I ndian and Chinese firms are going head to head in efforts to develop hydropower projects in Nepal in an attempt to build commercial and diplomatic relations with a country that is strategically located between two of the world’s fastest growing major economies.
Commercial and so-called exim banks from China are underwriting efforts by Chinese companies to develop hydropower projects in Nepal by promising money for these.
This model using so-called letters of intent promising credit has been successfully used by Chinese firms in Africa to win oil and gas exploration blocks.
“Since Nepal has a huge infrastructure funding requirement, such a model definitely helps,” said Himalaya Pande, director, West Seti Hydro Project, one of the largest hydropower projects being developed in Nepal.
“Chinese banks are flush with funds and are looking at opportunities in different parts of the world...India, on the other hand, has not adopted this model in Nepal.” Companies such as China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corp., or CMEC, and Sinohydro Corp. have used letters of intent promising credit provided by Bank of China and China Exim Bank to get contracts and projects.
CMEC has won the contract to construct 750MW West Seti Hydro Project and Sinohydro has picked up a 90% stake in the 50MW Upper Marsiangri project. CMEC had not responded to a questionnaire from Mint till late Tuesday evening.
Nepal has a hydropower potential of 83,000MW and needs an investment of around Rs9.96 trillion to harness this.
The country is open to partnering with Chinese and Indian firms to raise this money.
On Tuesday, Mint reported that it plans to offer Indian private sector firms majority stakes in midsize hydropower companies.
India isn’t worried by China’s display of money power.
“Chinese competition in Nepal is overstated. It is partly due to nervousness and partly due to the reason that they are strong. As Nepal is in our immediate neighbourhood, we get jittery,” said an Indian government official posted in Kathmandu who did not want to be named.
Nepal has emerged as a favourite destination for several Indian hydroelectric power generation firms. Companies that have plans to set up hydroelectric projects in that country include Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd, Bhilwara Energy Ltd and GMR Infrastructure Ltd.
It was only because India didn’t respond to requests for monetary participation in hydropower projects that Nepal turned to China, said one banker.
“We have contacted Indian banks such as Punjab National Bank and Canara Bank for participation in hydropower projects but they were not interested...only then did we go to the Chinese banks,” said Prithivi B. Pande, chairman and chief executive officer of Nepal Investment Bank, the largest investment bank in that country.
Nepal has an installed power generation capacity of 617MW, of which around 570MW is generated from hydropower. Although Nepal has 83,000MW of hydropower potential, it is facing a shortage of 100MW, which is expected to increase to around 300MW in the coming winter months.
Tapping some of the country’s hydropower potential could help bridge that gap and also serve as a source of power for India.
And Nepal could also be the ideal place for Indian infrastructure firms to showcase their integrated project development and financing model, said Anish De, chief executive officer of energy consulting firm Mercados Asia.
( Source: Live Mint)
Tuesday 23 September 2008
Wednesday 10 September 2008
CHINESE INCURSIONS ALL ALONG 4075 km BORDER
Though it eventually refrained from back-stabbing India during the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting at Vienna, China continues to needle Indian forces all along the 4,057-km Line of Actual Control (LAC).
In the latest set of incursions across the LAC, Chinese patrols once again "transgressed" into the Indian side at the strategically located Pangong Tso lake as well as Trig Heights in eastern Ladakh on September 2-3, said sources.
There were both boat and vehicle-mounted People's Liberation Army (PLA) patrols on the north bank of Pangong Tso, two-third of which is controlled by China as it extends from India to Tibet at an altitude of 4,218 metres, on September 2.
A day later, a vehicle-mounted PLA patrol crossed over at the Trig Heights. "The patrol was on our side for quite some time before it went back. PLA has really stepped up incursions into our side in eastern Ladakh region this year, with well over 100 transgressions being recorded there since January," said a source.
Pangong Tso and Trig Heights have become quite contentious since the 1999 Kargil conflict, with China even constructing a "track" right up to the lake's southern bank during that time to demonstrate its support to Pakistan. China, it's assessed, wants the border to be drawn in a straight line on the lake to gain strategic advantage. It seeks similar gains in Trig Heights and Demchok areas in the western sector.
But eastern Ladakh is not the only region where Chinese patrols have been flexing their muscles in an "aggressive" border management policy to put pressure on India and lay claim to disputed areas along the LAC.
Similar Chinese moves have been witnessed in the eastern sector in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim in recent months. In fact, perturbed by the incursions into Sikkim, "a settled matter" as far as India is concerned, the government in June had made some strong public statements about taking up the matter with China.
With over 80 incursions across the 206-km Sikkim-Tibet border being recorded since January, the Indian establishment is especially worried about the so-called 2.1 sq km "finger area", the northern-most tip of Sikkim, which China is claiming as its own territory.
The government, incidentally, is now conducting a fresh survey of the northern plateau in Sikkim to counter claims by China. The survey is using latest technology to chart out the watershed in the area, which is usually used to demarcate boundaries in mountainous areas.
Many feel China's gameplan could well be to use Sikkim as a leverage in its policy of exerting pressure on India over the Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh. Always careful of not ruffling Chinese feathers, India often downplays intrusions by its troops, holding that they take place due to "differing perceptions" of the still-unresolved LAC.
The fact, however, remains that the step-up in incursions has been accompanied by a hardening of the Chinese posture in the never-ending border talks to delineate the LAC. What has added to the worry of Indian defence planners is the rapid build-up of military infrastructure by China all along the LAC making it possible for it to amass large troops at the border in double-quick time.
( SOURCE: tIMES OF iNDIA)
In the latest set of incursions across the LAC, Chinese patrols once again "transgressed" into the Indian side at the strategically located Pangong Tso lake as well as Trig Heights in eastern Ladakh on September 2-3, said sources.
There were both boat and vehicle-mounted People's Liberation Army (PLA) patrols on the north bank of Pangong Tso, two-third of which is controlled by China as it extends from India to Tibet at an altitude of 4,218 metres, on September 2.
A day later, a vehicle-mounted PLA patrol crossed over at the Trig Heights. "The patrol was on our side for quite some time before it went back. PLA has really stepped up incursions into our side in eastern Ladakh region this year, with well over 100 transgressions being recorded there since January," said a source.
Pangong Tso and Trig Heights have become quite contentious since the 1999 Kargil conflict, with China even constructing a "track" right up to the lake's southern bank during that time to demonstrate its support to Pakistan. China, it's assessed, wants the border to be drawn in a straight line on the lake to gain strategic advantage. It seeks similar gains in Trig Heights and Demchok areas in the western sector.
But eastern Ladakh is not the only region where Chinese patrols have been flexing their muscles in an "aggressive" border management policy to put pressure on India and lay claim to disputed areas along the LAC.
Similar Chinese moves have been witnessed in the eastern sector in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim in recent months. In fact, perturbed by the incursions into Sikkim, "a settled matter" as far as India is concerned, the government in June had made some strong public statements about taking up the matter with China.
