ESSAY: Wisdom out of the box


BY LHENDUP G BHUTIA

Mumbai: My grandfather is a distant memory. Tall, dark-skinned, a little hunched, he spoke only Tibetan and Nepali. We did not spend much time with each other, but I still remember that every morning he woke me up and took me to our chausham (prayer-room).

There I was made to clasp my hands and touch with my head a wooden box, about four feet by two. After this little act of obeisance, I was free to go and play. The day he passed away, he did not have the strength to come and rouse me from my sleep. But someone else called me in and made me pay my respects to the box.

And then one day, the box was opened. It contained a bunch of antiquated papers, all neatly stacked and without any binding. They featured writings in Tibetan, with tiny drawings of people in meditation. It was called Lam remd (roughly translated as ‘stages to a path’) and contained prayers (to help attain enlightenment).

Unlike most other Tibetans, my grandfather Abo Kunga did not come to India in 1959, when the Dalai Lama took refuge in India.

He came as a tradesman in 1945 to Kalimpong, which was then a small hamlet by a river in what is now northern West Bengal. He made the journey sometimes on foot, sometimes on mule, carrying silverware and wool atop 11 mules, traveling sometimes for two weeks at a stretch, surviving on yak cheese, dried meat and tsampa (barley flour that, with a little warm water, could make for a quick meal). This 10 day long trip that sometimes stretched to 14 was undertaken every month, and the trade was so good, he not only rented a house and a stable, he even brought my grandmother.

And then in early 1950, China invaded Tibet and they could never return.

When news reached of the invasion, I’m told the first thing my grandmother prayed for was not her house in Lhasa, nor her relatives, but for the book of Lam remd she owned in Tibet. But relatives who sneaked out of Lhasa brought bad news: the book had been destroyed in a fire. She did not cry on hearing that; instead she gathered enough money to travel to Dharamsala, get a reprint of an original Lam remd, and seek out the Dalai Lama to bless it. She died when my father was only 15, and the book was passed on.

When the Dalai Lama stated last year that a “cultural genocide” was taking place in China, he could have as easily been speaking about the genocide of these Tibetan books. Many of them were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s when monasteries and libraries were burnt; some were lost while the Tibetans were fleeing the marching Chinese, and many more were simply lost in the march of time.

As a matter of fact, there are ten kinds of Tibetan books, the more important ones being on Tibetan medicine, Buddhist religion and philosophy, architecture, grammar (of Sanskrit and Tibetan), and translated works of Indian scholars on Buddhist philosophy, mathematics and astronomy. Their content is invaluable, as Sonam Topgyel, assistant librarian at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (LTWA) in Dharamsala explains. “Some extremely important Indian works were lost forever when the Nalanda University was destroyed by the Turks,” says the librarian of one of the world’s largest libraries containing Tibetan books. “But these are still available in Tibetan translation,” he adds. But these works, till now preserved in Tibetan, now risk being lost forever, if not lost already.

There is, however, a significant attempt going on to find these books and preserve them. At the forefront of this endeavour is a Mormon from Utah by the name E Gene Smith. He is a leading Tibetologist, the founder of the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (TBRC) in New York, and the subject of a new documentary, Digital Dharma (that has been directed by veteran television and documentary filmmaker Dafna Yachin) which is almost ready for release. The TBRC has more than a 1, 00,000 Tibetan books, making it the largest collection of Tibetan literature outside Tibet.

Since 1968, Smith has been travelling across the world, collecting these books for preservation. And he has also helped reprint them, so that each one of these books is now not locked up in some dingy corner awaiting disintegration, but has a hundred other copies. This way, he hopes, the culture of a nation will not become a passing memory.

But of late, he has started a new project: digitising these books. About 8,000 volumes of these books, ranging from religion to medicine, have now been uploaded on the internet. “We reprinted the books so that more people could access them. But imagine the reach when you upload it on the internet!” Smith says.

Along with this project of preserving and maximizing the reach of these books, Smith is also busy with what he calls a project of “giving back”.

Five years ago, the LTWA in Dharamsala, along with many other monasteries and libraries in Chinese-occupied Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, India and Central Asia received a hard disk, containing 300 GB of different Tibetan prayers. That small hard disk, no bigger than the size of their fists, contained, to the utter amazement of many monks, content that could dwarf many a library. But a recurrent trouble bothered them. “They didn’t get strong enough anti-viruses, and the computer kept crashing,” says Smith.

It wasn’t the first time Smith had faced a problem. When he had first started reprinting Tibetan books, the Tibetans themselves weren’t happy. “Tibetan books are not like the ones we use. They are not bound and are long. The first set of reprints was like our modern notebooks and centrally bound, and most did not like this. I rectified this issue, by simply getting them bound from the top,” adds Smith.

Similarly, he solved the problem of the viruses too. Since last year, these libraries and universities, 70 till now, have been receiving brand-new Apple Macintosh computers that are more virus-resistant and have a storage capacity of 400 GB. Topgyel of LTWA says, “It is so much easier to use the Mac to read these texts. We don’t have to go through large libraries to find the relevant information.”

Widely acknowledged as a saviour of Tibetan culture and literature, Smith believes his task is still incomplete. “Several thousands of Tibetan texts are still lost across continents. What we have accomplished is nothing more than retrieving a solitary drop from the ocean,” says Smith.

As for me, my parents discarded a lot of old belongings when we shifted home a few years ago. But the book in the box still remains. And I still clasp my hands and touch my head with it. Not because it is religious, but because it tells me who my grandfather was and where he came from.

source:Barun Roy

‘Sikkim: The Wounds of History’ reopened by Biraj Adikhari

‘Time has come when we need to bring a sense of closure to history’

GANGTOK, January 27: Claimed as a ‘hard look’ through the lens of the Constitution by a ‘new generation’ Sikkimese into the tumultuous events of 1973 which changed Sikkim and its spillover into present, Sikkim National People’s Party (SNPP) Biraj Adikhari authored book ‘Sikkim: The Wounds of History’ was released by the party treasurer Diley Namgyal Kazi and working president Tseten Lepcha here on Republic Day.

Running over 131 pages, the book’s central theme plays around the pre and post events of Article 371 F, the Constitutional shield of Sikkim. Due to the conflict introduced by certain procedures and provisions of the Constitution of India, the Sikkimese people are today increasing looking back to whatever protections they had, asserts Adikhari in his book.

Admitting that the subject matter is an old story, Adikhari said that the book is a fresh and totally radical look with some serious questions.

“This book is not about the people’s revolution of 1973. Enough books have been written about that. Rather it shall focus on retracing the constitutional jugglery which took place to define Sikkim’s status within the Union of India. The question of status is important here because we need to determine whether it is correct to club Sikkim with other ‘regular’ States of the Indian Union”, said Adikhari in his introduction of the book.

The author said that the book shall enquire into the fact that ‘after the merger/annexation, were the Sikkimese people expected to shed their distinct identity which was cultivated over the decades, and if their identity is to remain then how do they address it constitutionally’. The book ‘shall also point out the controversial steps which were taken in this whole exercise so that it invigorates the younger generation to take interest in their political past because, unfortunately, succeeding generations of Sikkimese children are growing up having a distorted version of their own history, as none of these facts are included in the school curriculum in Sikkim’, he said in the introductory part.

Questioning on the 35th amendment of the Indian Constitution that turned Sikkim into an ‘associate State’ which was retracted seven months later paving way for the 36th amendment which officially declared Sikkim to be a ‘regular State’, Adikhari said that ambiguity was further compounded considering the declaration of emergency in the country.

“At a time when India’s most powerful opposition leaders were almost voiceless, the Constitution was amended not once but twice to accommodate Sikkim. So how much of a voice did the representatives of Sikkim have in these debates for something as important as constitutional amendments”, said Adikhari in his book.

Claming the outcome of the tumultuous transition of Sikkim into a part of the Indian Union was the raging debate among the younger generation on who is a Sikkimese, Adikhari’s book adds that ‘while the Sikkimese is confused about his rights within India, the normal Indian citizen is even more confused about his rights in Sikkim today’.

He had highlighted some landmark verdicts, which he said, seems to suspend the most fundamental rights of non-Sikkimese Indians in Sikkim.

Due to the massive rate of influx during the last three decades, the rapid demographic changes have increased the urgency for a clear distinction between who is a Sikkimese and who is not and special provisions accorded by Article 371F should be acknowledged by all, said Adikhari. Perhaps a new nomenclature like ‘associate State’ needs to be cooked up, he added.

Justifying the issues reinforced in his book, Adikhari said that he is bringing this up because he believes ‘time has come when we need to bring a sense of closure to history’. “There are so many questions which have not been answered yet, and this state of continuing confusion has caused the wounds left over from history to fester again. These are the wounds of history, which have been around for more than three decades now, and shall have to be addressed if Sikkim is to move into the future”, said Adikhari.

While releasing the book, the SNPP president said that he wrote the book because he had been ‘jailed’ on Republic Day last year along with the party treasurer and working president because he was claiming that Indian Constitution had been ‘violated’.

There are two types of constitution existing in Sikkim which is very unfortunate, said Adikhari adding that he is attempting to clear the confusion in his book. The book is not an extensive book but is done in a simple manner to be a first hand reference on the history of Sikkim, he added.

Excluding the introductory part, the book has six chapters on Sikkim’s history starting from the uprising to the insertion of Article 371F in the Indian Constitution. The book has also five appendixes – May 8 Tripartite Agreement of 1973, the Constitution (35th) Amendment Act 1974, The Government of Sikkim Act 1974, Resolution Dated 10/4/75 passed by the Sikkim Assembly and The Constitution (36th Amendment) Act 1975.

source: sikkim express

ESSAY: Cry freedom


It remains a riddle why India’s Nepali community, celebrated for its spirit of loyalty and sacrifice, was left out in the cold when the rest of the country was aroused from a century-long slumber of self-oblivion, writes Romit Bagchi

A CHARGE is often made against India’s Gorkha community that it took no remarkable part in the country’s freedom movement. Such a summary dismissal of a community as regards its loyalty to the nation has assumed serious undertones in the context of the Gorkhaland agitation that continues in the Darjeeling hills. To repudiate the charges, the Gokha leadership in the hills takes recourse to a few names like Dal Bahadur Giri, Durga Malla, Ram Singh Thakuri and others. This has been continuing for years and in this process a serious aspect remains ignored.

