A B Vajpayee- Handshake Accross the Himalayas

Handshake across the Himalayas

The “Handshake across the Himalayas” – Vajpayee and China : Part I1

In the first years after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned India and China spearheading a “resurgent Asia [1].” The two largest countries in Asia were breaking out of decades of European dominance, and he felt that they should cooperate to lead the region towards peace and stability in the aftermath of World War II. Nehru was initially optimistic about relations with China, particularly after receiving a warm reception during a 1954 visit. However, his hopes for a “resurgent Asia” quickly collapsed as border disputes and Cold War positioning turned the two countries into rivals. Relations between India and China remained strained throughout the Cold War’s duration and in the decade that followed. Although leaders from both sides persisted with bilateral talks to negotiate a resolution of the border questions, no lasting progress was made. India’s nuclear test in 1998 did little to ease the tensions, particularly after Prime Minister Vajpayee suggested that China was a factor in conducting the test at Pokhran.

In 1998, just as in 1974, China did not perceive a nuclear India as a grave threat. China still had a larger, more advanced military and a more extensive nuclear stockpile. The tests themselves did not anger China so much as the letter that Vajpayee wrote to President Clinton shortly after, meant as a private correspondence but leaked to the New York Times. Without explicitly mentioning China, the letter clearly used it as a justification for the nuclear tests:

We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem . . . that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state [55].

Adding to China’s anger was the comment by the Minister of Defense, Georges Fernandes, who publicly called China “India’s threat number one [56].” The Chinese were infuriated by what it saw as India’s hawkish, unnecessary rhetoric. In response, China took advantage of American anger about the tests and joined with the US to condemn the nuclear tests on the international scene. Holding the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council at the time, it promoted Resolution 1172, which condemned the tests of both India and Pakistan. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Zhu Bangzao, called India’s action “a hard blow . . . It will entail serious consequences to the peace and stability in South Asia and the world at large [57].” China did not respond physically, but it used its rising status in the global arena to remind India of its power advantage.

Vajpayee was perfectly aware of China’s power, and his humiliation from 1962 and 1979 offered a plausible motivation to try and challenge that power. Indeed, Vajpayee had strongly supported acquiring nuclear weapons following the 1962 war, so approving them in 1998 and signaling out a Chinese threat was not a departure from his past. While he knew that a nuclear weapon would not unequivocally put India on the bar with China, it could suggest India’s intent to defend itself if necessary, as well as add to its status on the world scene. China was a long-time member of the nuclear weapons club; for India to join would be a way of playing “catch-up” to China’s progress.

Yet, at the same time, Vajpayee was reluctant to isolate China and unravel the achievements that had essentially started with his visit in 1979. He understood that agitating China would not remove it as a threat, nor would it enhance the levels of trade and exchange that the earlier agreements had jumpstarted. China was a neighbor and too important of a partner to isolate. Hence Vajpayee initiated diplomatic efforts to mitigate the situation. He dispatched Jaswant Singh to Beijing in July 1999 and consulted closely with National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, a China expert who made a strong effort to assure the Chinese that India did not see it as an enemy [58]. The joint working groups soon resumed, and the two countries recommitted themselves to cooperation.

As the ministerial visits revitalized the diplomatic progress, India and China prepared to build cooperation to an even higher level. President K. R. Narayanan visited China in May 2000, where he and Chinese President Jiang Zemin launched the first bilateral security dialogue between the two countries. The dialogue was devoted to global and regional security issues and was followed by two more such dialogues in 2001 and 2002. Zemin and Narayanan also initiated a bilateral Eminent Persons Group consisting of scientists, scholars, and diplomats from both sides to counsel relations [59]. The various dialogues and other groups hoped to replace past hostilities with more constructive methods for establishing peace. If India and China could cooperate in matters of mutual concern, they could see each other more as partners and less as rivals – thereby easing regional tensions.

But the crucial groundwork for peace was economics. Vajpayee saw trade as a bridge builder: If there was mutual interest at stake, the risk of conflict would decrease. The increased visits between the two countries produced new trade deals and bolstered economic ties. In 1991, bilateral trade amounted to $265 million; in 2001, three years after the Pokhran fallout, that figure was at $3.6 billion – with an increase of just over 23% in 2000-2001 alone [60]. The mutual economic interests served a larger purpose: to foster a better environment for the more difficult issue, the border. That issue would be the center of Vajpayee’s own visit to China in 2003.

Panchsheel Revisited
Almost twenty-five years after his visit to China as Minister of External Affairs, Vajpayee returned to China on a six-day trip, the first such trip since Rao’s in 1993. As with the 1979 visit, this new effort was not expected to resolve the border issue. However, it was an attempt to use improved relations to come to some kind of agreement. It was also meant to symbolize the progress made between the two former enemies.

The leaders used economics as the heart of all agreements. Vajpayee himself was accompanied by a delegation of Indian businessmen and made two speeches at business events to reiterate the importance of trade as a bridge builder [61]. A milestone came with the Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade, which reopened Nathu Lu in Sikkim as a trading pass; this marked the first time that China recognized Sikkim as a part of India. In exchange for that recognition, Vajpayee recognized Tibet as an autonomous region in China; Vajpayee furthermore assured the Chinese that India would “not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-Chinese activity in India [62].” Changgu in Sikkim and Renqinggang in Tibet were also established as trade ports, commemorating the significant change in border policy [63]. Vajpayee found himself in a situation similar to Nehru’s in 1954. Tibet had historic and economic ties to India, but China was more essential to Indian interests. Respecting China’s position on Tibet, no matter how controversial, was easier than angering it by treating the region as sovereign. The core difference between Panchsheel in 1954 and Vajpayee’s visit in 2003 was that “mutual respect of territorial integrity” went in both directions. Vajpayee acknowledged Tibet, but in so doing, succeeded in getting the Chinese to acknowledge Sikkim. He did not leave Beijing empty-handed.
Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh remained unresolved, but they were naturally more difficult to negotiate. Those had been the regions over which the Indians and Chinese had fought in 1962. Nevertheless, Vajpayee and his homologue Wen Jiabao committed to a continuing effort towards a resolution. Their Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China mandated special representatives from each country to engage in boundary talks; while not an official treaty, it espoused a framework for future discussion on the issue. Furthermore, it recommitted India and China to joint cooperation in order to promote the interests of developing countries, particularly in global trade organs like the World Trade Organization. Notably, they voiced support for a multipolar world, one that would allow both countries to have influence on the world scene [64]. Just as in the first years of the post-colonial era, neither India nor China wanted to assert their power in Asia and not be dominated by a superpower. India and China were “resurging” economically and politically in the global arena, and they did not want their ascendance to be limited.