With over 80 incursions across the 206-km Sikkim-Tibet border being recorded since January, the Indian establishment is especially worried about the so-called 2.1 sq km "finger area", the northern-most tip of Sikkim, which China is claiming as its own territory.
The government, incidentally, is now conducting a fresh survey of the northern plateau in Sikkim to counter claims by China. The survey is using latest technology to chart out the watershed in the area, which is usually used to demarcate boundaries in mountainous areas.
Many feel China's gameplan could well be to use Sikkim as a leverage in its policy of exerting pressure on India over the Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh. Always careful of not ruffling Chinese feathers, India often downplays intrusions by its troops, holding that they take place due to "differing perceptions" of the still-unresolved LAC.
The fact, however, remains that the step-up in incursions has been accompanied by a hardening of the Chinese posture in the never-ending border talks to delineate the LAC. What has added to the worry of Indian defence planners is the rapid build-up of military infrastructure by China all along the LAC making it possible for it to amass large troops at the border in double-quick time.
( SOURCE: tIMES OF iNDIA)
Tuesday 9 September 2008
GORKHALAND TALKS ENDS ON POSITIVE NOTE
Next talks on November
September 8: The much anticipated tripartite talks on Gorkhaland demand between the Centre, West Bengal government and political parties of Darjeeling ended today evening at New Delhi on a positive note.
During the meeting, both the Centre and West Bengal government conceded that separate state of Gorkhaland demand was ‘not anti-national’ but a ‘Constitutional’ demand.
The Centre was represented by Union Home Secretary Madukar Gupta while the West Bengal government was represented by state Chief Secretary Amit Kiran Deb, Home Secretary Ashok Mohan Chakraborty and DHGC caretaker administrator BL Meena.
Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) general secretary Roshan Giri had led a united delegation of all the major political parties of Darjeeling in the tripartite talks which lasted almost three hours.
Speaking to SIKKIM EXPRESS over phone from New Delhi, Mr. Giri said that meeting ended on a positive note and all the political parties were satisfied over the outcome.
“The West Bengal Chief Secretary Amit Kiran Deb said during the meeting that Gorkhaland demand was not anti-national but a Constitutional demand”, informed Mr. Giri. “The Chief Secretary also admitted that the government cannot say that Gorkhaland is not possible”, he added.
“The Union Home Secretary also spoke on similar lines and the whole meeting was very positive”, Mr. Giri said. All the political parties from Darjeeling who attend the tripartite talks are satisfied, he added.
The next tripartite meeting will be held on November but no date has been finalized as yet.
Earlier, representatives from GJM and other political parties focused their deliberations on the sole demand for Gorkhaland. All the parties submitted historical data and documents and spoke on why Gorkhaland demand is being made, informed Mr. Giri.
The GJM general secretary also said that the Centre was informed that the Gorkhaland state demand also includes Dooars and plain areas of Siliguri.
Gorkhaland is very important for all the people and tribals of Darjeeling and Dooars region and also for the minority communities and Muslims, Marwaris and other communities from Darjeeling-Dooars, we told the Centre and West Bengal government representatives, said Mr. Giri.
We have understood that the Centre will now adopt a new perspective and look positively on Gorkhaland demand, he added.
Mr. Giri claimed that the GJM president Bimal Gurung’s Gandhian movement has forced the Centre to think positively on Gorkhaland demand. Now the Centre cannot rule out Gorkhaland, he added.
The other political parties attending today’s meeting were CPRM, ABGL and hills units of CPIM, BJP and Congress.
( sOURCE: sIKKIM eXPRESS)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
September 8: The much anticipated tripartite talks on Gorkhaland demand between the Centre, West Bengal government and political parties of Darjeeling ended today evening at New Delhi on a positive note.
During the meeting, both the Centre and West Bengal government conceded that separate state of Gorkhaland demand was ‘not anti-national’ but a ‘Constitutional’ demand.
The Centre was represented by Union Home Secretary Madukar Gupta while the West Bengal government was represented by state Chief Secretary Amit Kiran Deb, Home Secretary Ashok Mohan Chakraborty and DHGC caretaker administrator BL Meena.
Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) general secretary Roshan Giri had led a united delegation of all the major political parties of Darjeeling in the tripartite talks which lasted almost three hours.
Speaking to SIKKIM EXPRESS over phone from New Delhi, Mr. Giri said that meeting ended on a positive note and all the political parties were satisfied over the outcome.
“The West Bengal Chief Secretary Amit Kiran Deb said during the meeting that Gorkhaland demand was not anti-national but a Constitutional demand”, informed Mr. Giri. “The Chief Secretary also admitted that the government cannot say that Gorkhaland is not possible”, he added.
“The Union Home Secretary also spoke on similar lines and the whole meeting was very positive”, Mr. Giri said. All the political parties from Darjeeling who attend the tripartite talks are satisfied, he added.
The next tripartite meeting will be held on November but no date has been finalized as yet.
Earlier, representatives from GJM and other political parties focused their deliberations on the sole demand for Gorkhaland. All the parties submitted historical data and documents and spoke on why Gorkhaland demand is being made, informed Mr. Giri.
The GJM general secretary also said that the Centre was informed that the Gorkhaland state demand also includes Dooars and plain areas of Siliguri.
Gorkhaland is very important for all the people and tribals of Darjeeling and Dooars region and also for the minority communities and Muslims, Marwaris and other communities from Darjeeling-Dooars, we told the Centre and West Bengal government representatives, said Mr. Giri.
We have understood that the Centre will now adopt a new perspective and look positively on Gorkhaland demand, he added.
Mr. Giri claimed that the GJM president Bimal Gurung’s Gandhian movement has forced the Centre to think positively on Gorkhaland demand. Now the Centre cannot rule out Gorkhaland, he added.
The other political parties attending today’s meeting were CPRM, ABGL and hills units of CPIM, BJP and Congress.
( sOURCE: sIKKIM eXPRESS)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sunday 7 September 2008
TIBET-THE LOST FRONTIER
TIBET-THE LOST FRONTIER
Himmat Singh Gill
Tibet: The Lost Frontier
by Claude Arpi.
Lancer Publishers, New Delhi.
Pages 338. Rs 795.
Tibet was indeed a lost frontier during the 19th and first quarter of the 20th centuries. It was known only to a few intrepid explorers who ventured out to this landlocked Himalayan kingdom of the lamas and their cavernous monasteries, perched precariously high on the snowy mountaintops. Today, with all the diplomatic chess boarding and armed military turbulence that has overtaken this once peaceful and religiously oriented land, it would not be wrong to say that a frontier has been lost, but this time to a powerful Communist giant that has merrily trampled all over it without mercy or any regret.
Arpi, who was born in France and is an avid student of Tibet, tells the story of the takeover of this once autonomous land, now a part of China, and the ‘masterly inactivity’ of an Indian leadership under Jawaharlal Nehru, assisted by his blue-eyed diplomat K. M. Panikkar, our man in Beijing.