Did the national leadership spearheading the anti-colonial struggle make any worthwhile effort to involve the community in the national mainstream? There are possibilities that the casually hurled insinuation against the community will lose much of its force if a serious attempt were made to answer the question.

History, of course, bears witness to the fact that the Gorkha regiment served as cannon fodder for British forces during World Wars I and II. The Punjab regiment also played the same role. Yet the common people of Punjab participated in India’s struggle for freedom even if the Gorkha community remained largely conspicuous by its irresponsiveness to the anti-colonial upsurge.

Rather, a few organisations like the Hillmen’s Association chose a subservient role towards the British regime. They never tired of debunking the nationalist fervour gripping the country, the objective being to curry favour with the imperial government. Even the literary movement launched principally by Parasmani Pradhan remained engrossed in developing the Nepalese culture and language. And the first political outfit in the hills, the All India Gorkha League, also steered clear of the freedom struggle and concentrated instead on the interests of the community.

The loyalty of a large section of the upper middle class and middle class in the hills towards the British crown was evident beyond any question during the times when the freedom struggle in Bengal was showing an extremist penchant. The oppression of the colonial government in course of the Civil Disobedience Movement provoked some Bengali youths associated with a secret society known as the Dhaka Anusilan Samity to make an attempt on the life of the former governor of Bengal, Sir John Anderson, during his stay in Darjeeling, the summer capital of the imperial government, in May 1934. The attempt was, however, unsuccessful.

But before the governor’s arrival and the consequent Lebong Race Course shooting incident, Darjeeling’s local elite presented an address to Anderson assuring him of full loyalty against the tide of extremist forms of nationalism. “We are sure your Excellency will find a congenial atmosphere in the bracing climate of these hills and your Excellency will undoubtedly feel a happy change here, especially after the heated political controversies which characterise life in the plains below. We are not so ambitious as our brethren of the extremist political party in the plains. We assure your Excellency of our readiness to respond to any call on our people at all times and in any emergency,” ran the address.

With the preponderant mood of the elite strongly inclined to the imperial power and the level of the political consciousness of the common people, principally comprising tea plantation labourers and recruits for the military regiments, remaining abysmally undeveloped, it was but natural that the appeal of nationalism was weak in the hills. Some isolated sparks of ascendant nationalism were found here and there, though.

Way back in 1906-07, when the representatives of the hills were busy appealing to the British regime to carve out a separate administrative unit for the Darjeeling hill areas, a few Indian Nepalis participated in the Swadeshi movement, having a connection with the extremist groups in lower Bengal. Even a journal, Gorkha Sathi, was published from Calcutta to spread nationalistic ideas among the Neapli populace. The government later banned it.

When Mahatma Gandhi launched the non-cooperation movement in 1918-19, a galaxy of nationalist figures emerged on the hill horizon. Apart from Dal Bahadur Giri, there were Bhaktavir Lama, popularly known as “Asahayogi Lama”, Agam Singh Giri, Ramchandra Giri, Khargabahadur Bista and Dharanidhar Koirala, who took charge of the anti-colonial movement in the hills.

Two women, Helen Ahmed, a Christian Lepcha from Kurseong, and Mahadevi Chettri, a Nepalese, participated in the national struggle for independence under Gandhi’s leadership.

The national leadership, however, did not take much of an initiative to involve the common people in the nationalist struggle. Some who became leaders came into close contact with the national leadership and tried their best, despite the limited resources, to arouse the nascent spirit of nationalism in the local populace. But the Darjeeling hills were more or less kept out of the tempo of the anti-colonial movement, with the leadership displaying rather inexplicable lethargy in seizing the initiative from the pro-colonial elitists as regards mobilising public opinion in the nationalist direction. No conscious efforts were made to link the anti-colonial struggle with the day-to-day problems of the populace, though grievances were mounting, particularly among the plantation labourers against their exploitation.

Later, the Communist Party of India tapped the fount of grievances with immense dividends.

Things, however, started changing somewhat with the election of Subhas Chandra Bose as president of the Indian National Congress in 1938-39. He appealed to Indian Nepalis in the Darjeeling hills to join him at a meeting of the Bengal Provincial Congress held in Jalpaiguri in 1939. Responding to the appeal, an estimated 1,000 people from remote hill areas enrolled.

That the spirit of nationalism was latent in the subjective world of Indian Nepalis awaiting initiation became evident when the Indian National Army came into being with its appeal to Indian prisoners of war to join the fight for independence. During World War II, when British rule collapsed in Singapore and Burma and the Japanese took control, a large number of the POWs were recruited in the INA and these recruits comprised several Indian Nepali soldiers.

Captain Durga Malla and Major Dal Bahadur Thapa, both from Kalimpong sub-division, were captured, court martialled and then hanged for their participation in the war against the British in Southeast Asia under the INA and its leader, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose. Malla was hanged on 29 August 1944 and Thapa on 9 March 1945, a few months before the historic INA trial started in the Red Fort.

Apart from these two martyrs, there were several Indian Nepali soldiers from Darjeeling, Assam and Dehra Dun who were recruited as INA officers and fought for the country valiantly, like Colonel Dilman Singh Thapa, Dal Singh Rana, Major Puran Singh Khawas and Captain Ram Singh Thakuri.

Special mention must be made of Captain Ram Singh Thakuri, who remains immortal as the military musician for the Azad Hind government-in-exile because of the tunes he set to the INA’s marching songs. These tunes are time- transcending in their electrifying appeal.

Corkha National Liberation Front chief Subash Ghisingh made a significant comment during the nationwide celebration of Subhash Chandra Bose’s centenary in 1997. He said in public that the Indian Gorkha community could forget everything, but would always remember Bose’s peerless struggle for India’s independence.

This outburst of emotion for the revolutionary leader made one thing clear: that if ignited with loving sincerity, the patriotic fervour smouldering in the Indian Gorkha community would have consumed pro-British elitist leanings. It remains a riddle why the community, celebrated for its spirit of loyalty and sacrifice, was left out in the cold when the rest of the country was aroused from the century-long slumber of self-oblivion.

source: Statesman/ Shri Barun Roy

Citizenship to Gorkhas:
High Court asks Centre, EC to file affidavits


Taking up a petition on granting of Indian citizenship to people of Nepal residing in India post January 26, 1950, the Calcutta High Court today directed the Centre to state its position on the matter through an affidavit.

A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice M S Shah and Justice Bhaskar Bhattcharya directed the Centre, Election Commission of India, secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, the West Bengal government and others to file affidavits within four weeks, after which the case would be taken up for hearing.

The direction was passed in response to a PIL filed by Siliguri-based organisation ‘Janachetana’ demanding cancellation of Indian citizenship granted to Gorkhas, who are originally citizens of Nepal, after January 26, 1950.

Petitioner’s counsel Sakya Sen told court that there were two treaties — Britain India Nepal Tripartite Agreement of 1947 and Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 — which stated that Nepalese citizens would enjoy many rights in India if they reside here but would remain citizens of that country in a reciprocal arrangement.

He also said a gazette notification of August 23, 1988, by the Centre had sought to clarify misconceptions regarding citizenship of Gorkhas stating that those who came to India before January 26, 1950, could claim citizenship of the country. Those who came after that date would remain citizens of Nepal. The petitioner claimed that there has been a large influx of Nepali citizens into India, mainly in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts of West Bengal and that they had been “unlawfully” granted electoral rights here.

Sen submitted that there has been a sudden surge in the electoral rolls in these areas and alleged that the Election Commission of India and the State Election Commission had not properly verified the applications for inclusion in the electoral rolls. Admitting the petition, the Division Bench directed that the matter would be heard again on April 9.

source:indian Express/Barun roy

SIKKIM EMBLEM


by Tenzin C. Tashi
source: Proud to be Sikkimese- Shri Shital Pradhan


The ‘Kham-sum-ongdu’, the coat of arms of the Namgyal dynasty melds oriental symbolism with British heraldry. The symbol of religious and political government, the ‘Kham-sum-ongdu’ literally means the conqueror of the three worlds or ‘lokas’, these being:


1. ‘Kama loka’ – the world of sensual pleasure
2. ‘Rupadhatu loka’ – the realm of the material world ...
3. ‘Arupadhatu loka’ – the spiritual world or world of formless spirits

The two griffins symbolise the mythological horse of Indra as well as Tachog Balaha, one of the manifestations of Avalokiteshvara or Chenrezig.

The twelve rings within the shield represent the ‘twelve interdependent contributories of origination of all phenomenon.’

The eight lotus petals symbolize the Eight Fold Path which is to bring peace and harmony to Sikkim.

The helmet, symbolising the defensive force of our land is crested by a conch shell which depicts the propagation of Dharma in Sikkim.

The Kham-sum-ongdu has now been adopted by the Government of Sikkim as its official emblem.

SERIES: HIMALAYAN JOURNALS by Joseph Dalton Hooker – Episode 57 Vol II

COURTESY: SHRI BARUN ROY

THIS SERIES WAS MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH THE CONTRIBUTION OF ABDUL KALAM EZANI

THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE] EXCLUSIVE

HIMALAYAN JOURNALS

JOSEPH DALTON HOOKER, M.D., R.N., F.R.S.

CHOOMBI DISTRICT

On the following morning we proceeded up the valley, towards a very steep rocky barrier, through which the river cut a narrow gorge, and beyond which rose lofty snowy mountains: the peak of Tunkra being to our left hand (north). Saxifrages grew here in profuse tufts of golden blossoms, and _Chrysosplenium,_ rushes, mountain-sorrel (_Oxyria_), and the bladder-headed _Saussurea,_ whose flowers are enclosed in inflated membranous bracts, and smell like putrid meat: there were also splendid primroses, the spikenard valerian, and golden Potentillas.

The ascent was steep and difficult, up a stony valley bounded by precipices; in this the river flowed in a north-west direction, and we were obliged to wade along it, though its waters were bitterly cold, the temperature being 39 degrees. At 15,000 feet we passed from great snowbeds to the surface of a glacier, partly an accumulation of snow, increased by lateral glaciers: its slope was very gentle for several miles; the surface was eroded by rain, and very rough, whilst those of the lateral glaciers were ribboned, crevassed, and often conspicuously marked with dirt-bands.