The Declaration’s components thus echoed Nehru’s dream of “resurgent Asia” in its commitment to Sino-Indian cooperation to facilitate stability and empowerment in the developing world. It also called to mind the Panchsheel’s Five Principles, working towards a “peaceful coexistence.” The Declaration explicitly stated that “[t]he common interest of the two sides outweigh their differences. The two countries are not a threat to each other [65].” While it left the border question unanswered, the deal brokered a better setting in which it could be considered, as well as a greatly reduced probability of going to war again over the territories.

In fact, the two countries once again cooperated in the international community, stressing their commitment to a multipolar world order. In multinational organizations, both countries shied away from criticizing each other on sensitive issues. Despite Western outcry about China’s presence in Tibet, India never publicly broached the issue. When Pakistan complained about Indian human rights abuses in Kashmir, China pressured it to drop its demands for a UN resolution on the subject [66]. India and China intentionally tried to keep their most contentious regional issues from becoming international ones. Neither wanted to see a third party interfere or mediate in Tibet or Kashmir, and they united to defend that common interest. Fifty years earlier, Nehru had hoped that this would be a cornerstone of the Sino-Indian relationship. In 2003, Vajpayee helped it to become a reality.

The magnitude of Vajpayee’s visit was immediately acknowledged. The newspaper China Daily hailed Vajpayee’s visit as “a handshake across the Himalayas [67].” It signified a marked improvement in bilateral relations and set a strong base for future cooperation. It greatly increased trade, setting China on track to become India’s largest trading partner [68], and it made noteworthy compromises on at least one part of the border. Most remarkable was that Vajpayee was the prime minister to initiate it all. In his early years as a Member of Parliament, he had been extremely critical of what he considered Nehru’s conciliatory tone towards China; he had also encouraged the development of nuclear weapons in order to counter China. Vajpayee had seemed an unlikely bridge builder between India and China. But as a pragmatist, he understood that India stood to gain from a good relationship with China, in terms of economics, politics, and security. Vajpayee disagreed with Nehru’s China policies, but he agreed that India had more to lose by ignoring China.


He also felt that he could pursue better relations with China while promoting India’s interests above everything else. He was quick to reconcile with China after the Pokhran tests, but he still refused to negotiate India’s need to protect itself in a nuclear neighborhood. Perhaps recollecting the shame after the 1962 defeat, he made it clear that India’s defense and territory could not be compromised. He assured China that India would acknowledge its sovereignty over Tibet, but made that contingent on China’s acceptance of an Indian Sikkim. In contrast to other Indian leaders, he did not see the Sino-Indian relationship as zero-sum. Vajpayee simultaneously pursued stronger ties with both China and the US, so that India could benefit from both partnerships but not be overwhelmingly influenced by one side or the other. This came as the US-Chinese relationship strained because of their increased rivalry. Without taking a side, Vajpayee maintained good ties to both. Similarly, he did not consider China’s support of Pakistan to be a deal-breaker. He did not welcome the continuation of a “Chinese Israel,” but he saw the reality that China was not going to reverse its policy. It would serve India no purpose to have tense relations with both countries at the same time. Vajpayee’s viewpoint was significant. In the Cold War era, the Sino-Soviet relationship or the Chinese-Pakistani cooperation prevented India and China from having productive relations; in the post-Cold War era, zero-sum relationships were simply impractical.
Vajpayee provided India and China with a framework for future cooperation. His initiatives allowed the countries to focus on economic ties first and foremost, creating common ground for cooperation in other, more problematic areas. India and China have since profited greatly from bilateral trade, with annual revenues in the billions. The border working groups continue as well. In September 2007, the eleventh round of talks by the 2003 Declaration’s mandated special representatives was held in Beijing [69]. Talks remain inconclusive, but symbolize an improvement from the many years of cynicism and minimal communication. Furthermore, the enhanced ties make it all the more unlikely that the two countries will go to war again in the future, even if a final agreement is still far in the distance.

India and China continue to differ greatly in several issues besides the border, yet the very scope of their trade dissuades the severing of relations. India and China view each other as partners too valuable to renounce. Vajpayee contributed greatly to that view through his economic and strategic initiatives. A man who had once been a vocal skeptic of China’s intentions was also a man who made India a viable partner of China, something that Nehru himself had been unable to do.

Vajpayee’s view of China was less idealistic than Nehru’s. He was fully aware of the country’s dynamic economic and political expansion, not only in Asia but on the global scale. China was, in Vajpayee’s perspective, as much of a rival for global power and influence as it was a partner. Despite this worldview, Vajpayee would be successful in alleviating many of the past and present tensions, making an acclaimed visit in 2003 and moving towards a workable solution for the border issues. When he left office the next year, he left having set the groundwork for enhanced cooperation between the two neighbors. The disputes did not disappear, but, because of Vajpayee’s initiatives, they no longer stood in the way of a “resurgent Asia” between the two most populous, expanding states in the world.

“Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai”? War between Brothers

In 1954, when Prime Minister Nehru visited Beijing, citizens from both India and China celebrated the partnership between the two countries, cheering, “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai!” – “India and China are brothers!” These two ancient civilizations, whose first interactions occurred as early as the first century with the spread of Buddhism [2], were now emerging into the post-World War and post-colonial era. Many hoped that the two countries could cooperate and reestablish their past power and glory.

Absent from the celebrations but present in the politics was the underlying reason for Nehru’s visit. India and China shared another historical legacy, inherited from colonialism: an unresolved border.
In the nineteenth century, Britain established “buffer states” to protect its territory in India. One such case occurred in 1865, when Britain imposed the Johnson Line in the northern part of India. The Johnson Line incorporated the desert region of Aksai Chin as part of the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir. The British never consulted China, who considered Aksai Chin as its own. When the British finally did offer an agreement in 1899, China did not sign. The British interpreted this silence as tacit acceptance [3].

