The 30-Year War in Afghanistan

June 29, 2010 | 0858 GMT


By George Friedman

The Afghan War is the longest war in U.S. history. It began in 1980 and continues to rage. It began under Democrats but has been fought under both Republican and Democratic administrations, making it truly a bipartisan war. The conflict is an odd obsession of U.S. foreign policy, one that never goes away and never seems to end. As the resignation of Gen. Stanley McChrystal reminds us, the Afghan War is now in its fourth phase.

The Afghan War’s First Three Phases
The first phase of the Afghan War began with the Soviet invasion in December 1979, when the United States, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, organized and sustained Afghan resistance to the Soviets. This resistance was built around mujahideen, fighters motivated by Islam. Washington’s purpose had little to do with Afghanistan and everything to do with U.S.-Soviet competition. The United States wanted to block the Soviets from using Afghanistan as a base for further expansion and wanted to bog the Soviets down in a debilitating guerrilla war. The United States did not so much fight the war as facilitate it. The strategy worked. The Soviets were blocked and bogged down. This phase lasted until 1989, when Soviet troops were withdrawn.

The second phase lasted from 1989 until 2001. The forces the United States and its allies had trained and armed now fought each other in complex coalitions for control of Afghanistan. Though the United States did not take part in this war directly, it did not lose all interest in Afghanistan. Rather, it was prepared to exert its influence through allies, particularly Pakistan. Most important, it was prepared to accept that the Islamic fighters it had organized against the Soviets would govern Afghanistan. There were many factions, but with Pakistani support, a coalition called the Taliban took power in 1996. The Taliban in turn provided sanctuary for a group of international jihadists called al Qaeda, and this led to increased tensions with the Taliban following jihadist attacks on U.S. facilities abroad by al Qaeda.

The third phase began on Sept. 11, 2001, when al Qaeda launched attacks on the mainland United States. Given al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, the United States launched operations designed to destroy or disrupt al Qaeda and dislodge the Taliban. The United States commenced operations barely 30 days after Sept. 11, which was not enough time to mount an invasion using U.S. troops as the primary instrument. Rather, the United States made arrangements with factions that were opposed to the Taliban (and defeated in the Afghan civil war). This included organizations such as the Northern Alliance, which had remained close to the Russians; Shiite groups in the west that were close to the Iranians and India; and other groups or subgroups in other regions. These groups supported the United States out of hostility to the Taliban and/or due to substantial bribes paid by the United States.

The overwhelming majority of ground forces opposing the Taliban in 2001 were Afghan. The United States did, however, insert special operations forces teams to work with these groups and to identify targets for U.S. airpower, the primary American contribution to the war. The use of U.S. B-52s against Taliban forces massed around cities in the north caused the Taliban to abandon any thought of resisting the Northern Alliance and others, even though the Taliban had defeated them in the civil war.

Unable to hold fixed positions against airstrikes, the Taliban withdrew from the cities and dispersed. The Taliban were not defeated, however; they merely declined to fight on U.S. terms. Instead, they redefined the war, preserving their forces and regrouping. The Taliban understood that the cities were not the key to Afghanistan. Instead, the countryside would ultimately provide control of the cities. From the Taliban point of view, the battle would be waged in the countryside, while the cities increasingly would be isolated.

The United States simply did not have sufficient force to identify, engage and destroy the Taliban as a whole. The United States did succeed in damaging and dislodging al Qaeda, with the jihadist group’s command cell becoming isolated in northwestern Pakistan. But as with the Taliban, the United States did not defeat al Qaeda because the United States lacked significant forces on the ground. Even so, al Qaeda prime, the original command cell, was no longer in a position to mount 9/11-style attacks.

During the Bush administration, U.S. goals for Afghanistan were modest. First, the Americans intended to keep al Qaeda bottled up and to impose as much damage as possible on the group. Second, they intended to establish an Afghan government, regardless of how ineffective it might be, to serve as a symbolic core. Third, they planned very limited operations against the Taliban, which had regrouped and increasingly controlled the countryside. The Bush administration was basically in a holding operation in Afghanistan. It accepted that U.S. forces were neither going to be able to impose a political solution on Afghanistan nor create a coalition large enough control the country. U.S. strategy was extremely modest under Bush: to harass al Qaeda from bases in Afghanistan, maintain control of cities and logistics routes, and accept the limits of U.S. interests and power.