A gently sloping saddle, bare of snow, which succeeds the glacier, forms the top of the Tunkra pass; it unites two snowy mountains, and opens on the great valley of the Machoo, which flows in a part of Tibet between Sikkim and Bhotan; its height is 16,083 feet above the sea by barometer, and 16,137 feet by boiling-point. Nothing can be more different than the two slopes of this pass; that by which I had come presented a gentle snowy acclivity, bounded by precipitous mountains; while that which opened before me was a steep, rocky, broad, grassy valley, where not a particle of snow was to be seen, and yaks were feeding near a small lake not 1000 feet down. Nor were snowy mountains visible anywhere in this direction, except far to the south-east, in Bhotan. This remarkable difference of climate is due to the southerly wind which ascends the Tibetan or Machoo valley being drained by intervening mountains before reaching this pass, whilst the Sikkim current brings abundant vapours up the Teesta and Lachoong valleys.

Chumulari lies to the E.N.E. of the Tunkra pass, and is only twenty-six miles distant, but not seen; Phari is two marches off, in an easterly direction, and Choombi one to the south-east. Choombi is the general name given to a large Tibetan province that embraces the head of the Machoo river, and includes Phari, Eusa, Choombi, and about thirteen other villages, corresponding to as many districts, that contain from under a dozen to 300 houses each, varying with the season and state of trade. The latter is considerable, Phari being, next to Dorjiling, the greatest Tibetan, Bhotan, Sikkim, and Indian entrepot along the whole Himalaya east of Nepal. The general form of Choombi valley is triangular, the broader end northwards: it is bounded by the Chola range on the west from Donkia to Gipmoochi, and by the Kamphee or Chakoong range to the east; which is, I believe, continuous with Chumulari. These meridional ranges approximate to the southward, so as to form a natural boundary to Choombi. The Machoo river, rising from Chumulari, flows through the Choombi district, and enters Bhotan at a large mart called Rinchingoong, whence it flows to the plains of India, where it is called at Couch-Behar, the Torsha, or, as some say, the Godadda, and falls into the Burrampooter.

The Choombi district is elevated, for the only cultivation is a summer or alpine one, neither rice, maize, nor millet being grown there: it is also dry, for the great height of the Bhotan mountains and the form of the Machou valley cut off the rains, and there is no dense forest. It is very mountainous, all carriage being on men’s and yaks’ backs, and is populous for this part of the country, the inhabitants being estimated at 3000, in the trading season, when many families from Tibet and Bhotan erect booths at Phari.

A civil officer at Phari collects the revenue under the Lhassan authorities, and there is also a Tibetan fort, an officer, and guard. The inhabitants of this district more resemble the Bhotanese than Tibetans, and are a thievish set, finding a refuge under the Paro-Pilo of Bhotan,* [There was once a large monastery, called Kazioo Goompa, at Choombi, with upwards of one hundred Lamas.

During a struggle between the Sikkim and Bhotan monks for superiority in it, the abbot died. His avatar reappeared in two places at once! in Bhotan as a relative of the Paro-Pilo himself, and in Sikkim as a brother of the powerful Gangtok Kajee. Their disputes were referred to the Dalai Lama, who pronounced for Sikkim. This was not to be disputed by the Pilo, who, however, plundered the Goompa of its silver, gold, and books, leaving nothing but the bare walls for the successful Lama! The Lhassan authorities made no attempt to obtain restitution, and the monastery has been consequently neglected.] who taxes the refugees according to the estimate he forms of their plunder. The Tibetans seldom pursue the culprits, as the Lhassan government avoids all interference south of their own frontier.

NEPAL: Madhesis have it far better

NEPAL: Three years later

BY PRASHANT JHA


Madhesis have it far better in January 2010 than in January 2007


By Bikash Rai


This week marked the third anniversary of the Madhes movement. Over three weeks in January 2007, the spontaneous uprising in Tarai rocked the foundation of Nepali state and nationalism, challenged established forces, ensured federalism, and reconfigured politics. At a time when the Madhes is weaker and more fragmented than it has been since then, it would be instructive to look back at the lessons from the plains.

Here is what the Madhesis told the existing Nepali state: change or perish. In specific terms, this meant political representation, substantive inclusion, reframing symbols of nationhood, and treating citizens who wore dhoti, did not know how to speak Nepali, and had kinship links across the border with dignity and not scorn. If the Kathmandu establishment refused to do so, it would cost the state its legitimacy and erode political authority among one third of its own people. Despite the hiccups, resistance by sections in the capital, and the entrenched social prejudices, the Madhes has won this battle politically and intellectually. What remains is transforming it into institutions.

The second message was to the Maoists: beware of what you have unleashed. Though the Maoists had sowed the militant Madhesi consciousness, the movement itself acquired a strong anti-Maoist tilt. This was due to the failure of the Maoists to push for federalism in the interim constitution, the recklessness of the Maoist Madhesi leadership, the class character (mid-sized landlords), political orientation (anti-communist), the caste mix of Madhesi leaders, and the perception that the Maoists were a part of the same Pahadi club.

The Maoists have since become more careful, but a similar pattern of ex-Maoists turning to ethnic radicalism can be discerned in the western Tarai. The Maoists and most Madhesi parties remain at loggerheads, but in some ways their commitment to federalism now makes them natural allies.

The people also gave a clear signal to the Nepali Congress, which the grand old party failed to read: reform or shrink. Instead of making the Madhes agenda its own, the NC misread the public mood entirely and felt that the andolan would only hurt the Maoists. The NC home minister (Krishna Sitaula) was seen to have suppressed the movement.

Leaders like Ram Baran Yadav spent all their time in bashing Madhesi leaders and claiming it was sponsored by reactionaries. And the party was a late and reluctant convert to federalism. The failure to innovate meant life was tough if you were a moderate Madhesi NC leader. This breed, led by Mahant Thakur, waited for a year but then left when the pressure from below became intense. The NC’s rout in the elections was a result of its failure in the Madhes.

But the starkest message was to the new Madhesi political class that had created, and capitalized on the Madhes movement: be inclusive of all communities in Tarai, and fight for us in Kathmandu. Through the past three years, the trend has been that as any Madhesi leader or party has come close to Kathmandu or joined the government, it has lost legitimacy and credibility back home in Tarai.

Instead of using the period to build an organisation, and force issues, the leaders have been extremely amenable to co-option, and making a quick buck by looting the state. A glance through the last names of the martyrs reveals that people of all Hindu castes, Dalits, Muslims. But the structures of the Madhesi parties reveal they adopted exclusivist and discriminatory practices and did with Dalits, Muslims and Tharus what hill elites had done with them. This is why the various communities are now finding their own ways of political articulation.

The last year has not been good for the Madhes. Its most powerful party split. It has been unable to force the vice-president back into his position, and get language rights recognised. Madhesi reactionary leaders who had nothing to do with the movement have been able to corner all the advantages and win a share in the power structure. The distance with the Tharus, who are actually allies in the battle against the old regime, grew. The inclusion bill was never operationalised. And India (by splitting the MJF and not backing the VP) showed that it will happily sacrifice the Madhes if it clashes with its interests at the centre.

But history’s twists and turns should not make us ignore the larger picture. It is far better being a Madhesi in Nepal in January 2010 than it was in January 2007. That is the Madhes movement’s biggest achievement.

SOURCE: nEPALTIMES.COM

Sikh ShaheedNanak Singh’s 2nd Memorial - Keynote speech by Lieutenant General. (Retd) S K Sinha


Lieutenant General S.K Sinha said:

I feel greatly honoured being here to deliver the Second Shaheed Nanak Singh Memorial lecture. Sardar Nanak Singh was a science graduate with a law degree who gave up a career in the Police and joined the Bar to serve the national cause. He became the leading human rights activist of his province and he fearlessly defended the soldiers of Azad Hind forces, for which he suffered reprisals. He believed in the unity of the country and was opposed to Partition. A spirited and dedicated citizen, he made the supreme sacrifice for a noble cause. While trying to save students who had organized a peace march against the division of the country, he was done to death in Multan during the pre Partition communal carnage. A worthy citizen with a worthy name, he sacrificed his life for a worthy cause. Today, while paying my humble tribute to the memory of this great man, I have chosen to speak on Defending India’s Integrity. This is in line with the cause for which Sardar Nanak Singh attained martyrdom.

I belong to a generation which in its early years had been under foreign rule. As a young Army officer connected with combating communal carnage in Punjab during the Partition holocaust, I recall with horror what happened at that time in which millions got killed and millions got uprooted. Jinnah’s obduracy and propagation of two nation theory, fitted well with the policy of Divide and Rule pursued by the British. The communal tornado which raged in the country following Jinnah’s Direct Action Day in Kolkata, made it impossible for the country to hold together. The British now chose to Divide and Quit. Jinnah and his communalists had their way and the country was partitioned. I still recall their slogan of that time, “Hans ke lia hai, Pakistan Larke lenge Hindustan.”

There were many prophets of gloom in 1947. They predicted that India being a multi ethnic, multi lingual and multi religious behemoth could not hold together. On the other hand, they felt that a strong common religious bond will enable Pakistan to remain united, despite the geographical separation of its two wings. They were proved wrong on both counts. For the last over six decades, we have been fighting both external enemies and internal forces of different hues, threatening our national integrity. We have ensured that our nation’s integrity has remained inviolate. This does not mean that we can afford to be complacent. Today, both external and internal threats to our national integrity are greater than ever before. Let us first discuss the dimensions of these threats before considering how we should meet the grave challenges posed by them.

We have chosen a polity which is fundamentally different from our two powerful neighbours, who are both nuclear weapon powers. One has established the dictatorship of the proletariat with one party rule as opposed to our opting for the freedom of the individual and a multi-party system. The other believes in religious fundamentalism and a theocratic State as against our choice of pluralism and a secular polity. These two neighbours have formed a nexus and they are hostile to India. The USA is the lone super power in the world which should be our natural ally because both India and the USA are vibrant democracies. Lately, a strategic consensus has been developing between India and the USA. However, in its national interests the USA has been showing a tilt towards China for economic reasons and towards Pakistan for its support in the war against terror. India must be self reliant in tackling the threats to her national integrity.