In the early twentieth century, British attention shifted to Tibet, the Buddhist Himalayan kingdom that separated India from China and which China also claimed. The British had previously acquired the neighboring tea-producing lands of Assam and Sikkim from wars in the early nineteenth century; wanting to expand their influence in the region, they invaded Tibet in 1903. Britain and Tibet signed a treaty in late 1904 that set the border between Tibet and Sikkim, granted the British unlimited trading rights, and prohibited Tibet from engaging in foreign relations [4]. A year later, the British signed another treaty with Russia that decreed that China was the suzerain of Tibet [5]. China used these treaties to justify its claim that Tibet was not a sovereign state, but an autonomous region in China.

However, in the following years, China experienced internal turmoil as its Qing dynasty collapsed. The Dalai Lama, the ruler of Tibet, took advantage of the situation and expelled Chinese troops in 1912. The British again scrambled to defend their interests amid the regional instability. In 1914, at a convention in Simla, Britain and Tibet decided on a new boundary, the McMahon Line. In addition, Britain claimed some of the Himalayan region for itself (the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh). Britain and Tibet signed the treaty, but China refused, arguing that Tibet was not a sovereign state [6]. There was an obvious dispute, but Britain’s involvement in the World Wars and China’s civil war took precedence over the next decades.

Two disputed territories, Aksai Chin (left) and Arunachal Pradesh (right) continue to cause tension in India-China relations.
As the post-War era began, the border question remained in the background, at least initially. During the war, Nehru had established a good relationship with the Chairman of the Nationalist Government of China, General Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang vocally supported India’s independence movement and encouraged the British to grant it independence [7]. After this was realized in 1947, it looked as if India and China were destined to have promising relations. The war marked the end of imperial control in both countries, British in India and Japanese in China. The Europeans were out of the picture, allowing the two to reassert their ancient heritage and chart their own course into the modern era.

Chiang, though, would not be the one to lead China into the post-colonial years. After decades of civil war, the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) defeated Chiang’s government, which fled to Formosa (present-day Taiwan). The new leadership took root under the Chinese Communist Party president Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai. Despite this change, Nehru considered China a potential global partner. While India adopted a democratic form of government and China a communist one, both sought to develop without foreign influence. In that sense, Nehru thought that China could be a non-aligned ally vis-à-vis the two superpowers of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nehru also had a practical reason to court China rather than isolate it. China was larger than India, had a stronger military, and had its own ambitions to become an Asian power. If India and China went to war against each other, India would not be able to defend itself without outside help. Nehru was determined not to allow India to rely on foreign powers [8]. It was therefore more convenient for India to become an ally of China, not a rival.

Nehru’s first initiatives towards China thus embodied both optimism and realism, intending to demonstrate goodwill and even solidarity. On December 30, 1949, India became the second non-communist country to recognize the PRC [9], and it later lobbied for the PRC to hold the seat for China in the United Nations, instead of Chiang’s Republic of China government in Formosa [10]. These gestures rebuffed the Western bloc while stressing India’s support for its neighbor.
Externally, then, India and China appeared to be united against the lines drawn by the Cold War. Internally, though, each country desired to assert itself as a capable power. That meant a confrontation with one of the lasting relics of the colonial past, the unresolved border.

Both countries took a different approach to the issue. India wanted to keep the land and trade benefits it had held as part of the British Empire, so it accepted the de facto borders that had previously been established by the Johnson and McMahon Lines [11]. It subsequently kept the border regions of Assam and Sikkim, and part of the Himalayas, the latter of which became known as the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA); it furthermore expected to uphold all of the trading privileges that Tibet had allotted to Britain [12]. The Tibetans protested but ultimately could not eject the Indians.

Mao and Zhou shared Nehru’s contempt of foreign influence, but their interpretation of such nationalism was to completely reject all of the boundaries imposed by the European imperialists. They saw Nehru’s acceptance of the colonial boundaries hypocritical [13]. Nehru had fought for independence from the British Empire but was upholding the territorial status quo. He now proclaimed himself a leader of the non-aligned, post-colonial Asia but was using Western, imperial claims to assert India’s status. To China, these paradoxes cast doubt on Nehru’s commitment to a “resurgent Asia.” When Nehru declared his support for the old boundaries, China initially remained silent, saying that the Tibet question was not urgent at the moment and that China had “no time to study the solution [14].” Nehru, for his part, saw China’s silence as acceptance of India’s claim.

The reality was that China had all but rejected his stance. Anxious to quell any potential separatist movements, China invaded Tibet in 1950 and easily annexed it in 1951, Tibet being in no position to resist. The Indian prime minister found himself in a difficult position. India had economic ties to Tibet, which the Chinese presence now threatened. Furthermore, Nehru had avowed to rid Asia of imperialism, which the takeover of Tibet arguably exhibited. Accepting China’s actions without protest could thwart Nehru’s hopes of becoming a true post-colonial leader.

Map of Tibet

Moreover, members of his own Congress Party called for a harder stance on China. Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel feared that China had imperialistic intentions, and that Tibet was only its first conquest. He argued that India should do all that it could to build up a strong defense against it: “[China] is united and strong . . . In the guise of ideological expansion lies concealed racial, national, or historical claims [15].” Patel specifically worried that the unresolved borders would become China’s next focus. For him and others, Nehru’s idealism and dreams of a “resurgent Asia” facilitated by India and China seemed unrealistic. China’s territorial pursuits showed that it was not committed to ending imperialism in Asia after all. It was a rising power in the region, and it wanted to be the main power in the region. Instead of trying to win over China, some believed, India should prepare to resist it.

