Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India

Jing-dong Yuan | Bio | 30 Nov 2008
World Politics Review



Sino-Indian relations have registered significant progress in the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi have engaged in a series of summit meetings, frequent high-level visits, joint anti-terrorism training exercises between the two militaries, and fast-growing bilateral trade. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to China in January 2008, the two countries issued a joint document on a Shared Vision for the 21st Century, pledging to promote a harmonious world of peace and stability and further strengthen the Sino-Indian Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. These developments have encouraged analysts across the Himalaya to talk about the return of the 1950s Panchsheel and the prospects of "Chindia" in the coming decades.

A closer look at Chinese perspectives on India's rise is therefore warranted, as well as an assessment of both the promises of further cooperation and the potential pitfalls of conflict in the coming years, as the two rising Asian powers continue their upward trajectory toward great-power status. Given their combined human resources and economic potentials, their shared past experiences and newfound paths to development, prosperity, and power, the two countries can make important contributions to regional and global peace. At the same time, unresolved territorial disputes, mutual suspicions of each other's intentions, and other contentious issues could threaten the sustainability and continuing improvement of a critical bilateral relationship.

From Normalization to Strategic Partnership

Sino-Indian relations suffered a serious setback after the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests as New Delhi justified its action by alleging that the so-called China threats were the main reason why it went nuclear. The strong Chinese reactions and Beijing's active diplomatic campaigns to isolate India eventually led New Delhi to seek rapprochement.[1] Sino-Indian relations gradually thawed. In June 2003, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid an official visit to China, the first in over a decade. Since then, Beijing and New Delhi not only have declared that neither country would view the other as a security threat, they also have elevated their relationship to one of strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and stability. During Chinese President Hu Jintao's November 2006 visit to India, the two countries adopted a ten-point strategy to further strengthen the bilateral relationship, accompanied by over a dozen agreements on trade, investment, energy cooperation, and cultural and educational exchanges. Beijing now views its relationship with India one of global and strategic importance that is long-term, all-round, and stable.[2]

This optimistic view of the bilateral relationship and its future prospects is shared or at least publicly echoed by Chinese and Indian officials, with both governments actively promoting full-fledged developments in political, economic, and security spheres. Both Beijing and New Delhi support a multipolar world and oppose unilateralism; they also hold common positions on issues ranging from the environment and climate change to global trade. Sino-Indian strategic dialogue, anti-terrorism consultation, and energy cooperation have further enhanced confidence and trust between the two countries and strengthened their strategic and cooperative partnership.[3]

The most noticeable progress in Sino-Indian relations, though, has been registered in growing two-way trade. From a mere $117 million in 1987, bilateral trade grew to $38.7 billion in 2007, with the two countries setting a target of $60 billion for 2010 during Prime Minister Singh's visit. In July 2006, the two countries re-opened the historical Nathu La Pass that had been close since the 1962 war to even further promote border trade.[4]

The two countries have also made progress in the area of defense cooperation. Building upon the 1993 and 1996 agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility, and developing confidence building measures in the military field, Beijing and New Delhi have in recent years expanded ties to include port calls, joint search and rescue exercises, and defense exchanges.[5] Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee's May 28-June 2, 2006 visit to China was a major milestone in Sino-Indian defense ties, signaling the two militaries' first steps towards institutionalizing bilateral military relations. The most noticeable achievement in this regard is the signing of the Sino-Indian Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation, the first such document between the two countries.[6] In addition to meeting Chinese leaders and his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Cao Gangchuan, Mukherjee also visited a number of cities and military facilities during his visit, including the Lanzhou Military Region, the first foreign defense minister to do so.[7]

Given its unique and dominating position on the subcontinent, India has always featured prominently in Beijing's South Asia strategy. During the Cold War, that strategy focused on aligning with and supporting Pakistan and developing close ties with other South Asian states to counter Indian -- and by association, Soviet -- influence in the region.[8] In recent years, India's fast economic growth and its diplomatic activism attract increasing attention from Chinese analysts. Gone are the days when China could look down upon India as a light weight and a regional power confined to South Asia. Indeed, India's rise presents serious challenges to China's security interests with regard to territorial disputes, energy security, and regional and global power realignment.[9]

The coming years will testify to whether the good will and momentum generated by the recent high-level visits can be maintained. Clearly, obstacles remain and sustained efforts at the highest political level are required to build trust between Asia's two rising powers. These include mutual suspicions and the potentials for competition and rivalry; the still unresolved territorial disputes, even though the LAC has been relatively peaceful over the last forty-six years; China's relationship with Pakistan in the regional context; and the emerging China-India-U.S. strategic triangle.[10]