The three phases of American involvement in Afghanistan had a common point: All three were heavily dependent on non-U.S. forces to do the heavy lifting. In the first phase, the mujahideen performed this task. In the second phase, the United States relied on Pakistan to manage Afghanistan’s civil war. In the third phase, especially in the beginning, the United States depended on Afghan forces to fight the Taliban. Later, when greater numbers of American and allied forces arrived, the United States had limited objectives beyond preserving the Afghan government and engaging al Qaeda wherever it might be found (and in any event, by 2003, Iraq had taken priority over Afghanistan). In no case did the Americans use their main force to achieve their goals.

The Fourth Phase of the Afghan War
The fourth phase of the war began in 2009, when U.S. President Barack Obama decided to pursue a more aggressive strategy in Afghanistan. Though the Bush administration had toyed with this idea, it was Obama who implemented it fully. During the 2008 election campaign, Obama asserted that he would pay greater attention to Afghanistan. The Obama administration began with the premise that while the Iraq War was a mistake, the Afghan War had to be prosecuted. It reasoned that unlike Iraq, which had a tenuous connection to al Qaeda at best, Afghanistan was the group’s original base. He argued that Afghanistan therefore should be the focus of U.S. military operations. In doing so, he shifted a strategy that had been in place for 30 years by making U.S. forces the main combatants in the war.

Though Obama’s goals were not altogether clear, they might be stated as follows:

1.Deny al Qaeda a base in Afghanistan.
2.Create an exit strategy from Afghanistan similar to the one in Iraq by creating the conditions for negotiating with the Taliban; make denying al Qaeda a base a condition for the resulting ruling coalition.
3.Begin withdrawal by 2011.
To do this, there would be three steps:

1.Increase the number and aggressiveness of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
2.Create Afghan security forces under the current government to take over from the Americans.
3.Increase pressure on the Taliban by driving a wedge between them and the population and creating intra-insurgent rifts via effective counterinsurgency tactics.
In analyzing this strategy, there is an obvious issue: While al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan in 2001, Afghanistan is no longer its primary base of operations. The group has shifted to Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and other countries. As al Qaeda is thus not dependent on any one country for its operational base, denying it bases in Afghanistan does not address the reality of its dispersion. Securing Afghanistan, in other words, is no longer the solution to al Qaeda.

Obviously, Obama’s planners fully understood this. Therefore, sanctuary denial for al Qaeda had to be, at best, a secondary strategic goal. The primary strategic goal was to create an exit strategy for the United States based on a negotiated settlement with the Taliban and a resulting coalition government. The al Qaeda issue depended on this settlement, but could never be guaranteed. In fact, neither the long-term survival of a coalition government nor the Taliban policing al Qaeda could be guaranteed.

The exit of U.S. forces represents a bid to reinstate the American strategy of the past 30 years, namely, having Afghan forces reassume the primary burden of fighting. The creation of an Afghan military is not the key to this strategy. Afghans fight for their clans and ethnic groups. The United States is trying to invent a national army where no nation exists, a task that assumes the primary loyalty of Afghans will shift from their clans to a national government, an unlikely proposition.

The Real U.S. Strategy
Rather than trying to strengthen the Karzai government, the real strategy is to return to the historical principles of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan: alliance with indigenous forces. These indigenous forces would pursue strategies in the American interest for their own reasons, or because they are paid, and would be strong enough to stand up to the Taliban in a coalition. As CIA Director Leon Panetta put it this weekend, however, this is proving harder to do than expected.

The American strategy is, therefore, to maintain a sufficient force to shape the political evolution on the ground, and to use that force to motivate and intimidate while also using economic incentives to draw together a coalition in the countryside. Operations like those in Helmand province — where even Washington acknowledges that progress has been elusive and slower than anticipated — clearly are designed to try to draw regional forces into regional coalitions that eventually can enter a coalition with the Taliban without immediately being overwhelmed. If this strategy proceeds, the Taliban in theory will be spurred to negotiate out of concern that this process eventually could leave it marginalized.