China is our big neighbour in the North with whom we share a 4,000 kilometer border in the Himalayas. In the past, the pendulum of power used to be South of the Himalayas but it has now swung decisively to the North. We have an unresolved border dispute with China which led to a war between us in 1962. We suffered a humiliating defeat in that war due to our unpreparedness and the failure of both our political and military leadership. The 1967 artillery duel in Sikkim to an extent restored our prestige. After the famous Mao smile of the Seventies, relationship between our two countries improved and diplomatic relations were restored. Dialogue to resolve the border dispute has continued for the past seventeen years with hardly any progress. However, tranquility has been maintained on the border and there has been no instance of exchange of fire. China’s policy appears to be to keep the borders with India tranquil but not solve the border dispute; trade with India but arm Pakistan. After Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, a marked improvement took place in Sino-Indian relations. China gave up its stand that Sikkim was not a part of India. It now recognized Sikkim as a State within India. Nathu La was opened for trade. Trade between the two countries shot up to 40 US million dollars. Importantly, during Vajpayee’s visit, it was agreed that while delineating the border, inhabited areas will not be disturbed. This implied that there would be no change in the present position of Towang. Despite these positive developments, China has continued with its policy of keeping India locked in South Asia. It has put in place, a string of pearls encircling India. It has established naval bases at Coco Islands in Myanmar, at Hambantola in Sri Lanka and at Gawdar in Pakistan. It has been trying to establish its influence in Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It has been arming Pakistan with both conventional and nuclear weapons. With its encirclement policy, China is trying to chain India like a lion in a cage. Simultaneously, China has tremendously increased its military capability in Tibet. A railway line and an oil pipe line has been constructed from Gormo to Lhasa with the former being extended to the Nepal border. A super East West highway has been constructed in Tibet. Operational airfields, missile bases and logistic dumps have been developed. China has the capability to maintain 24 divisions in Tibet and concentrate such a large force there in two to three weeks. Another point of concern is the Chinese plan to divert the Brahmaputra to feed its arid regions and produce 40,000 MW of electricity. This will have a catastrophic effect on India’s North East. Since 2007 there appears to be a marked downslide in Sino-Indian relations. China has raised the pitch of its rhetoric on Arunachal Pradesh, claiming it to be part of its territory. It has been trying to block Asian Development Bank loan to India. It continues to oppose India’s membership of the Security Council. A think tank in China has advocated steps to disintegrate India, breaking her into several States. Its State controlled newspaper has warned that India should not forget 1962.

Our other powerful neighbour is Pakistan. The origin and history of Pakistan is one of relentless hostility towards India. Pakistanis misread history and fancy themselves as the descendents of the Central Asian conquerors, who in the medieval period, repeatedly invaded and subjugated India. The fact however is that they are the descendents of the indigenous people who converted to Islam. Their romanticized view of martial superiority received a setback in 1947 when Pakistan could not grab Srinagar and the Valley, a big jolt in 1965 when their aggression was defeated and got shattered by a humiliating surrender in 1971. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto talked of one thousand years war with India. Realising that India could not be defeated in a conventional war Zia-ul-Haq adopted the strategy of thousand cuts to bleed India to death in Kashmir. And today Zardari talks of one thousand years of war on ideology over Kashmir. Having failed to achieve this goal in Kashmir, Pakistan has now extended its terrorist attacks to the metropolitan cities of India. The macabre drama in Mumbai on 26/11 was the mother of terror attacks. It humbled our Nation like the debacle in 1962 had done. With US assistance, Pakistan organized the Taliban which captured power in Afghanistan and forced the Soviet Union out of that country. Encouraged by Taliban’s success in Afghanistan, Pakistan started large scale cross border terrorism in Kashmir. Pakistan has become the epicentre of terrorism in the world. Forced by the US to join the war against terror, Pakistan Army has now been fighting the Taliban. This has invited the wrath of the latter. Suicide bombings leading to large scale casualties have become a daily routine in Pakistan. The political, economic and security scenario in Pakistan is very volatile. Despite all their assurances, there can no guarantee that its nuclear arsenal will not fall into the hands of the Jihadis. A major portion of Pakistan Army is now deployed on its Western border. This has weakened Pakistan’s military capability on its eastern border with India. Pakistan Army is too embroiled on its western border and in dealing with terrorist violence in its mainland, to undertake any military offensive against India. Yet with US assistance it continues to strengthen its military with modern weapons, in preparation for a showdown with India. In case India forces a war on Pakistan, the terrorists and the Taliban, who have been nursed as strategic assets by Pakistan Army, are likely to sink their differences and join in a common Jihad against India.

Our other neighbours do not have the capability to pose a viable military threat to our country. However, Nepal and Bangladesh can cause security concerns. Nepal is facing a period of turmoil with Maoists gaining considerable strength. They make no secret of their anti-India stand. It is a pity that at one stage our Government had outsourced our foreign policy in Nepal to our Communists. The growing power of Maoists and the increased Chinese influence in Nepal, adversely affect Indias’s security interests. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujeebur Rahman, Bangladesh’s relations with India became increasingly sour. The demographic invasion from Bangladesh continued unabated. Indian insurgent groups of the North East were given asylum and assistance in Bangladesh. The intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the ISI and the DGSI, provided them support. With growing religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh, Jihadis from that country found the environment friendly to launch terrorist attacks in India. During her first tenure as Prime Minister, Sheikh Haseena could do little to alter the situation because of her slender majority and political compulsions. With her recent landslide victory in the last elections giving her a massive mandate, she has been trying to alter course of Bangladesh. She is taking action against religious fundamentalists in her country and trying to improve relations with India. The recent handing over of the President of ULFA, the leading insurgent outfit of North East, who had been living in Bangladesh for the last thirty years, shows a marked change of policy towards India. This is a most welcome development. Our other two land neighbours are Bhutan and Myanmar. The former has been our most friendly neighbour who has always supported us at all international forums. The former King introduced democracy in the country which now has a constitutional monarchy. Bhutan has political stability. Myanmar has been under military rule. India’s sympathy for the jailed popular leader and Nobel peace laureate, Aung Syi , has been the cause for official relations between the two countries not being too cordial. Chinese influence has been growing in Myanmar. Our only maritime neighbour is Sri Lanka. The recent wiping out of the LTTE in that country has been a welcome development. However, unless the Tamil problem is solved politically, peace and normalcy may be elusive in that country.

I have tried to give a broad brush resume of the situation in our bordering countries. China and Pakistan pose serious threats to our national integrity. Besides external threats, we also face serious internal threats. These are from secessionism and terrorism of both Jihadi and Naxal variety.

Secessionist movements erupted in the North East starting with Nagaland in 1956. This was followed by insurgency in Manipur, Mizoram and Tripura. These have been basically tribal insurgencies. Culturally and historically, the tribes in the North East had not been assimilated with the rest of India. The population of these areas is sparse and these regions are in the remote fringe areas on the border. Naga insurgency has been dormant for the last thirteen years with cease fire holding. Hopefully a peaceful solution may emerge in due course. Over two decades ago, insurgency came to an end in Mizoram with a political settlement. Today, Mizoram is the most peaceful State in the North East. The violence in Tripura is more in the nature of ethnic conflict between the tribal population and the immigrants from erstwhile East Pakistan in the wake of Partition. The original inhabitants have been reduced to a minority in the State. The ongoing militancy in Manipur is a matter of concern. Today, Manipur is the most disturbed State in the North East.

The ULFA insurgency in the Brahmaputra Valley in Assam has been the most serious such movement in the North East. The population of Assam is more than double the combined population of the six remaining States of the North East. With its oil and tea wealth, Assam is economically much richer than these States. Abutting on the narrow Siliguri corridor, Assam provides the only land link from our mainland to the large land mass in the North East. I was Governor of Assam for six years. When I assumed that office in 1997, militancy was at its peak in the State. We managed to turn round the situation with a three prong strategy of unified command, economic development and psychological initiatives. Unified command ensured that the Army, the Para Military and the Police worked as complementary rather than competing forces. Intensified and coordinated operations broke the back of ULFA militancy. The militants suffered heavy casualties and a large number surrendered with weapons. The final blow was delivered by the Bhutanese Army. The militant camps in the bordering jungles of Bhutan were wiped out. As part of economic development, we installed one lakh shallow tube wells in the Brahmaputra Valley, turning Assam from a rice deficit to a rice surplus State. The influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh had been the root cause for insurgency in Assam. I took up this matter in my 42 page printed report to the President. It was serialised and published in full in every newspaper of Assam. This had a very healthy impact in winning over the people. We projected the three icons of Assam, the great spiritual leader Mahapurush Shankardev, the great warrior Lachit Borphukan and the great statesman Lokpriya Gopinath Bordoloi as our national heroes. Lachit’s statue was installed at the National Defence Academy, and a gold medal instituted in his name. Bordoloi was posthumously awarded the Bharat Ratna, fifty years after his death. I declared that my aim was to make the people of Assam proud of their past and the rest of India proud of Assam. All this led to spectacular results isolating the militants from the people. Over a period of time, 81 ULFA militants were apprehended by villagers in rural areas. Half of them were lynched and the remainder handed over to the Police. Surrenders of ULFA militants started being watched appreciatively by the local people. By 2003 ULFA militancy was virtually over. Unfortunately, on account of a policy of appeasement and vote bank politics, pressure on ULFA was called off and they were allowed to rest and regroup. ULFA violence again started but now it lacked popular support, as in earlier days. Lately through military operations much attrition has been inflicted on ULFA. Its top leadership is in disarray and its President, Arbind Rajkhowa who had been operating from Bangladesh for thirty years, is now in our custody.

Religious fundamentalism has been the basic cause for the secessionist movement in Jammu and Kashmir. Militancy in that State has been a mix of terrorism, insurgency and proxy war. Kashmir has been an international hotspot ever since 1947, embroiled in the coils of the then prevailing Cold War. I moved from Assam to Kashmir in 2003 and was Governor of that State for five years till 2008. We tried out the same three pronged strategy that had worked in Assam. We reduced the level of violence from an average of 10 a day to 1 a day. We tried to woo the separatists with massive doses of economic aid. We installed one thousand micro hydel projects based on water mills. Each of these produced 5 to 8 megawatt of electricity. Villages on the mountains which had not seen an electric bulb now had 30 to 40 light points. By day, the power could be used for grinding corn or operating loom. As part of psychological initiatives, we launched a big campaign to promote Kashmiriyat. This stands for amity and brotherhood across religious divide. Religious fundamentalism has got too deep rooted amongst the intelligentsia in the Valley and their Pakistan connection has become too strong.