Despite progress in bilateral relations over the past few years, mutual suspicions remain. This is partly due to the dynamics of the security dilemma and structural conflicts between the two Asian giants, with the lack of institutionalized and regular high-level official exchanges also playing a role.[11] The two Asian giants' continuing upward trajectory in growing economic and military power, and political influence, is bound to lead each into the other's perceived sphere of interests, meaning that conflicts may arise.[12] India has watched China's phenomenal economic and military growth with both envy and alarm. If there is one single lesson that New Delhi's security analysts drew from the 1962 war, it would be that power and strength are the only ticket to the club of great powers. For many of them, the very fact that China continues to lead India on most indicators of power poses a greater threat than its military defeat forty-six years ago.[13]

Meanwhile, China is paying close attention to India's growing military power and its nuclear and missile developments. New Delhi's successful test of the Agni-III ballistic missile further extends its ability to reach Chinese targets inland.[14] Beijing is also wary of New Delhi's eastward strategy of developing greater economic and military ties with Japan and the ASEAN countries. Indeed, the increasingly warm ties between New Delhi and Tokyo have been carefully watched by strategic analysts in Beijing.[15]

Territorial disputes remain a sensitive and occasional touchy issue between the two countries. There remain lingering suspicion and distrust, and the scar of the 1962 war has yet to be healed. The Chinese side has suggested that the Line of Actual Control (LAC), with some minor modifications, could be the starting point for negotiating a final settlement. While the appointment of special representatives during Vajpayee's 2003 visit to China was an important indication that the two governments were determined to resolve this issue, progress remains painfully slow. After twelve rounds of talks between the special representatives, the two sides remain deadlocked and no prospects of breakthrough seem to be in sight.[16]

In a recent incident, Beijing declined to issue a visa to an official from Arunachal Pradesh, stating that the official in question was a permanent resident of China's territory and therefore did not require a visa to enter China, causing New Delhi to call off the scheduled visit by a 107-member delegation of the IAS (India Administrative Service). This serves as a clear reminder that until the border disputes are settled, normalization will not be complete.[17]

While the territorial disputes remain deadlocked, they are at least manageable as any use of force to regain claims is too costly for either Beijing or New Delhi to entertain. India's growing power and its foreign policy orientation, though, are of growing strategic significance and command much closer scrutiny by Chinese analysts. The first concerns China's energy security. India occupies a unique geostrategic position in the Indian Ocean, straddling the natural junction of the busy international shipping lanes. According to Chinese analysts, since the early 1990s India has been implementing the so-called "Indian Ocean dominance strategy" by establishing absolute military supremacy over countries in the region and deterrence against major maritime powers in their attempts to extend influence and/or establish outposts in the region.[18]

Chinese analysts are particularly attentive to what they see as New Delhi's ambitions for building a blue-water navy: a fleet of 145 ocean-going surface ships by 2015, capable of operating beyond the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy has shifted from the past doctrine of active defense to a new one of offensive defense. Chinese media suggest that India has an ambitious plan to control the Strait of Malacca with its eastern naval command and the so-called Project Seabird, including the consolidation and expansion of the Kadamba naval base to control the IO. India maintains two important overseas territories: Andaman Islands and Nicobar Islands that can be used to block the Malacca Strait and control the entire Bay of Bengal. Once India controls the area, it controls the arteries of the global economy.[19]

Beijing's growing attention to the Indian Ocean has been driven by broader strategic considerations. Concerns over potential blockades against choke points in the IOR by hostile powers aside, China's Indian Ocean strategy has always been and likely will continue to be informed by its relationships with India, Pakistan, and the smaller South Asian countries. China claims the right to develop and maintain cordial relationships with states in what New Delhi may regard as its sphere of influence, through trade, investment, and military assistance. Indeed, Beijing's efforts to make inroads in South Asia mirrors New Delhi's "Look East Policy"; both reflect the two Asian powers' perceptions of each other's intents, and their pursuit of opportunities and relative power.[20]

In recent years, China has become increasingly involved in projects -- in Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, among others -- that appear to aim at developing alternative land routes for oil transports should maritime passages be disrupted.[21] Chinese activities in the IOR have drawn growing attention to and speculation about Beijing's intentions, in particular by Indian analysts.[22] Some analysts argue that China's strategy toward the Indian Ocean forms part of its grand strategy and long-term objectives of undermining U.S. influence in the region and establishing and consolidating its own.[23] They point to Chinese initiatives over the past decades, in particular Beijing's efforts to establish what has now been described as a "string of pearls" with ongoing and proposed construction of sea ports and pipelines -- a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence in Indian Ocean littorals.[24]



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Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India
Jing-dong Yuan | Bio | 30 Nov 2008
World Politics Review


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Sino-Pakistani ties continue to cast a shadow over the China-India entente, despite Beijing's efforts to address New Delhi's concerns. While China's neutrality during the 1999 Kargil crisis demonstrates a more balanced Chinese South Asia policy, that gesture has yet to translate into good will and confidence on India's part that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is not targeted at India. New Delhi remains suspicious of the so-called "all-weather" Sino-Pakistani relationship, in particular their defense cooperation -- such as the joint development of advanced fighter aircraft -- and Chinese assistance in constructing strategic port facilities for Pakistan in Gwadar.[25]