There is an anomaly in this strategy, however. Where the United States previously had devolved operational responsibility to allied groups, or simply hunkered down, this strategy tries to return to devolved responsibilities by first surging U.S. operations. The fourth phase actually increases U.S. operational responsibility in order to reduce it.

From the grand strategic point of view, the United States needs to withdraw from Afghanistan, a landlocked country where U.S. forces are dependent on tortuous supply lines. Whatever Afghanistan’s vast mineral riches, mining them in the midst of war is not going to happen. More important, the United States is overcommitted in the region and lacks a strategic reserve of ground forces. Afghanistan ultimately is not strategically essential, and this is why the United States has not historically used its own forces there.

Obama’s attempt to return to that track after first increasing U.S. forces to set the stage for the political settlement that will allow a U.S. withdrawal is hampered by the need to begin terminating the operation by 2011 (although there is no fixed termination date). It will be difficult to draw coalition partners into local structures when the foundation — U.S. protection — is withdrawing. Strengthening local forces by 2011 will be difficult. Moreover, the Taliban’s motivation to enter into talks is limited by the early withdrawal. At the same time, with no ground combat strategic reserve, the United States is vulnerable elsewhere in the world, and the longer the Afghan drawdown takes, the more vulnerable it becomes (hence the 2011 deadline in Obama’s war plan).

In sum, this is the quandary inherent in the strategy: It is necessary to withdraw as early as possible, but early withdrawal undermines both coalition building and negotiations. The recruitment and use of indigenous Afghan forces must move extremely rapidly to hit the deadline (though officially on track quantitatively, there are serious questions about qualitative measures) — hence, the aggressive operations that have been mounted over recent months. But the correlation of forces is such that the United States probably will not be able to impose an acceptable political reality in the time frame available. Thus, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is said to be opening channels directly to the Taliban, while the Pakistanis are increasing their presence. Where a vacuum is created, regardless of how much activity there is, someone will fill it.

Therefore, the problem is to define how important Afghanistan is to American global strategy, bearing in mind that the forces absorbed in Iraq and Afghanistan have left the United States vulnerable elsewhere in the world. The current strategy defines the Islamic world as the focus of all U.S. military attention. But the world has rarely been so considerate as to wait until the United States is finished with one war before starting another. Though unknowns remain unknowable, a principle of warfare is to never commit all of your reserves in a battle — one should always maintain a reserve for the unexpected. Strategically, it is imperative that the United States begin to free up forces and re-establish its ground reserves.

Given the time frame the Obama administration’s grand strategy imposes, and given the capabilities of the Taliban, it is difficult to see how it will all work out. But the ultimate question is about the American obsession with Afghanistan. For 30 years, the United States has been involved in a country that is virtually inaccessible for the United States. Washington has allied itself with radical Islamists, fought against radical Islamists or tried to negotiate with radical Islamists. What the United States has never tried to do is impose a political solution through the direct application of American force. This is a new and radically different phase of America’s Afghan obsession. The questions are whether it will work and whether it is even worth it.

NEPAL-THE GLIMSES OF HISTORY-ASHOK CHAURASIA

NEPAL: THE GLIMPSES OF HISTORY

By—ASHOK CHAURASIA

Indo-Nepal relation is historic one, age old and deep-rooted. Mithila King Raja Janak was the ruler of the region. Janakpur, the capital and birthplace of Mata Janaki (Sita), the virtuous queen of Lord Ram, is in Nepal. His Maithili subjects are the aborigines of the region. The main language of the region was Sanskrit. Till 1334 A.D. the modern capital of Mithila was Simraungarh and Hari Singh Dev was its ruler. Mughal ruler Gyasuddin attacked Simraungarh in the same year and destroyed the famous Pashupatinath temple. Hari Singh fled to Kathmandu valley and later on ruled the valley.

Similarly, as per mentioned in Mahabharat, Kirats the followers of Lord Shiva were the inhabitants in the valleys of the region. Yalambar was the first Kirati king. Matatirth was his capital. He finds a reference in Mahabharat too. It is said that he had met Indra - the Lord of heaven. The festival “Indra Yatra” is famous in Nepal. Perhaps, as per Nepal’s recorded history, Kirats arrived here in 7th or 8th century B.C. from the east. It is a matter of contradiction and extortion. Gopalas, the cow herder’s dynasty ruled the region prior to the Kirats. Nepal observes the grand festival of “Gai-Yatra”(cow-festival) too every year.

