Tibet and sought an asylum. Gorkha occupation inSikkim continued up to 1817, when the British forced them to leave Sikkim east of river Mechi as per terms of Segauli Treaty. Though the bulk of the Gurkhaswithdrew from Sikkim for time being, they returned eastward within a few years as per the British policy to locate Nepalese on the Eastern Himalayas. Darjeeling was secured by the British from Sikkim as a hill resort for theconvalescing Europeans in 1835. Hardy Nepalese labors were encouraged tosettle to clear the forests and develop it in to an urban centre for the European. Asper the provisions of the 1861 Treaty signed at Tumlong, the British got acomplete foothold in Sikkim. The British secured the Sikkimese principality in1888 and appointed John Claude White as the Political Officer residing atGangtok. The Ruler was interned along with his consort and White ranadministration with the help of Council of Advisors.Land lease system was introduced; Nepali Newars were invited to mine copperand mint coins; forestland was released to Nepali labour for agricultural development so that revenue of the State could be increased. Settlement of the‘Paharias’ –Nepalese labour led to physical violence between the colonizers andBhotia qazis. Matter went up to such a situation that ruler, Thutub Namgyal,appealed to the Viceroy to intervene in colonization of the Nepalese in Sikkim. At last, an imaginary line just north of Gangtok, drawn from East to West in 1894,was agreed to be the northern limit of Nepalese settlement in Sikkim. By the time the third Census of India was conducted in 1891, the number of the Nepalese in Sikkim had risen to 30, 458. Out of which after discounting the Lepchas (5,762), the Bhotias (4,894) and the Limbus (3,356), Nepalese werenumbered more than half (15,458). The 2001 Census of India recorded thepopulation of Sikkim at 540,493 persons. Among them 22 percent were identifiedas the scheduled tribes (Lepcha, Bhotia inclusive of Chumbipa, Dopthapa, Dukpa, Kagatey, Sherpa, Tibetan, Tromopa, and Dolmo), 5.93 percent as the scheduledcastes of Nepali origin (Kami, Saraki, Damai, Lohar and Manjhi) and thereare Nepamul communities such as Tamang, Gurung, Rai,Limbu and Sunwar, who have been recognized as the Other Backward Castes(OBCs). More than three-fourth population of Sikkim is of Nepali origin. They are sociallydivided into ‘tagadharis’ (those, who are entitled to sacred thread---Bahun and Chhetris) and ‘matwalis’ (those, who are by tradition permitted to drinkintoxicants). Then, there is a social hierarchy starting with the Thakuris, Newarisand Kiratis. While the Thakuris have a four fold division of varns (casts); Newarisare a separate ethnic stock invariably following Lamaism and Kiratas claim to thestatus of ‘janajatis’ i.e. tribesmen on the fringe of the Nepali social world. Thelingua franca of the community is Nepali or Gorkhali. However, Newaris andkiratis are at least bi-lingual and they are not necessarily Hindus.2. Political and Economic Profile Sikkim and NepalA profile of Sikkim, even today, cannot be developed without a detailedexamination of its long relationship with Nepal which has shaped its history and development more than any other influence, barring India. It appears that withconsolidation of Gorkha rule in Kathmandu Valley (1768 - 1814) , a new Gorkhaor Nepalese identity began to emerge. The Gorkha onslaught on Sikkim led to badblood between the Bhotias and the Nepalese. There was another reason for thismutual distrust. While Bhotias looked to Tibet as their political, religious andcultural fount, Nepalese were of Hindu orientation in such matters. Almost five decade long excursion in Sikkim did not mean complete withdrawal of Nepalese ethnic elements from Sikkim in 1817 with signing of Treaty of Titaliya, by which Nepal surrender all her possessions east of river Mechi to Namgyal rulers. For example, Jorethang, a small village on south -eastern part of Sikkim, is derivedafter name of Gorkha General, Jawaher Singh Thapa. Within less than two decades of signing of the Treaty of Titaliya, Sikkim wasinveigled to cede Darjeeling hills, ‘the road of destiny’ (Pinn 1990) to the British between 1835-1839. Col. W G A Lloyd, the British factotum on Darjeeling hills in 1830s, “whose lack of sensitivity in human relations was one of his leastattractive traits” informed his superiors in Calcutta that the Sikkim ruler hadgifted the hill to the British out of friendship. What he did not sufficiently informthat as per oriental tradition the ruler of Sikkim expected a matching return gift from the Governor- General. Thus, possession of Darjeeling began with a built-ingrudge on the part of Sikkim. To begin with, it was an enclave within Sikkimese territory, to which the British got engaged in developing in to an urban hill resort. Within no time, developers, shopkeepers, tea planters and hordes of labourersbegan to pour in this newly established hill station in search of opportunities. Those were the days, when slavery was a common practice in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Apart from genuine migrants, slaves, criminals, and even politicalfugitives began to take shelter in this New Haven. The hill resort not only gavenew opportunities to the new comers, but it also offered better terms of earningand wages.There was something like exodus of human beings to Darjeeling, which became a matter of resentment among hill states such as Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan withthin population. There was a sizeable migration of the Nepalese to Darjeeling, but Nepal found alternatives to its depleting manpower. Sikkim and Bhutan developed a grudge against growing glitter of Darjeeling and their rulers felt thatas if it was done at their cost. Continuous harassment of Darjeeling enclave byill-informed Sikkimese authorities led to a number of skirmishes between theSikkimese and the British in next 25 years from ceding of Darjeeling in 1835.Needless to add that ill-equipped Sikkim was poorly prepared for this context andit lost all the territories south of its present boundary up to the plains of India andwest of river Teesta to the Nepalese boundary in the west. Not only that, theBritish overlords also brought Sikkim under their imperial protection.This created a new situation in which the British watched Nepalese perseveranceand industriousness from close quarters while engaged in developing the newlyacquired district of Darjeeling. Wherever unskilled and semi-skilled labour wasrequired, the Nepalese were employed, especially in the hilly tracts. Within a fewdecades, Darjeeling was developed as model district by dint of Nepalese labour. There was another angle to this scenario.The British were suspicious of the people of Tibetan origin. They experimented with Nepalese response in similar situations and found them ‘loyal, trustworthyand obedient’. Thus, they decided unintentionally to settle the eastern Himalayanfoothills with the Nepalese settlement, a wedge between the highlander Bhotiasand the Indian plains. The culmination of this policy might be seen in Herbert H Risley’s famous gazetteer of Sikkim in 1994 (Risley, H H : 1994). Naturally, under Britishinspiration, the Neplese began to settle in western, and southern Sikkim and south western Bhutan. In the year 1867, two Newar brothers, Laxmidas and Chandrabir Maksey, were granted deeds for settling Nepalese on wasteland and uninhabitedareas in East and South Sikkim, mining copper and minting coins.The lease was granted for a period of 20 years at an annual rate of Rs. 500 to theking and Rs. 700 to Phodang Lama and Khansa Dewan. They opened the virginareas to the colonizers, brought in skilled labour for mining and minting,organized forests, constructed link roads and bridged some of the steams for roadtraffic. They ultimately developed about 20 estates and within two decades thedemographic picture of Sikkim was changed by turning the west and south districts into predominantly Nepalese habitations. This was not to the liking of theBhotia pastoralists, who desired extensive land for grazing their cattle, leading toarmed conflicts between the two sides. Thutub Namgyal (1874-1914) succeeded his half brother to the throne of Sikkimin 1874 and married his widow. He appears to be obstinate in temperament, indecisive in state matters and partisan to a faction of the couriers. Unfortunatefor him, his coming to power in Sikkim coincided with an aggressive policy topush to the Himalayas by the British. Sikkim rulers had extensive estate inChumbi valley and they used to reside at Phari specially during the winter months and some members of the family used to stay there regularly and visit royalpersonae in Sikkim frequently. Herdsmen grazing royal cattle on northernpastureland across the Himalayan divide used to descend to low laying Chumbi valley during the freezing winter months. Northern Sikkim commanded ideal andextensive pasture -land in which Tibetan and Sikkimese cattle used to graze as per the demand of the season.The herdsmen traded butter, cheese. wool, yak tails, leather and hide, preciousstone, horses, dogs and other light but precious commodities. By tradition everyBhotia inclusive of monks are entitled to trade. Their normal orientation was naturally north to Tibet, to which they visited on pilgrimage, trading and evencontracting marital alliances. The Namgyal court was equally divided in tofactions. At least the one of such factions, to which the British termed as the pro-Tibetan, was aggressively antagonistic to Nepalese settlement, and not without reasons, on alleged British instigation.Thutub was ordered to secure Tibetan compliance on the British demands to opentheir marts for British goods and to receive the British representatives for politicaland commercial negotiations, to which he was not temperamentally suited. Having failed to accomplish the expected demands, the royal couple wasimprisoned at Kurseong, Darjeeling and Kalimpong on nominal maintenanceallowance. The King was asked to re-call his son, Tchoda Namgyal, the crownprince known as Tarings, to Sikkim for getting him educated. The royal couplesaw through the façade and decided to send the contrary message to the Prince. Having exhausted their patience in securing the Prince back to Sikkim, the Britishat last refused his claim to the throne and decided to groom Sidkeong Tulku as thefuture king. Sikkim and Bengal All through second part of 19thcentury, Sikkim was treated as if it was part ofBengal Presidency. In fact, it was the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling andCommissioner of Rajshahi Division, of Bengal , who were controlling the affairs of the state. By 1888, the British had decided to take over the administration byappointing a resident Political Officer, John Claude White, who had experienced the Nepalese perseverance in the past and was steeped in the British desire topush to the Himalayas to the maximum. He began to structure the Sikkimeseeconomy “Chaos reigned everywhere, no revenue system, the Maharaja takingwhat he required, as he wanted it from the people, those nearest the capital havingto contribute to the larger share, while those more remote had toll taken fromthem by the local officials in the name the raja, though little found its way to him;no court of justice, no police, no public works, no education for younger generation. The task before me was a difficult one, but fascinating; the countrywas a new one and every thing was in my hands”(White 1971).In such a situation, there was no surprise that the coffers of the state were empty; he appointed an advisory council; surveyed the different districts and within a period of five years, a system taxation and revenue was established. Further more, he found “the country sparsely populated, and in order to bring more land under cultivation, it was necessary to encourage immigration, and this was done by giving land on favourable terms to Nepalese, who, as soon as they knew it was tobe had, came freely in”. The British took the steps to introduce a system of periodic land lease, in whichcultivable areas were divided in to Ellakas. The entire such land was divided into: land lease to the Lessees on periodic auction, private estates, and Ellakas under the five/ six monasteries. Land revenue was to be deposited on the fixed dates by the lease holders to the State bankers. Revenue from the private estateswas also to be deposited to the State Bankers, M/S Jethraj Bhojmull on stateaccount. And the monasteries held their estates rent -free and spend the revenueon upkeep of their establishments and other ecclesiastic purposes.However, all three types of land holdings were extremely oppressive to the cultivators (bustiwalas). There was a series of unpaid labour practices employedby all the Ellaka-holders. Then there were Newar Thekodars, who were allotted land on contract (thika) way back in 1877 for mining, settlements, and forestmanagement. The State was happy to collect its revenue on fixed dates and forgetabout the fate of the cultivators most of time. Most of these landlords held judicial and policing powers as well, which made thelife of cultivators all the more difficult. The last lease of land ended in 1935,which was extended to the time it was finally abolished under popular demand after Indian independence. 