Nehru had already acknowledged that China was a rising power, but he feared military confrontation. Much to the dismay of Patel and others in Parliament, Nehru gave a muted response. In a diplomatic note to Premier Zhou, Nehru criticized the invasion of Tibet and said that China had “acted rather foolishly [16].” Then, so as not to anger the Chinese, he accepted Zhou’s reply that “the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of China [17]” and made an effort to support China on the world stage. At the United Nations, he continued to lobby for the PRC’s seat and voted against labeling it as the aggressor of the Korean War [18]. Nehru’s actions embodied both his optimism for good relations and his determination to avoid war with his larger, more populous neighbor. Either way, strained relations were not in India’s national interest. As he affirmed:

I have always thought that it is important, even essential if you like, that these two countries of Asia, India and China, should have friendly and as far as possible cooperative relations [19].

In Nehru’s point of view, Tibet’s defeat was the price to pay for friendly, cooperative relations. For India’s sake, it was better to accept the invasion rather than risk war by coming to Tibet’s defense. In 1954, Nehru recognized Tibet as a part of China and called for “peaceful negotiations adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty [20].” On April 29, 1954, he and Zhou signed the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India, more commonly known as the Panchsheel Agreement. Panchsheel had two components -- a preamble, which established “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” and the body, which outlined regulations for Indo-Tibetan trade and rights for Indian and Tibetan pilgrims [21]. This agreement accepted the Chinese position on Tibet, but it also produced an idealistic framework for future cooperation between India and China. That framework, the “Five Principles” found in the preamble, remains the most cited part of Panchsheel. The Five Principles called for:

Mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty
Mutual non-aggression
Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs
Equality and mutual benefit
Peaceful coexistence [22].

Nehru and Zhou vowed to uphold those principles while building stronger relations. Nehru, for his part, was optimistic that the close ties and cooperation espoused by the agreement would be the basis for his “resurgent Asia,” a strong and peaceful Asian voice on the world stage. “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai” became the motto of Panchsheel [23]. It embodied both the physical border between the countries as well as Nehru’s hopes that they could jointly become the leaders of a rising Asia.
The physical border quickly proved itself to be the greatest obstacle to Panchsheel’s realization. Each side wanted to resolve it, and in its own favor. Just a few months after signing Panchsheel, Nehru commissioned new maps of India that included Aksai Chin as Indian territory. When he visited China in October 1954, he brought up the border question to Zhou, who had seen the maps. Zhou did not appear outraged at India’s claims, but acknowledged that China had many unsettled borders with its neighbors and thus had “no basis for fixing the boundary lines [24].” For the time being, the “mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty” of Panchsheel amounted to recognition of the issue but no urgency to settle it permanently. That passivity would reap severe consequences on Sino-Indian relations in the decades to come.

In the mid-1950s, China began constructing National Highway 219 in Aksai Chin, a military road linking Tibet with the Chinese province of Xinjiang [25]. Zhou approved the road, despite the Indian maps and despite Zhou’s seeming indifference to setting a boundary. India itself had not paid much attention to the remote region and only discovered the Chinese road when it was featured in a 1958 map published by China’s official magazine, China Pictorial. This map not only claimed Aksai Chin for China, but the NEFA as well [26]. Zhou justified the map with the same position that China had always held: The Johnson and McMahon lines were illegal and imposed by imperial Britain; China had never accepted them, and China never would accept them

Nehru protested but was still reluctant to forcefully respond. He and Zhou continued to communicate but did not come close to a resolution.

Events in Tibet made a resolution all the more unlikely, anyway. In 1956, Buddhist monks angry with China’s land redistribution policy rebelled. China’s army, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), finally squashed it in 1959, as the Dalai Lama fled to India. The Chinese accused India of interfering in its domestic affairs, though Nehru assured them that the Dalai Lama would not be accorded political powers. This did not ameliorate the uproar, particularly as members of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) were demanding that India ally with the United States to free Tibet from Chinese expansionism [28]. The goodwill from Panchsheel eroded amid the tensions, and both countries erected more border posts as a warning. Since the borders had never been bilaterally demarcated to begin with, the stage was set for the physical conflict that Nehru had tried to avoid.

Soon enough, skirmishes did start to occur. An October 20, 1959 confrontation in Kongka La, Aksai Chin, resulted in the death of nine Indian soldiers and the capture of seven [29]. Public opinion in India expressed outrage against China, and Nehru’s political opposition blasted the government’s inaction. Vajpayee, by now a rising figure in the BJS, led the opposition in demanding Nehru to release a White Paper documenting all government contact with China [30]. Facing increasing pressure, the government complied.

When the White Paper was released, Parliament was stunned by the extent of China’s territorial claims and was all the more infuriated with Nehru’s inaction. Most vocal in its anger was the BJS, whose president urged a counterattack against the Chinese: “[India’s] self-interests and honour demand early and effective action to free the Indian soil from Chinese aggression [31].” To nationalist party members such as Vajpayee, India’s security was at stake, and the Chinese needed to be stopped before it became too late. Patel’s warning from nearly a decade earlier was proving true. India’s leadership had allowed it to become the next target of expansionist China.

The anti-China feeling in both Parliament and the Indian public compelled Nehru to act. His first measure was to employ what would be termed his “Forward Policy,” the placement of Indian troops in military posts within the disputed areas. However, that policy proved ineffective because the posts were poorly equipped. While the PLA had trucks and automatic rifles, the Indian Army moved by foot and used World War I-era rifles [32]. His next step was to invite Zhou to Delhi for negotiations. Many in the BJS feared that negotiations would cost India some of its territory, and the party held a protest in front of Nehru’s home just five days before the Chinese premier arrived [33]. The talks produced no resolution, as the two sides failed to agree on a common border.

As the talks with China stalemated and pressure from the opposition mounted, the Indian prime minister increased the posts in the disputed areas and made Chinese withdrawal from Aksai Chin the precondition for any future negotiation with China [34]. His harder stance was emboldened by India’s 1961 takeover of Goa, a tiny Portuguese colony on India’s west coast. It was a symbolic victory that gave a sense of invincibility. If India could easily defeat the last European imperialist on the subcontinent, it could surely defeat the first new Asian imperialist. In fact, the Goa success was drastically exaggerated. The Portuguese were even more poorly equipped than the Indians (one battalion fought in gym shoes), and had withdrawn without much of a fight. However, patriotism overshadowed reality and inspired confidence against the Chinese. Home Minister Lal Baladur Shastri swore that “[i]f the Chinese will not vacate the areas India will have to repeat what she did in Goa [35].”