China's special ties with Pakistan have undergone noticeable changes since the end of the Cold War and in particular with the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. While in the past, strategic necessities and mutual interests led China to lend its support to Pakistan on almost all positions that Islamabad considered critical, that unconditional support no longer applies in today's much changed strategic environment. Beijing's attitude toward the Kashmir issue, for instance, reflects its changing priorities and broader security interests in South Asia. Indeed, China's Kashmir policy has come full circle: from the stance of neutrality in the early 1950s; to the pro-Pakistan position of the 1960s and 1970s; to a mixed UN resolutions plus the Simla agreement balancing act of the 1980s (as Beijing was seeking rapprochement with New Delhi but continued to maintain entente with Islamabad); to the current position, adopted since the early 1990s, on characterizing the Kashmir issue as a bilateral matter.

China's Kashmir policy must be understood within the broader contexts of its South Asia policy in general, and where this policy fits in Beijing's global strategies and its bilateral relationships with India and Pakistan in particular.[26] One of the key objectives of Beijing's post-Cold War global strategy has been to develop a peaceful environment for economic development. Within this context, China has sought to resolve contentious issues, including boundary disputes with a number of its neighboring countries, from the former Soviet Union to Vietnam. That general posture of good neighborly policy has also been applied to the South Asian region, where Beijing has sought rapprochement with India since the late 1980s.

As China re-orients its foreign policy and security posture in the post-Cold War era, with a focus on East Asia and a possible military conflict with the United States over the Taiwan Strait, it has growing interests in seeing a stable South Asia and a better relationship with India. That explains Beijing's more unequivocal position on the Kashmir issue clearly in favor of India's position. That decision is firmly grounded in the belief that the only realistic way to resolve the Kashmir conflict is through peaceful negotiation between India and Pakistan. As Islamabad's trusted friend, Beijing could and should use its influence to convince Pakistan why it is also in its interest to resolve the issue peacefully.

However, these policy shifts do not mean that Beijing is abandoning Islamabad. On the contrary, China continues to provide crucial support -- moral as well as material -- to Pakistan, for at least three reasons. First, a stable Pakistan and one that manages its relationship with India provides stability to China's southwest periphery. Second, with ethnic separatism and religious extremism on the rise in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Beijing needs the full understanding and assistance from the Pakistani government to prevent terrorist groups from using Pakistan as a training base and launch pad to undermine China's national unity. Third, as a major Muslim country, Pakistan plays a unique role in serving as a conduit to the broader Islamic world for China. Clearly, new thinking and renewed energies are needed to develop an all-round relationship that goes beyond the narrow defense linkage.[27]

Chinese security analysts are also debating the significance and implications of a warming U.S.-India relationship that spans from nuclear cooperation to the building of a so-called democracy arch. Washington and New Delhi share normative values (democracy) and strategic interests while Beijing's ties with both are more driven by contingent rather than structural interests.[28] In this context, the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the warming strategic relationship are viewed within the broader context of Washington's global strategic calculations. The Bush administration is seen as seeking to enlist India to balance against China's rapid rise. In addition, the U.S. also recognizes the value of India as an emerging market and would like to see India succeed economically as an alternative model -- based on a market economy and democracy -- to the so-called "Beijing Consensus" (i.e., economic success with relatively tight political control). This may also explain why Washington is more liberal regarding relaxation of controls on high-tech transfers to India, but not to China.[29]

Chinese analysts focus on the expansion of U.S.-India ties, in particular in the areas of defense and energy cooperation, as well as economic relations. According to Chinese analyses, the Bush administration seeks to consolidate the U.S.-India relationship by focusing on three key areas. The first involves forming a strong politico-strategic partnership by emphasizing their shared values as the world's oldest and largest democracies along with their common interests in combating global terrorism, achieving energy security, and maintaining regional stability. The second focuses on expanding bilateral trade to achieve the $50 billion target in three years. The two countries have already had extensive interdependence in software development, service outsourcing, and investments in infrastructure and manufacturing.[30]

But perhaps the most significant aspect of this growing cooperation, apart from the nuclear deal, is enhanced defense and space cooperation, and the emerging U.S.-India military ties that span from arms sales to joint military exercises. Chinese sources point to an October 2002 Pentagon report on Indo-U.S. military relations that indicates major shifts of U.S. policy toward India, defining and recognizing it as a major rising power, and helping it to achieve that status in anticipation of its endorsement of key U.S. policy objectives. These range from anti-terrorism, protection of critical sea lanes of communication, to interception of WMD-related shipment and missile defenses. During Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee's visit to the U.S. in June 2005, the Pentagon signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with India in which the U.S. would provide a broad range of defense equipment and military technologies, including fighter aircraft (F-16 and F-18) and joint research and development.[31] Chinese analysts suggest the reason for the U.S. policy change from restriction and control to one of relaxation and even preferential treatment is largely driven by a desire to balance China's growing power. At the same time, India's growing defense budget and arms acquisitions also make it an attractive customer for U.S. arms exports.[32]

Conclusion

Sino-Indian relations have experienced significant improvement over the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi are making concerted efforts to further the bilateral strategic and cooperative partnership that serves the long-term interests of both countries. From China's perspective, developing a stable relationship with India contributes to its broader policy toward South Asia and forms an integral part of its overall strategic orientation.