3. Sikkim and India By the 1940s, the Political Officer in Gangtok had developed a new foundsympathy for the Bhotia ruler. It appears that the common Nepalese inkingtowards democratic movements warned them to side with the Bhotias againsttheir one time favourite, the Nepalese. AJ Hopekinson, the last British PoliticalOfficer, advised the rulers of Sikkim and Bhutan to send their delegation alongwith their memoranda to wait on the Cabinet Mission sent by Britain to negotiatewith the Indians for transfer of power. The Sikkimese delegation went to Delhi,but failed to meet the Mission. However, Foreign and Political Department, Government of India prepared a route for the Cabinet Mission on August10, 1946, which provided the guidelines for future to the Indian Union:“In practice, it may well prove difficult to secure a tidy solution to the future ofNepal, Sikkim and Bhutan and even to the Eastern marches of Kashmir, Ladakh.This will largely depend on future policy and fate of China and hence of Tibet.The Government of the (Indian) Union must be prepared for complication onNorth East Frontier (NEFA) and evolve a policy to meet them. This may wellhave to be that of maintaining all principalities in virtual independence of India,but as buffer and, as far as possible, client states. There may be greater advantagein according Sikkim a more independent status than in seeking to absorb Bhutan as well Sikkim in the Indian Union, adding to the communal problem of Buddhism to those of Islam and Hinduism…the Government would be welladvised to avoid entering in to fresh commitments with any one of those frontierstates or seeking to redefine their status. Their importance is strategic in directrelation to Tibet and China and indirectly to Russia. Such adjustment of theirrelations with the (Indian) Union as can usefully be affected by …those politicalstrategic considerations … account of which it is hoped that the Treaty will takerather than the Constitutional niceties, which do not help defence policy” .State PoliticsAgainst the above imperial advice, which the newly independent Indian Unionseems to have followed, the masses of three Himalayan kingdoms identifiedthemselves with Indian aspirations and shared their perception of change and identified their feudal rulers with archaic colonial privileges. Many of leaders of the Nepali Congress, Sikkim State Congress and Bhutan State Congress weremembers of the Indian National Congress and at least some of them, identified themselves with the demands for responsible government, abolition of the feudal rights and introduction of land reforms by abolishing landed gentry. Similarly, the oppressed of Sikkim, before they organized themselves into SikkimState Congress, had limited and localized organizations such as Praja Sudharak Samaj, Gangtok, led by Tashi Tshering; Praja Samelan, Temi Tarku, led by D B Tewari and Gobardhan Pradhan; and Praja Mandal, Chakhung, led by LhendupDorji Kazi. The indomitable Tashi Tshering called for a public meeting of like-minded groups on December 7, 1947 at Polo Ground, Gangtok and invited other two fora to join his efforts. He had prepared a document, “A Few Facts About Sikkim” in English, which was translated in to Nepali by Chandra Das Rai and itscyclo-styled copies were distributed among the masses. There were star leaderssuch as Tshering himself, Sonam Tshering, L D Kazi, Roy Chaudhury, Mrs.Helen Lepch , but the thunder was stolen by 24 year old C.D Rai, whose eloquentNepali speech was a novel experience to politically indolent Sikkim. Sensing the public mood, the three above organizations decided jointly to formSikkim State Congress on that very day and chalked out to meet the ruler with athree point demand: (a) abolition of landlordism; (b) formation of an interimgovernment and (c) accession of Sikkim to India. The State Congress leaders met the ruler on 9thDecember, 1947 with their above charter of demands.The Maharaja was advised to go with the changing time and concede the populardemands of the common man. Some land reforms were immediately introducedsuch as abolition of lessee system; end of various forms of un-paid labour; restructuring of judicial system. As negotiation was on between the SikkimDurbar and the Government of India, it was decided to keep in abeyance thedemand for Sikkim’s merger with India. Without working out modalities of itsfunctioning, its power and legal implications, it was agreed to install a popularinterim government with five members; two nominees of the king and three fromthe State Congress. The indolent Maharaja had almost surrendered all his political and administrativefunctions in favour of his son, Palden Thondup, in whose scheme of thingsSikkim stood for only Bhotia, Lepchs and Tchongs. Sensing the mood of time, even the prince was forced to go to the people. Hegot his courtiers, aristocrats, monks and sycophants organized into the SikkimNational Party, “an anti-thesis of the State Congress” on April 30, 1948 to opposeall the steps, resolutions and personnel of the State Congress and back all themoves on the part of palace for the continuation of its anachronism. The popular leaders waited for about a year and saw that the palace instead of agreeing to their demands was busy consolidating itself. The Congress went on agitation to press for its demands in February, 1949, in which popular leaders such as C D Rai and other five were arrested. Thistriggered a spate of resentment against the palace and more than ten thousand followers of the Congress gheraoed the palace on May 1, 1949. The Maharaja had taken shelter in the Residency and the administration had stopped functioning. Onthe advice of the Political Officer, Harishwer Dayal, I C S to Maharaja was forced to install at long last a popular ministry on May 1949 with Tashi Tshering as theChief Minister, D S Lepcha, and C D Rai from the State Congress and D Dahduland R PAlley, two nominees of the ruler.This was the high point of the achievements of the Sikkim Congress, which normally assumed that it had the mandate from the people to rule the country asper its party programme. On the other hand, the palace felt that it had placated thepopulists and it would choose their own time and action to mould the emergentsituation. In such a situation, there was little chance that this half way democraticexperiment would succeed. Having read the writings on the walls, Tashi Tshering,the Chief Minister realized that the formation of the ministry had been agreed toby the Durbar more with a view to discrediting the Congress leaders thanallowing them to carry out the people’s mandate. Disgusted with scheming of theCrown Prince, the Chief Minister threatened to resign and assumed agitation(satyagraha or peaceful protests). Alarmed by these developments, New Delhi decided to send its Deputy Minister for External Affairs to Gangtok. The minister stayed in Sikkim for four days, met with the ministers twice, the Maharaja, Maharajkumar, even the ‘leaders’ of Sikkim National Party and came back to Delhi without resolving the problem. It is alleged that ‘the Sikkim Durbar went all out to dazzle the Minister with Sikkim’s royal hospitality and loaded him with costly gifts’. It appears that thepalace had been able to impress upon the visitor that New Delhi would find theDurbar more dependable than that of the popular public leaders. This became clear on June 6, 1949, when Political Officer, Harishwer Dayal, I C S, summoned the Sikkim cabinet to his office and informed them that they had been dismissedby him in the name of the Government of India and he had taken over theadministration of Sikkim himself. The leaders, who had all along had faith in good office of the ruling Indianleaders, were stunned by this course of action. The public was demoralized andthe palace heaved a sigh of relief. The Government of India asked the Durbar toappoint a senior administrator as the Dewan of Sikkim, who would over-see the social reforms, economic development and governance of the state Ethnic Balancing ActJ S Lall of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) took over as the Dewan of Sikkim onAugust 11,1949 and tried to streamline the administration in view of the populardemands for land reforms, forced labour and feudal privileges. To the disappointment of State Congress, the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty was signed atGangtok by Political Officer, Harishwer Dayal and the Maharaja of Sikkim, TashiNamgyal on December 5, 1950. It stipulated that Sikkim would be an Indianprotectorate. The Government of India was to retain defence, external affairs, custom andcommunication. India agreed to provide Rs. three lakh per annum to Sikkim as long as the Government of Sikkim duly observed the terms of Treaty.Furthermore, the Supreme Court of India would be the last arbitrator in case ofany dispute in interpretation of the provisions of Treaty. The Maharaja issued a Proclamation proposing an election for the State Council with 12 elected members, five nominated members and a President to be nominated by the king.More sinister for democratic forces was the introduction of the evil of notorious ‘parity system’, by which about 25 percent Lepcha- Bhotias on six elective seatswere equated with 75 percent Sikkimese of Nepalese extraction on another sixsuch seats in the Council. Needless to add that this formula was further extendedto all walks of life I Sikkimese administration causing strong resentment amongthe sufferers. Similarly, the electoral process, voting procedure, counting systemand even election tribunals were skewed in such a way that the Nepalese ingeneral and democratic forces in particular were at a disadvantage.The first election to the State Council was held in the middle of June 1953. The results confirmed the expected electoral behaviour by choosing six Nepalesebelonging to State Congress on Nepali seats and six Lepcha- Bhotias aligned toSikkim National Party on Lepcha- Bhotia seats. The number of seats in the State Council kept on changing from 17 in 1953 to 20 in 1958 ( One, more to king’s nominees + one to the Monks—Sangha + one, the General Seat running for entire state), and 24 in 1966 ( King’s nominees-6+Lepcha-Bhotia-7 + Nepalese-7+Sangha- 1 + General –1 + Tchongs-1 + Scheduled Castes- 1). In practice 18 elective seats in State Council were divided between Nepalese andLepcha- Bhotias. While two ethnic Lepchas and Bhotias were shown together for distribution of loafs and bread, numerically large Nepalese common wealthinvariably shown as fragmented. While Sikkim National Party, a beneficiary tothese scheming was more than willing to welcome such a fraud, t he StateCongress and its off-shoots invariably protested, which was brushed aside by the palace. The State Council and Executive Council Proclamation, 1953 claimed “to associating people more and more closely with the governance of the State’, butin reality it created an intricate arrangement of electoral process with a limited, complex, controversial and purposive political participation. The ExecutiveCouncil with its limited power was used as a leverage to cause defection fromdemocratic parties