Arpi traces the winding paths of the three ancient civilisations of Tibet, China and India, which over time developed their own characteristics, and the pacifist and non-violent signature of a Dalai Lama-ruled Tibet, which ironically added impetus to its own dismemberment at the hands of Mao and his party when they took power in China after overthrowing the KMT government of Chiang-Kai-Shek A nuclear-armed Communist China eager to stretch out its reach and boundaries in Asia clearly saw the importance of Tibet in the furtherance of its strategic ascendancy. The author points out very clearly this prophetic assessment when he writes that, “The key to conflict or peace in Asia lies on the Tibetan plateau”.
With the occupation of Tibet in 1950,China sent out an unambiguous message to a newly independent India and the ruling elite in the neighbouring Soviet Union that it harboured political and military designs of a serious kind in this part of the world. The October 1912 the Government of Tibet’s letter to the Viceroy asking for a British representative to be posted to Lhasa and its directions to China to withdraw all its officials and troops from inside Tibet was followed by the Simla Convention of April 1914, where Tibet and the British government agreed to their mutual boundary being along the McMahon Line. With the Chinese representative only initialing and not signing this pact, a vacuum was left wide open for subsequent disputes which in fact came to a head with the attack on India in 1962.The 13th Dali Lama’s prediction that “large insects are eating and secretly injuring small insects” was true in every respect.
Besides the change in fortune that the British had left India and a ‘karma’ that was none too benign to the people of Tibet, it was their added misfortune that an idealist Nehru, sold over Non-Alignment and notions of bringing peace to Asia and the world at large, remained oblivious till the end to the trampling of a buffer neighbour state.
In the meanwhile, Ambassador Panikkar continued to send glowing reports about the growth of Indo-Chinese friendship and Zhou-EnLai’s warmth in relations, and all this suited Nehru to the tick until of course he suddenly learnt in 1951-52 that the Chinese were feverishly constructing the Aksai Chin road, linking Ladakh to Tibet. In Parliament, Prof Ranga lashed out at Panikkar for “professing the friendship not only to China’s people, not only to the Chinese government but to China’s sovereignty over Tibet. This beats anybody and everybody”.
The attention of readers is drawn to the fact that it was in Panikkar’s time that in official government-to-government correspondence, the fact of an Indian acceptance of a Chinese ‘suzerainty’ over Tibet was changed to that of their having ‘sovereignty’ over the Himalayan kingdom, leading to an entirely bigger concession being inadvertently made to the Communists. Rightly does Arpi say that “Nehru did not want (to) take a clear stand” on the question of Tibet as a buffer state.
Arpi even brings out the startling fact that after the occupation of Tibet, there was no food to feed the Chinese troops, and for quite some time on Chinese request Indian rice was sent through the Chumbi Valley trade route on orders of Nehru, with our foreign office being instructed to keep the matter under the wraps.
It was again in October1951, when Secretary-General in the External Affairs Ministry Bajpai cautioned Nehru about the distinct possibility of Chinese “small forces dribbling in” through the many passes on the border and “make(ing) trouble for India”, that the Prime Minister outrightly rejected such a contingency. The author says, “Nehru also felt that large expenditures on the Army would starve the development of the country and its social progress.” Much the same attitude sadly prevails even today in our babudom and political masters, when they are dealing with the Indian Army of today.
Nehru visited China in 1954 and his grandson Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. In between we had the 1967 Nathu-La clash and another one at Wangdung in Arunachal in 1986. Narasimha Rao in 1993, A.B. Vajpayee in 2003 and now Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2008, have all visited China, and yet the vexed border question in the northeast along the McMahon Line remains unresolved to this day. It should be clear to any Indian as to why China is keeping this dispute unresolved and open to dispute. And while the Dalai Lama resides in India, a previously independent and autonomous state has been erased from the world map.
Claude Arpi’s well researched and illuminating account of the failure of India’s diplomacy in its very backyard is a tribute to not only the author’s painstaking efforts at getting to the truth (which few Indian writers can be credited with as regards to writing on Tibet), but also marks a plus for the publishers who thought of bringing out this very instructive account. This study vividly points out that the peace-loving people like the Tibetans can no longer hope to remain in a Shangri-la of their own cut off from the prying eyes and their adventurous designs, and that to exist as an independent nation one must fine-tune not only its diplomacy but also be militarily strong enough to send out the right message.
sOURCE: tHE tRIBUNE
Himmat Singh Gill
Tibet: The Lost Frontier
by Claude Arpi.
Lancer Publishers, New Delhi.
Pages 338. Rs 795.
Tibet was indeed a lost frontier during the 19th and first quarter of the 20th centuries. It was known only to a few intrepid explorers who ventured out to this landlocked Himalayan kingdom of the lamas and their cavernous monasteries, perched precariously high on the snowy mountaintops. Today, with all the diplomatic chess boarding and armed military turbulence that has overtaken this once peaceful and religiously oriented land, it would not be wrong to say that a frontier has been lost, but this time to a powerful Communist giant that has merrily trampled all over it without mercy or any regret.
Arpi, who was born in France and is an avid student of Tibet, tells the story of the takeover of this once autonomous land, now a part of China, and the ‘masterly inactivity’ of an Indian leadership under Jawaharlal Nehru, assisted by his blue-eyed diplomat K. M. Panikkar, our man in Beijing.
Arpi traces the winding paths of the three ancient civilisations of Tibet, China and India, which over time developed their own characteristics, and the pacifist and non-violent signature of a Dalai Lama-ruled Tibet, which ironically added impetus to its own dismemberment at the hands of Mao and his party when they took power in China after overthrowing the KMT government of Chiang-Kai-Shek A nuclear-armed Communist China eager to stretch out its reach and boundaries in Asia clearly saw the importance of Tibet in the furtherance of its strategic ascendancy. The author points out very clearly this prophetic assessment when he writes that, “The key to conflict or peace in Asia lies on the Tibetan plateau”.
With the occupation of Tibet in 1950,China sent out an unambiguous message to a newly independent India and the ruling elite in the neighbouring Soviet Union that it harboured political and military designs of a serious kind in this part of the world. The October 1912 the Government of Tibet’s letter to the Viceroy asking for a British representative to be posted to Lhasa and its directions to China to withdraw all its officials and troops from inside Tibet was followed by the Simla Convention of April 1914, where Tibet and the British government agreed to their mutual boundary being along the McMahon Line. With the Chinese representative only initialing and not signing this pact, a vacuum was left wide open for subsequent disputes which in fact came to a head with the attack on India in 1962.The 13th Dali Lama’s prediction that “large insects are eating and secretly injuring small insects” was true in every respect.
Besides the change in fortune that the British had left India and a ‘karma’ that was none too benign to the people of Tibet, it was their added misfortune that an idealist Nehru, sold over Non-Alignment and notions of bringing peace to Asia and the world at large, remained oblivious till the end to the trampling of a buffer neighbour state.
In the meanwhile, Ambassador Panikkar continued to send glowing reports about the growth of Indo-Chinese friendship and Zhou-EnLai’s warmth in relations, and all this suited Nehru to the tick until of course he suddenly learnt in 1951-52 that the Chinese were feverishly constructing the Aksai Chin road, linking Ladakh to Tibet. In Parliament, Prof Ranga lashed out at Panikkar for “professing the friendship not only to China’s people, not only to the Chinese government but to China’s sovereignty over Tibet. This beats anybody and everybody”.