But Beijing is not impervious to the problems and challenges ahead. These include the need to broaden the scope and depth of strategic dialogue and continued confidence building measures to minimize and dispel mutual suspicions and threat perceptions. In particular, the two countries should seek to promote common interests through the emerging China-India-U.S. triangle rather than to take advantage of their respective bilateral ties with the world's only superpower to undermine the other's security interests. In addition, China and India should consult more on international and regional issues where they share common interests. These could include a fair and equitable international political and economic order, non-intervention, environment, disarmament, and anti-terrorism. Increasingly, the two countries are also expanding cooperation in the energy sector.

But full and complete normalization, let alone the development of the strategic and cooperative partnership between Asia's two rising powers, is possible only if China and India can set a clearly defined timetable for the resolution of the border dispute. Beijing and New Delhi must also manage well the China-India-Pakistan triangle and prevent conflicts in the Indian Ocean as both recognize the growing importance of energy security.

Dr. Jing-dong Yuan is Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and Associate Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he teaches Chinese security and foreign policy, East Asian security and arms control, and U.S. Asia Policy. He is the co-author of "China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?" (Lynne Rienners Publisher, 2003) and is currently writing a book on China's security policy since the end of the Cold War.

Photo: Chinese President Hu Jintao, November 2004. Photo by U. Dettmar for Agência Brasil. (Licensed under the Creative Commons License Attribution 2.5 Brazil license.)

Notes:

1. John W. Garver, "The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity Following India's Nuclear Tests," The China Quarterly 168 (December 2001), pp. 865-889.

2. Ambassador Zhang Yan, "Perspective on India and China-India Relations," speech at the Asia Society, June 18, 2008, Hong Kong, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t466857.htm; Cheng Ruisheng, "Prospect of China-India Relations after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Visit," China Report 44:1 (2008), p. 60.

3. Cheng Ruisheng, "Lun zhongyin zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi [On Sino-Indian Strategic and Cooperative Partnership]," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies Quarterly], no. 1 (2007), pp. 13-18.

4. Amb. Zhang, op cit.

5. P.S. Suryanarayana, "On the Right Track," Frontline, 21:9 (April 24-May 7, 2004), http://www.flonnet.com/fl2109/stories/20040507002504600.htm

6. Pallavi Aiyar, "India, China MoU on Military Ties." The Hindu. 30 May 2006. Accessed using the Foreign Broadcast Information Service www.opensource.gov, 3 July 2006.

7. "Indian defense minister visited numerous military facilities in China," Zhongguowang [www.china.org.cn], June 1, 2006, at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/HIAW/1226024.htm; Chen Jihui and Qian Feng, "Yindu fangzhang jielian fang zhongri [Indian Defense Minister Visits Japan, China]," Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], May 29, 2006, p. 2, at http://paper.people.com.cn/hqsb/html/2006-05/29/content_6001646.htm.

8. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001).

9. Zhao Gancheng, "Zhongguo dui yindu zhanlue qianxi [An Analysis of China's Strategy toward India]," Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian Studies], no. 1 (2008), pp. 3-8.

10. Gareth Price, "China and India: Cooperation and Competition," Asia Programme Briefing Paper, Chatham House, May 2007, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/download/-/id/474; Zhang Guihong, "Sino-Indian Security Relations: Bilateral Issues, External Factors and Regional Implications," South Asian Survey 12:1 (2005), pp. 61-74.

11. John W. Garver, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations," India Review 1:4 (October 2002), pp.1-38; David Scott, "Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century," Asian Security 4:3 (2008), pp. 244-270; Han Hua, "Youhao linbang heshi anquan weixie—zhongyin ruhe kandai duifang [Good Neighbor or Security Threat: How China and India View Each Other]," Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies] 73 (2002), pp.6-13.

12. Jaideep Saikia, "Quest for a Chindian Arc: Leadership in the Asian Century," Defense & Security Analysis 22:4 (December 2006), pp. 421-434; Greg Sheridan, "East Meets East: The Sino-Indian Rivalry," The National Interest 86 (November/December 2006), pp. 92-96.

13. Song Dexing, "21 shiji de zhongyin guanxi: yindu de genben zhanlue guanqie jiqi luoji qidian [Sino-Indian Relations in the 21st Century: India's Fundamental Strategic Concerns and Their Logical Premises]," Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian Studies], no. 2 (2007), pp. 3-8; Tang Lu, "Yindu rengwei zouchu zhongyin zhanzheng yinying [India Still under Shadow of '62 War]," Guoji Xianqu Daobao [International Herald Leader], November 28, 2008, online edition, http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2008-11/28/content_10423612.htm.