and legislative wing of these parties were not given their rightto choose their representatives to it. All along, efforts were made on the part of the Durbar to polarize the political parties along its ‘cherished ethnic divide’. This becomes clear, when one casts a glance on electoral results of political partiesduring the five elections held for the State Council from 1953 to 1973:Table 1Electoral results of the political parties in Sikkim from 1953 to 1973. S.N Political Parties19531958196719701973Total 1. Sikkim State Congress68242222. Sikkim National Party 66 5 7 9 333. Sikkim National Congress ....855184, Unattached Independents ....32207Elective Seats in Council121418181880One learns certain lessons from the above table. Firstly, with active support and connivance of the Durbar, the Sikkim National Party increased its representation in the Council continuously from 1958 to 1973, when its rigged support basecolapsed once the massed decided not to take the farce any more. Secondly,affairs of Sikkim State Congress were similarly on the decline, as its leadersproved more vulnerable to the poaching from others susceptible to the loaves andfishes from power to be. Thirdly, Sikkim National Congress under the leadershipof Lhendup Dorji Kazi continued to be persecuted and its functionaries wereinvariably harassed to the extent that all its General Secretaries were made toleave the party. Chandra D Rai, Bhim B Gurung, Lal B Basnet, Santosh K Rai, Chatur Singh Rai and Nand Lal Thapa were made to leave the party because of various cases filed by the State or agencies. The Indian Hand Rigging and other electoral malpractices became blatant by the time elections to the State Council were held in 1973. A small controversy with reference to thecounting centre at Gangtok ignited and within no time political parties organizeddemonstrations against the Government. Police force was used to control theagitation, which added fuel to fire. Sikkim National Congress and Sikkim State Congress demanded countermanding of the election and ordering a fresh poll. The Durbar adopted its old dual policy of repression and causing dissension in itspolitical rivals. But this time it did not work. Demonstrators began to attack andtake over the police stations in the interior. The two political parties decided toboycott and disturb ruler’s birthday celebration on April 4, 1974 in spite ofappeals made on the contrary. The situation was grim and a pitched battle wasfought between the demonstrators and the police. . The place was obdurate andwent ahead with the birthday celebrations, which angered the masses even more. The administration collapsed and the ruler was forced to request the PoliticalOfficer to take over the administration, as his father had done 24 years back. The Political Officer took over the administration for time being, but the political stalemate continued. The Government of India encouraged the Durbar andpolitical leaders to negotiate an agreement and establish normalcy in the State, butstands on both sides were hardening. At last, a tripartite agreement between the ruler, political leaders and India was reached on May 8, 1973. Unlike in 1949, the Government of India had decided to discard the unsolicitedcolonial advice this time and took a clear stand on democratic principles. Thefamous tripartite agreement envisaged ruler to be a constitutional head,establishment of a responsible government with democratic rights, rule of law,fundamental rights, independent judiciary, adult franchise and executive andlegislative powers to the people’s representatives. Article 5 of the Agreement envisages: “The system of election shall be so organized as to make the (State)Assembly adequately representative of the various sections of the population. Thesize and the composition of the Assembly and of the Executive Council shall besuch as may be prescribed from time to time, care being taken to ensure that nosingle section of the population acquires a dominating position due mainly to itsethnic origin, and that the rights and interests of the Sikkimese Bhotia- Lepchaorigin and of Sikkimese Nepali, which includes Tsongs and scheduled castesorigin, are fully protected”. According to the provisions of the Agreement, a State Legislative Assembly of 32 members (Lepcha- Bhotia 15 + one seat to the monks + Nepalese 15 + one seat to the Scheduled Castes among the Nepalese untouchables), a Chief Minister,and a Council of Ministers responsible to the Assembly to be elected onuniversal adult franchise was envisaged. With a view to carrying out specialprovisions of the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty, an Office of the Chief Executive to bemanned by an Indian functionary was created between the two and a deference of opinion between him the ruler was to be referred to the Political Officer atGangtok, whose opinion would be binding. The political atmosphere in Sikkimsurcharged with and in such excitements, election to the State Assembly were held in April, 1974. With exception of one Lepcha- Bhotia seat to a nominee ofSikkim National Party, the remaining 31 seats were captured by the newly formedSikkim Congress. Lhendup Dorji Kazi, the leader of Sikkim Congress LegislatureParty, was sworn as the first duly elected Chief Minster of Sikkim. These andother developments were seen as evidence of dilution of “Sikkim’s InternationalStatus” by the Ruler, which may be seen as a conflict between the head of the state and his people.Merger of Sikkim The State Assembly met in an emergency season and passed this resolution: “ Theinstitution of Chogyal (the head of the state) is hereby abolished and Sikkim shallhence forth be a constituent unit of India”. While the ruler went on asking forright of self determination to Sikkim, this Resolution of the Assembly was put tothe electorate and 97 percent favoured it. This led to the Indian Parliament passing the 38thConstitutional Amendment Bill on April 26, 1975. Thus, Sikkimceased to exist as an Indian protectorate and became the 22ndstate of the IndianUnion. Accordingly, the office of the Chogyal stood abolished and provisions ofthe Indo-Sikkimese Treaty, Tripartite Agreement and the Government of IndiaACT, 1974 were made inoperative. Lhendup Dorji Kazi (LD Kazi), the ChiefMinster, emerged as the central figure after these epoch making developments. His style of functioning was that of an old -world patriarch, addicted to advicefrom all corners, but too old to learn anything afresh.As the Chief Minister of Sikkim, he changed political affiliation five times between December 1975 to January 1980 as per the change of ruling parties in the Central Government in Delhi. For New Delhi, the Kazi had replaced the old Chogyal and old policies continued to be pursued. In such a situation, thebureaucrats from the Central Government turned out to be friends, philosophersand guides to the Kazi. The Governor to the State, B B Lal, ICS and Kazi’sconsort, Kazani Eliza Maria Dorji, basically ran the state. The Kazi was effective for politically placid Sikkimese scenario, but he was not cut for the complexIndian political reality. He could neither restrain his younger colleagues such asNar Bhadur Khatiwara, Ram Chandra Poudyal, nor could he satisfy the seniorcolleagues like Chatur Singh Rai or Bhim B. Gurung. Very soon, the party became faction ridden; serious charges of corruption werelevelled against functionaries. The governor, the Kazani and higher bureaucrats,all began to assert in day to day administration on the name of “the popular government”. Kazi was still basking in the ‘glory of the merger (of Sikkim to India)’ when the first election to the State Assembly was announced. Prior to thatOrdinance 7, 1979 was issued by the Government of India, by which 12 seatswere reserved for the indigenous tribes like Lepchas and Bhotias, two to thescheduled castes and one to the monks and rest of 17 seats in Assembly were declared as ‘general’, which means they were open to any Indian to contest, provided that person was a bona fide voter in Sikkim. Elections to State Assembly were conducted at the end of 1979. The Kazi’s partywas soundly beaten and he too lost. An upstart, Nar Bahadur Bhandari, who had mounted an aggressive compaign against “Kazi and Co.” and termed them ‘des bechwas’ (those, who had sold the country, Sikkim), secured the maximum seats in the Assembly. And in the subsequent elections, in 1984 and 1989, it was Bhandari, who swept the polls winning almost all the seats in Assembly. He wasinvited to form the government. Bhandari’s long regime of 15 years was notoriousfor charges of corruption, inefficiency, and high- handedness.This schoolteacher turned Chief Minister was later charged for possessingproperty disproportionate to his known sources of income. Bhandari became so autocratic that no body could oppose him for his lapses and survive politically.That also included his wife, who was elected as the member of the IndianParliament from Sikkim. However, he kept on raising the issue of reserving seatsin the State Assembly for the Nepamul, the Indians of Nepalese origin, the constitutional recognition of Nepali las an Indian language nd granting citizenship to the remaining Nepamul in Sikkim. But, once the Government of Indiaimplemented the Mandal Commission Reports, there was a type of upsurge among the Nepamul Bharatiyas. Leaders of communities, listed as the ‘Other Backward Castes’ by the Mandal Commission, raised the flag of revolt against Bhandari charging that he stood forthe hegomony of the higher castes among the Nepamul. A little- known former police constable turned politician, Pawan Singh Chamlin, upset Bhandari’s applecart, by forming a new political party, Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF) and posinga serious challenge to his leadership. The elections to the State Assembly 1994,1999 and 2004 proved that Bhandari’s style of politics was not appreciated anymore by the Sikkimese electorate and Chamling carried home in these polls. 4. Sikkim and its Immediate Region Sikkim is a Himalayan State. Its history, culture, society, economy, resources andover-all world -view is intricately routed in its neighbourhood and is shared withthe communities across political boundaries. Bhotia, Lamaism (MahayanBuddhism), traditional north ward trading across the Himalayas will not beunderstood without reference to Sherpas, Tibetans and Bhutanese in general and Chumbi Valley in particular. Similarly, highlanders’ pastoral economy will bebetter appreciated and its relevance understood in terms of its linkages with NorthDistrict beyond Nothu-la pass and seasonal cycle of human and cattle movements across the Himalayan divide. Lepcha and Linbu traditions in themselves willremain relevant largely to the ethnographic interest, but if an effort is made to seethe phenomenon in its terms of ‘kirati culture’ and ‘janajati movement in eastern Nepal, a new vista will open to appreciate the nuances of ethnicity.Only then, can a holistic image of Sikkimese society emerge. How can oneimagine high altitude eco-tourism in Sikkim without reference to Eastern Nepal,Chumbi valley in Tibet, Ha Valley of Bhutan and Darjeeling? Even if we agree toinsulate Sikkimese Nepamul from Nepal for the sake of argument, the Nepamul scenario of Sikkim will always be incomplete without reference to Darjeeling. And the river Teesta, which is backbone of Lepcha and Sikkimese lifeline,equally inseparable from every day life of the common people of North Bengal.Any talk of electric generation, industrial enterprise, irrigation system,horticultural efforts in Sikkim without reference to West Bengal will simply beimpractical and futile. Border TradeUp to 1962 there was a thriving Indo-Tibetan trade across the border through theNathu-la Pass, Gangtok, Kalimpong, Darjeeling and Calcutta. This trade was carried with the help of coolies , ponies, yaks, and other animals acrossHimalayan divides through road less terrain. Tibetan aristocrats, lamas, commoners, Sikkimese Kazis, Newar traders, Ladakhachi caravan pliers, and Marwari merchants all had their establishments at the above towns. So much sothat even cars used to be dismantled in parts and carried to the Tibetan plateau on the back of humans and