The attention of readers is drawn to the fact that it was in Panikkar’s time that in official government-to-government correspondence, the fact of an Indian acceptance of a Chinese ‘suzerainty’ over Tibet was changed to that of their having ‘sovereignty’ over the Himalayan kingdom, leading to an entirely bigger concession being inadvertently made to the Communists. Rightly does Arpi say that “Nehru did not want (to) take a clear stand” on the question of Tibet as a buffer state.
Arpi even brings out the startling fact that after the occupation of Tibet, there was no food to feed the Chinese troops, and for quite some time on Chinese request Indian rice was sent through the Chumbi Valley trade route on orders of Nehru, with our foreign office being instructed to keep the matter under the wraps.
It was again in October1951, when Secretary-General in the External Affairs Ministry Bajpai cautioned Nehru about the distinct possibility of Chinese “small forces dribbling in” through the many passes on the border and “make(ing) trouble for India”, that the Prime Minister outrightly rejected such a contingency. The author says, “Nehru also felt that large expenditures on the Army would starve the development of the country and its social progress.” Much the same attitude sadly prevails even today in our babudom and political masters, when they are dealing with the Indian Army of today.
Nehru visited China in 1954 and his grandson Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. In between we had the 1967 Nathu-La clash and another one at Wangdung in Arunachal in 1986. Narasimha Rao in 1993, A.B. Vajpayee in 2003 and now Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2008, have all visited China, and yet the vexed border question in the northeast along the McMahon Line remains unresolved to this day. It should be clear to any Indian as to why China is keeping this dispute unresolved and open to dispute. And while the Dalai Lama resides in India, a previously independent and autonomous state has been erased from the world map.
Claude Arpi’s well researched and illuminating account of the failure of India’s diplomacy in its very backyard is a tribute to not only the author’s painstaking efforts at getting to the truth (which few Indian writers can be credited with as regards to writing on Tibet), but also marks a plus for the publishers who thought of bringing out this very instructive account. This study vividly points out that the peace-loving people like the Tibetans can no longer hope to remain in a Shangri-la of their own cut off from the prying eyes and their adventurous designs, and that to exist as an independent nation one must fine-tune not only its diplomacy but also be militarily strong enough to send out the right message.
sOURCE: tHE tRIBUNE
Saturday 6 September 2008
INDO NEPAL BONE OF CONTENTION
Indo-Nepal bone of contention
The new regime in Kathmandu is spitting fire over the calamity caused by the Kosi floods following a breach in its embankment. Nepal has termed the 1954 Kosi Treaty with India as a “blunder” and is going to push India for its review for amendments.
Nepal’s perspectives on its water relations with India are partly rooted in what it sees as the unsatisfactory outcome of past engagements. These relate to the Sarada river agreement of 1920 and the Kosi and Gandak agreements of 1954 and 1959.
In each case, Nepal feels aggrieved by the far larger water use by India as compared to the more limited area it has been able to irrigate. On the other hand, Indian experts point out that “this is obviously a fact of geography…Nepal’s mountainous landscape limits its arable and irrigable area as compared with India’s vast and sprawling Ganga plains.”
While New Delhi maintains that “any sense of hurt on this score is misplaced,” it appears that Maoist regime now playing in the erstwhile Himalayan kingdom is going to spit more fire over trans-boundary river treaties, especially the one related to the Kosi.
The real problem is that the institutional arrangements for implementing several Indo-Nepal treaties, agreements and understandings are weak. Over 14 joint committees exist to manage, develop and implement cooperation between India and Nepal in the field of water resources. But the outcome of these committees has not been satisfactory.By looking at the number of joint committees formed earlier, it seems that whenever problems emerge the existing committees are keen to form another committee to look after the issues without trying to solve them. Performances of many of these committees are never monitored. Some of these committees have not met since their formation while others meet infrequently.
Since the beginning of the last century, India and Nepal have entered into several treaties on the trans-boundary Rivers to share benefits from the rivers. They include: the Sarada Agreement (1920) on the Mahakali river; the Kosi Project Agreement (1954); and the Gandak Project and Power Agreement.
The Kosi Project Agreement was signed on April 25, 1954, to control the floods and to prevent free oscillation of the river over time. It was revised on December 19, 1966 following the Nepalese people’s protests.
The agreement allowed India to construct at its own cost a pair of embankments to confine the Kosi river in its course, and a barrage across the river in Nepal close to the international border. Construction works were completed in 1959 and 1963 respectively. The Kosi barrage also provides irrigation water to Bihar through eastern and western main canals.
The salient features of the Kosi agreement are: Nepal has every right to withdraw water from the Kosi river and its tributaries for irrigation and other purposes in Nepal; India has the right to regulate the balance in the Kosi river at the barrage site for irrigation and to generate hydropower from the eastern main canal.
The Kosi Project Agreement of 1954, subsequently revised in 1966, “made no provision for irrigation in Nepal from the project.” However, agreements and understandings through an exchange of letters made the following provisions:
An understanding reached in 1971 allowed Nepal to withdraw 400 cusecs of water from the western main canal to irrigate about 25,000 ha of land in Nepal, through a project called the Western Kosi Canal Project, which was developed by India at its own cost; and an additional agreement between India and Nepal as of April 7, 1978, made provision for the renovation and extension of irrigation facilities developed earlier in Nepal. India met the entire cost.
Recently, India and Nepal agreed that the investigations of the Kosi multipurpose project be undertaken jointly. It includes a Kosi dam in Nepal upstream of the Kosi barrage near Barakshetra, as a long-term measure to augment the lean season flow for irrigation, to control floods with specific flood cushion in the reservoir and for power generation.
The multipurpose project also includes trans-basin transfer of water from the Sun Koshi to the Kamala river in Nepal for irrigation development in both the countries. A navigation canal access from the Kosi high dam, along the left bank, up to the Ganga, is also being considered, which could provide navigation access to the sea to the land locked Nepal and north India. Experts believe that it could also benefit Bangladesh as it could provide the much-needed augmentation of lean season flow in the Ganga at Farakka and also flood control benefits.
The outstanding issue in this case is that India wants to develop this project with a concept of providing a “flood cushion in the Kosi high dam to provide flood relief to Bihar.” Nepal wants to maximise its own benefits from the project. Nepal is keen on developing the Sun Koshi-Kamala diversion independent of the Kosi high dam, while India thinks that both the Kosi high dam and the Sun Koshi-Kamala diversion be taken up together.
India is also interested in the Kamala dam project in addition to the Sun Koshi trans-basin diversion into the Kamala. But Nepal has raised some environmental problems with this dam.
Between 1960 and the mid-1990s, several multipurpose water resource projects were studied in Nepal for their joint development with India. These included the Kosi river project. Despite several levels of talks and negotiations, further cooperation between New Delhi and Kathmandu in the field of water resources did not materialise till the signing of the Mahakali Treaty in 1996. Though part of the reason, says experts, may have been political, an important factor was the “lack of mutual trust” between the two nations in resolving several issues.