14. Raj Chengappa, "Building India's Missile Muscle," India Today International, April 30, 2007, pp. 36-39; Siddharth Srivastava, "India Has China in its Range," Asia Times, April 14, 2007.

15. Saurabh Shukla, "Love with Tokyo," India Today International, June 11, 2007, pp. 42-43; Zhao Hong, "India's Changing Relations with ASEAN: From China's Perspective," Journal of East Asian Affairs 20:2 (Fall/Winter 2006), pp. 141-170; Shi Hongyuan, "Yinri guanxi chixu shengwen jiqi dongyin [The Continuing Warming Indo-Japanese Ties and Their Genesis], Guoji Ziliao Xinxi [International Information], no. 8 (2007), pp. 7-11.

16. Gurmeet Kanwal, "India-China Territorial Dispute Little Progress despite Prolonged Negotiations," South Asia Monitor: A Perspective on the Region, February 2008, http://www.southasiamonitor.org/2008/Feb/news/gur.shtml.

17. Saurabh Shukla, "Beijing Turns Truant Again," India Today International, June 11, 2007, p. 7; Jo Johnson, "India Cancels Diplomatic Visit to China," Financial Times, May 27, 2007.

18. Xu Hua, "Yindu zhongshi haiyang junshi weishe [India Emphasizes Maritime Deterrence]," Xiandai Junshi [Conmilit] (April 2000), pp. 54-56.

19. Chen Jihui, "Yindu haijun yaoguan maliujia [INS Wants to Control Malacca Strait]," Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times], March 1, 2006, http://world.people.com.cn/GB/14549/4152188.html; Lai Yang, "Yindu quanmian tisheng junshi shili [India Enhances Overall Military Capabilities]," Shijie Xinwenbao [World News Journal], March 4, 2008, http://gb.cri.cn/12764/2008/03/04/2945@1964796.htm (accessed on May 8, 2008).

20. On Sino-Indian rivalry in the Indian Ocean from a historical perspective, see Garver, Protracted Contest, chapter 10. On Chinese views of India's Look East Policy, see Zhao Gancheng, "Yindu 'dongxiang' zhengce de fazhan ji yiyi [The Evolution and Implications of India's Look East Policy]," Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], no. 8 (2007), pp. 10-16, 64.

21. John W. Garver, "Development of China's Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-west and South Asia," The China Quarterly (2006), pp. 1-22.

22. "Into the Wide Blue Yonder," The Economist, June 7, 2008, pp. 53-54; Khurana, "China's 'String of Pearls'."

23. David Walgreen, "China in the Indian Ocean Region: Lessons in PRC Grand Strategy," Comparative Strategy 25 (2006), pp. 55-73.

24. Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power across the Asian Littoral (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2006); Sudha Ramachandran, "India Chases the Dragon in Sri Lanka," Asia Times Online, July 10, 2008, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JG10Df03.html (accessed on July 17, 2008).

25. David Montero, "China, Pakistan Team Up on Energy," Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 2007; Henry Chu, "China's Footprint in Pakistan," Los Angeles Times, April 1, 2006; Ziad Haider, "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6:1 (Winter 2005), pp. 95-103.

26. On this point, see Michael Yahuda, "China and the Kashmir Crisis," BBC World News, June 2, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2020788.stm

27. Zhou Rong, "Zhongba zhanlue hezuo xu zhuru xinde huoli [Sino-Pak Strategic Cooperation Needs New Vitality]," Nanya Yanjiu Jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], no. 1 (2007), pp. 24-27.

28. For an excellent analysis, see John W. Garver, "The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," NBR Analysis 13:5 (October 2002), pp.5-56. See also, Lisa Curtis, "The Triangular Dynamics in Asia: The U.S., India, and China," Heritage Lectures, April 11, 2007; Siddharth Srivastava, "China Looks on at the US-India Lockstep," Asia Times, June 30, 2007; Daniel Twining, "The New Great Game: Why the Bush Administration Has Embraced India," The Weekly Standard, December 25, 2006, pp. 15-19; Amit Gupta, "U.S.-India-China: Assessing Tripolarity," China Report 42:1 (2006), pp. 69-83.

29. Zhan Dexiong, "Bushi zai qiangdiao meiyin guanxi [Bush Again Adjusts the US-Indian Relations]," Liaowang Xingwen Zhoukan [Outlook Weekly], March 6, 2006, p. 85; Zhang Zhenqiang, "Meiguo weihe xia zhongzhu tuidong meiyin hezuo [Why Is U.S. Investing So Much to Promote U.S.-India Cooperation]?" Lianhe Zaobaowang [zaobao.com], March 10, 2006, http://www.zaobao.com/special/forum/pages3/forum_lx060310c.html.