Thus we could not achieve the same amount of success as in Assam. Our major weakness in Kashmir has been on the media front. Margaret Thatcher once said that the media is the oxygen for the terrorists. The Valley media spewing venom against India has a free run and hardly any attempt is made to counter the baseless anti-India propaganda by separatists and unscrupulous politicians. Thus a total non-issue of constructing temporary prefabricated shelters on100 acres of land, traditionally used to put up tents for pilgrims, was projected as an attempt to change the demography of the Valley. A communal tornado was raised on this issue leading to a prominent Indian journalist and some human rights activists, advocating that India should pull out from the Valley. Similarly the recent Shopian case in which two young women had drowned in a river was falsely projected as a case of rape and murder by Security Forces, to generate anti India feelings. Through such tactics, life in the Valley is often brought to a standstill by widespread agitation for weeks as happened during the Amarnath and Shopian agitations.

Jihadi terrorism in Kashmir commands a certain amount of sympathy from the local people, but it is a different story elsewhere in the country, where it has no popular support except from some sleeper cells. In the last few years, city after city in the country has suffered Jihadi terrorism sponsored from Pakistan. The 26/11 Mumbai terror attack was the most recent and most devastating in this series. Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed the master mind behind 26/11 had spoken on November 3, 2000, “ Jihad is not about Kashmir only. Fifteen years ago people would have found it ridiculous if someone had told them about the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Insha Alla, today I announce the break up of India. We will not rest till the whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan.” While repeated terrorist attacks were taking place against our cities, the Government had been pathetically ineffective in dealing with the menace. It lacked the political will because of its anxiety to keep its vote bank intact. The horrendous Mumbai episode forced it to change course.

The other type of terrorism we face is of the Left extreme variety - the Naxal or Maoist terrorism. The Prime Minister has referred to it as the most serious security challenge facing the country. 20 States, 233 districts and 2000 Police Stations in the country are affected by this menace. The Naxal movement is led by people totally dedicated to the teachings of Marx and Mao. They have been able to gain the support of the backward and deprived people, particularly the tribals, promising them an El Dorado. A Red corridor has been established from the borders of Nepal through Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chattisgarh, and Madhya Pradesh to Andhra Pradesh. The thickly forested area of 7000 square miles, mostly in Chattisgarh, with a population of 20,000 tribal people in 237 villages has become a Naxal haven. They call this a liberated zone where they run a parallel government, administering justice through public courts. Through extortion from businessmen, contractors and even government officials, they manage to raise 500 to 700 crores a year. They have been able to acquire a formidable array of weapons and explosives. Their total strength is estimated to be 20,000 underground and 50,000 over ground workers. They have been carrying out spectacular strikes like looting a district police armoury in Orissa and carrying away 500 rifles, and attacking a district jail in Bihar in broad daylight rescuing their colleagues as also releasing other prisoners. They have also been holding up prestigious railway trains like Rajdhani Express in West Bengal besides attacking railway stations and police stations in different States. Of course all this has not happened overnight. This has been happening over a period of years. Primarily due to bad governance, the State has not been able to prevent all this and has allowed the grass to grow under its feet.
Having discussed at length the external and internal threats to our national integrity, I shall now discuss the strategy that we need to adopt. Before doing so, I must mention that we as a nation suffer from the dead weight of history. We succumbed repeatedly to invaders during the millennium before Independence. Possibly, the Panipat syndrome of unpreparedness and lack of strategic vision continues to remain in our genes. This has got compounded by vote bank politics and policy of appeasement in dealing with security issues. Political parties have been colluding with illegal migration from Bangladesh. The Government has been soft in tackling Jihadi terrorism. Similarly attempt is being made to resolve the Kashmir issue through a policy of appeasement by providing bounty for families of terrorists killed in encounters and the possibility of further loosening the political links of the State with the Centre. All this only whets the appetite of the separatists. Obama is learning to his cost that terrorists cannot be won over by appeasing their co-religionists. His appeasing speech at Cairo and Istambul had no influence over Al Qaeda as shown by the suicide bomber in the airliner over Detroit on last Christmas day. American military thinker, George Tanham was not wrong when he wrote that India does not have a strategic doctrine.

We have been facing threats from Pakistan since 1947 and from China since mid fifties. We have to work on a two front strategy but we have never tried to force a two front strategy on Pakistan. During the 1965 and 1971 wars, we did not activate Pakistan’s western border, even when we had a friendly Government in Kabul. We did not have a deep strike capability across the desert, either in 1965 or 1971, to attack Pakistan’s vulnerable road and rail communication in Sindh, not far from the border. Our thinking has been defensive mired in ditch cum bund, in the Punjab. In Kashmir we ignored scope for offensive in Gilgit Baltistan area where local discontent with Pakistan could be exploited. We ignored Sardar Patel’s warning in 1950, about the threat arising from the Chinese occupation of Tibet. We paid dearly for this in 1962. Even today while China has been feverishly increasing its military capability in Tibet and building elaborate infrastructure, we have done little to improve our capability in the Himalayas. Recently a retired Naval Chief has stated that we cannot match Chinese naval might and our Air Chief has expressed concern over the fact that our Air Force is one third the size of the Chinese Air Force. For nearly thirty years we have been trying to acquire self propelled medium artillery but have so far not been able to do so. The acquisition of tanks, submarines and fighter planes has also been similarly delayed. For the past many years, 30% of funds allocated for modernization of our Defence Forces, remain unutilized due to our archaic and cumbersome procedures. China with an economy three times as large as India’s has been spending 4.3% of its GDP on Defence, while we spend less than 3% of our GDP on Defence. After the Kargil war, the then Government had approved the recommendations of the working group for reorganizing our higher defence command. Even after ten years, the crucial recommendation for one point military advice has not yet been implemented. We have a headless integrated defence staff without a Chief of Defence Staff. A cosmetic integration of Services Headquarters with Ministry of Defence has been carried out, which does not serve much purpose. It is imperative that our shortcomings in Defence preparedness be removed on a war footing.
We do not need to go in for an arms race with China and try to equal its military capability. An attacker needs a three to one superiority. In the mountains, this ratio should preferably be even higher. We must have at least half if not a little more of China’s military strength in the Himalayas, to deter military aggression. It is true that 2010 is not 1962 but we must not permit too big an asymmetry between Chinese and our military capability in the Himalayas. We also need to break the Chinese encircling strategy by reaching out to countries in the region like, Iran, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Viet Nam. We must have a strong Blue Water Navy to dominate the Indian Ocean. In so far as Pakistan is concerned, we must ensure that we have an edge over Pakistan at all times both in conventional and nuclear weapons. We should force a two front strategy on Pakistan. In case of aggression by Pakistan we should have the capability for a counter offensive causing maximum damage where it hurts most.

Secessionist threats in the North East have to be tackled through inflicting maximum attrition on the militants. Concurrently through economic development and psychological initiatives, the militants should be isolated from the people. We need to win hearts and minds as was successfully demonstrated in Assam. As for the secessionist movement in Kashmir, apart from containing violence we need to give priority to media management for effectively countering anti-India propaganda. Policy of appeasement must be shunned as that only whets the appetite of separatist. The decision to provide bounty for the families of militants killed in encounters in Kashmir was unfortunate. Jammu and Kashmir has already got more autonomy than other States in the country. We should not in the name of more autonomy dangerously weaken the State’s political links with the Centre. The solution of Jammu and Kashmir should not be Kashmir centric. It has to be Jammu and Kashmir centric. The LOC should be made into an international border. Trade and cultural relations as also co-operation in disaster and environment management, on either side of the LOC should be encouraged.

For the past many years, little was being done to tackle Jihadi terrorism on our mainland or to tackle Naxal terrorism. Under a new dispensation in the Home Ministry, dynamism has been introduced in our approach to these problems. The setting up of National Investigating Agency, National Counter Terrorism Centre and enacting special law, are all steps in the right direction. It is fortunate that there has been no major terrorist attack in any of our cities after 26/11. Naxal terrorism is now being tackled vigorously. Violence has to be countered with violence but at the same time, equal if not greater vigour should be displayed in implementing development plans in the affected regions. The Police and the Paramilitary must be provided modern weapons. Concurrently Police reforms should be carried out to prevent politicization of the Police. The Police Station is the cutting edge of the Police administration. It has remained most neglected. We need to put an end to this. The number of Police stations has to be increased substantially and so must and the quality of manpower and facilities for them.

In conclusion, I submit that a strong India capable to counter all the external and internal threats to her integrity, is the need of the hour. This will also be the best tribute we can pay to the memory of the great patriot, Sardar Nanak Singh, who sacrificed his life for the country. India has been a land of peace. In thousands of years of our history we have never committed military aggression against any country. We do not covet any territory and we would like to uphold peace in our region. Ashoka the Great carried out his unmatched policy of peace from a position of great military strength. Our efforts to promote peace from a position of military weakness landed us in great trouble in 1962. While we should concentrate on making ourselves strong to deal with security threats, we need simultaneously to make every effort to promote peace. I am glad that Dr Rami Ranger, the worthy son of Sardar Nanak Singh, has set up a forum to promote friendship between India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. I wish him and his colleagues success in this noble endeavor.

source:The Sikh Times

Merger is the only solution for both Sikkim and Darjeeling people

Sikkim-Darjeeling United Front formed

20 Jan, Gangtok: The two allies Gorkha National Congress and the Sikkim Jan Shakti Party have together come under one dictum raising the slogans for merger of Sikkim and Darjeeling. While interviewing with the press in the capital today the duo associates has given birth to separate body “Sikkim-Darjeeling united Front” which spearheads under the president ship of DK Bomjan, is told. The formation of new Front would be pressurizing state government for formulating official ground for merger of Sikkim and Drajeeling. While addressing to a media President Bomjon said that the state of Sikkim should seek for its fragmented geographical boundry with the WB government as well as centre for which centre probably would take some reasonable steps. The people of both the territories have an ethnic ties even after the separation during the colonial regime but after the separation ties gradually disintegrated with time, he said. It is not a Gorkha thing but it’s all about safe guard of people of both the places, no matter tomorrow the people may have to wander like a refugee in own homeland if immediately things are not sorted out.
The newly formed body would effortlessly work to make the slogan more focused among the mass by penetrating to each and every corners within various places inside Sikkim. While talking to the media Vice President Niren Rai GNC stressed that today Darjeeling stands alone in own homeland after separation from Sikkim in the history. The movement of Sikkim Darjeeling United Front will voice the concern to all walks of people of Sikkim, is said.