( Source: The Tribune)
The new regime in Kathmandu is spitting fire over the calamity caused by the Kosi floods following a breach in its embankment. Nepal has termed the 1954 Kosi Treaty with India as a “blunder” and is going to push India for its review for amendments.
Nepal’s perspectives on its water relations with India are partly rooted in what it sees as the unsatisfactory outcome of past engagements. These relate to the Sarada river agreement of 1920 and the Kosi and Gandak agreements of 1954 and 1959.
In each case, Nepal feels aggrieved by the far larger water use by India as compared to the more limited area it has been able to irrigate. On the other hand, Indian experts point out that “this is obviously a fact of geography…Nepal’s mountainous landscape limits its arable and irrigable area as compared with India’s vast and sprawling Ganga plains.”
While New Delhi maintains that “any sense of hurt on this score is misplaced,” it appears that Maoist regime now playing in the erstwhile Himalayan kingdom is going to spit more fire over trans-boundary river treaties, especially the one related to the Kosi.
The real problem is that the institutional arrangements for implementing several Indo-Nepal treaties, agreements and understandings are weak. Over 14 joint committees exist to manage, develop and implement cooperation between India and Nepal in the field of water resources. But the outcome of these committees has not been satisfactory.By looking at the number of joint committees formed earlier, it seems that whenever problems emerge the existing committees are keen to form another committee to look after the issues without trying to solve them. Performances of many of these committees are never monitored. Some of these committees have not met since their formation while others meet infrequently.
Since the beginning of the last century, India and Nepal have entered into several treaties on the trans-boundary Rivers to share benefits from the rivers. They include: the Sarada Agreement (1920) on the Mahakali river; the Kosi Project Agreement (1954); and the Gandak Project and Power Agreement.
The Kosi Project Agreement was signed on April 25, 1954, to control the floods and to prevent free oscillation of the river over time. It was revised on December 19, 1966 following the Nepalese people’s protests.
The agreement allowed India to construct at its own cost a pair of embankments to confine the Kosi river in its course, and a barrage across the river in Nepal close to the international border. Construction works were completed in 1959 and 1963 respectively. The Kosi barrage also provides irrigation water to Bihar through eastern and western main canals.
The salient features of the Kosi agreement are: Nepal has every right to withdraw water from the Kosi river and its tributaries for irrigation and other purposes in Nepal; India has the right to regulate the balance in the Kosi river at the barrage site for irrigation and to generate hydropower from the eastern main canal.
The Kosi Project Agreement of 1954, subsequently revised in 1966, “made no provision for irrigation in Nepal from the project.” However, agreements and understandings through an exchange of letters made the following provisions:
An understanding reached in 1971 allowed Nepal to withdraw 400 cusecs of water from the western main canal to irrigate about 25,000 ha of land in Nepal, through a project called the Western Kosi Canal Project, which was developed by India at its own cost; and an additional agreement between India and Nepal as of April 7, 1978, made provision for the renovation and extension of irrigation facilities developed earlier in Nepal. India met the entire cost.
Recently, India and Nepal agreed that the investigations of the Kosi multipurpose project be undertaken jointly. It includes a Kosi dam in Nepal upstream of the Kosi barrage near Barakshetra, as a long-term measure to augment the lean season flow for irrigation, to control floods with specific flood cushion in the reservoir and for power generation.
The multipurpose project also includes trans-basin transfer of water from the Sun Koshi to the Kamala river in Nepal for irrigation development in both the countries. A navigation canal access from the Kosi high dam, along the left bank, up to the Ganga, is also being considered, which could provide navigation access to the sea to the land locked Nepal and north India. Experts believe that it could also benefit Bangladesh as it could provide the much-needed augmentation of lean season flow in the Ganga at Farakka and also flood control benefits.
The outstanding issue in this case is that India wants to develop this project with a concept of providing a “flood cushion in the Kosi high dam to provide flood relief to Bihar.” Nepal wants to maximise its own benefits from the project. Nepal is keen on developing the Sun Koshi-Kamala diversion independent of the Kosi high dam, while India thinks that both the Kosi high dam and the Sun Koshi-Kamala diversion be taken up together.
India is also interested in the Kamala dam project in addition to the Sun Koshi trans-basin diversion into the Kamala. But Nepal has raised some environmental problems with this dam.
Between 1960 and the mid-1990s, several multipurpose water resource projects were studied in Nepal for their joint development with India. These included the Kosi river project. Despite several levels of talks and negotiations, further cooperation between New Delhi and Kathmandu in the field of water resources did not materialise till the signing of the Mahakali Treaty in 1996. Though part of the reason, says experts, may have been political, an important factor was the “lack of mutual trust” between the two nations in resolving several issues.
( Source: The Tribune)
Tuesday 2 September 2008
CLIMATE-A STUDY
by:Smt. Kalpana Palkhiwala**
Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the “average weather”, or more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. The classical period is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). These quantities are most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the climate system.
The difference between climate and weather is usefully summarized by the popular phrase “Climate is what you expect, weather is what you get”. Over historical time spans there are a number of static variables that determine climate, including latitude, altitude, proportion of land to water, proximity to oceans and their currents, mountains, persistent ice or snow cover, humidity, rainfall, atmospheric particle count, the density and type of vegetation coverage affecting solar heat absorption, water retention, and rainfall on a regional level. Alterations in the quantity of atmospheric greenhouse gases determines the amount of solar energy retained by the planet, leading to global warming or global cooling. Modern climate classification methods also focus on the relative frequency of different air mass types or locations within synoptic weather disturbances, plant hardiness, evapotranspiration, air mass origin and certain biomes.
Regions having similar characteristics features of climate are grouped under one climatic zone based on the climatic factors. The country can be divided into a number of climatic zones. India can be divided into six climatic zones, namely, hot and dry, warm and humid, moderate, cold and cloudy, cold and sunny and composite. Particularly mean monthly temperatures-minimum and maximum and relative humidity are considered here. A place is assigned to one of the first five climatic zones only when the defined conditions prevail there for more than six months. In cases where none of the defined categories can be identified for six months or longer, the climatic zone is called composite. According to recent code of Bureau of Indian Standards, the country may be divided into five major climatic zones. It is seen that the recent classification is not very different from the earlier one except that the cold and cloudy, and cold and sunny have been grouped
together as cold climate; the moderate climate is renamed as temperate climate. However, a small variation is noticed as far as the land area of the country corresponding to different zones is concerned. It may be mentioned that each climatic zone does not experience the same climate for the whole year. It has a particular season for more than six months and may experience other seasons for the remaining period.
Hot and Dry
The hot and dry zone lies in the western and the central part of India, Jaisalmer, Jodhpur and Sholapur are some of the towns that experience this type of climate. The mean monthly temperature remains 30 degree celsius and relative humidity 55 %.