30. People's Daily Online, March 6, 2006. http://world.people.com.cn/GB/4168062.html

31. Xinhuawang [Xinhua News Online], "Meiguo wujiao daolou xuanbu xiang yindu chushou xianjin zhandouji [Pentagon Announces Sales of Advanced Fighter Aircraft to India]," March 2, 2006. http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2006-03/03/content_4251167.htm; Liu Li, "Gongtong erzhi zhongguo: meiyin qiaoding shinian junshi hezuo [Jointly Containing China: U.S. and India Nail Ten-Year Military Cooperation Package]," Dongfang Zaobao [Oriental Morning Post], June 30, 2005, http://news.cphotos.net/Articles/guoji/200506302130900.htm; Zhang Li, "Cong 'hexieyi' jiedu yinmei guanxi [The Nuclear Deal and the Indo-U.S. Strategic Relationship]," Nanya Yanjiu Jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], No. 3 (2005), pp. 43-50.

32. Hou Hongyu, "Shixi meiguo duiyin junbei chukou zhengze de bianhua [An Analysis of Changes in U.S. Arms Export Policy toward India]," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 12 (2005), pp. 13-16.


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Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India
Jing-dong Yuan | Bio | 30 Nov 2008
World Politics Review


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Sino-Pakistani ties continue to cast a shadow over the China-India entente, despite Beijing's efforts to address New Delhi's concerns. While China's neutrality during the 1999 Kargil crisis demonstrates a more balanced Chinese South Asia policy, that gesture has yet to translate into good will and confidence on India's part that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is not targeted at India. New Delhi remains suspicious of the so-called "all-weather" Sino-Pakistani relationship, in particular their defense cooperation -- such as the joint development of advanced fighter aircraft -- and Chinese assistance in constructing strategic port facilities for Pakistan in Gwadar.[25]

China's special ties with Pakistan have undergone noticeable changes since the end of the Cold War and in particular with the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. While in the past, strategic necessities and mutual interests led China to lend its support to Pakistan on almost all positions that Islamabad considered critical, that unconditional support no longer applies in today's much changed strategic environment. Beijing's attitude toward the Kashmir issue, for instance, reflects its changing priorities and broader security interests in South Asia. Indeed, China's Kashmir policy has come full circle: from the stance of neutrality in the early 1950s; to the pro-Pakistan position of the 1960s and 1970s; to a mixed UN resolutions plus the Simla agreement balancing act of the 1980s (as Beijing was seeking rapprochement with New Delhi but continued to maintain entente with Islamabad); to the current position, adopted since the early 1990s, on characterizing the Kashmir issue as a bilateral matter.

China's Kashmir policy must be understood within the broader contexts of its South Asia policy in general, and where this policy fits in Beijing's global strategies and its bilateral relationships with India and Pakistan in particular.[26] One of the key objectives of Beijing's post-Cold War global strategy has been to develop a peaceful environment for economic development. Within this context, China has sought to resolve contentious issues, including boundary disputes with a number of its neighboring countries, from the former Soviet Union to Vietnam. That general posture of good neighborly policy has also been applied to the South Asian region, where Beijing has sought rapprochement with India since the late 1980s.

As China re-orients its foreign policy and security posture in the post-Cold War era, with a focus on East Asia and a possible military conflict with the United States over the Taiwan Strait, it has growing interests in seeing a stable South Asia and a better relationship with India. That explains Beijing's more unequivocal position on the Kashmir issue clearly in favor of India's position. That decision is firmly grounded in the belief that the only realistic way to resolve the Kashmir conflict is through peaceful negotiation between India and Pakistan. As Islamabad's trusted friend, Beijing could and should use its influence to convince Pakistan why it is also in its interest to resolve the issue peacefully.

However, these policy shifts do not mean that Beijing is abandoning Islamabad. On the contrary, China continues to provide crucial support -- moral as well as material -- to Pakistan, for at least three reasons. First, a stable Pakistan and one that manages its relationship with India provides stability to China's southwest periphery. Second, with ethnic separatism and religious extremism on the rise in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Beijing needs the full understanding and assistance from the Pakistani government to prevent terrorist groups from using Pakistan as a training base and launch pad to undermine China's national unity. Third, as a major Muslim country, Pakistan plays a unique role in serving as a conduit to the broader Islamic world for China. Clearly, new thinking and renewed energies are needed to develop an all-round relationship that goes beyond the narrow defense linkage.[27]

Chinese security analysts are also debating the significance and implications of a warming U.S.-India relationship that spans from nuclear cooperation to the building of a so-called democracy arch. Washington and New Delhi share normative values (democracy) and strategic interests while Beijing's ties with both are more driven by contingent rather than structural interests.[28] In this context, the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the warming strategic relationship are viewed within the broader context of Washington's global strategic calculations. The Bush administration is seen as seeking to enlist India to balance against China's rapid rise. In addition, the U.S. also recognizes the value of India as an emerging market and would like to see India succeed economically as an alternative model -- based on a market economy and democracy -- to the so-called "Beijing Consensus" (i.e., economic success with relatively tight political control). This may also explain why Washington is more liberal regarding relaxation of controls on high-tech transfers to India, but not to China.[29]