Tibet: Connectivity, Capabilities and Consequences

P. Stobdan

January 9, 2009


Since 1951, China had fueled massive economic investment in Tibet. In recent decades, infrastructure assumed the salience in China’s Tibet strategy, especially under its ‘Go West’ policy, launched by Jiang Zemin in 2000. The stated goal was to usher Tibet into an era of modernity and prosperity. The policy gained more urgent priority since 2003 when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao showed greater commitment to make Tibet a part of China’s economic miracle. The 1,100 kilometer railway to Lhasa that cost $4.2 billion has symbolized China’s success in Tibet. Even the Indian Defence Minister Mr. A K Antony accepted the fact that there was no comparison of such development on the Indian side, when he visited a forward location in December 2007.

In 2007, China’s State Council had approved 180 projects for Tibet that would cost over 770 billion yuan ($10.2) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan. Reports suggest that more than 77 percent projects have already commenced. According to the Tibet Autonomous Regional Development and Reform Commission, over 200 billion Yuan were spent during the year 2008.

On October 14, 2008, Chinese military engineers and workers began digging a tunnel in Tibet’s Galung La Mountain in Nyingchi Prefecture to build the most difficult highway to China’s last road-less Medog County that borders Arunachal Pradesh. China’s state media prominently highlighted the significance of the 141 km long road connecting Medog with Tibet’s main East-West highway. The project will be completed by 2010.

The great concern for India is the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP), also known as the ‘Great Western Line’. The project is worth China’s $60 billion that aims to divert more than 40 billion cubic meters of water annually from China’s longest river, the Yangtze, and its tributaries through a tunnel under the Yellow River to northern China. The initial phase is expected to be ready by 2010. But a section of the route has already been used for meeting the water requirements during the Beijing Olympics. The initial two routes of the project will take water from the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze basin through the Yellow River to Beijing, Tianjin, and other booming cities in the north. The third route plans to divert waters from Tibet’s Yalong, Dadu and Jinsha rivers to the northern plains. The Brahmaputra project forms the second phase of the third route. The project was envisaged on the assumption that by 2030 the Yangtze basin will not have sufficient water for transfer to the north. The major concern here is: why is China going ahead with the SNWTP if there is inadequate water available for rerouting?

The project’s aim is to divert the Tsangpo at the Shoumatan Point (the ‘Big U-turn’) for constructing the world’s largest hydroelectric plant at the knick-zone to generate 40,000 Megawatts of electricity, and for diverting 200 billion cubic meters of water annually to the arid north. The project will involve enormous engineering complexity on the scale of the Tibet railway system and the Three Gorges dam. Media reports also suggest China’s proposal to use nuclear explosives to blast a 15 kilometer tunnel at the U-turn.

The great challenge for India regarding the project is that India has no water sharing treaty with China. China has rarely bothered to share information prior to flood situations. As a result India often becomes vulnerable to environmental threats. Also, there is no record of China consulting the lower riparian states before undertaking construction of dams upstream.

As the economies of India and China grow, both are going to compete not only for oil and gas but also for water resources. One can conclude that China as the upstream state would treat water as a strategic commodity.

Points raised during the Discussion

China is unwilling to discuss the issue with India at the bilateral level.
There is a need to discuss water diversion by China at the United Nations and the issue also needs to be brought before the International Court of Justice.
The potential impact on India of China blocking the Brahmaputra river needs to be examined.
Prepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

source: IDSA.

IDSA COMMENT :Chinese Checkers in the Himalayas
Sikkim in picture
by ; P. Stobdan

June 13, 2008 reprint

In a disturbing sign, the Chinese seem to have brought up Sikkim and not Arunachal Pradesh back to the table during the recent visit of Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to China. The belief was that China had implicitly recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim in 2003, and as such there was no dispute on the matter with China. China’s recognition of Sikkim was interpreted as a quid pro quo for India’s recognition of total Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in 2003.

In an article in the Indian Express on October 6, 2004, this author had argued that Beijing – even after the 2003 commitment – maintains the position that Sikkim is a historical issue between India and China and ‘‘hopes’’ it will be resolved as bilateral relations improve. That though the Chinese have not yet raised the border issue in the Sikkim portion, they might bring it up in future. And that, the recognition of Sikkim as a part of India will depend on the demarcation of the boundary to the satisfaction of the Chinese. Similarly, the trade agreement between Sikkim and Tibet is also without prejudice to the status of Sikkim.

The Sino-Indian relationship, with a strategic dimension since 2005, has progressed by leaps and bounds, pushing the trajectory of trade growth currently at $40 billion and now set to hit $60 billion by 2010. But will it withstand the strains of repeated Chinese frowns at the border? New Chinese provocations have come since July 2007, ranging from the demolition of Indian forward posts in North Sikkim, objection to Indian troops’ deployment in the Siliguri Corridor, objection to the Prime Minister’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, cyber intrusion on Indian computer networks, laying a fresh claim in “Finger Area” and now expressing “unhappiness” over India reopening its airbase at Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh.

Why does China play checkers, when India has been going out of its way to save Beijing from facing embarrassing prospects over the Olympics torch relay? China surprised India by laying claim to the 2.1 square kilometre “Finger Area” in Sikkim and threatened to demolish the stone cairns, usually fiddled only by rustling Yaks.

On Tibet, India was fulfilling its commitment, but China almost expressed contempt for India and its democratic form of government; peremptorily summoned the Indian Ambassador in the middle of the night and threatened to withdraw the Olympic torch if India cannot ensure its security. It wanted India to crack down on the Tibetans and even specified the type of security that should be adopted for the relay. These events ominously gave an impression that the government had waffled on its Tibet policy and was bending over backwards to please the Chinese. The debate over the Indian response contrasted from being totally meek to a sharp display of realpolitik maturity. Op-ed contributors thought Mukherjee’s warning to the Dalai Lama had diminished India as a democracy and made everyone “feel small”. Nearly everyone empathised with the Tibetans, but at the same time realised the inability to offend China. Chinese could correctly assess the Indian public mood. For they know for sure that New Delhi has a soft government with its foreign office not willing to take a confrontationist line, its military not in a mood to fight, a large section of its political class, across party lines, amenable for concessions to China, and most importantly Indian intellectuals, including think-tanks, have become ardent aficionados or acolytes of China.

On this score, even the Dalai Lama should now gracefully accept defeat, collect his passport from Chanakya Puri and return to Lhasa for he should know that the answers for his problems lie in Beijing and not in New Delhi or in Western capitals. After all, he also knows that the religion he practices, though it came from India, the same lineage and tradition also prevails in China. The ultimate salvation for the Tibetans naturally lies not in the West but in the East. The Dalai, so far, has successfully played the democracy and human rights game, and in the process inflicted enough damage on China. It is now time for him to reconcile with China and take up a larger responsibility for the revival and restoration of Buddhism in China. India could potentially moderate his future plan but now lacks a sense of imagination. After all, Buddhism is no longer on India’s agenda after Nehru’s death. In fact, it is China which is fast assuming the leadership role of the Buddhist world. Therefore, it is not too late for the Dalai Lama to quickly resume his traditional “Priest” role for China, at least for the Dhamma’s sake. And, in the process, if he can revive the spiritual bonds among Indian, Chinese, Tibetans, and rest of the Asians, then possibly he would have achieved the task of laying the foundation for a new architecture of peace and destiny in Asia.

Mukherjee’s visit also clearly indicates that we have not gained any leverage in Beijing for our handling of Tibetan protests. Instead, the Chinese look more belligerent and claim fresh areas. Clearly, China seems to be making a dubious shift in its position. China has been aiming to snatch Tawang if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh through negotiation, but now understands the difficulty stemming from the Indian domestic angle. The pleading by Chinese leaders to make Tawang an exception is well known. But now knowing that this is unattainable, Beijing is possibly resorting to another trick by reopening the Sikkim card as a leverage to pressurise India over Tawang. They may be intending to withhold formal recognition of India’s sovereignty and say – give us Tawang or face new consequences in Sikkim. Recall the PLA-owned think tank’s latest article A warning to the Indian Government: Don’t be Evil, which warned India to stay away from the “path of confrontation” and not to “misjudge the situation”.

The PLA has started using the Tibet railway since December 2007 and is steadily ramping up its military infrastructure (road, rail and air) capabilities in Tibet close to the Indian border for dual usage. The Tibet crisis and India’s acquiescence may have emboldened the Chinese to further assert the point that Tibet is incomplete without Tawang and that it is crucial for Tibet’s security. Beijing could bring up fresh obstacles. A case is being built up that internationally branded terrorists are active on Indian soil. Beijing will next ask New Delhi to dismantle the Dalai Lama’s Dharamsala set-up. The PLA may even be contemplating a limited military pursuit to capture Tawang, while India still thinks that China’s position in Tibet is tenuous. They have been cautioning New Delhi on Arunachal Pradesh and very soon they would say – we had warned you before!

The External Affair Minister’s visit to China has not broken any new ground. Beijing seems to have given a snub to Mukherjee by cancelling his planned meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao. But significantly he has not allowed Beijing to set its agenda on Sikkim. The progress on our concern over the trans-Himalayan Rivers is also little. So, was the visit only about aid diplomacy to deliver relief materials worth $5 million to quake victims in Sichuan? We could have done this better through spiritual diplomacy.

On Tibet, Mukherjee seems to have got a pat on his back but the Chinese leadership was probably not happy with Indian media coverage of the Dalai Lama. Mukherjee may have reiterated India’s position on Tibet, though it is not clear whether the phrase Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is being used.

All in all, the visit appeared as a bit of a disappointment with no substantive breakthrough being made on any of the controversial issues. The Chinese, on the other hand, visibly appeared reluctant to move ahead in a positive way and keen to play checkers with India.

India needs to be watchful of China’s moves in South Asia. In Pakistan, Chinese firms are constructing a hydro project on the Neelam River in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Their profile is ever growing in Nepal. In Sri Lanka, China has surpassed India and Japan by providing $1 billion in aid with no strings attached. After Gwadar, it is building a port in Sittwe (Myanmar) and one at Hambantota (Sri Lanka). Reports suggest that Chinese weapons are pouring into the Northeastern states. The news channels splashed fresh satellite images of China building a major underground nuclear submarine base on Hainan to control the Indian Ocean Region.

Given China’s unpredictable behaviour, it would be too early to drop one’s guard. Instead, India should exploit the current window of opportunity and assert its position before it gets closed once the Olympics are over. The reopening of Daulat Beg Oldi is a thoughtful and an unusually sharp decision. We should consolidate our position further and reopen Chushul and Fukche.