animals. And there was an intricate net work to supply commodities from Calcutta to Lhasa in Tibet and likewise Tibetan wool, gold, precious gems, borax, dogs, yak tails and other light and luxury items werebrought to Indian markets. The British had an eye on the Tibetan tea market and had even planned a hundredyears back to stretch the Indian railways from Siliguri to Chumbi valley tofacilitate this border trade. There were occasions on these days, when Chinese travelers from Tibetan locations to China and Tibetan dignitaries going back toTibet from China were facilitated through this route. Kalimpong, located on anodal point, was closest to Chumbi Valley, Bhutan, Gangtok and Darjeeling, and thus it developed in to an ideal border trading mart. The border dispute between India and China led to discontinuation of this regional lifeline in 1962. It is gratifying that once more Sino-Indian friendship is growing and it is hoped that border trade across Nathu-la pass will begin verysoon. There is some teething problem in it at the local level. Nathu-la falls under exclusive Bhotia region, where non- tribal cannot own land as per existinglaw of the land. But not only all ethnic groups of Sikkim, but even traders fromout side Sikkim see opening of the border trade as a new opportunity for them tojoin in. There is already a clamour in favour or against the existing land laws in theregion. In fact, the governments of Sikkim and West Bengal are coordinating theirefforts to remove bottlenecks, and creating warehousing, custom clearancefacilities, space for the traders, market, transportation, electric power transmission,residential, banking and other administrative amenities in consultation with the Central Government. Caution has to be sounded in this regard. Traditionalpatterns of trading is on the mind of the Indian stake-holders, in which human and animal power was used for transportation on the mule tracks; limited andrelatively light commodities were traded; and informal banking facilities based onkinship or friendly ties were utilized. Since then the world has undergone amassive change.Local and regional Bhotia and Tibetan traders will now have to compete with the most articulate, experienced and enterprising younger generation of new traderscoming from all over the region and beyond. In case this route does meet withtheir expectations of the stake holders, it will be a big setback to similar initiatives elsewhere. Expectations are high from this trade route and if it is opened, it hasthe potential to provide a new corridor to Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal fromTibet besides boosting the regional economy of Sikkim and Darjeeling. 5. Eco-Tourism, Mountain TourismApart from trading, this region has other potential: eco-tourism and mountaintourism and horticultural innovations. Darjeeling has been a centre ofmountaineering to high Himalayan peaks for decades. Darjeeling has the worldheritage toy train, a narrow gauge train built at the time of the British and which is a major tourist attraction. High altitude mountain trekking and climbing,pilgrimages to hill top monasteries across Eastern Nepal, Darjeeling, Sikkim, Chumbi Valley and western Bhutan are enormous draws. It is time to think alongthese lines and plan for the infrastructure to turn potential into reality. Sikkim, Darjeeling and Western Bhutan are endowed with some of the rare varieties oforchids, flowers, fruits, rhododendrons, butterflies as well as the rarely-sightedsnow leopard, bears and many birds species. These are rarely exposed on eco-tourism, which will also be linked with high altitude sports. More than 82 percent of the total area of the State is classified as forestland. Out of which 42.46 percent area is under the National Parks and Sanctuaries, whereflora and fauna are protected. In this context it may be mentioned that 1, 785 sq.km. Khangchendzonga National Park is proposed to increase to 2,600 sq. km. More than one- third of the 5,000 flowering plants found in the country, arelocated in Sikkim. Similarly, almost fifty percent of 1400 butterflies, recorded in Indian sub-continent, have been identified in the State (Department of Information and Public Relations: 2003). The Sikkim is the State, whose Chief Minister wasadjudged as the most eco-friendly (the Greenest) head of the administrationamong the Indian States some year’s back. The State has identified DendrobiumNobile as the State Flower, rhododendron as the State Tree, red Panda as the StateAnimal and Blood Pheasant as the State Bird. As we have mentioned earlier that Sikkim is the land of Limbu-kirati culturalcontext with Buddhistic overtone, religious tourism may be another area where Sikkim may collaborate with its immediate neighbours to the north in Tibet, eastto Bhutan and south in Darjeeling in West Bengal. Sikkim has three dozensignificant monasteries besides famous Namgyal Institute of Technology atGangtok. The hydroelectric power is one area in which Sikkim has potential,because its snowfed perennial rivers pass through extremely undulatingtopography, ideal for such an enterprise. It goes without saying that Sikkim’s recent membership to North Eastern Councilis more in the domain of economic development of smaller mountainous andfrontier states on India’s north eastern frontiers. As soon as one crosses the RangitRiver at Rangpo, one finds evidence of new direction -- small-scale industrialunits, institutions of higher learning, hydropower generation projects. In view of ajournalist, Sikkim has limited industrial options, which are further complicated bythe absence of its own airport and railhead. It has, therefore, rightly focused onmicro industries. A current success is the processing of Dalley, the small red chilly that surprises every body by its volatile pungency (Rai, J : 2004). By and large, Sikkim is entirely engaged in primary sector of production:agriculture, horticulture, grazing, dairy production and mining. Among the industries, Sikkim Distillery, Sikkim Jewels, Sikkim Time Corporation are the ones, which are just visible. There are about a dozen cotton production-cum–training centres and another half a dozen centres for production of woollen cloth.All these together hardly employ less than 5, 000 persons. In the absence ofsufficient cultivable land in this mountainous state , it is industries, which holdsthe key for providing gainful employment to the Sikkimese. However, there are handicaps and constraints in this regard: (I) Lack of knowledge of the entrepreneur regarding manufacturing activities; (ii) Lack of raw material; ( iii)Absence of proper manpower; ( iv) Poor marketing network; (v) Inflexible landlaws and lack of enabling laws; (vi)Underdeveloped infrastructure facilities, and (vii) Shortage of credit and finance (Lama, M P : 2001). Sikkim has made progress during these last decades. For example, the infantmortality rate dropped from 60 in 1951 to 51 in the year 1997. Similarly, literacyrates went up from 7 percent in 1951 to 70 percent in 2001 and as much as 83percent children between the age group of 6 to 17 years attend schools. Nowschool exists within walking distance of each village. Women enjoy relativelygreater freedom in Sikkim compared to their sisters from other state of IndianUnion in a number of ways. Sikkim reported a per capita Net Domestic Product of Rs.. 9, 472 in 1995-1996. Only 23 percent children below the age of 3 yearswere found malnourished against an all India such statistics of 47 percent in the year 1998-99. Over 80 percent households have electricity; 85 percent of thehouseholds have piped or hand pump generated drinking water system and asmuch as 73 percent households have toilet or latrine facility as against 36 percent for India as a whole.As agriculture has a handicap and industries are yet to make a mark, Sikkim aswell joins her other sister states of North Eastern Council for solution to their similar problems. Once the trade route between Tibet and Sikkim at Nathula pass is formalized, an all weather multilane road running from Nathula to Gangtok, Rangpo, Kalimpong and Siliguri in the plains will change the economic scenarioof the region. Then possibly Sikkim will have to think of developing a drytransport depot at Rangpo. There is a lot of silent trade, which goes across borderswith Nepal and Bangladesh. This has to be formalized and made use of in apositive way. Sikkim is similar in some ways to Myanmar, Thailand, Laos,Kampuchea, Malaysia and Vietnam. Most of them are basically agriculturalcommunities with a fast growing rural population. They have their traditional skill of mountain agriculture, horticulture, and animal husbandry, fishing and hunting.What these hard working people require are modern technological expertise to getgainful employment in industries and service sectors.
References Basnet, L B. 1974. SIKKIM : A Political History. New Delhi: S. Chand & CO, Pvt.LTD. Das, B S. 1983. The Sikkim Saga. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. Department of Information & Public Relations, Government of Sikkim. 2003. 297Our Natural Resources and Our Responsibilities. Gangtok. Dutta Ray, Sunanda. 1985. Smash and Grab : Annexation of Sikkim. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. Lama, Mahendra P. 2001. Sikkim Human Development Repor. Delhi: Governmentof Sikkim, Social Science Press. Pinn, F. 1990. The Road Of Destiny: Darjeeling Letters 1939. Delhi: OxfordUniversity Press. Rai, Joel. 2004. ‘Sikkim: The Mantra Is Micro’. India Today, Vol. xxix No. 32.August 10-16.Rustomji. Nari. 1987. SIKKIM: A Himalayan Tragedy. Bombay: Allied PublishersPvt. Ltd. Sinha, A C. 1975. Politics of Sikkim: A Sociological Study. Faridabad: ThompsonPress. Sinha, A C. 1998. Bhutan: Ethnic Identity and National Dilemma. New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House.Sinha, A C. 2003. THE NEPALIS IN NORTHEAST INDIA: A Community In Search of Indian Identity. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company.White, J C. 1971. SIKKHIM AND BHUTAN: 1971: Twenty-One Years On TheNorth East Frontier: 1887- 1907. Delhi: Vivek Publishing House. FirstIndian Print.
NOTE: Copyright of This Article is with A.C.SINHA on whose book it is based on.
by The Sikkim Times
June 09,2007
Sikkim, an Indian State on the Eastern Himalayan ranges, is counted among stateswith Buddhist followers, which had strong cultural ties with the Tibetan regionof the Peoples’ Republic of China. Because of its past feudal history, it was one of the three ‘States’ along with Nepal and Bhutan which were known as ‘the Himalayan Kingdoms’ till 1975, the year of its merger with the Indian Union.It is a small state with 2, 818 sq. m. (7, 096 sq. km.) between 27 deg. 4’ North to28 deg 7’ North latitude between 80 deg. East 4’ and 88deg. 58’ East longitude.This 113 kilometre long and 64 kilometre wide undulating topography is locatedabove 300 to 7,00 metres above sea level. Its known earliest settlers, the Lepchas,termed it as Neliang, the country of the caverns that gave them shelter. Bhotias,the Tibetan migrants, called it lho’mon, ‘the land of the southern (Himalayan)slop’. As rice plays important part in Buddhist rituals in Tibet, which they used toprocure from India, they began calling it ‘Denjong’ (the valley of rice). Folktraditions inform us that it was also the land of mythical ‘Kiratas’ of Indian classics. The people of Kirati origin (Lepcha, Limbu, Rai and possibly Magar)used to marry among themselves in the hoary past. As the saying goes, a newlywedded Limbu bride on her arrival to her groom’s newly constructed house,exclaimed, “Su-khim” -- the new house. This word not only got currency, but alsogot anglicized into Sikkim (Basnet 1974).Sikkim claims that it had an extensive territory in the past. The Shah rulers ofNepal invaded Sikkim from 1770 to 1810 and came to the river Tista.Subsequently Sikkim lost the region known as Limbuan in Nepal. Up to the lastdecade of 19thcentury, Chumbi valley was a part of Sikkim. Between 1817 to1861, Sikkim lost its foothills and Darjeeling hills in the south to British India.Succession disputes in the ruling family in Sikkim gave Bhutan the chance tointerfere with its internal affairs and it lost land on its eastern frontiers to Bhutan.