India’s tougher position did not persuade China to reverse its own course. The Goa takeover confirmed to them that Nehru was the next Asian imperialist. Just as Patel and others had feared that Tibet would be the first step in Chinese empire-building, the Chinese feared that Goa was the first step in Indian empire-building. Unlike India, though, the Chinese were prepared to act decisively.

On October 10, 1962, the PLA surprised India with an attack in the NEFA. The Indian Army was caught off-guard and totally unprepared. His troops still fighting with antiquated weapons, Nehru asked the United States for military equipment [36]. On November 20, after six weeks of bloody combat and ultimately a Chinese victory in both the NEFA and Aksai Chin, a ceasefire was declared. China kept Aksai Chin and gave the NEFA (which later became the state of Arunachal Pradesh) to India, and both sides retreated 20 kilometers behind what was called the Line of Actual Control, the line that continues to serve as the India-China border today [37]. Despite conceding the NEFA, China emerged as the clear winner. While China had captured almost 4,000 Indian soldiers, India had been unable to take a single Chinese prisoner-of-war [38].

The Sino-Indian War of 1962 was a serious blow for India, which had lost men, territory, and prestige. Nehru was humiliated. Accepting Tibet, supporting China internationally, and pledging to cooperate for “peaceful coexistence” ultimately failed to prevent war. His hopes of a “resurgent Asia” collapsed, as the two Asian powers became enemies. His vision of an India completely independent from the superpowers was also challenged when he asked for and accepted US aid against China – which still could not carry India to victory. Nehru was not alone in his humiliation. For nationalists like Vajpayee, it was certainly a low point for Indian prestige, underlining how far India still had to go before it could be considered a power.

Skirmishes, Visits, and a Smiling Buddha

In the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War, relations between the two countries remained cold. The bitter feelings from the war were compounded by nuclear developments and Cold War alignments.

Soon after the ceasefire was declared in 1962, the BJS began to push a nuclear agenda. Embarrassed by the Indian Army’s apparent weaknesses, the BJS adamantly wanted to develop a strong defense, particularly against China, which was rapidly solidifying its military advantage. The Chinese had previously received assistance from the Soviet Union for constructing a nuclear program, and most observers felt that it would only be a matter of time before China acquired a nuclear weapon. Sure enough, China conducted its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964.

More disturbing to India was China’s lean towards Pakistan. China and Pakistan had had their own border disputes, but the Sino-Indian War motivated the two countries to cooperate against their common enemy. They soon resolved their dispute, and China began to take Pakistan’s side in any Indo-Pakistani conflict. From 1965 on, Pakistan received the largest amount of Chinese aid, which took the form of money, missiles, and nuclear technology. As South Asian expert Stephen P. Cohen noted, “Pakistan is China’s Israel [40].” India was infuriated with China’s support for Pakistan, but, militarily, India had no options.

In this context, Vajpayee led the BJS in calling for a motion in the Lok Sabha that supported developing nuclear weapons in India. It failed, but Vajpayee received much attention and support [41]. India found itself surrounded by security threats, and it did not want to be as vulnerable as it had been in 1962. The momentum to go nuclear increased, and in 1974, Operation Smiling Buddha, approved by Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi, marked India’s entrance into nuclear capabilities.

While India’s nuclear tests annoyed China, the source of most ill-will during the 1970s was its cooperation with the Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet relations had collapsed more than a decade earlier, as ideological differences wedged the two communist countries apart. In the late 1950s, the Soviets halted all nuclear assistance to China and pulled out its economic advisors. In the 1960s, the Soviets also fought a border war with China along the Amur and Ussuri rivers [42]. China began to pursue warmer relations with the US soon after, and both countries supported Pakistan in the 1971 war. Although Nehru had intended for India to remain independent of Cold War divisions, the circumstances encouraged Indo-Soviet cooperation. The Soviets supported India in its conflicts with Pakistan, in addition to supplying industrial assistance. The cooperation was reaffirmed in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation [43]. Instead of unity, the two Asian countries were falling into the very Cold War poles that they had avowed to avoid.

When the Cold War dynamics were removed, though, Sino-Indian relations improved slightly. The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan created a rift in its relations with India, removing one barrier to cooperation. At the same time, China was in the process of reform under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Deng wanted to modernize the Chinese economy and open it up to foreign trade. He was thus willing to pursue better relations with India. In February 1979, Minister of External Affairs Vajpayee made the first high-level trip to China since Vice President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in 1958 [44]. The fact that Vajpayee was even in China at all was notable, having been a staunch China critic in Parliament and profoundly upset by the 1962 defeat. But Prime Minister Desai wanted to establish “genuine non-alignment:” While keeping good ties with the Soviets, India would seek better relations with China, moving away from Indira Gandhi’s pro-Soviet lean [45].


Vajpayee appeared cognizant of the changing geopolitical environment and relaxed his previously hard-line stance against China. He asserted that India’s foreign policy should be “capable of replying to changing situations in the world [46]” and was willing to reach out to China if it was in India’s best interest. Nonetheless, nobody expected a major breakthrough in the longstanding border conflict; Vajpayee himself called the trip a “probing mission [47].” Still, the visit was acknowledged by both sides as a change from the past and a possible step forward to the future.
As predicted, the “probing mission” did not solve the core differences between the two countries, but Vajpayee did achieve some positive results. He had been able to procure pilgrimage rights for Indians to Mt. Kailash and Lake Mansarovar, Hindu holy sites located in Tibet that had been closed by Chinese authorities after the Dalai Lama’s flight in 1959 [48]. Vajpayee also reprimanded Deng for China’s pro-Pakistan stance, saying that it only created “an additional and unnecessary complication to the prospects of Sino-Indian relations.” The very next year, Deng publicly called the Kashmir conflict a “bilateral dispute,” thereby lessening its overwhelming support for Pakistan [49]. The visit progressed until China suddenly invaded Vietnam on February 17, which came as a surprise and an embarrassment to India [50]. The abrupt invasion reminded Vajpayee of the unexpected invasion in 1962. Once again, India had been caught off guard by the Chinese despite India’s efforts to cooperate.

