Bangladesh & Sikkim: Nepal’s Response

M. R. Josee
Senior Journalist

Britain’s 1947 departure from India, new China’s emergence in 1949, including her re-establishment of authority in Tibet, have had national security policy implications for Nepal — and continues to do so.

Other regional developments, too, have had their impact, particularly the creation of Bangladesh and the merger with, or annexation of Sikkim, by India in the 1970s.

Before that, note must be taken of Nepal’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1960 — a decision that was also influenced by geo-strategic considerations, including the imperative of broadening her contacts beyond her immediate periphery.

Nepal’s policy of trade diversification, begun with a trade treaty with Pakistan in 1962, can thus be interpreted as an attempt to maximize her security vis-à-vis powerful neighbors.

It had come in the wake of initial bilateral contacts in 1952, under the auspices of the consultative committee of the Colombo Plan, and subsequently at Bandung. (Author)

It was inevitable that the ripple effects of the 1971 creation of Bangladesh from East Pakistan through the active intervention of India should have been felt beyond the region.

The carefully planned dismemberment of Pakistan through the instrumentality of Indo-Soviet collaboration formalized on August 9, 1971 via a 20-year friendship treaty that possessed all the hallmarks of a security pact, was noted with deep anxiety in Nepal, as elsewhere.

Though Nepal, faced with a fait accompli, had no option other than to finally accept the reality of Bangladesh, her public policy makers noted the disturbing implications, national security-wise, that Pakistan — cultivated, among other reasons, as a countervailing force against India — underwent a sudden transformation: from a close to distant neighbor.

Its effect on Nepal’s national security policy mindset would become dramatically manifest a few years later, spurred by developments in the neighboring kingdom of Sikkim. That happened in less than two years’ time through a carefully orchestrated anti-Chogval (ruler) movement in 1973-74 that led, ultimately, to Sikkim’s integration with India in 1975.

It is also clear that Nepal’s sense of tranquility and security was rudely disturbed by developments in Sri Lanka, particularly India’s overt military intervention in 1987, following the Indo-Lanka Accord of July after which the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) declared war against Indian forces deployed on the Island. After suffering over 1,100 casualties, India’s military intervention was ended in 1989.

NEPAL’S RESPONSE

The elimination of Sikkim’s distinct personality and the uprooting of a dynasty that could be traced back at least from Pungshoq Namgyal’s installation in 1642 (B.S.K Grover, Sikkim and India…), set the stage for a fundamental re-think of Nepal’s national security options.

Basically, it took the shape of the Zone of Peace (ZOP) proposal unveiled in Kathmandu on February 25, 1975 by King Birendra at a farewell reception for dignitaries who had gathered for his coronation.

Its rationale was projected elliptically by his explaining that “we are not prompted out of fear or threat from any country or quarter… As heirs to a country that has always lived in independence, we wish to see that our freedom and independence shall not be thwarted by the changing flux of time…when conciliation is replaced by belligerency and war.” (HM King Birendra’s Peace Proposal for Nepal)

The very first reference to a Nepal-specific zone of peace was in King Birendra’s address to the Fifth NAM summit in Algiers on September 8, 1973, thus: “Nepal situated between two of the world’s most populous countries, wishes within her frontiers to be enveloped in a zone of peace.”(The Rising Nepal, September 9, 1973)

It will be appropriate to recall that although by the time of the Popular Movement of April 1990, 116 sovereign nations had extended Support to ZOP, India refused to do so.

Over the years, India’s mainstream media had made it abundantly clear that India’s refusal to do so was that endorsement would cancel her special status in Nepal purportedly secured in the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty — one that could not be compared to Nepal’s ties with any country including China, Nepal’s other immediate neighbor.

ZOP was formally cremated when the drafters of the 1990 Constitution in their collective wisdom threw out the ZOP baby along with the Panchayat bathwater. A few years earlier ZOP had been inscribed into the directive principles of the Panchayat constitution through its third amendment.

Therein the following foreign policy objective was enunciated: “to work towards making Nepal a Zone of Peace by adopting the basic ideals of the United Nations and the principles of nonalignment”. (Author)

No authoritative answer has been provided to date for thus killing a key national security policy initiative. Most independent analysts believe such a move was inspired by a desire to placate India, which had lent powerful support, including via its media, to toppling the panchayat order and transforming the monarchy from a ruling to a reigning entity.

NATIONAL SECURITY GQALS/POLICY SIDELINED

In addition to ZOP’s rubbishing, the decade after 1990 witnessed the deliberate, neglect of national security goals and policies.

This writer has it on excellent authority that an attempt soon after 1990 by a group of academics to set up an independent institute to pursue strategic studies from a Nepali perspective was spiked by the Nepali Congress government installed after general elections following the drafting of the November 1990 Constitution. (Source who requested anonymity)

For long, “foreign policy issues were solely decided by the prime minister, who held on to the foreign affairs portfolio till the bitter end, without virtually any debate in political circles, or indeed, as can be made out, much input from HMG’s ministry of foreign affairs.” (Author)

It was in that environment of opacity that Prime Minister Koirala, during his official visit to India in December 1991, categorically told the international media in New Delhi that “the forcible expulsion of southern Bhutanese by the Thimphu regime was a matter that fell wholly within Bhutan’s domestic jurisdiction.” (Author)

Whatever the reasons that prompted Koirala’s truly egregious comment, it triggered an upsurge in ethnic cleansing activities within Bhutan. Thus, within year of that statement, the Bhutanese refugee population in Nepal shot up to about 100,000 from a figure of around 10,000 at the time of Koirala’s India mission.

Thereafter, “Koirala’s government continued to turn a blind eye to the problem until in 1993 when it finally agreed to seek bilateral talks with the Thimphu regime. Completely disregarding the fact that the problem clearly involved Nepal, Bhutan and India, the country of first asylum or transit, Koirala agreed that talks should be bilateral, not trilateral, and, furthermore, that they should be led by the two home ministers, not foreign ministers. Meetings at foreign ministers’ level were to come much later. (Author)

Clearly, lacking transparency in the functioning of the ministry of foreign affairs, led by the prime minister, and sans a national debate on the multi-faceted implications of the Bhutanese refugee crisis, including on her national security, this issue has lingered on unresolved until today, despite about a score of rounds of formal talks. Despite all that, not one Bhutanese refugee has been repatriated to Bhutan, as of this writing.

What is perhaps its most disturbing aspect from the point of view of Nepal’s national security is India permitting — some claim, assisting — Bhutanese refugees to cross through at least 100 km. of Indian territory before entering Nepal, but preventing them from returning home.

Another national security policy disaster was the failure of a succession of post-1990 governments to stem the flow of illegal migrants across the open Nepal-India border and the inability, during that period, to bring about effective control of cross-border movement there, including by criminal elements.

The impact of cross-border terrorism on national security is too obvious to merit any further elaboration here.

(The author is a senior journalist of Nepal)

2010-02-25