Chinese analysts focus on the expansion of U.S.-India ties, in particular in the areas of defense and energy cooperation, as well as economic relations. According to Chinese analyses, the Bush administration seeks to consolidate the U.S.-India relationship by focusing on three key areas. The first involves forming a strong politico-strategic partnership by emphasizing their shared values as the world's oldest and largest democracies along with their common interests in combating global terrorism, achieving energy security, and maintaining regional stability. The second focuses on expanding bilateral trade to achieve the $50 billion target in three years. The two countries have already had extensive interdependence in software development, service outsourcing, and investments in infrastructure and manufacturing.[30]

But perhaps the most significant aspect of this growing cooperation, apart from the nuclear deal, is enhanced defense and space cooperation, and the emerging U.S.-India military ties that span from arms sales to joint military exercises. Chinese sources point to an October 2002 Pentagon report on Indo-U.S. military relations that indicates major shifts of U.S. policy toward India, defining and recognizing it as a major rising power, and helping it to achieve that status in anticipation of its endorsement of key U.S. policy objectives. These range from anti-terrorism, protection of critical sea lanes of communication, to interception of WMD-related shipment and missile defenses. During Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee's visit to the U.S. in June 2005, the Pentagon signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with India in which the U.S. would provide a broad range of defense equipment and military technologies, including fighter aircraft (F-16 and F-18) and joint research and development.[31] Chinese analysts suggest the reason for the U.S. policy change from restriction and control to one of relaxation and even preferential treatment is largely driven by a desire to balance China's growing power. At the same time, India's growing defense budget and arms acquisitions also make it an attractive customer for U.S. arms exports.[32]

Conclusion

Sino-Indian relations have experienced significant improvement over the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi are making concerted efforts to further the bilateral strategic and cooperative partnership that serves the long-term interests of both countries. From China's perspective, developing a stable relationship with India contributes to its broader policy toward South Asia and forms an integral part of its overall strategic orientation.

But Beijing is not impervious to the problems and challenges ahead. These include the need to broaden the scope and depth of strategic dialogue and continued confidence building measures to minimize and dispel mutual suspicions and threat perceptions. In particular, the two countries should seek to promote common interests through the emerging China-India-U.S. triangle rather than to take advantage of their respective bilateral ties with the world's only superpower to undermine the other's security interests. In addition, China and India should consult more on international and regional issues where they share common interests. These could include a fair and equitable international political and economic order, non-intervention, environment, disarmament, and anti-terrorism. Increasingly, the two countries are also expanding cooperation in the energy sector.

But full and complete normalization, let alone the development of the strategic and cooperative partnership between Asia's two rising powers, is possible only if China and India can set a clearly defined timetable for the resolution of the border dispute. Beijing and New Delhi must also manage well the China-India-Pakistan triangle and prevent conflicts in the Indian Ocean as both recognize the growing importance of energy security.


Sino-Pakistani ties continue to cast a shadow over the China-India entente, despite Beijing's efforts to address New Delhi's concerns. While China's neutrality during the 1999 Kargil crisis demonstrates a more balanced Chinese South Asia policy, that gesture has yet to translate into good will and confidence on India's part that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is not targeted at India. New Delhi remains suspicious of the so-called "all-weather" Sino-Pakistani relationship, in particular their defense cooperation -- such as the joint development of advanced fighter aircraft -- and Chinese assistance in constructing strategic port facilities for Pakistan in Gwadar.[25]

China's special ties with Pakistan have undergone noticeable changes since the end of the Cold War and in particular with the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. While in the past, strategic necessities and mutual interests led China to lend its support to Pakistan on almost all positions that Islamabad considered critical, that unconditional support no longer applies in today's much changed strategic environment. Beijing's attitude toward the Kashmir issue, for instance, reflects its changing priorities and broader security interests in South Asia. Indeed, China's Kashmir policy has come full circle: from the stance of neutrality in the early 1950s; to the pro-Pakistan position of the 1960s and 1970s; to a mixed UN resolutions plus the Simla agreement balancing act of the 1980s (as Beijing was seeking rapprochement with New Delhi but continued to maintain entente with Islamabad); to the current position, adopted since the early 1990s, on characterizing the Kashmir issue as a bilateral matter.

China's Kashmir policy must be understood within the broader contexts of its South Asia policy in general, and where this policy fits in Beijing's global strategies and its bilateral relationships with India and Pakistan in particular.[26] One of the key objectives of Beijing's post-Cold War global strategy has been to develop a peaceful environment for economic development. Within this context, China has sought to resolve contentious issues, including boundary disputes with a number of its neighboring countries, from the former Soviet Union to Vietnam. That general posture of good neighborly policy has also been applied to the South Asian region, where Beijing has sought rapprochement with India since the late 1980s.