Land and People
Lepchas -It is clamed that the Lepchas, who call themselves ‘Rong’ , the people living inravines, migrated to the present site from Assam hills, are the earliest settlers ofland. They have elaborate terms for rivers, water lives, flora and fauna of Sikkimunlike any community found in the country. However, their current name itself, is a gift of the Nepali language, “Lapcho’, cairn, the residents of the heap of stone, or the stone house. It is claimed that Rongs were organized by Turve Panu, theirking or chief, in the hoary past After some generations, kingship came to an endand the tribe switched off to a system of chieftainship. It is said that Thokeng Tek,the Lechpa chief, was instrumental in installing the Bhotia rule in Sikkim byassociating himself with the Tibetan migrants. Accordingly, a dozen of Lepchachiefs were accorded with the status of Dzongpens, or regional rulers or thegovernors, by the first Bhotia theocrat, Phuntso Namgyal (1642 –1670). These Dzongpens along with another dozen of Bhotia Councillors came to be known asthe qazis or kazis, the Sikkimese aristocrats, in course of time .These two dozen qazis inter-married among themselves and many of the Lepchasbecame Buddhists. However, the Lepcha qazis came to be known as the ‘createdor the fashioned’ ones (‘A-den’) against the Bhotia (‘Bar fung-mo’) ‘t he flowing from on high’; the lower and the higher order respectively of the qazis.Ethnological literature on the Lepchas suggests that it is a community of ‘mild,timid, and peaceful persons who are devoid of all sort of conflict’. It is said thatthere is no word for violence and conflict in their language. By tradition, they areinhabitants of Inner Himalayan highland and they lived in Zongu Lepcha reserve, a preserve of the former royal family. BhotiasBhotia herdsmen moved in search of pasture grounds as per seasonalrequirements without any consideration to the geographical divides. They used tocamp in high Himalayas during the summer and Chumbi valley in the harsh winter. It appears that the Bhotia herdsmen were already there in Sikkim during the period of Guru Padama Sambhava (eight century A D), who is credited tohave preached an early form of Buddhism. It is said that some Bhotia patriarchsof Namgyal dynasty came to Sikkim in 13 the century along with their cattle wealth. Khye-Bumsa was one, whose descendants would play significant role in
history of Sikkim, who had settled down in Chumbi valley. Some four hundredyears after that date, three monks from Tibet met at Yoksom near Gangtok andstaked their claim to rule over Sikkim, but they failed to settle their conflicting claims. At long last, they appeared to have postponed their quarrel and decided toexplore more for a better choice. As the myth goes, they chanced upon Phuntso Namgyal , a well-establishedpatriarch from Khye-Bumsa’stock, who also happened to be close to the localLepcha. The three holy men took Phuntso to Yoksom, where he was consecratedas the ruler of Denjong in 1642. The Bhotias follow polyandry as well aspolygamy. Apart from the newly chosen king, the Bhotia kalons ( Councillors) were encouraged to marry Lepcha and Limbu ladies besides their Bhotiaconsorts. The monks were also instrumental in creating an ethnic common wealthof lho’+mon+Tshongs ( Lhomontshong= lho-Bhotia ( father), +mon-Lepcha(mother)+ Tshong-Limbu ( the child), an organic family of three ethnic stocksresiding in Sikkim at the time .A ritual of blood brother hoodamong three tribes was claimed to be solemnized, in which apart from Buddhistpractices shamanistic rituals were also enacted. LimbusLimbus are one of the indigenous communities of Sikkm, residing there evenbefore the Namgyal dynasty was established in 1642. It is a community divided into three gotras (clan): Bhiphuta (the animists), Kashi Gotra (those, who are underHindu fold) and Lhasa Gotra or the Tshongs (the Buddhists). Myth suggests thatwhile the first clan claims to have sprung up from earth right in Limbuan and theyhave their own system of belief. The second one are said to have come fromVaranasi (Kashi on river Ganges in India) and they appear to be sanskritisedLimbus, who are under Hindu fold. Lastly, the Lhasa clan is said to have migrated from Lhasa, Tibet and are Lamaists. So much so that last Chogyal ofSikkim had introduced a separate reserve seat in Sikkim State Council for theTshongs. However, once the system of ethnic parity was done away with in 1979, this provision was with drawn. Right now Limbus are counted among the OtherBackward Castes (OBCs) since 1994. And since then, it was the Limbus (Sanchman Limbu), Now, Pawan Kumar Chamling is who ruling the State.
Nepale or the Paharias (NEPAMUL) A new power emerged in Nepal in the form of Prithvi Narayan Shah in mid-19thcentury, who consolidated his kingdom in Nepal and his successors tried toextend its boundaries in the East and West of the country. Gorkha generalsvanquished the weak Namgyal authority in Sikkim. Gorkha generals Kazi Damodar Pande and Jahar Singh Thapa crossed in to Sikkim and capturedterritories west of river Tista in 1789. The king of Sikkim, Tenzing Namgyal (1780-1793), ran away to Tibet and sought an asylum. Gorkha occupation inSikkim continued up to 1817, when the British forced them to leave Sikkim east of river Mechi as per terms of Segauli Treaty. Though the bulk of the Gurkhaswithdrew from Sikkim for time being, they returned eastward within a few years as per the British policy to locate Nepalese on the Eastern Himalayas. Darjeeling was secured by the British from Sikkim as a hill resort for theconvalescing Europeans in 1835. Hardy Nepalese labors were encouraged tosettle to clear the forests and develop it in to an urban centre for the European. Asper the provisions of the 1861 Treaty signed at Tumlong, the British got acomplete foothold in Sikkim. The British secured the Sikkimese principality in1888 and appointed John Claude White as the Political Officer residing atGangtok. The Ruler was interned along with his consort and White ranadministration with the help of Council of Advisors.Land lease system was introduced; Nepali Newars were invited to mine copperand mint coins; forestland was released to Nepali labour for agricultural development so that revenue of the State could be increased. Settlement of the‘Paharias’ –Nepalese labour led to physical violence between the colonizers andBhotia qazis. Matter went up to such a situation that ruler, Thutub Namgyal,appealed to the Viceroy to intervene in colonization of the Nepalese in Sikkim. At last, an imaginary line just north of Gangtok, drawn from East to West in 1894,was agreed to be the northern limit of Nepalese settlement in Sikkim. By the time the third Census of India was conducted in 1891, the number of the Nepalese in Sikkim had risen to 30, 458. Out of which after discounting the Lepchas (5,762), the Bhotias (4,894) and the Limbus (3,356), Nepalese werenumbered more than half (15,458). The 2001 Census of India recorded thepopulation of Sikkim at 540,493 persons. Among them 22 percent were identifiedas the scheduled tribes (Lepcha, Bhotia inclusive of Chumbipa, Dopthapa, Dukpa, Kagatey, Sherpa, Tibetan, Tromopa, and Dolmo), 5.93 percent as the scheduledcastes of Nepali origin (Kami, Saraki, Damai, Lohar and Manjhi) and thereare Nepamul communities such as Tamang, Gurung, Rai,Limbu and Sunwar, who have been recognized as the Other Backward Castes(OBCs). More than three-fourth population of Sikkim is of Nepali origin. They are sociallydivided into ‘tagadharis’ (those, who are entitled to sacred thread---Bahun and Chhetris) and ‘matwalis’ (those, who are by tradition permitted to drinkintoxicants). Then, there is a social hierarchy starting with the Thakuris, Newarisand Kiratis. While the Thakuris have a four fold division of varns (casts); Newarisare a separate ethnic stock invariably following Lamaism and Kiratas claim to thestatus of ‘janajatis’ i.e. tribesmen on the fringe of the Nepali social world. Thelingua franca of the community is Nepali or Gorkhali. However, Newaris andkiratis are at least bi-lingual and they are not necessarily Hindus.2. Political and Economic Profile Sikkim and NepalA profile of Sikkim, even today, cannot be developed without a detailedexamination of its long relationship with Nepal which has shaped its history and development more than any other influence, barring India. It appears that withconsolidation of Gorkha rule in Kathmandu Valley (1768 - 1814) , a new Gorkhaor Nepalese identity began to emerge. The Gorkha onslaught on Sikkim led to badblood between the Bhotias and the Nepalese. There was another reason for thismutual distrust. While Bhotias looked to Tibet as their political, religious andcultural fount, Nepalese were of Hindu orientation in such matters. Almost five decade long excursion in Sikkim did not mean complete withdrawal of Nepalese ethnic elements from Sikkim in 1817 with signing of Treaty of Titaliya, by which Nepal surrender all her possessions east of river Mechi to Namgyal rulers. For example, Jorethang, a small village on south -eastern part of Sikkim, is derivedafter name of Gorkha General, Jawaher Singh Thapa. Within less than two decades of signing of the Treaty of Titaliya, Sikkim wasinveigled to cede Darjeeling hills, ‘the road of destiny’ (Pinn 1990) to the British between 1835-1839. Col. W G A Lloyd, the British factotum on Darjeeling hills in 1830s, “whose lack of sensitivity in human relations was one of his leastattractive traits” informed his superiors in Calcutta that the Sikkim ruler hadgifted the hill to the British out of friendship. What he did not sufficiently informthat as per oriental tradition the ruler of Sikkim expected a matching return gift from the Governor- General. Thus, possession of Darjeeling began with a built-ingrudge on the part of Sikkim. To begin with, it was an enclave within Sikkimese territory, to which the British got engaged in developing in to an urban hill resort. Within no time, developers, shopkeepers, tea planters and hordes of labourersbegan to pour in this newly established hill station in search of opportunities. Those were the days, when slavery was a common practice in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Apart from genuine migrants, slaves, criminals, and even politicalfugitives began to take shelter in this New Haven. The hill resort not only gavenew opportunities to the new comers, but it also offered better terms of earningand wages.There was something like exodus of human beings to Darjeeling, which became a matter of resentment among hill states such as Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan withthin population. There was a sizeable migration of the Nepalese to Darjeeling, but Nepal found alternatives to its depleting manpower. Sikkim and Bhutan developed a grudge against growing glitter of Darjeeling and their rulers felt thatas if it was done at their cost. Continuous harassment of Darjeeling enclave byill-informed Sikkimese authorities led to a number of skirmishes between theSikkimese and the British in next 25 years from ceding of Darjeeling in 1835.Needless to add that ill-equipped Sikkim was poorly prepared for this context andit lost all the territories south of its present boundary up to the plains of India andwest of river Teesta to the Nepalese boundary in the west. Not only that, theBritish overlords also brought Sikkim under their imperial protection.This created a new situation in which the British watched Nepalese perseveranceand industriousness from close quarters while engaged in developing the newlyacquired district of Darjeeling. Wherever unskilled and semi-skilled labour wasrequired, the Nepalese were employed, especially in the hilly tracts. Within a fewdecades, Darjeeling was developed as model district by dint of Nepalese labour. There was another angle to this scenario.The British were suspicious of the people of Tibetan origin. They experimented with Nepalese response in similar situations and found them ‘loyal, trustworthyand obedient’. Thus, they decided unintentionally to settle the eastern Himalayanfoothills with the Nepalese settlement, a wedge between the highlander Bhotiasand the Indian plains. The culmination of this policy might be seen in Herbert H Risley’s famous gazetteer of Sikkim in 1994 (Risley, H H : 1994). Naturally, under Britishinspiration, the Neplese began to settle in western, and southern Sikkim and south western Bhutan. In the year 1867, two Newar brothers, Laxmidas and Chandrabir Maksey, were granted deeds for settling Nepalese on wasteland and uninhabitedareas in East and South Sikkim, mining copper and minting coins.The lease was granted for a period of 20 years at an annual rate of Rs. 500 to theking and Rs. 700 to Phodang Lama and Khansa Dewan. They opened the virginareas to the colonizers, brought in skilled labour for mining and minting,organized forests, constructed link roads and bridged some of the steams for roadtraffic. They ultimately developed about 20 estates and within two decades thedemographic