Perhaps the land is also the birthplace of lord Buddha; who born in 563 B.C. (mediaeval period) at Lumbini as the son of King Shudodhan who was the ruler of Kapilvastu, now a part of Nepal. Sidharth Gautam got enlightened at Gaya (Bihar) under a banyan tree. Buddha himself visited the holy places of Swayambhu and Guheswari, now in Nepal. The holy places of the region are of high importance. The places like Pashupatinath, Manokamna, Machendranath, Basukinath, Bodhnath, Kumari ghar etc are highly revered in Nepal. The prominent rivers of the region are Narayani, Koshi, Indrawati, Bagmati, Mahakali, Karnali etc. The highest mountain peak of the world, Sagarmatha (Mt.Everest) is situated in Nepal.


By 260B.C. the region was the part of Maurya Empire. Emperor, Ashok the Great visited Kathmandu and Lumbini. Here he erected four Stupas. He arranged his daughter Charumati’s marriage with Devpal, a local prince of Pashupati. Gupta dynasty also ruled the region for a long period.

Lord Pashupatinath is regarded as the guardian deity of Nepal and of the Hindu society as a whole. Licchavi King Supuspadev provided a big shape to the temple. There are several historical evidences that prove the Licchavi king’s ruled the Kathmandu valley for a long period (from slight before 1st till 12th century). During 8th to 11th century the southern part of the valley came under the occupation of Chalukya Empire of southern India and hence, from 876 B.C. Newari era began. Newar, supposed to be a clan of Karnataka. During this period lot of Buddhists from south India fled to Kathmandu valley. By 12th century, Thakuris alias Mallas (Rajputs of North India) emerged powerful in the valley. During Mall’s time the people of Kathmandu were known as Newars.


By the 14th century, Jayasthimall, a Newar King tried to unite the several principalities of the region which short-lived and in 1482 the territory split into three kingdoms: Kathmandu, Patan and Bhadgaon.

Prithvinarayan Shah (a prince of Sisodia clan of Chittor, Rajasthan) unified Nepal. Hence, he is regarded as the father of the modern Nepal. First he established a small principality of Gorkha (means-protector of cow); thereby conquering about more than 22 other princely states of the region, created modern Nepal. On 21st December 1768 he became the ruler of unified Nepal defeating Sen (Maithili) ruler of the valley and declared Nepal as the land of associate garden of 4 Verna (i.e. Brahman, Chatrya, Baisya and Sudra) and 36 castes. P.N.Shah was popularly known as Gorkha ruler, meaning, the cow protector and follower of Guru-Gorakhnath. Unfortunately, he banned the enrollment of Maithili and other Terai (Plain) people in his Nepal Army, as in 1774 Jay Prakash Mall attacked Kathmandu with 12000 strong Maithili troops (Tirhoot Army).

Eventually, Anglo-Nepal War (1814-16) broke out, in which Nepal suffered a complete rout. In exchange of Nepalese autonomy a treaty of Sugauli was singed between East India Company and Shah king in 1816. After 18th century Nepal plunged into internal turmoil. It was fueled by British under a divide and rule policy. This led to Kot Massacre in 1864; a bloody infighting between the Military personnel and Kings loyalists, in which Ranas executed several hundred princes and chieftains. Jung Bahadur Rana (Rajput clan of Mewar, Rajasthan) a fast rising military leader emerged victorious. He became the Prime Minister with all executive powers and the King was made titular. He founded Rana Dynasty and ruled Nepal till 1950 with the help of British government. Highly autocratic and centralized Rana regime not only isolated Nepal from its roots but also fully assisted the British in 1857; the first Indian Freedom Movement.