A typical hot and dry region is usually flat with sandy or rocky ground conditions, and sparse vegetation comprising cacti, thorny trees and bushes. There are few sources of water on the surface, and the underground water level is also very low. Due to intense solar radiation (values as high as 800-950 W/m2), the ground and the surroundings of this region are heated up very quickly during day time. In summer, the maximum ambient temperatures are as high as 40-45 oC during the day and 20-30 oC at night. In winter, the values are between 5 and 25 oC during the day and 0 to 10 oC at night. It may be noted that the diurnal variation in temperature is quite high, that is, more than 10 oC.
The climate is described as dry because the relative humidity is generally very low, ranging from 25 to 40% due to low vegetation and surface water bodies. Moreover, the hot and dry regions receive less rainfall – the annual precipitation being less than 500 mm.
Hot winds blow during the day in summers and sand storms are also experienced. The night is usually cool and pleasant. A generally clear sky, with high solar radiation causing an uncomfortable glare, is typical of this zone. As the sky is clear at night, the heat absorbed by the ground during the day is quickly dissipated to the atmosphere. Hence, the air is much cooler at night than during the day. In such a climate, it is imperative to control solar radiation and movement of hot winds. The design criteria should therefore aim at resisting heat gain by providing shading, reducing exposed area, controlling and scheduling ventilation, and increasing thermal capacity. The presence of “water bodies” is desirable as they can help increase the humidity, lot of heat in the afternoons and evenings. As far as possible, this heat should be avoided by appropriate design features.
Warm and Humid
The warm and humid zone covers the coastal parts of the country. Some cities that fall under this zone are Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata. The high humidity encourages abundant vegetation in these regions.
The diffuse fraction of solar radiation is quite high due to cloud cover, and the radiation can be intense on clear days. The dissipation of the accumulated heat from the earth to the night sky is generally marginal due to the presence of clouds. Hence, the diurnal variation in temperature is quite low. In summer, temperatures can reach as high as 30 – 35 o C during the day and 25-30 o C at night. In winter, the maximum temperature is between 25 to 30 o C during the day and 20 to 25 o C at night. Although the temperatures are not excessive, the high humidity causes discomfort.
An important characteristic of this region is the relative humidity, which is generally very high, about 70-90% throughout the year. Precipitation is also high, being about 1200 mm per year, or even more. Hence, the provision for quick drainage of water is essential in this zone.
The wind is generally from one or two prevailing directions with speed ranging from extremely low to very high. Wind is desirable in this climate, as it can cause sensible cooling of the body.
The main design criteria in the warm and humid region are to reduce heat gain by providing shading, and promote heat loss by maximizing cross ventilation. Dissipation of humidity is also essential to reduce discomfort.
Moderate
Pune and Banglore are examples of cities that fall under this climatic zone. Areas having a moderate climate are generally located on hilly or high-plateau regions with fairly abundant vegetation. The solar radiation in this region is more or less the same throughout the year. Being located at relatively higher elevations, these places experience lower temperatures than hot and dry regions. The temperatures are neither too hot nor too cold. In summers, the temperature reaches 30 – 34 o C during the day and 17 – 24 o C at night. In winter, the maximum temperature is between 27 to 33 o C during the day and 16 to 18 o C at night.
The design criteria in the moderate zone are to reduce heat gain by providing shading, and to promote heat loss by ventilation.
Composite
The composite zone covers the central part of India. Some cities that experience this type of climate are New Delhi, Kanpur and Allahabad. A variable landscape and seasonal vegetation characterize this zone. The intensity of solar radiation is very high in summer with diffuse radiation amounting to a small fraction of the total. In monsoons, the intensity is low with predominantly diffuse radiation. The maximum daytime temperature in summers is in the range of 32 – 43 o C, and night time values are from 27 to 32 o C. In winter, the values are between 10 to 25 o C during the day and 4 to 10 o C at night.
The relative humidity is about 20 – 25 % in dry periods and 55 – 95 % in wet periods. The presence of high humidity during monsoon months is one of the reasons why places like New Delhi and Nagpur are grouped under the composite and not hot and dry climate. Precipitation in this zone varies between 500 – 1300 mm per year. This region receives strong winds during monsoons from the south-east and dry cold winds from the north-east. In summer, the winds are hot and dusty. The sky is overcast and dull in the monsoon, clear in winter and frequently hazy in summer.
Generally, composite regions experience higher humidity levels during monsoons than hot and dry zones. Otherwise most of their characteristics are similar to the latter. Thus, the design criteria are more or less the same as for hot and dry climate except that maximizing cross ventilation is desirable in the monsoon period.
Cold and Cloudy
Generally, the northern part of India experiences this type of climate. Most cold and cloudy regions are situated at high altitudes. Ootacamund, Shimla, Shillong, Srinagar and Mahabaleshwar are examples of places belonging to this climatic zone. These are generally highland regions having abundant vegetation in summer.
The intensity of solar radiation is low in winter with a high percentage of diffuse radiation. Hence, winters are extremely cold. In summer, the maximum ambient temperatures is in the range of 20 – 30 o C during the day and 17 – 27 o C at night, making summers quite pleasant. In winter, the values range between 4 and 8 o C during the day and -3 to 4 o C at night, making it quite chilly.
The relative humidity is generally high and ranges from 70 – 80 %. Annual total precipitation is about 1000 mm and is disturbed evenly throughout the year. This region experiences cold winds in the winter season. Hence, protection from winds is essential in this type of climate. The sky is overcast for most part of the year except during the brief summer.
Conditions in summer are usually clear and pleasant, but owing to cold winters, the main criteria for design in the cold and cloudy region aim at resisting heat loss by insulation and infiltration, and promoting heat gain by directly admitting and trapping solar radiation within the living space.
Cold and Sunny
The cold and sunny type of climate is experienced in Leh (Ladakh). The region is mountainous, has little vegetation, and is considered to be a cold desert.
The solar radiation is generally intense with a very low percentage of diffuse radiation. In summer, the temperature reaches 17 – 24 o C during the day and 4 – 11 o C at night. In winter, the values range from -7 to 8 o C during the day and -14 to 0 o C at night. Winters thus, are extremely cold. The relative humidity is consistently low ranging from about 10 – 50 % and precipitation is generally less than 200 mm per year. Winds are occasionally intense. The sky is fairly clear throughout the year with a cloud cover of less than 50%.
As this region experiences cold desert climatic conditions, the design criteria are to resist heat loss by insulation and controlling infiltration. Simultaneously, heat gain needs to be promoted by admitting and trapping solar radiation within the living space.
*Deputy Director(M & C)
Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the “average weather”, or more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. The classical period is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). These quantities are most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the climate system.
The difference between climate and weather is usefully summarized by the popular phrase “Climate is what you expect, weather is what you get”. Over historical time spans there are a number of static variables that determine climate, including latitude, altitude, proportion of land to water, proximity to oceans and their currents, mountains, persistent ice or snow cover, humidity, rainfall, atmospheric particle count, the density and type of vegetation coverage affecting solar heat absorption, water retention, and rainfall on a regional level. Alterations in the quantity of atmospheric greenhouse gases determines the amount of solar energy retained by the planet, leading to global warming or global cooling. Modern climate classification methods also focus on the relative frequency of different air mass types or locations within synoptic weather disturbances, plant hardiness, evapotranspiration, air mass origin and certain biomes.