picture of Sikkim was changed by turning the west and south districts into predominantly Nepalese habitations. This was not to the liking of theBhotia pastoralists, who desired extensive land for grazing their cattle, leading toarmed conflicts between the two sides. Thutub Namgyal (1874-1914) succeeded his half brother to the throne of Sikkimin 1874 and married his widow. He appears to be obstinate in temperament, indecisive in state matters and partisan to a faction of the couriers. Unfortunatefor him, his coming to power in Sikkim coincided with an aggressive policy topush to the Himalayas by the British. Sikkim rulers had extensive estate inChumbi valley and they used to reside at Phari specially during the winter months and some members of the family used to stay there regularly and visit royalpersonae in Sikkim frequently. Herdsmen grazing royal cattle on northernpastureland across the Himalayan divide used to descend to low laying Chumbi valley during the freezing winter months. Northern Sikkim commanded ideal andextensive pasture -land in which Tibetan and Sikkimese cattle used to graze as per the demand of the season.The herdsmen traded butter, cheese. wool, yak tails, leather and hide, preciousstone, horses, dogs and other light but precious commodities. By tradition everyBhotia inclusive of monks are entitled to trade. Their normal orientation was naturally north to Tibet, to which they visited on pilgrimage, trading and evencontracting marital alliances. The Namgyal court was equally divided in tofactions. At least the one of such factions, to which the British termed as the pro-Tibetan, was aggressively antagonistic to Nepalese settlement, and not without reasons, on alleged British instigation.Thutub was ordered to secure Tibetan compliance on the British demands to opentheir marts for British goods and to receive the British representatives for politicaland commercial negotiations, to which he was not temperamentally suited. Having failed to accomplish the expected demands, the royal couple wasimprisoned at Kurseong, Darjeeling and Kalimpong on nominal maintenanceallowance. The King was asked to re-call his son, Tchoda Namgyal, the crownprince known as Tarings, to Sikkim for getting him educated. The royal couplesaw through the façade and decided to send the contrary message to the Prince. Having exhausted their patience in securing the Prince back to Sikkim, the Britishat last refused his claim to the throne and decided to groom Sidkeong Tulku as thefuture king. Sikkim and Bengal All through second part of 19thcentury, Sikkim was treated as if it was part ofBengal Presidency. In fact, it was the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling andCommissioner of Rajshahi Division, of Bengal , who were controlling the affairs of the state. By 1888, the British had decided to take over the administration byappointing a resident Political Officer, John Claude White, who had experienced the Nepalese perseverance in the past and was steeped in the British desire topush to the Himalayas to the maximum. He began to structure the Sikkimeseeconomy “Chaos reigned everywhere, no revenue system, the Maharaja takingwhat he required, as he wanted it from the people, those nearest the capital havingto contribute to the larger share, while those more remote had toll taken fromthem by the local officials in the name the raja, though little found its way to him;no court of justice, no police, no public works, no education for younger generation. The task before me was a difficult one, but fascinating; the countrywas a new one and every thing was in my hands”(White 1971).In such a situation, there was no surprise that the coffers of the state were empty; he appointed an advisory council; surveyed the different districts and within a period of five years, a system taxation and revenue was established. Further more, he found “the country sparsely populated, and in order to bring more land under cultivation, it was necessary to encourage immigration, and this was done by giving land on favourable terms to Nepalese, who, as soon as they knew it was tobe had, came freely in”. The British took the steps to introduce a system of periodic land lease, in whichcultivable areas were divided in to Ellakas. The entire such land was divided into: land lease to the Lessees on periodic auction, private estates, and Ellakas under the five/ six monasteries. Land revenue was to be deposited on the fixed dates by the lease holders to the State bankers. Revenue from the private estateswas also to be deposited to the State Bankers, M/S Jethraj Bhojmull on stateaccount. And the monasteries held their estates rent -free and spend the revenueon upkeep of their establishments and other ecclesiastic purposes.However, all three types of land holdings were extremely oppressive to the cultivators (bustiwalas). There was a series of unpaid labour practices employedby all the Ellaka-holders. Then there were Newar Thekodars, who were allotted land on contract (thika) way back in 1877 for mining, settlements, and forestmanagement. The State was happy to collect its revenue on fixed dates and forgetabout the fate of the cultivators most of time. Most of these landlords held judicial and policing powers as well, which made thelife of cultivators all the more difficult. The last lease of land ended in 1935,which was extended to the time it was finally abolished under popular demand after Indian independence. 3. Sikkim and India By the 1940s, the Political Officer in Gangtok had developed a new foundsympathy for the Bhotia ruler. It appears that the common Nepalese inkingtowards democratic movements warned them to side with the Bhotias againsttheir one time favourite, the Nepalese. AJ Hopekinson, the last British PoliticalOfficer, advised the rulers of Sikkim and Bhutan to send their delegation alongwith their memoranda to wait on the Cabinet Mission sent by Britain to negotiatewith the Indians for transfer of power. The Sikkimese delegation went to Delhi,but failed to meet the Mission. However, Foreign and Political Department, Government of India prepared a route for the Cabinet Mission on August10, 1946, which provided the guidelines for future to the Indian Union:“In practice, it may well prove difficult to secure a tidy solution to the future ofNepal, Sikkim and Bhutan and even to the Eastern marches of Kashmir, Ladakh.This will largely depend on future policy and fate of China and hence of Tibet.The Government of the (Indian) Union must be prepared for complication onNorth East Frontier (NEFA) and evolve a policy to meet them. This may wellhave to be that of maintaining all principalities in virtual independence of India,but as buffer and, as far as possible, client states. There may be greater advantagein according Sikkim a more independent status than in seeking to absorb Bhutan as well Sikkim in the Indian Union, adding to the communal problem of Buddhism to those of Islam and Hinduism…the Government would be welladvised to avoid entering in to fresh commitments with any one of those frontierstates or seeking to redefine their status. Their importance is strategic in directrelation to Tibet and China and indirectly to Russia. Such adjustment of theirrelations with the (Indian) Union as can usefully be affected by …those politicalstrategic considerations … account of which it is hoped that the Treaty will takerather than the Constitutional niceties, which do not help defence policy” .State PoliticsAgainst the above imperial advice, which the newly independent Indian Unionseems to have followed, the masses of three Himalayan kingdoms identifiedthemselves with Indian aspirations and shared their perception of change and identified their feudal rulers with archaic colonial privileges. Many of leaders of the Nepali Congress, Sikkim State Congress and Bhutan State Congress weremembers of the Indian National Congress and at least some of them, identified themselves with the demands for responsible government, abolition of the feudal rights and introduction of land reforms by abolishing landed gentry. Similarly, the oppressed of Sikkim, before they organized themselves into SikkimState Congress, had limited and localized organizations such as Praja Sudharak Samaj, Gangtok, led by Tashi Tshering; Praja Samelan, Temi Tarku, led by D B Tewari and Gobardhan Pradhan; and Praja Mandal, Chakhung, led by LhendupDorji Kazi. The indomitable Tashi Tshering called for a public meeting of like-minded groups on December 7, 1947 at Polo Ground, Gangtok and invited other two fora to join his efforts. He had prepared a document, “A Few Facts About Sikkim” in English, which was translated in to Nepali by Chandra Das Rai and itscyclo-styled copies were distributed among the masses. There were star leaderssuch as Tshering himself, Sonam Tshering, L D Kazi, Roy Chaudhury, Mrs.Helen Lepch , but the thunder was stolen by 24 year old C.D Rai, whose eloquentNepali speech was a novel experience to politically indolent Sikkim. Sensing the public mood, the three above organizations decided jointly to formSikkim State Congress on that very day and chalked out to meet the ruler with athree point demand: (a) abolition of landlordism; (b) formation of an interimgovernment and (c) accession of Sikkim to India. The State Congress leaders met the ruler on 9thDecember, 1947 with their above charter of demands.The Maharaja was advised to go with the changing time and concede the populardemands of the common man. Some land reforms were immediately introducedsuch as abolition of lessee system; end of various forms of un-paid labour; restructuring of judicial system. As negotiation was on between the SikkimDurbar and the Government of India, it was decided to keep in abeyance thedemand for Sikkim’s merger with India. Without working out modalities of itsfunctioning, its power and legal implications, it was agreed to install a popularinterim government with five members; two nominees of the king and three fromthe State Congress. The indolent Maharaja had almost surrendered all his political and administrativefunctions in favour of his son, Palden Thondup, in whose scheme of thingsSikkim stood for only Bhotia, Lepchs and Tchongs. Sensing the mood of time, even the prince was forced to go to the people. Hegot his courtiers, aristocrats, monks and sycophants organized into the SikkimNational Party, “an anti-thesis of the State Congress” on April 30, 1948 to opposeall the steps, resolutions and personnel of the State Congress and back all themoves on the part of palace for the continuation of its anachronism. The popular leaders waited for about a year and saw that the palace instead of agreeing to their demands was busy consolidating itself. The Congress went on agitation to press for its demands in February, 1949, in which popular leaders such as C D Rai and other five were arrested. Thistriggered a spate of resentment against the palace and more than ten thousand followers of the Congress gheraoed the palace on May 1, 1949. The Maharaja had taken shelter in the Residency and the administration had stopped functioning. Onthe advice of the Political Officer, Harishwer Dayal, I C S to Maharaja was forced to install at long last a popular ministry on May 1949 with Tashi Tshering as theChief Minister, D S Lepcha, and C D Rai from the State Congress and D Dahduland R PAlley, two nominees of the ruler.This was the high point of the achievements of the Sikkim Congress, which normally assumed that it had the mandate from the people to rule the country asper its party programme. On the other hand, the palace felt that it had placated thepopulists and it would choose their own time and action to mould the emergentsituation. In such a situation, there was little chance that this half way democraticexperiment would succeed. Having read the writings on the walls, Tashi Tshering,the Chief Minister realized that the formation of the ministry had been agreed toby the Durbar more with a view to discrediting the Congress leaders thanallowing them to carry out the people’s mandate. Disgusted with scheming of theCrown Prince, the Chief Minister threatened to resign and assumed agitation(satyagraha or peaceful protests). Alarmed by these developments, New Delhi decided to send its Deputy Minister for External Affairs to Gangtok. The minister stayed in Sikkim for four days, met with the ministers twice, the Maharaja, Maharajkumar, even the ‘leaders’ of Sikkim National Party and came back to Delhi without resolving the problem. It is alleged that ‘the Sikkim Durbar went all out to dazzle the Minister with Sikkim’s royal hospitality and loaded him with costly gifts’. It appears that thepalace had been able to impress upon the visitor that New Delhi would find theDurbar more dependable than that of the popular public leaders. This became clear on June 6, 1949, when Political Officer, Harishwer Dayal, I C S, summoned the Sikkim cabinet to his office and informed them that they had been dismissedby him in the name of the Government of India and he had taken over