However, several renowned leaders of Nepal like Bisweshwar Prasad Koirala (founder of Nepali Congress), Matrika Prasad etc. joined Indian National Freedom Movement in 1920. Fearing the strong and fast spreading Indian National Movement, cleverly Britain seceded Nepal from India, in 1923. Perhaps, leaders like Subarn Samsher Rana, Ganesh Man Singh, Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and Girija Prasad Koirala joined Indian freedom movement and wanted to liberate Nepal from the autocratic and pro-British Rana regime as well as from imperialist British clutches. Ranas executed Dharm Bhakta Mathema, Shukraraj Shastri and Dashrath Chand while doing so. B.P.Koirala and Matrika Prasad were arrested, imprisoned in Bankipur jail in 1930. In jail they met Dr.Rajendra Prasad. Later on they were released in 1945.They also joined J.P.’s Socialist and Gandhi’s Quit India Movements. B.P. Koirala, the former Prime Minister of Nepal had clearly said-“Indian National Movement was also our movement because the autocracy of Ranas was supported by British Imperialists”. Regarding Ranas regime J.N.Nehru had said-“to hope reforms from the Ranas is like hoping the milk from a dry cow”. No doubt India sincerely supported the democratic movements in Nepal. And hence in January25, 1947 Nepali National Congress came into existence. Soon after Nepali Congress, came into existence the Communist Party of Nepal, supported by Russia and China.

In November 1950, King Tribhuvan, from his palace prison, managed to flee India. It is said that the King Tribhuvan had requested Pandit Nehru to merge Nepal into Indian union but Nehru ignored the request. India-Nepal singed the historic Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950, here by India opened its vast resources to the citizens of Nepal. As per the treaty none of the Nepal’s citizen is regarded as foreigner in India and vice-versa. Ultimately, Rana regime came to an end in 1951 and once again the Shah dynasty rule was established under a simple constitutional monarchy system of government, a democratic government with powerful Prime Minister.





























In 1956, Dr. K.I. Singh government banned teaching of Hindi. This led to a pro-Hindi and anti-Hindi movement in Nepal. The government of India remained unconcerned about the ban. Later on, in 1959 B.P. Koirala introduced Hindi in Madhes (foot hill of Nepal) but King Mahendra revoked it after a coup in 1962. He dismissed the elected government and took absolute powers in his own hand. This led to a sharp difference between India and king Mahendra. India was in favor of democracy but China supported the king. Taking advantage of Indo-Sino war of 1962 King floated one –state-one Language policy declaring Nepali as national and official language of Nepal at the suffering of other languages and completely banned Hindi in 1963. Prior to this, Hindi and Nepali both enjoyed an equal status as official and educational language of Nepal. Kashi was the base of Nepali publications. Hindi and Nepali have the same Devnagri script, same Sanskrit origin and a lot of similarities in words. There was never dispute in-between the two languages. Unfortunately King, under Chinese influence, tried to provoke and plant the anti-Hindi, anti-India feelings among the Nepali-speaking people of Nepal.

Whereas, according to Nepal’s 2001 national census, there are 92 different living languages in Nepal. The major languages of the state are Nepali-48%, Hindi-32% (Maithili-13%, Bhojpuri-8%, Tharu-4%, Urdu-4% Awadhi-2%, Bajjika-1%), Nepal Bhasa (Newari)-3%, Rai-3%, Tamang-3%, Limboo-2%, Magar-2%, Gurung-2%, Sherpa-1%. Today there is a strong demand for the equal status as Nepali to 11 other major languages. In last 6 decades Hindu and Buddhists are reduced to 81% and 11% respectively, where as Islam (4%) and Christianity (4%) have increased tremendously.

In 1969 Nepal cancelled an arm agreement with India and ordered India to withdraw its military mission from Kathmandu and listening posts from the Tibet-Nepal frontier. The Indo-Nepal relation does not improved during Birendra’s regime too; rather it deteriorated to its utmost level. During nineties he developed closer tie with China, as a result in 1989, the government of India led by Rajiv Gandhi closed Indo-Nepal border to all economic traffic. Though, after intervention of Bharatia Janata Party, Vishwa Hindu Parsad and Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh the border was opened. Hindu organizations of India and Nepal tried hard to improve the bilateral relation of both the nations. King Birendra along with several political leaders of Nepal were invited in several functions organized by Vishwa Hindu Parisad.