Regions having similar characteristics features of climate are grouped under one climatic zone based on the climatic factors. The country can be divided into a number of climatic zones. India can be divided into six climatic zones, namely, hot and dry, warm and humid, moderate, cold and cloudy, cold and sunny and composite. Particularly mean monthly temperatures-minimum and maximum and relative humidity are considered here. A place is assigned to one of the first five climatic zones only when the defined conditions prevail there for more than six months. In cases where none of the defined categories can be identified for six months or longer, the climatic zone is called composite. According to recent code of Bureau of Indian Standards, the country may be divided into five major climatic zones. It is seen that the recent classification is not very different from the earlier one except that the cold and cloudy, and cold and sunny have been grouped
together as cold climate; the moderate climate is renamed as temperate climate. However, a small variation is noticed as far as the land area of the country corresponding to different zones is concerned. It may be mentioned that each climatic zone does not experience the same climate for the whole year. It has a particular season for more than six months and may experience other seasons for the remaining period.
Hot and Dry
The hot and dry zone lies in the western and the central part of India, Jaisalmer, Jodhpur and Sholapur are some of the towns that experience this type of climate. The mean monthly temperature remains 30 degree celsius and relative humidity 55 %.
A typical hot and dry region is usually flat with sandy or rocky ground conditions, and sparse vegetation comprising cacti, thorny trees and bushes. There are few sources of water on the surface, and the underground water level is also very low. Due to intense solar radiation (values as high as 800-950 W/m2), the ground and the surroundings of this region are heated up very quickly during day time. In summer, the maximum ambient temperatures are as high as 40-45 oC during the day and 20-30 oC at night. In winter, the values are between 5 and 25 oC during the day and 0 to 10 oC at night. It may be noted that the diurnal variation in temperature is quite high, that is, more than 10 oC.
The climate is described as dry because the relative humidity is generally very low, ranging from 25 to 40% due to low vegetation and surface water bodies. Moreover, the hot and dry regions receive less rainfall – the annual precipitation being less than 500 mm.
Hot winds blow during the day in summers and sand storms are also experienced. The night is usually cool and pleasant. A generally clear sky, with high solar radiation causing an uncomfortable glare, is typical of this zone. As the sky is clear at night, the heat absorbed by the ground during the day is quickly dissipated to the atmosphere. Hence, the air is much cooler at night than during the day. In such a climate, it is imperative to control solar radiation and movement of hot winds. The design criteria should therefore aim at resisting heat gain by providing shading, reducing exposed area, controlling and scheduling ventilation, and increasing thermal capacity. The presence of “water bodies” is desirable as they can help increase the humidity, lot of heat in the afternoons and evenings. As far as possible, this heat should be avoided by appropriate design features.
Warm and Humid
The warm and humid zone covers the coastal parts of the country. Some cities that fall under this zone are Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata. The high humidity encourages abundant vegetation in these regions.
The diffuse fraction of solar radiation is quite high due to cloud cover, and the radiation can be intense on clear days. The dissipation of the accumulated heat from the earth to the night sky is generally marginal due to the presence of clouds. Hence, the diurnal variation in temperature is quite low. In summer, temperatures can reach as high as 30 – 35 o C during the day and 25-30 o C at night. In winter, the maximum temperature is between 25 to 30 o C during the day and 20 to 25 o C at night. Although the temperatures are not excessive, the high humidity causes discomfort.
An important characteristic of this region is the relative humidity, which is generally very high, about 70-90% throughout the year. Precipitation is also high, being about 1200 mm per year, or even more. Hence, the provision for quick drainage of water is essential in this zone.
The wind is generally from one or two prevailing directions with speed ranging from extremely low to very high. Wind is desirable in this climate, as it can cause sensible cooling of the body.
The main design criteria in the warm and humid region are to reduce heat gain by providing shading, and promote heat loss by maximizing cross ventilation. Dissipation of humidity is also essential to reduce discomfort.
Moderate
Pune and Banglore are examples of cities that fall under this climatic zone. Areas having a moderate climate are generally located on hilly or high-plateau regions with fairly abundant vegetation. The solar radiation in this region is more or less the same throughout the year. Being located at relatively higher elevations, these places experience lower temperatures than hot and dry regions. The temperatures are neither too hot nor too cold. In summers, the temperature reaches 30 – 34 o C during the day and 17 – 24 o C at night. In winter, the maximum temperature is between 27 to 33 o C during the day and 16 to 18 o C at night.
The design criteria in the moderate zone are to reduce heat gain by providing shading, and to promote heat loss by ventilation.
Composite
The composite zone covers the central part of India. Some cities that experience this type of climate are New Delhi, Kanpur and Allahabad. A variable landscape and seasonal vegetation characterize this zone. The intensity of solar radiation is very high in summer with diffuse radiation amounting to a small fraction of the total. In monsoons, the intensity is low with predominantly diffuse radiation. The maximum daytime temperature in summers is in the range of 32 – 43 o C, and night time values are from 27 to 32 o C. In winter, the values are between 10 to 25 o C during the day and 4 to 10 o C at night.
The relative humidity is about 20 – 25 % in dry periods and 55 – 95 % in wet periods. The presence of high humidity during monsoon months is one of the reasons why places like New Delhi and Nagpur are grouped under the composite and not hot and dry climate. Precipitation in this zone varies between 500 – 1300 mm per year. This region receives strong winds during monsoons from the south-east and dry cold winds from the north-east. In summer, the winds are hot and dusty. The sky is overcast and dull in the monsoon, clear in winter and frequently hazy in summer.
Generally, composite regions experience higher humidity levels during monsoons than hot and dry zones. Otherwise most of their characteristics are similar to the latter. Thus, the design criteria are more or less the same as for hot and dry climate except that maximizing cross ventilation is desirable in the monsoon period.
Cold and Cloudy
Generally, the northern part of India experiences this type of climate. Most cold and cloudy regions are situated at high altitudes. Ootacamund, Shimla, Shillong, Srinagar and Mahabaleshwar are examples of places belonging to this climatic zone. These are generally highland regions having abundant vegetation in summer.
The intensity of solar radiation is low in winter with a high percentage of diffuse radiation. Hence, winters are extremely cold. In summer, the maximum ambient temperatures is in the range of 20 – 30 o C during the day and 17 – 27 o C at night, making summers quite pleasant. In winter, the values range between 4 and 8 o C during the day and -3 to 4 o C at night, making it quite chilly.
The relative humidity is generally high and ranges from 70 – 80 %. Annual total precipitation is about 1000 mm and is disturbed evenly throughout the year. This region experiences cold winds in the winter season. Hence, protection from winds is essential in this type of climate. The sky is overcast for most part of the year except during the brief summer.
Conditions in summer are usually clear and pleasant, but owing to cold winters, the main criteria for design in the cold and cloudy region aim at resisting heat loss by insulation and infiltration, and promoting heat gain by directly admitting and trapping solar radiation within the living space.