In 1962, it was Nehru who had seen his diplomatic efforts end in unexpected war; in 1979, it was Vajpayee who was stunned by Chinese incursions. He canceled the rest of the trip out of protest, and his departure marked the last time a high-level Indian representative would visit China for nearly a decade.

Nevertheless, the geopolitical realties of the time dissuaded both governments from breaking ties. The Soviet Union was weakening and no longer a reliable supporter or a barrier to relations. India still could not challenge China militarily, and without a sufficient ally in the region, needed to continue diplomatic relations with its neighbor if it wanted to prevent war. Visits continued throughout the 1980s; although they were limited to ministers and envoys, and still did not settle the border issue, they did keep India and China in contact rather than at war.
Cordial relations almost ended in 1986 when border clashes broke out again, this time in the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. Both sides increased their number of troops and patrols. India asked the Soviet Union for support, but none came. Instead, Deng Xiaoping sent Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi a message via US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger: Unless India stopped “nibbling” at Chinese territory, China would “teach India a lesson [51].” Gandhi took the message seriously and called for intense, bilateral discussions to resolve the crisis. In December 1988, he made the first trip to China by an Indian prime minister since his grandfather Nehru. He and Deng made remarkable progress, re-emphasizing the Five Principles of Panchsheel and committing to more bilateral cooperation. Gandhi’s visit produced two joint working groups specifically for the border issues, calls for increased trade and cultural exchange, and agreements to cooperate in civil aviation, science, and technology [52]. For Sino-Indian relations, this was a definite breakthrough from the past. While it still did not answer the border question, it fostered closer ties that would be harder to break.

The relationship continued to strengthen, with Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to India in 1991 and Indian President Ramaswami Venkataraman’s visit to China in 1992. But the next milestone came with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s 1993 visit to China. The countries signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), whereupon both sides agreed to respect the LAC, reduce troop levels, and increase bilateral talks to address the border issue [53].

This was followed by the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC, which called for further troop reductions and a pledge to not use military force against the other side [54]. Knowing that the border issue would be difficult to resolve, the countries opted for such treaties to lessen the chance of military conflict. The agreements continued the bilateral progress, but when Vajpayee became Prime Minister in 1998 and approved the nuclear tests at Pokhran, Sino-Indian relations faced a new challenge.

371 F IN THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

THE CONSTITUTION (THIRTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1975


Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution
(Thirty-eighth Amendment) Bill, 1975 which was enacted as
the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

The Sikkim Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on the 10th
April, 1975 which, inter alia, noted the persistent harmful activities
of the Chogyal which were aimed at undermining the responsible
democratic Government set up under the provisions of the May 8
Agreement of 1973 and the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974. The
Resolution declared that the Assembly had satisfied itself that these
activities of the Chogyal not only violated the objectives of the
Agreement of May 8, 1973, but also ran counter to the wishes of the
people of Sikkim and impeded their democratic development and
participation in the political and economic life of India.
Accordingly the Assembly solemnly declared and resolved that "The
institution of the Chogyal is hereby abolished and Sikkim shall
henceforth be a constituent unit of India, enjoying a democratic and
fully responsible Government".

2. The Assembly also resolved that this Resolution be submitted to
the people of Sikkim forthwith for their approval. A special opinion
poll conducted by the Government of Sikkim on the 14th April, 1975
resulted in a total of 59,637 votes in favour and 1,496 votes against
the Resolution out of a total electorate of approximately 97,000.

3. The result of this poll was communicated to the Government of
India by the Chief Minister of Sikkim on the 15th April, 1975. The
Chief Minister on behalf of the Council of Ministers strongly
requested the Government of India to make an immediate response and
accept the above decision, taking, as has been requested in the
Assembly Resolution of the 10th April, 1975, such measures as may be
necessary and appropriate to implement the decision as early as
possible.

4. The Chief Minister and other Ministers of Sikkim also visited New
Delhi on the 16th-17th April, 1975 and urged the Government of India
to take immediate action in this behalf.

5. Accordingly, it is proposed to include Sikkim as a full-fledged
State in the First Schedule to the Constitution and to allot to Sikkim
one seat in the Council of States and one seat in the House of the
People. It is also proposed to insert a new article containing the
provisions considered necessary to meet the special circumstances and
needs of Sikkim.

6. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.


NEW DELHI; Y. B. CHAVAN.

The 19th April, 1975.



THE CONSTITUTION (THIRTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1975


[16th May, 1975.]


An Act further to amend the Constitution of India.


BE it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-sixth Year of the Republic
of India as follows:-

1. Short title and commencement.-(1) This Act may be called the
Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975.

(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the date_668 on
which the Bill for this Act [introduced in the House of the People as
the Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Bill, 1975], as passed by
the House of the People, is passed by the Council of States.

2. Amendment of First Schedule.-In the First Schedule to the
Constitution, under the heading "I. THE STATES", after entry 21, the
following entry shall be inserted namely:-

"22. Sikkim The territories which immediately before the
commencement of the Constitution
(Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, were
comprised in Sikkim.".

3. Insertion of new article 371F.-After article 371E of the
Constitution, the following article shall be inserted, namely:-

"371F. Special provisions with respect to the State of Sikkim.-
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-

(a) the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall consist of
not less than thirty members;

(b) as from the date of commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereafter in this article referred to as the
appointed day)-

(i) the Assembly for Sikkim formed as a result of the elections held
in Sikkim in April, 1974 with thirty-two members elected in the said
elections (hereinafter referred to as the sitting members) shall be
deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly
constituted under this Constitution;

(ii) the sitting members shall be deemed to the members of the
Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly elected under this
Constitution; and

(iii) the said Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall
exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Legislative
Assembly of a State under this Constitution;

(c) in the case of the Assembly deemed to be the Legislative Assembly
of the State of Sikkim under clause (b), the references to the period
of five years in clause (1) of article 172 shall be construed as
references to a period of four years and the said period of four years
shall be deemed to commence from the appointed day;

(d) until other provisions are made by Parliament by law, there shall
be allotted to the State of Sikkim one seat in the House of the People
and the State of Sikkim shall form one parliamentary constituency to
be called the parliamentary constituency for Sikkim;