Earlier in February 1963, M.S.Golwalkar,the then chief of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, while visiting Sri Pashupatinath temple, met the King Mahendra; both had discussions on several issues to improve the bilateral relations. Minister Dr.Tulsi Giri accompanied him. Sri Guruji (Golwalkar) on Febraury27, 1963; wrote to Pandit Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, regarding the discussion urging him to take up necessary steps to improve the friendly relations and to clear the certain doubts of the king but Nehru did not paid any head to the request. In Febraury1965, on the auspicious eve of Makar Sankrati, Sangh invited The King Mahendra in its Nagpur function for which king had agreed, but Nehru government stopped him from taking part in the function. Though, today Hindu Organizations including Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh of Nepal is gaining strength in Nepal in spite of hurdles and odds. Know the people of Nepal, as a whole, seems getting aware of the foul play of evil elements like Maoists, Church, China, I.S.I., Islamic fundamentalists and certain vested leaders and media. Surprisingly, with the help of these elements, the Chinese influence, Christianity and Islam is also growing in Nepal.

It is said that- “ the loss of culture is the loss of identity and the loss of identity is the loss of nationality. So, these elements are trying hard to uproot Nepal from its glorious past, its culture, tradition and religion. And hence, they are attacking the Hindu identities of Nepal.

Unfortunately, on May18, 2006, under Maoist pressure, Nepal lost its glory of being the only Hindu Nation of the world and was declared secular. Since 1996, in 10 year long Maoists insurgency, more than 13000 people lost their life. Finally, Maoist elements do not even spared the Monarchs, loyal to them. On June1, 2001 his own son and crown prince Dipendra assassinated his father, the King Birendra along with all royal members of the family in the palace shooting-spree and so, on May 28,2008; 239 years old monarchy was abolished; Constituent Assembly declared Nepal, a Federal Democratic Republic. Sri Ram Varan Yadav was elected as the first President and Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachand; the Maoist chief became the first Prime Minister of Nepal. Dictatorial Maoist govt. fall within a year and CPN (UML)- govt. led by Madhav Kumar Nepal, supported by Nepali Congress-Madhesies, and other 20 parties had formed the new govt. The biggest challenge before Nepal is to write its new constitution. Maoists are all posing the hurdles in constitution writing, as they wants such a constitution which suits them.

The modern history of Nepal clearly states that the ruling clans along with Brahmins, Chettris, Castes and Newars; today known as Nepali have come from Rajasthan,Kumaun,Garhwal, Kanaujj and Karnataka respectively. Maithilies and Kirats are the real son of the soil. Nepali language came into existence only in nineteenth century; prior to this there was Sanskrit, Nepalbhasa and Khas language.Later on the Khas language was termed as Nepali and declared as national language in 1963 by King Mahendra.

The name Nepal derived from the Sanskrit word “nipalaya”, which means ‘abode at the foothill’. It is also said that the name Nepal may have derived from the Sanskrit word ‘NEP’ meaning cow herder- the Gopalas, who came in the valley for the first time from the Ganges Plain. According to Nepali scholars, the ancient chronicles report that, a sage (Rishi) named Ne-muni existed in the valley. In Skandh Puran and Pashupati puran his name is mentioned. He became the protector (pala) of this land and the founder of its first ruling dynasty. The name of the country, Ne-pala, therefore originally meant the land protected by Ne. Till 20th century only Kathmandu valley was called as NEPAL.
Human teeth found in Butwal proved to be 10 lack years old, which proves the existence of Human being. Neolithic tools found in the Kathmandu valley are 9000 years old.

In Puranas, it is said that- “Himalayat samaramva, yavadendu sarowaram; tad dev nirmitam desham hindustham prachakshyatey”, meaning - the land stretched right from The Great Himalayas up to the ocean in south is the land created by the God himself. Rishi Aurobind has said – ‘the land is divinely designed triangle”. Nepali writers like Adi-kavi Bhanubhakta say–It is a rare thing to be born in Bharat Varsa and Maha-kavi Laxmi Prasad Devkota say-the history of Bharat Varsa is so sweet, nice and glorious.

By------Ashok Chaurasia
All India Secretary,
Nepali Sanskriti Parisad
All India Treasurer,
Rashtriya Sampadak Sangam

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