theadministration of Sikkim himself. The leaders, who had all along had faith in good office of the ruling Indianleaders, were stunned by this course of action. The public was demoralized andthe palace heaved a sigh of relief. The Government of India asked the Durbar toappoint a senior administrator as the Dewan of Sikkim, who would over-see the social reforms, economic development and governance of the state Ethnic Balancing ActJ S Lall of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) took over as the Dewan of Sikkim onAugust 11,1949 and tried to streamline the administration in view of the populardemands for land reforms, forced labour and feudal privileges. To the disappointment of State Congress, the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty was signed atGangtok by Political Officer, Harishwer Dayal and the Maharaja of Sikkim, TashiNamgyal on December 5, 1950. It stipulated that Sikkim would be an Indianprotectorate. The Government of India was to retain defence, external affairs, custom andcommunication. India agreed to provide Rs. three lakh per annum to Sikkim as long as the Government of Sikkim duly observed the terms of Treaty.Furthermore, the Supreme Court of India would be the last arbitrator in case ofany dispute in interpretation of the provisions of Treaty. The Maharaja issued a Proclamation proposing an election for the State Council with 12 elected members, five nominated members and a President to be nominated by the king.More sinister for democratic forces was the introduction of the evil of notorious ‘parity system’, by which about 25 percent Lepcha- Bhotias on six elective seatswere equated with 75 percent Sikkimese of Nepalese extraction on another sixsuch seats in the Council. Needless to add that this formula was further extendedto all walks of life I Sikkimese administration causing strong resentment amongthe sufferers. Similarly, the electoral process, voting procedure, counting systemand even election tribunals were skewed in such a way that the Nepalese ingeneral and democratic forces in particular were at a disadvantage.The first election to the State Council was held in the middle of June 1953. The results confirmed the expected electoral behaviour by choosing six Nepalesebelonging to State Congress on Nepali seats and six Lepcha- Bhotias aligned toSikkim National Party on Lepcha- Bhotia seats. The number of seats in the State Council kept on changing from 17 in 1953 to 20 in 1958 ( One, more to king’s nominees + one to the Monks—Sangha + one, the General Seat running for entire state), and 24 in 1966 ( King’s nominees-6+Lepcha-Bhotia-7 + Nepalese-7+Sangha- 1 + General –1 + Tchongs-1 + Scheduled Castes- 1). In practice 18 elective seats in State Council were divided between Nepalese andLepcha- Bhotias. While two ethnic Lepchas and Bhotias were shown together for distribution of loafs and bread, numerically large Nepalese common wealthinvariably shown as fragmented. While Sikkim National Party, a beneficiary tothese scheming was more than willing to welcome such a fraud, t he StateCongress and its off-shoots invariably protested, which was brushed aside by the palace. The State Council and Executive Council Proclamation, 1953 claimed “to associating people more and more closely with the governance of the State’, butin reality it created an intricate arrangement of electoral process with a limited, complex, controversial and purposive political participation. The ExecutiveCouncil with its limited power was used as a leverage to cause defection fromdemocratic parties and legislative wing of these parties were not given their rightto choose their representatives to it. All along, efforts were made on the part of the Durbar to polarize the political parties along its ‘cherished ethnic divide’. This becomes clear, when one casts a glance on electoral results of political partiesduring the five elections held for the State Council from 1953 to 1973:Table 1Electoral results of the political parties in Sikkim from 1953 to 1973. S.N Political Parties19531958196719701973Total 1. Sikkim State Congress68242222. Sikkim National Party 66 5 7 9 333. Sikkim National Congress ....855184, Unattached Independents ....32207Elective Seats in Council121418181880One learns certain lessons from the above table. Firstly, with active support and connivance of the Durbar, the Sikkim National Party increased its representation in the Council continuously from 1958 to 1973, when its rigged support basecolapsed once the massed decided not to take the farce any more. Secondly,affairs of Sikkim State Congress were similarly on the decline, as its leadersproved more vulnerable to the poaching from others susceptible to the loaves andfishes from power to be. Thirdly, Sikkim National Congress under the leadershipof Lhendup Dorji Kazi continued to be persecuted and its functionaries wereinvariably harassed to the extent that all its General Secretaries were made toleave the party. Chandra D Rai, Bhim B Gurung, Lal B Basnet, Santosh K Rai, Chatur Singh Rai and Nand Lal Thapa were made to leave the party because of various cases filed by the State or agencies. The Indian Hand Rigging and other electoral malpractices became blatant by the time elections to the State Council were held in 1973. A small controversy with reference to thecounting centre at Gangtok ignited and within no time political parties organizeddemonstrations against the Government. Police force was used to control theagitation, which added fuel to fire. Sikkim National Congress and Sikkim State Congress demanded countermanding of the election and ordering a fresh poll. The Durbar adopted its old dual policy of repression and causing dissension in itspolitical rivals. But this time it did not work. Demonstrators began to attack andtake over the police stations in the interior. The two political parties decided toboycott and disturb ruler’s birthday celebration on April 4, 1974 in spite ofappeals made on the contrary. The situation was grim and a pitched battle wasfought between the demonstrators and the police. . The place was obdurate andwent ahead with the birthday celebrations, which angered the masses even more. The administration collapsed and the ruler was forced to request the PoliticalOfficer to take over the administration, as his father had done 24 years back. The Political Officer took over the administration for time being, but the political stalemate continued. The Government of India encouraged the Durbar andpolitical leaders to negotiate an agreement and establish normalcy in the State, butstands on both sides were hardening. At last, a tripartite agreement between the ruler, political leaders and India was reached on May 8, 1973. Unlike in 1949, the Government of India had decided to discard the unsolicitedcolonial advice this time and took a clear stand on democratic principles. Thefamous tripartite agreement envisaged ruler to be a constitutional head,establishment of a responsible government with democratic rights, rule of law,fundamental rights, independent judiciary, adult franchise and executive andlegislative powers to the people’s representatives. Article 5 of the Agreement envisages: “The system of election shall be so organized as to make the (State)Assembly adequately representative of the various sections of the population. Thesize and the composition of the Assembly and of the Executive Council shall besuch as may be prescribed from time to time, care being taken to ensure that nosingle section of the population acquires a dominating position due mainly to itsethnic origin, and that the rights and interests of the Sikkimese Bhotia- Lepchaorigin and of Sikkimese Nepali, which includes Tsongs and scheduled castesorigin, are fully protected”. According to the provisions of the Agreement, a State Legislative Assembly of 32 members (Lepcha- Bhotia 15 + one seat to the monks + Nepalese 15 + one seat to the Scheduled Castes among the Nepalese untouchables), a Chief Minister,and a Council of Ministers responsible to the Assembly to be elected onuniversal adult franchise was envisaged. With a view to carrying out specialprovisions of the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty, an Office of the Chief Executive to bemanned by an Indian functionary was created between the two and a deference of opinion between him the ruler was to be referred to the Political Officer atGangtok, whose opinion would be binding. The political atmosphere in Sikkimsurcharged with and in such excitements, election to the State Assembly were held in April, 1974. With exception of one Lepcha- Bhotia seat to a nominee ofSikkim National Party, the remaining 31 seats were captured by the newly formedSikkim Congress. Lhendup Dorji Kazi, the leader of Sikkim Congress LegislatureParty, was sworn as the first duly elected Chief Minster of Sikkim. These andother developments were seen as evidence of dilution of “Sikkim’s InternationalStatus” by the Ruler, which may be seen as a conflict between the head of the state and his people.Merger of Sikkim The State Assembly met in an emergency season and passed this resolution: “ Theinstitution of Chogyal (the head of the state) is hereby abolished and Sikkim shallhence forth be a constituent unit of India”. While the ruler went on asking forright of self determination to Sikkim, this Resolution of the Assembly was put tothe electorate and 97 percent favoured it. This led to the Indian Parliament passing the 38thConstitutional Amendment Bill on April 26, 1975. Thus, Sikkimceased to exist as an Indian protectorate and became the 22ndstate of the IndianUnion. Accordingly, the office of the Chogyal stood abolished and provisions ofthe Indo-Sikkimese Treaty, Tripartite Agreement and the Government of IndiaACT, 1974 were made inoperative. Lhendup Dorji Kazi (LD Kazi), the ChiefMinster, emerged as the central figure after these epoch making developments. His style of functioning was that of an old -world patriarch, addicted to advicefrom all corners, but too old to learn anything afresh.As the Chief Minister of Sikkim, he changed political affiliation five times between December 1975 to January 1980 as per the change of ruling parties in the Central Government in Delhi. For New Delhi, the Kazi had replaced the old Chogyal and old policies continued to be pursued. In such a situation, thebureaucrats from the Central Government turned out to be friends, philosophersand guides to the Kazi. The Governor to the State, B B Lal, ICS and Kazi’sconsort, Kazani Eliza Maria Dorji, basically ran the state. The Kazi was effective for politically placid Sikkimese scenario, but he was not cut for the complexIndian political reality. He could neither restrain his younger colleagues such asNar Bhadur Khatiwara, Ram Chandra Poudyal, nor could he satisfy the seniorcolleagues like Chatur Singh Rai or Bhim B. Gurung. Very soon, the party became faction ridden; serious charges of corruption werelevelled against functionaries. The governor, the Kazani and higher bureaucrats,all began to assert in day to day administration on the name of “the popular government”. Kazi was still basking in the ‘glory of the merger (of Sikkim to India)’ when the first election to the State Assembly was announced. Prior to thatOrdinance 7, 1979 was issued by the Government of India, by which 12 seatswere reserved for the indigenous tribes like Lepchas and Bhotias, two to thescheduled castes and one to the monks and rest of 17 seats in Assembly were declared as ‘general’, which means they were open to any Indian to contest, provided that person was a bona fide voter in Sikkim. Elections to State Assembly were conducted at the end of 1979. The Kazi’s partywas soundly beaten and he too lost. An upstart, Nar Bahadur Bhandari, who had mounted an aggressive compaign against “Kazi and Co.” and termed them ‘des bechwas’ (those, who had sold the country, Sikkim), secured the maximum seats in the Assembly. And in the subsequent elections, in 1984 and 1989, it was Bhandari, who swept the polls winning almost all the seats in Assembly. He wasinvited to form the government. Bhandari’s long regime of 15 years was notoriousfor charges of corruption, inefficiency, and high- handedness.This schoolteacher turned Chief Minister was later charged for possessingproperty disproportionate to his known sources of income. Bhandari became so autocratic that no body could oppose him for his lapses and survive politically.That also included his wife, who was elected as the member of the IndianParliament from Sikkim. However, he kept on raising the issue of reserving seatsin the State Assembly for the Nepamul, the Indians of Nepalese origin, the constitutional recognition of Nepali las an Indian language nd granting citizenship to the remaining Nepamul in Sikkim. But, once the Government of Indiaimplemented the Mandal Commission Reports, there was a type of upsurge among the Nepamul Bharatiyas. Leaders of communities, listed as the ‘Other Backward Castes’ by the Mandal Commission, raised the flag of revolt against Bhandari charging that he stood forthe hegomony of the higher castes among the Nepamul. A little- known former police constable turned politician, Pawan Singh Chamlin, upset Bhandari’s applecart, by forming a new political party, Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF) and posinga serious challenge to his leadership. The elections to the State Assembly 1994,1999 and 2004 proved that Bhandari’s style of politics was not appreciated anymore by the Sikkimese electorate and Chamling carried home in these polls. 