Cold and Sunny
The cold and sunny type of climate is experienced in Leh (Ladakh). The region is mountainous, has little vegetation, and is considered to be a cold desert.
The solar radiation is generally intense with a very low percentage of diffuse radiation. In summer, the temperature reaches 17 – 24 o C during the day and 4 – 11 o C at night. In winter, the values range from -7 to 8 o C during the day and -14 to 0 o C at night. Winters thus, are extremely cold. The relative humidity is consistently low ranging from about 10 – 50 % and precipitation is generally less than 200 mm per year. Winds are occasionally intense. The sky is fairly clear throughout the year with a cloud cover of less than 50%.
As this region experiences cold desert climatic conditions, the design criteria are to resist heat loss by insulation and controlling infiltration. Simultaneously, heat gain needs to be promoted by admitting and trapping solar radiation within the living space.
*Deputy Director(M & C)
NEPAL-ROAD AHEAD IS NOT EASY
I t may have been just a coincidence that a week after he was sworn in, Nepal’s new Maoist Prime Minister was in Beijing for his first foreign visit. But, for Nepalis, the visit had a geopolitical meaning.
Our leaders traditionally first go to New Delhi, our largest trading partner, after taking office. The picture of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal shaking hands with President Hu Jintao was splashed across Nepali newspapers’ front pages last week. Little wonder: Everyone’s looking for signs about how this new government will behave.
Dahal may actually find that waging war was easier than delivering on his party’s utopian promises. Dahal, still known by his nom de guerre, Prachanda, or “The Fierce One,” is the first Maoist in history to be voted in as head of state. The Maoists lead a shaky coalition with the United Marxist-Leninists (which despite its name is a moderate leftist party) and a regional party representing the Madhesi people of Nepal’s eastern plains.
In their ambitious election manifesto, the Maoists promised “revolutionary” land reform, basic health and education, an ethnicity-based federal state structure and a South Africa-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate war crimes. Overarching all this are their wild promises to deliver 20% gross domestic product growth and $3,000 per capita income by 2020, and to transform Nepal into a Singapore.
The more urgent challenge, howev er, is simply to provide economic relief. More than half of Nepal’s population lives below the poverty line, hunger stalks the land and inflation is running at 20% for foodstuff. The government can’t afford to subsidize petroleum products and people have endured two years of long queues at gas stations.
How well will the new government meet these challenges? Finance minister Baburam Bhattarai wants to launch large showcase projects that generate immediate employment. He has plans for a railway artery from east to west, investments in highways, hydropower and a new international airport. That alone won’t be enough. The government needs to find jobs for the 450,000 Nepalis who enter the labour market every year. About half of them emi grate to find work every year, mostly to India, the Gulf states, Malaysia and South Korea.
The Maoists realize job creation is not possible without foreign investment, and have tried to assure domestic business and the international community that they will respect private property, encourage foreign direct investment and smooth labour relations. Investors aren’t convinced. The Maoists’ youth wing has a habit of extorting businesses. The Maoist threat to enforce a higher minimum wage for foreign-owned enterprises has already spooked multinationals in Nepal, as has the its sponsorship of militant unionism and preferential treatment for domestic enterprises under its concept of “national capitalism.” Still, it does look like Messrs Dahal and Bhattarai are more in line with Deng Xiaoping than with Mao Zedong or the Gang of Four on the economy. But hardcore Maoists in the ranks think the leadership has sold out on the revolution. This faction has to be kept in check.
The coalition’s final challenge is to ensure political stability so that the 601-member constituent assembly can start drafting Nepal’s new constitution. The transition from monarchy to republic in the past two years was delayed, but it went surprisingly smoothly. For that progress to continue, the government must integrate the Maoist army into the national army, while also downsizing it. The constitution framers will also have to grapple with how to divide the country into federal units, each unit’s power over economic policy and how the judiciary should function.
The road ahead is not easy. But the fact that Nepal has seen such far-reaching political transformation since 2006 without large outbreaks of violence and through political negotiations means it could just pull it off.
(Kunda Dixit is editor of the Nepali Times.)
Our leaders traditionally first go to New Delhi, our largest trading partner, after taking office. The picture of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal shaking hands with President Hu Jintao was splashed across Nepali newspapers’ front pages last week. Little wonder: Everyone’s looking for signs about how this new government will behave.
Dahal may actually find that waging war was easier than delivering on his party’s utopian promises. Dahal, still known by his nom de guerre, Prachanda, or “The Fierce One,” is the first Maoist in history to be voted in as head of state. The Maoists lead a shaky coalition with the United Marxist-Leninists (which despite its name is a moderate leftist party) and a regional party representing the Madhesi people of Nepal’s eastern plains.
In their ambitious election manifesto, the Maoists promised “revolutionary” land reform, basic health and education, an ethnicity-based federal state structure and a South Africa-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate war crimes. Overarching all this are their wild promises to deliver 20% gross domestic product growth and $3,000 per capita income by 2020, and to transform Nepal into a Singapore.
The more urgent challenge, howev er, is simply to provide economic relief. More than half of Nepal’s population lives below the poverty line, hunger stalks the land and inflation is running at 20% for foodstuff. The government can’t afford to subsidize petroleum products and people have endured two years of long queues at gas stations.
How well will the new government meet these challenges? Finance minister Baburam Bhattarai wants to launch large showcase projects that generate immediate employment. He has plans for a railway artery from east to west, investments in highways, hydropower and a new international airport. That alone won’t be enough. The government needs to find jobs for the 450,000 Nepalis who enter the labour market every year. About half of them emi grate to find work every year, mostly to India, the Gulf states, Malaysia and South Korea.
The Maoists realize job creation is not possible without foreign investment, and have tried to assure domestic business and the international community that they will respect private property, encourage foreign direct investment and smooth labour relations. Investors aren’t convinced. The Maoists’ youth wing has a habit of extorting businesses. The Maoist threat to enforce a higher minimum wage for foreign-owned enterprises has already spooked multinationals in Nepal, as has the its sponsorship of militant unionism and preferential treatment for domestic enterprises under its concept of “national capitalism.” Still, it does look like Messrs Dahal and Bhattarai are more in line with Deng Xiaoping than with Mao Zedong or the Gang of Four on the economy. But hardcore Maoists in the ranks think the leadership has sold out on the revolution. This faction has to be kept in check.
The coalition’s final challenge is to ensure political stability so that the 601-member constituent assembly can start drafting Nepal’s new constitution. The transition from monarchy to republic in the past two years was delayed, but it went surprisingly smoothly. For that progress to continue, the government must integrate the Maoist army into the national army, while also downsizing it. The constitution framers will also have to grapple with how to divide the country into federal units, each unit’s power over economic policy and how the judiciary should function.
The road ahead is not easy. But the fact that Nepal has seen such far-reaching political transformation since 2006 without large outbreaks of violence and through political negotiations means it could just pull it off.
(Kunda Dixit is editor of the Nepali Times.)
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