India could also reopen the issue of Skasgyam Valley, ceded to China by Pakistan. And, if Chinese continue to make diversionary moves, India should reclaim the ownership of Minser Enclave, composing of several villages, located inside Tibet on the bank of Mount Kailash. Minser was a sovereign part of India until mid-1960s, which New Delhi forgot about due to apathy and it deserves a revisit before the final boundary settlement.

SIKKIM:Nathu La: Pass To Prosperity But Also A Challenge


by Pushpita Das

Reprint

Nathu La, identified as the third mountain pass for border trade between India and China, is officially slated to open on July 6, 2006 after a gap of 44 years. Previous attempts to open the border pass had to be postponed due to lack of proper infrastructure. This time around, the infrastructure from the Indian side is complete. A field visit to Nathu La on June 25, 2006 revealed that the approach road has been constructed. And the warehouses, customs and administrative offices, banks etc. at Sherathang, the designated trade mart situated 5 km from Nathu La, have been completed.

Nathu La, situated at 14,420 feet was an offshoot of the ancient Silk Route, which connected India with China, the Middle East and Europe. It was thus once a part of the thriving Indo-Tibetan trade accounting for 80 per cent of the border trade between India and China at the start of the 20th century. The British even envisaged constructing a rail line from Siliguri to Chumbi Valley to facilitate greater border trade between India and Tibet. The border trade was, however, discontinued following the 1962 border war between India and China. With the thawing of relations between the two countries, hopes for the resumption of trade through Nathu La were once again generated. Sikkim, the State adversely affected due to the stopping of the border trade, forcefully advocated for its resumption.

The opening of Nathu La represents the culmination of a process of resumption of border trade between India and China that began in December 1991. On July 1, 1992, both countries signed a Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade. Border trade between India and China resumed in 1992-93, when two mountain passes at Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh and Lipu Lekh in Uttaranchal were opened. In June 2003, a MoU was signed between the two countries to resume border trade between Sikkim and Tibet. According to the MoU, Changgu in Sikkim and Renqinggang in Tibet Autonomous Region were designated as trade markets for India and China respectively. Nathu La was identified as the border pass for the entry and exit of persons, means of transport and commodities engaged in border trade. Both sides agreed to trade in 44 items (29 from export list and 15 from import list), which have been included in the border trade agreements of 1991, 1992 and 2003. Initially the trade will be tightly controlled, with just 60 vehicles and 100 traders allowed to pass through. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force will escort the Chinese traders and goods from Nathu La till Sherathang.

The border trade through Shipki La and Lipu Lekh did not provide any impetus to trade and commerce in the region. The importance of Nathu La, on the contrary, is believed to be immeasurable. The State government even constituted a Study Group headed by Mahendra P Lama of the Jawaharlal Nehru University to study the prospects of border trade. The Report of the Study Group titled, "Nathu La Trade: Prospects, Potentials and Opportunities," which was submitted on September 2005, had an optimistic tenor. According to the report, the opening of the trade route through Nathu La would not only benefit the landlocked state of Sikkim but also its adjoining regions like the North East Region and West Bengal. It suggested that trade though Nathu La should be integrated with movements of tourists and that a bus service between Gangtok and Lhasa should be started. The report also envisioned that border trade would transform Sikkim into a dry port and Siliguri in West Bengal into a major trading centre. If China avails the port facilities of Kolkata and Haldia, which are nearer to the southern and western regions of China, it would not only help cut its transportation costs but at the same benefit Kolkata and Haldia immensely. The report estimated that the trade volume would reach Rs. 353 crores by 2010 and by 2020 it would be approximately Rs. 573 crores.

The reopening of the Nathu La for border trade is seen as part of a greater confidence building measure between India and China. It would underscore China's policy of recognizing Sikkim as a constituent state of India. In his address to the Parliament in 2003, Atal Behari Vajpayee had said that the MoU on border trade through Nathu La in Sikkim was a significant development and "with this a process had started by which Sikkim would cease to be an issue in India-China relations." Economically, the benefits accruing to Sikkim are estimated to be immense. According to Chief Minister Pawan Kumar Chamling, the expected revenue generation from toll tax and license fee would be Rs. 81 lakhs for each of the first five years and is expected to go up to Rs. 3 crores. He also stated that revenue from tourists visiting Sheathing and Nathu La would be Rs. 181 lakhs and is expected to go up to Rs. 347 lakhs by 2010.

In the midst of the euphoria, a few voices of apprehension can also be heard. The general population of Sikkim appears to be sceptical about the benefits of the resumption of border trade. They feel that it would simply legalise the smuggling of goods, which has hitherto been carried out via Nepal. They fear that instead of Bagdogra and Siliguri, now Gangtok would be flooded with Chinese goods. As far as employment generation is concerned, a few hoteliers and transporters seem enthusiastic about the reopening of Nathu La. The local population, on the other hand, sees more opportunities in the tourism sector than in border trade. Moreover, border trade would initially benefit only the residents of the East Sikkim district (especially Bhutias), since only they will be allowed to trade with their Tibetan counterparts.

The people of Sikkim are also apprehensive that opening of the border pass would lead to a massive influx of Tibetan refugees. There is simmering resentment among the people of Sikkim towards the Tibetans. It is believed that during the late 1950s and early 1960s, substantial Tibetans crossed over to India and settled in Sikkim. In due course of time, they added "Bhutia" to their names and started availing the reservations facilities extended to the scheduled tribes of the state. Since the Tibetans were better educated compared to the local Bhutias, they were able to grab top positions in government as well as in other economic and social spheres.

In addition, a substantial influx of Tibetan refugees can also have adverse political implications. Sikkim is a small state with a population of approximately 5 lakhs. It has 32 constituencies with about 18,000 persons in each. Even a small addition of Tibetans to the voter's list can alter the political destiny of the state. Even if the security arrangements and the terrain around the border pass do not facilitate large scale Tibetan infiltration, complacency in guarding the borders can cost us dearly. The case of Bangladeshi refugees and illegal migrants do serve a good example to assess the impact of illegal migrants both in socio-economic and political life of the border states of India. The opening of the border pass can usher in an era of prosperity, but India should be prepared to meet the challenges it might pose in maintaining the peace and tranquillity of the strategically sensitive border regions.

Israel, Turkey and Low Seats


January 18, 2010 | 1854 GMT
By George Friedman

Last week a small crisis with potentially serious implications blew up between Israel and Turkey. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon summoned Turkish Ambassador to Israel Ahmet Oguz Celikkol to a meeting Jan. 11 to protest a Turkish soap opera that depicted Israeli agents kidnapping Palestinian children. When the ambassador arrived, he received a lower seat than Ayalon — and was photographed in that position, making it appear that Ayalon was speaking to an inferior. Ayalon wouldn’t shake hands with him during the televised parts of the meeting, and had an Israeli flag visible on the table. Topping it all off, Ayalon told an Israeli cameraman in Hebrew that the important thing was that people see Celikkol sitting down low “while we’re up high.”

Related Special Topic Page
Turkey’s Re-Emergence
Turks saw the images as a deliberate Israeli insult, though Ayalon argued that the episode was not meant as an insult but as a reminder that Israel does not take criticism lightly. While it is difficult to see the relative height of seats as an international incident, Ayalon clearly intended to send a significant statement to Turkey. The Turks took that statement to heart, so symbolism clearly matters. Israel’s intent is not so clear, however.

Turkey and Israeli National Security
Over the past year, Turkey has become increasingly critical of Israel’s relations with the Arab world. Turkey has tried to mediate, for example, between Syria and Israel. Now, Turkey has made it known that it holds Israel responsible for these failures. Even so, Turkey remains Israel’s major ally, albeit informally, in the Muslim world. Turkey is also a growing power. Uniquely in the region, it provides Israel with a dynamic economy to collaborate with. Turkey also has the most substantial and capable military force in the region. Should Turkey shift its stance to a pro-Arab, anti-Israel position, the consequences for Israel’s long-term national security would not be trivial.

Also last week, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman introduced a new concept to Israeli diplomacy, and Israel’s treatment of the Turkish ambassador must be understood in this light. According to Lieberman, Israel will expel ambassadors from countries that it feels have criticized Israel unfairly. The presence of ambassadors does not mean as much today as it did in the 18th century, but the image of Israel responding to criticism — which, fair or not, is widespread — by reducing relations seems self-defeating. For many governments, having Israel reduce diplomatic status causes no harm, and might even be a political plus domestically. Obviously, Lieberman’s statement was meant to generate support among the Israeli public, and it well might. But consider the strategic consequences to Israel.

Turkey has been shifting its position on its role in the Islamic world in recent years under the Islamist-rooted government of President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While increasingly critical of Israel, the Turkish government also has tried to bridge the gap between the Arabs and Israelis, albeit to promote Turkey’s position in the Muslim world. Thus, Turkey is far from being confrontational with Israel. Moreover, tensions in Turkey between secularists in the military and the civilian Islamist-rooted government are substantial. Turkish internal politics are complicated, and therefore politics between Turkey and Israel are complicated.

Israeli Strategy
Ever since its peace treaty with Egypt, Israel’s grand strategy has been to divide Muslim nations in the region, finding common interests with some to make certain no common front against Israel arises. To this end, Israel has formal treaties with Jordan and Egypt both based on common enemies. The Jordanian government — Hashemites ruling a country with a substantial Palestinian population — fears the Palestinians at least as much as Israel. Egypt, which suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s, opposes Hamas, which is an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel accordingly uses mutual hostility toward the Palestinians to create a balance of power on its border.

Still, both Egypt and Jordan have said — and will continue to say — many critical things about Israel. They need to speak to their respective domestic audiences, and Israel understands that what is said to satisfy that audience is not necessarily connected to their foreign and security policies. Some Israelis condemn both Egypt and Jordan for such criticisms. But from a larger perspective, if Egypt were to repudiate its peace treaty with Israel and begin refurbishing its military, and Jordan were to shift to an anti-Israeli policy and allow third parties to use its territory and the long and difficult-to-defend Jordan River as a base of operations, Israel would face a fundamental strategic threat.

So Israel has adopted a very simple policy: Egypt and Jordan may say what they want so long as Egypt does not abandon its neutrality and beef up its military and Jordan does not let a foreign force into the Jordan Valley. And given that the Israelis want to ensure that the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes survive, the Israelis tolerate periodic outbursts against Israel. Rhetoric is rhetoric and geopolitics is geopolitics, and the Israelis understand the distinction.