(e) the representative of the State of Sikkim in the House of the
People in existence on the appointed day shall be elected by the
members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim;

(f) Parliament may, for the purpose of protecting the rights and
interests of the different sections of the population of Sikkim make
provision for the number of seats in the Legislative Assembly of the
State of Sikkim which may be filled by candidates belonging to such
sections and for the delimitation of the assembly constituencies from
which candidates belonging to such sections alone may stand for
election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim;

(g) the Governor of Sikkim shall have special responsibility for peace
and for an equitable arrangement for ensuring the social and economic
advancement of different sections of the population of Sikkim and in
the discharge of his special responsibility under this clause, the
Governor of Sikkim shall, subject to such directions as the President
may, from time to time, deem fit to issue, act in his discretion;

(h) all property and assets (whether within or outside the territories
comprised in the State of Sikkim) which immediately before the
appointed day were vested in the Government of Sikkim or in any other
authority or in any person for the purposes of the Government of
Sikkim shall, as from the appointed day, vest in the Government of the
State of Sikkim;

(i) the High Court functioning as such immediately before the
appointed day in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim
shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed to be the High Court
for the State of Sikkim;

(j) all courts of civil, criminal and revenue jurisdiction, all
authorities and all officers, judicial, executive and ministerial,
throughout the territory of the State of Sikkim shall continue on and
from the appointed day to exercise their respective functions subject
to the provisions of this Constitution;

(k) all laws in force immediately before the appointed day in the
territories comprised in the State of Sikkim or any part thereof shall
continue to be in force therein until amended or repealed by a
competent Legislature or other competent authority;

(l) for the purpose of facilitating the application of any such law as
is referred to in clause (k) in relation to the administration of the
State of Sikkim and for the purpose of bringing the provisions of any
such law into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the
President may, within two years from the appointed day, by order, make
such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of
repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon,
every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and
modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall
not be questioned in any court of law;

(m) neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have
jurisdiction in respect of any dispute or other matter arising out of
any treaty, agreement, engagement or other similar instrument relating
to Sikkim which was entered into or executed before the appointed day
and to which the Government of India or any of its predecessor
Governments was a party, but nothing in this clause shall be construed
to derogate from the provisions of article 143;

(n) the President may, by public notification, extend with such
restrictions or modifications as he thinks fit to the State of Sikkim
any enactment which is in force in a State in India at the date of the
notification;

(o) if any difficulty arises in giving effect to any of the foregoing
provisions of this article, the President may, by order, do anything
(including any adaptation or modification of any other article) which
appears to him to be necessary for the purpose of removing that
difficulty:

Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of two
years from the appointed day;

(p) all things done and all actions taken in or in relation to the
State of Sikkim or the territories comprised therein during the period
commencing on the appointed day and ending immediately before the date
on which the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, receives
the assent of the President shall, in so far as they are in conformity
with the provisions of this Constitution as amended by the
Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, be deemed for all
purposes to have been validly done or taken under this Constitution as
so amended.".

4. Amendment of Fourth Schedule.-In the Fourth Schedule to the
Constitution, in the Table,-

(a) after entry 21, the following entry shall be inserted, namely:---

"22. Sikkim 1";

(b) existing entries 22 to 25 shall be renumbered as entries 23 to 26
respectively;

(c) for the figures "231", the figures "232" shall be substituted.

5. Consequential amendments.-The following consequential amendments
shall be made in the Constitution, namely:-

(a) article 2A shall be omitted;

(b) in article 80, in clause (1), the words and figure "Subject to the
provisions of paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule," shall be omitted;

(c) in article 81, in clause (1), the words and figure "and paragraph
4 of the Tenth Schedule" shall be omitted;

(d) the Tenth Schedule shall be omitted.




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VP SPEAKS ON CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT IN INDIA'S NEIGHBOURHOOD'

Vice President addresses International seminar on ‘changing political context in India’s Neighbourhood’
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5 NOV 2008

The Vice President of India Shri M. Hamid Ansari has said that our political commitment to closer ties with our neighbours in South-Asia is serious. India’s security interests are better served if our neighbours evolve as viable states with moderate and stable political and social environments and vibrant economies. Delivering key note address at the International Seminar on ‘Changing Political Context in India’s Neighbourhood: Prospects of Regional Security and Cooperation’ jointly organized by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) here today, he said that we wished to see South Asia at peace with itself, leading to ever widening circles of security, peace and prosperity in the region.

He said that experience elsewhere in the world shows that political constraints need not be permanent barriers to economic cooperation and the later could help create a climate of opinion to resolve conflicts.

He expressed his concern that the Human Development Indices of most countries of South Asia are not flattering and it would be a miracle if the targets of the Millennium Development Goals are achieved. Yet, economic growth has continued as most of the South Asian Countries have liberalized and moved towards market economies. Regional Cooperation has made headway within the framework of SAARC which itself has expanded to include Afghanistan as well as nine observers.

He commended that the new initiatives on the operationlisation of the SAARC Food Bank, establishment of the SAARC Development Fund, setting up of the South Asian University, launching of negotiations to bring serves into SAFTA and signing of the Convention of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters are significant for regional integration.

Following is the text of the Vice President’s address:

“I feel privileged to be here amidst such a distinguished audience. Over the years the IDSA has provided the impulse for such gatherings of scholars and analysts. The end products add to the compendium of knowledge. The attention of this conference, I understand, would be on dimensions of change in South Asia and its possible implications. The logic of geography is compelling. For India, the neighbourhood radiates in concentric circles, buttressed by history, cultural affinities and economic necessities.

Our political commitment to closer ties with our neighbours in South Asia is serious. India’s security interests are better served if our neighbours evolve as viable states with moderate and stable political and social environments and vibrant economies. We wish to see South Asia at peace with itself, leading to ever widening circles of security, peace and prosperity in the region.

The theme of this seminar is twofold: security and regional cooperation. Both need to be understood in themselves as also in their mutual relationship. Their logical manifestations could be (1) security exclusively in national terms (2) regional security cooperation (3) regional economic cooperation and (4) a mix of all these resulting in comprehensive security. In terms of linkages, it would be valid to ask if the perceived regional economic cooperation is to be the first step in our quest for regional security cooperation, or vice versa.