4. Sikkim and its Immediate Region Sikkim is a Himalayan State. Its history, culture, society, economy, resources andover-all world -view is intricately routed in its neighbourhood and is shared withthe communities across political boundaries. Bhotia, Lamaism (MahayanBuddhism), traditional north ward trading across the Himalayas will not beunderstood without reference to Sherpas, Tibetans and Bhutanese in general and Chumbi Valley in particular. Similarly, highlanders’ pastoral economy will bebetter appreciated and its relevance understood in terms of its linkages with NorthDistrict beyond Nothu-la pass and seasonal cycle of human and cattle movements across the Himalayan divide. Lepcha and Linbu traditions in themselves willremain relevant largely to the ethnographic interest, but if an effort is made to seethe phenomenon in its terms of ‘kirati culture’ and ‘janajati movement in eastern Nepal, a new vista will open to appreciate the nuances of ethnicity.Only then, can a holistic image of Sikkimese society emerge. How can oneimagine high altitude eco-tourism in Sikkim without reference to Eastern Nepal,Chumbi valley in Tibet, Ha Valley of Bhutan and Darjeeling? Even if we agree toinsulate Sikkimese Nepamul from Nepal for the sake of argument, the Nepamul scenario of Sikkim will always be incomplete without reference to Darjeeling. And the river Teesta, which is backbone of Lepcha and Sikkimese lifeline,equally inseparable from every day life of the common people of North Bengal.Any talk of electric generation, industrial enterprise, irrigation system,horticultural efforts in Sikkim without reference to West Bengal will simply beimpractical and futile. Border TradeUp to 1962 there was a thriving Indo-Tibetan trade across the border through theNathu-la Pass, Gangtok, Kalimpong, Darjeeling and Calcutta. This trade was carried with the help of coolies , ponies, yaks, and other animals acrossHimalayan divides through road less terrain. Tibetan aristocrats, lamas, commoners, Sikkimese Kazis, Newar traders, Ladakhachi caravan pliers, and Marwari merchants all had their establishments at the above towns. So much sothat even cars used to be dismantled in parts and carried to the Tibetan plateau on the back of humans and animals. And there was an intricate net work to supply commodities from Calcutta to Lhasa in Tibet and likewise Tibetan wool, gold, precious gems, borax, dogs, yak tails and other light and luxury items werebrought to Indian markets. The British had an eye on the Tibetan tea market and had even planned a hundredyears back to stretch the Indian railways from Siliguri to Chumbi valley tofacilitate this border trade. There were occasions on these days, when Chinese travelers from Tibetan locations to China and Tibetan dignitaries going back toTibet from China were facilitated through this route. Kalimpong, located on anodal point, was closest to Chumbi Valley, Bhutan, Gangtok and Darjeeling, and thus it developed in to an ideal border trading mart. The border dispute between India and China led to discontinuation of this regional lifeline in 1962. It is gratifying that once more Sino-Indian friendship is growing and it is hoped that border trade across Nathu-la pass will begin verysoon. There is some teething problem in it at the local level. Nathu-la falls under exclusive Bhotia region, where non- tribal cannot own land as per existinglaw of the land. But not only all ethnic groups of Sikkim, but even traders fromout side Sikkim see opening of the border trade as a new opportunity for them tojoin in. There is already a clamour in favour or against the existing land laws in theregion. In fact, the governments of Sikkim and West Bengal are coordinating theirefforts to remove bottlenecks, and creating warehousing, custom clearancefacilities, space for the traders, market, transportation, electric power transmission,residential, banking and other administrative amenities in consultation with the Central Government. Caution has to be sounded in this regard. Traditionalpatterns of trading is on the mind of the Indian stake-holders, in which human and animal power was used for transportation on the mule tracks; limited andrelatively light commodities were traded; and informal banking facilities based onkinship or friendly ties were utilized. Since then the world has undergone amassive change.Local and regional Bhotia and Tibetan traders will now have to compete with the most articulate, experienced and enterprising younger generation of new traderscoming from all over the region and beyond. In case this route does meet withtheir expectations of the stake holders, it will be a big setback to similar initiatives elsewhere. Expectations are high from this trade route and if it is opened, it hasthe potential to provide a new corridor to Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal fromTibet besides boosting the regional economy of Sikkim and Darjeeling. 5. Eco-Tourism, Mountain TourismApart from trading, this region has other potential: eco-tourism and mountaintourism and horticultural innovations. Darjeeling has been a centre ofmountaineering to high Himalayan peaks for decades. Darjeeling has the worldheritage toy train, a narrow gauge train built at the time of the British and which is a major tourist attraction. High altitude mountain trekking and climbing,pilgrimages to hill top monasteries across Eastern Nepal, Darjeeling, Sikkim, Chumbi Valley and western Bhutan are enormous draws. It is time to think alongthese lines and plan for the infrastructure to turn potential into reality. Sikkim, Darjeeling and Western Bhutan are endowed with some of the rare varieties oforchids, flowers, fruits, rhododendrons, butterflies as well as the rarely-sightedsnow leopard, bears and many birds species. These are rarely exposed on eco-tourism, which will also be linked with high altitude sports. More than 82 percent of the total area of the State is classified as forestland. Out of which 42.46 percent area is under the National Parks and Sanctuaries, whereflora and fauna are protected. In this context it may be mentioned that 1, 785 sq.km. Khangchendzonga National Park is proposed to increase to 2,600 sq. km. More than one- third of the 5,000 flowering plants found in the country, arelocated in Sikkim. Similarly, almost fifty percent of 1400 butterflies, recorded in Indian sub-continent, have been identified in the State (Department of Information and Public Relations: 2003). The Sikkim is the State, whose Chief Minister wasadjudged as the most eco-friendly (the Greenest) head of the administrationamong the Indian States some year’s back. The State has identified DendrobiumNobile as the State Flower, rhododendron as the State Tree, red Panda as the StateAnimal and Blood Pheasant as the State Bird. As we have mentioned earlier that Sikkim is the land of Limbu-kirati culturalcontext with Buddhistic overtone, religious tourism may be another area where Sikkim may collaborate with its immediate neighbours to the north in Tibet, eastto Bhutan and south in Darjeeling in West Bengal. Sikkim has three dozensignificant monasteries besides famous Namgyal Institute of Technology atGangtok. The hydroelectric power is one area in which Sikkim has potential,because its snowfed perennial rivers pass through extremely undulatingtopography, ideal for such an enterprise. It goes without saying that Sikkim’s recent membership to North Eastern Councilis more in the domain of economic development of smaller mountainous andfrontier states on India’s north eastern frontiers. As soon as one crosses the RangitRiver at Rangpo, one finds evidence of new direction -- small-scale industrialunits, institutions of higher learning, hydropower generation projects. In view of ajournalist, Sikkim has limited industrial options, which are further complicated bythe absence of its own airport and railhead. It has, therefore, rightly focused onmicro industries. A current success is the processing of Dalley, the small red chilly that surprises every body by its volatile pungency (Rai, J : 2004). By and large, Sikkim is entirely engaged in primary sector of production:agriculture, horticulture, grazing, dairy production and mining. Among the industries, Sikkim Distillery, Sikkim Jewels, Sikkim Time Corporation are the ones, which are just visible. There are about a dozen cotton production-cum–training centres and another half a dozen centres for production of woollen cloth.All these together hardly employ less than 5, 000 persons. In the absence ofsufficient cultivable land in this mountainous state , it is industries, which holdsthe key for providing gainful employment to the Sikkimese. However, there are handicaps and constraints in this regard: (I) Lack of knowledge of the entrepreneur regarding manufacturing activities; (ii) Lack of raw material; ( iii)Absence of proper manpower; ( iv) Poor marketing network; (v) Inflexible landlaws and lack of enabling laws; (vi)Underdeveloped infrastructure facilities, and (vii) Shortage of credit and finance (Lama, M P : 2001). Sikkim has made progress during these last decades. For example, the infantmortality rate dropped from 60 in 1951 to 51 in the year 1997. Similarly, literacyrates went up from 7 percent in 1951 to 70 percent in 2001 and as much as 83percent children between the age group of 6 to 17 years attend schools. Nowschool exists within walking distance of each village. Women enjoy relativelygreater freedom in Sikkim compared to their sisters from other state of IndianUnion in a number of ways. Sikkim reported a per capita Net Domestic Product of Rs.. 9, 472 in 1995-1996. Only 23 percent children below the age of 3 yearswere found malnourished against an all India such statistics of 47 percent in the year 1998-99. Over 80 percent households have electricity; 85 percent of thehouseholds have piped or hand pump generated drinking water system and asmuch as 73 percent households have toilet or latrine facility as against 36 percent for India as a whole.As agriculture has a handicap and industries are yet to make a mark, Sikkim aswell joins her other sister states of North Eastern Council for solution to their similar problems. Once the trade route between Tibet and Sikkim at Nathula pass is formalized, an all weather multilane road running from Nathula to Gangtok, Rangpo, Kalimpong and Siliguri in the plains will change the economic scenarioof the region. Then possibly Sikkim will have to think of developing a drytransport depot at Rangpo. There is a lot of silent trade, which goes across borderswith Nepal and Bangladesh. This has to be formalized and made use of in apositive way. Sikkim is similar in some ways to Myanmar, Thailand, Laos,Kampuchea, Malaysia and Vietnam. Most of them are basically agriculturalcommunities with a fast growing rural population. They have their traditional skill of mountain agriculture, horticulture, and animal husbandry, fishing and hunting.What these hard working people require are modern technological expertise to getgainful employment in industries and service sectors.
References Basnet, L B. 1974. SIKKIM : A Political History. New Delhi: S. Chand & CO, Pvt.LTD. Das, B S. 1983. The Sikkim Saga. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. Department of Information & Public Relations, Government of Sikkim. 2003. 297Our Natural Resources and Our Responsibilities. Gangtok. Dutta Ray, Sunanda. 1985. Smash and Grab : Annexation of Sikkim. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. Lama, Mahendra P. 2001. Sikkim Human Development Repor. Delhi: Governmentof Sikkim, Social Science Press. Pinn, F. 1990. The Road Of Destiny: Darjeeling Letters 1939. Delhi: OxfordUniversity Press. Rai, Joel. 2004. ‘Sikkim: The Mantra Is Micro’. India Today, Vol. xxix No. 32.August 10-16.Rustomji. Nari. 1987. SIKKIM: A Himalayan Tragedy. Bombay: Allied PublishersPvt. Ltd. Sinha, A C. 1975. Politics of Sikkim: A Sociological Study. Faridabad: ThompsonPress. Sinha, A C. 1998. Bhutan: Ethnic Identity and National Dilemma. New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House.Sinha, A C. 2003. THE NEPALIS IN NORTHEAST INDIA: A Community In Search of Indian Identity. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company.White, J C. 1971. SIKKHIM AND BHUTAN: 1971: Twenty-One Years On TheNorth East Frontier: 1887- 1907. Delhi: Vivek Publishing House. FirstIndian Print.
NOTE: Copyright of This Article is with A.C.SINHA on whose book it is based on.
by The Sikkim Times
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