That they understand this difference makes Ayalon’s behavior, let alone Lieberman’s as-yet-unimplemented policy, difficult to follow. It is difficult to know whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sanctioned Ayalon’s move. As has been the case in Israel for years, Netanyahu’s coalition is weak and fragmented, enabling smaller parties to pursue their own policies. There is no question that embarrassing the Turkish ambassador pleased many Israelis, particularly those who already belong to Netanyahu’s coalition. If the event was staged with an Israeli audience in mind, the episode might have made sense. But Ayalon also spoke to the Turkish public, and at the moment, the Turkish voters may well be more important to Israel than Israeli voters. Turkey is just too powerful a country for Israel to have as an enemy.

On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak made an official visit to Turkey, and both sides went out of their way to put the Ayalon incident behind them. Clearly, there are members of the Turkish and Israeli cabinets who do not want a crisis between the two countries. And they probably will be able to contain the current situation.

Either way, Israel certainly knew how the seating episode would play in Turkey. Perhaps the Israelis felt that by showcasing their displeasure they might incite Turkish secularists against the Islamists. If so, this is a dangerous game, as insulting Turkey is apt to mobilize the secularists against Israel as much as the Islamists, leading to a Turkish consensus on the Israeli issue not in Israel’s best interests.

The Turkish Re-Emergence
When we step back and look at the broader strategic picture, we see a Turkey slowly but systematically re-emerging as a regional power prepared to use its influence. Washington has observed this, too, and so regards Turkey as a key part of its strategy to draw down the U.S. presence in Iraq. Turkey does not want to see massive instability in Iraq any more than the Americans do. Similarly, in any confrontation with Iran, Turkey is both a communications channel and a potential ally. Further afield, Turkey is contributing to the Western war effort in Afghanistan, and has substantial influence in the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia. The United States has no desire to move into confrontation with Turkey. Indeed, it sees Turkey not so much as a U.S. surrogate, which Turkey is not, but as the most significant regional power with interests aligned with the United States.

Israel is also an ally of the United States, but it cannot achieve the things Turkey might in Syria, Iraq and the rest of the region. The U.S. interest at present lies in stabilizing these countries and moving them away from Iran. The Turks could help this process. The Israelis can’t. That means that in any breakdown of relations between Turkey and Israel, the United States will be hard-pressed to side with Israel. The United States shares fundamental interests with Turkey, so in breaking with Turkey, the Israelis are risking a breach with the United States.

U.S. relations aside, Israel needs its relationship with Turkey as well. The region as a whole has two major powers and one potential power. Turkey and Israel are the major powers, Egypt is the potential one. The ongoing Turkish economic surge of the past few years will generate economic activity throughout the region, particularly in Egypt, where wages are low and where the (albeit small) middle class can buy Turkish products. A Turkish-Egyptian economic relationship follows from the Turkish surge. Maintaining Egyptian neutrality is a foundation of Israeli national security, but souring Israeli-Turkish relations during a Turkish-sponsored economic revival in Egypt could threaten this. And Israel does not want to be caught between a hostile Egypt and Turkey.

Elsewhere in the region, Turkey is increasing its influence in Syria. It currently shares Israel’s interests in curbing Hezbollah in Lebanon and redirecting Syrian relations away from Iran toward Turkey. Obviously, Israel wants to see this process continue, but Turkey could expand its influence in Syria without dealing with Hezbollah.

Israeli Limitations
Turkey is a developing power with options, while Israel is a power that has developed to its limits. The Turkish re-emergence could well transform the region, and Turkey has a number of ways it could play this. By contrast, geopolitically and economically, Israel is committed in a certain direction. This is a moment during which Turkey has options, and more options than Israel.

Israel has relatively few tools available to shape Turkey’s choices, though it does have several ways to close off some Turkish choices. One of Turkey’s choices is to maintain its relationship with Israel. If the Turks choose not to maintain this relationship, Israel’s strategic position will suffer a severe blow. Logic would therefore have it that Israel would try to avoid sparking a political process in Turkey that makes breaking with Israel the easier choice.

By deliberately embarrassing the Turks, Lieberman and Ayalon are unlikely to make the Turks want to improve their relationship with Israel. And Lieberman and Ayalon seem to underestimate the degree to which Israel needs this relationship. Turkey can afford to criticize Israel because an Israeli rupture with Turkey actually solves diplomatic problems for Turkey without harming the Turkish strategic position. If Turkey breaks with Israel, Israel now has a very powerful regional adversary quite capable of arming regional Arab powers. It is also a country able to challenge the primacy of the Israeli relationship in American regional thinking. We therefore see avoiding a crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations as mattering more to Israel in the long run than to Turkey.

Himalayan kingdoms and India’s foreign policy

By S. D. Muni

India’s pursuance of the democracy factor in Bhutan and Sikkim was different from the Nepalese case. Though the security concern emanating out of the communist victory in China was the same, but the pressure of democratic forces was much weaker in Bhutan and Sikkim. The other pressing consideration of the Western intervention, present in Nepal, was almost completely absent in Bhutan and Sikkim. Nepal’s Rana rulers had an active relationship with the UK, US and France, and were keen to exploit that relationship for their political survival as already noted. In view of the absence of the Western concerns and the presence of weak democratic movements, India found it advisable to support and sustain feudal regimes in these two Himalayan countries in the interest of stability.

India’s policy towards all the Himalayan kingdoms had a similar thrust of retaining the core British strategic framework of keeping these kingdoms as an integral art of India’s defence structure, while shedding off its imperial and colonial façade. Emerging aspirations of people in these countries for democratization were responded to within this framework, i.e., without sacrificing the security interests. This was evident in Nepal as this was also evident in Bhutan and Sikkim.

There were also the nuanced differences in the legal status of sovereignty and degree of independence to be exercised by each of them. Nepal was considered a fully sovereign country. Sikkim was treated as a protectorate, slightly higher than the Indian princely states, but lower than Bhutan which gradually evolved into a full sovereign, independent state. Sikkim was eventually incorporated as an integral part of the Indian Union in 1975. These differences in legal status of the three Himalayan kingdoms were clearly reflected in the Treaties signed with Bhutan in 1948 and with Nepal and Sikkim (separately) in 1950. The Treaties laid down that while Bhutan was free in its internal affairs, its foreign relations were to be ‘guided’ by India’s advice.
Being an Indian protectorate, Sikkim’s foreign affairs were India’s responsibility and its internal autonomy was conditioned on ‘good governance’ to be overlooked by India. Yet another factor that accounted for a more accommodative Treaty with Bhutan as compared to Sikkim as that India’s treaty with Bhutan was concluded in 1949, before the victory of communist forces in China and the Chinese assertion in Tibet.

The demand for political liberalization in Sikkim dates back to the victory of India’s struggle for independence. Inspired by the Indian example, and with the support and encouragement from the Indian leadership, political parties were organized both in Bhutan and Sikkim.

The Sikkim State Congress (SSC) was formed in 1947. It demanded abolition of feudal land holdings, an interim government having representation of popular leaders and eventual merger of Sikkim into India. The Government of India forded the Sikkim princely ruler (the Maharaja) to introduce land reforms and install a government of popular representatives – two to be the Maharaja’s representatives and three nominees of the SSC. India at that time refused to discuss the proposal of Sikkim’s merger into India. This is an example of New Delhi siding with the feudal system in the interest of stability and order in Sikkim. Any support to change, if at all, had to be gradual.

The Sikkim ruler promptly introduced some reforms in the legal system and judicial procedures. But he was not forthcoming on the popular representation in the government. The Sikkim Maharaja virtually handed over his power to his son, Palden Thondup who floated a royalist political organization called Sikkim National Party (SNP), on April 30, 1948 with the objective of opposing the SSC. With the help of this party, the feudal ruler of Sikkim tried to consolidate his power provoking the SSC to agitate in 1949eir demands. The agitators marched to the palace in support of their demands. Under the pressure of the agitators and the Indian Political Officer in Gantok, Mr. Harishwar Dayal, the Maharaja was forced to constitute a new Ministry with popular representation from the SSC.

The inherent political contradictions between the Maharaja and the popular representatives, with Crown Prince working the popular ministry all the time, did not allow the compromise devised by India to function. The popular representatives threatened to resign from the government and to resume their agitation for democratization. The Indian Political Officer interviewed in favour of the Maharaja by dismissing all the popular representatives. To access the situation created by the agitation, Nehru had sent his Deputy Minister of External Affaires to Sikkim. He, it seems, went back with the impression that the Maharaja would be a better ally in strengthening India’s security interests in Sikkim than the democratic leaders. That is why, soon after the Minister’s departure, the Indian representative in Gantok dismissed the popular government and took the administration in his own hands. That was the end of struggle for democracy in Sikkim. Subsequently, India continued to strengthen Sikkim Monarchy in the interest of stability until the beginning of the seventies, when again, the larger interests of India’s perceived security, democratic movement was encouraged and Sikkim was eventually integrated into the Indian Union.

On the lines of Sikkim, Bhutanese expatriates of Nepali origin inspired by India’s independence and struggle of democratization in Sikkim and Nepal, also organized a political party called Bhutan State Congress (BSC) in 1952. This party called for the grant of citizenship rights and political representation to all the Nepalese settled in Bhutan. Inherent in the party’s demands was also the issue of democratization of Bhutan’s Monarchical system. In support of these demands, the BSC launched a Satyagraha (non violence residence) in 1954. This political movement was quickly suppressed by the Bhutan government by mobilizing their militia. There were sections in Indian civil society that lead support to the movement because of the expatriate Nepali population but the Government of India backed the Monarchy and did not let the resistance movement gather any political strength. The Bhutanese government was advised to sort out the citizenship issue which was done in 1958. Subsequently, the Advisory assembly was also setup to perform legislative functions.

An important aspect behind India’s support to Monarchies in Sikkim and Bhutan, related to its security interests has been that the resistance movements and forces of democratization in both of these countries had a strong ethnic character. In both Bhutan and Sikkim, democratization demand was raised by the Nepali groups and the Monarchies have been Bhotias and Lepchas in Sikkim and Drukpas in Bhutan; having closer cultural and religious linkages with Tibet. As a result, supporting democratic movement would have amounted to favoring one side in the ethnic divide and as a consequence, alienating the other one. Indian policy makers did take into account the possibility, howsoever remote, of the ruling Mongoloid ethnic groups in Bhutan and Sikkim seeking China’s support in case of India leading its weight with their Nepali protesters. Political instability precipitated in the process would surely have been exploited by China.

(Extracted from his book Foreign Policy of India, the democracy dimension)