As China re-orients its foreign policy and security posture in the post-Cold War era, with a focus on East Asia and a possible military conflict with the United States over the Taiwan Strait, it has growing interests in seeing a stable South Asia and a better relationship with India. That explains Beijing's more unequivocal position on the Kashmir issue clearly in favor of India's position. That decision is firmly grounded in the belief that the only realistic way to resolve the Kashmir conflict is through peaceful negotiation between India and Pakistan. As Islamabad's trusted friend, Beijing could and should use its influence to convince Pakistan why it is also in its interest to resolve the issue peacefully.

However, these policy shifts do not mean that Beijing is abandoning Islamabad. On the contrary, China continues to provide crucial support -- moral as well as material -- to Pakistan, for at least three reasons. First, a stable Pakistan and one that manages its relationship with India provides stability to China's southwest periphery. Second, with ethnic separatism and religious extremism on the rise in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Beijing needs the full understanding and assistance from the Pakistani government to prevent terrorist groups from using Pakistan as a training base and launch pad to undermine China's national unity. Third, as a major Muslim country, Pakistan plays a unique role in serving as a conduit to the broader Islamic world for China. Clearly, new thinking and renewed energies are needed to develop an all-round relationship that goes beyond the narrow defense linkage.[27]

Chinese security analysts are also debating the significance and implications of a warming U.S.-India relationship that spans from nuclear cooperation to the building of a so-called democracy arch. Washington and New Delhi share normative values (democracy) and strategic interests while Beijing's ties with both are more driven by contingent rather than structural interests.[28] In this context, the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the warming strategic relationship are viewed within the broader context of Washington's global strategic calculations. The Bush administration is seen as seeking to enlist India to balance against China's rapid rise. In addition, the U.S. also recognizes the value of India as an emerging market and would like to see India succeed economically as an alternative model -- based on a market economy and democracy -- to the so-called "Beijing Consensus" (i.e., economic success with relatively tight political control). This may also explain why Washington is more liberal regarding relaxation of controls on high-tech transfers to India, but not to China.[29]

Chinese analysts focus on the expansion of U.S.-India ties, in particular in the areas of defense and energy cooperation, as well as economic relations. According to Chinese analyses, the Bush administration seeks to consolidate the U.S.-India relationship by focusing on three key areas. The first involves forming a strong politico-strategic partnership by emphasizing their shared values as the world's oldest and largest democracies along with their common interests in combating global terrorism, achieving energy security, and maintaining regional stability. The second focuses on expanding bilateral trade to achieve the $50 billion target in three years. The two countries have already had extensive interdependence in software development, service outsourcing, and investments in infrastructure and manufacturing.[30]

But perhaps the most significant aspect of this growing cooperation, apart from the nuclear deal, is enhanced defense and space cooperation, and the emerging U.S.-India military ties that span from arms sales to joint military exercises. Chinese sources point to an October 2002 Pentagon report on Indo-U.S. military relations that indicates major shifts of U.S. policy toward India, defining and recognizing it as a major rising power, and helping it to achieve that status in anticipation of its endorsement of key U.S. policy objectives. These range from anti-terrorism, protection of critical sea lanes of communication, to interception of WMD-related shipment and missile defenses. During Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee's visit to the U.S. in June 2005, the Pentagon signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with India in which the U.S. would provide a broad range of defense equipment and military technologies, including fighter aircraft (F-16 and F-18) and joint research and development.[31] Chinese analysts suggest the reason for the U.S. policy change from restriction and control to one of relaxation and even preferential treatment is largely driven by a desire to balance China's growing power. At the same time, India's growing defense budget and arms acquisitions also make it an attractive customer for U.S. arms exports.[32]

Conclusion

Sino-Indian relations have experienced significant improvement over the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi are making concerted efforts to further the bilateral strategic and cooperative partnership that serves the long-term interests of both countries. From China's perspective, developing a stable relationship with India contributes to its broader policy toward South Asia and forms an integral part of its overall strategic orientation.

But Beijing is not impervious to the problems and challenges ahead. These include the need to broaden the scope and depth of strategic dialogue and continued confidence building measures to minimize and dispel mutual suspicions and threat perceptions. In particular, the two countries should seek to promote common interests through the emerging China-India-U.S. triangle rather than to take advantage of their respective bilateral ties with the world's only superpower to undermine the other's security interests. In addition, China and India should consult more on international and regional issues where they share common interests. These could include a fair and equitable international political and economic order, non-intervention, environment, disarmament, and anti-terrorism. Increasingly, the two countries are also expanding cooperation in the energy sector.

But full and complete normalization, let alone the development of the strategic and cooperative partnership between Asia's two rising powers, is possible only if China and India can set a clearly defined timetable for the resolution of the border dispute. Beijing and New Delhi must also manage well the China-India-Pakistan triangle and prevent conflicts in the Indian Ocean as both recognize the growing importance of energy security.

Dr. Jing-dong Yuan is Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and Associate Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he teaches Chinese security and foreign policy, East Asian security and arms control, and U.S. Asia Policy. He is the co-author of "China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?" (Lynne Rienners Publisher, 2003) and is currently writing a book on China's security policy since the end of the Cold War.