Perceptions, as this audience is well aware, have changed overtime. At one point security in the conventional sense offered a menu of choices in regard to security cooperation and suggested options ranging from alliances to collective security, security regimes and security communities. At a later stage, frameworks for communication and dialogue emerged. Each of these was experimented with; results varied from region to region.

Regional economic cooperation has tended to be influenced by a set of factors relating to intra-regional relations and convergence of political interests and cultural compatibility. The potential for economic cooperation is stymied when historic fears cloud security perceptions.

South Asia presents a varied picture towards the end of 2008. In some areas, forces of change are resonating noticeably. Bhutan has opted for a new system of governance through a constitutional monarchy. Change is the message of the election in Maldives last week. Nepal has witnessed historic transition from a monarchy to a democratic republic with a new leadership, and a new constitution in the offing. Pakistan has reverted to civilian rule with a new Parliament and a democratically elected President.

Less specific are the readings on Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The former seeks a return to constitutional democracy and the latter an end to internecine strife.

The conflict in Afghanistan remains a source of considerable concern and calls for innovative solutions premised on national unity.

India, having registered rapid growth in recent years, is itself moving into a period of state and national elections.

The move towards popular and democratically elected governments in South Asia, however, has not eclipsed the existing challenges to governance in all the countries of the region. Poverty and economic disparities coupled with ethnic and social divisions have created political and social fault lines that have been exploited by non-state actors with their own agendas.

Human Development indices of most countries of South Asia are not flattering and it would a miracle if the targets of the Millennium Development Goals are achieved. Yet, economic growth has continued as most of the South Asian countries have liberalised and moved towards market economies. Regional cooperation has made headway within the framework of SAARC which itself has expanded to include Afghanistan as well as nine observers.

New initiatives on the operationalisation of the SAARC Food Bank, establishment of the SAARC Development Fund, setting up of the South Asian University, the launching of negotiations to bring services into SAFTA and signing of the Convention of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters are significant for regional integration.

The question that one must ask is whether the changed and changing political context in many SAARC countries would confine itself to domestic politics or go beyond it to develop a changed context for security and economic cooperation with India? In other words, do the new political elites in our neighbourhood harbour a new paradigm of bilateral and regional cooperation?

We have to admit that the traditional pattern of bilateral state-to-state relations has already been transformed in varying degrees as a result of globalisation. Governments today do not control information or patterns of human interaction. Across the region, we see a web of connectivities between political actors, media centres, civil society organisations and commercial entities. Common people freely exchange views and ideas on their governments and their lives.

The prospects of security and economic cooperation are thus correlated to the ability of States to broad-base their relations beyond the traditional frameworks.

Let me venture to summarise some overarching themes that characterise the emergence of this new political context.

First, there is recognition of the importance of good relations with India and an advocacy for closer economic and political relations. There is also a desire for updating, where relevant, the existing instrumentalities of such cooperation to reflect the new ground level realities. The question for renegotiating existing treaties has been raised in this context.

Second, India on its part has tried - incrementally and non-reciprocally - to incentives economic cooperation through confidence building measures. As a result, some in our neighbourhood have begun to feel that a prosperous and economically vibrant India is an opportunity for them to reap both economic and political benefits.

Third, political elites are increasingly emphasising that the desired economic outcomes transcend investments, growth or development. The focus is on the human development of people, the quality of the lives of citizens and even Gross National Happiness!

Fourth, all countries in South Asia realise that globalisation would be meaningless without the improvement of intra-regional connectivities. Informal trade and third country trade is still predominant with formal intra-regional trade constituting under 5% of South Asia’s overall trade.

On the other hand, negative security perceptions continue to cloud cooperation in tackling trans-national and cross-boundary issues. These include security concerns such as terrorism, drug-trafficking and money laundering, as well as economic and developmental issues such as food, water, climate change and energy security.

Some initiatives need to be mentioned. India has taken the lead in building infrastructure for intra-regional trade in the full knowledge that the economic importance of intra-regional trade is considerable for the smaller regional economies. Taking the theme of connectivity forward, the SAARC Transport Ministers identified specific corridors for implementation linking Nepal, Bhutan, India and Bangladesh. A draft Motor Vehicles Agreement and a draft Railway Agreement are also being negotiated.

The expectation is that cross-border trucking and container movements, improved regional air and rail links and upgraded customs and trade facilitation would knit our neighbourhood in a network of mutually beneficial economic partnerships contributing to long term political and social stability.

Such partnerships are the need of the hour and can help address problems that cannot be solved nationally. Two instances of these lie in (i) rivers and flood control; and (ii) energy generation, energy trade and energy transit. Both are critical to the achievement of development goals of the countries of South Asia.

Experience elsewhere in the world shows that political constraints need not be permanent barriers to economic cooperation and that the latter could help create a climate of opinion to resolve conflicts.

We live in times of great change. The challenges we confront overflow national frontiers. The public in South Asia has, in diverse ways, signalled its impatience with the politics of the status quo. This is most evident in the younger generation. It is now for the governments to think innovatively and encapsulate this impulse in national policies.

History is witness to occasions when bold thinking has led to creativity. Why should South Asia be an exception and remain embedded in the unproductive routine and ritual of six decades?

Would it then be altogether unrealistic to hope that South Asian cooperation would seek to achieve the following?

• Free travel and trade across frontiers, a euro-style single currency, environmentally sustainable and regionally balanced development.

• Security coordination resulting in Joint action on crime and terror.

• Speak with a single voice and work closely together on trade issues and development policy.

• Develop a mechanism for dispute resolution.

• Coordinate approaches on major foreign and defence policy questions?

The meandering River of Time is mighty and can flow in many directions. The answers to the above questions lie in harnessing it for common good and regional betterment. The analyst should go beyond identifying the obstacles and pitfalls to suggesting solutions. I venture to hope that today’s conclave would be part of such an effort. I thank Mr. Sisodia for inviting me today. I wish the Seminar all success”.

sOURCE: pib)