30 Dec 2008
Bangladesh’s former prime minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed won the country’s first election since 2001 in a landslide on Tuesday, crushing her bitter rival to retake power.
The Election Commission said Hasina’s Awami League party had won 231 of the 297 seats in Parliament counted so far, giving her an overwhelming win in Monday’s vote with just a few results still to be tallied. “She has a clear majority to govern without any other party,” commission spokesman S.M. Asaduzzaman said.
Her rival Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which won the last election in 2001 by a huge margin, got only 27 seats in the ballot that ended an army-backed caretaker government’s two-year rule.
“There have been a lot of irregularities,” BNP spokesman Rizvi Ahmed said. “Our supporters have been kept from voting, and our polling agents and officials have been barred from performing their duties.” The Islamic party Jamaat-e-Islami, the BNP’s key partner, was way down on the 17 seats it garnered in 2001, winning just two this time.
Sheikh Hasina and Zia, known as the battling begums, ruled alternately from 1991 until the interim government was installed, and their bitter personal rivalry has been blamed for paralysing political life in the country.
The caretaker regime made efforts to shake up the system, and went so far as to jail both women for corruption, but agreed to release them to contest the election.
Newspapers hailed Sheikh Hasina’s performance, with the Englishlanguage Daily Star describing the win as “stunning” proof that the country was “hungry for change”.
A UN-funded digital electoral roll, which eliminated 12.7 million fake names, appeared to have put a lid on the widespread vote rigging seen in previous polls, observers said.
The election attracted a record voter turnout of 85%, with the figure reaching 90% in rural areas, the Elec tion Commission said.
Tuesday, 30 December 2008
Saturday, 27 December 2008
Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India
Jing-dong Yuan | Bio | 30 Nov 2008
World Politics Review
Sino-Indian relations have registered significant progress in the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi have engaged in a series of summit meetings, frequent high-level visits, joint anti-terrorism training exercises between the two militaries, and fast-growing bilateral trade. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to China in January 2008, the two countries issued a joint document on a Shared Vision for the 21st Century, pledging to promote a harmonious world of peace and stability and further strengthen the Sino-Indian Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. These developments have encouraged analysts across the Himalaya to talk about the return of the 1950s Panchsheel and the prospects of "Chindia" in the coming decades.
A closer look at Chinese perspectives on India's rise is therefore warranted, as well as an assessment of both the promises of further cooperation and the potential pitfalls of conflict in the coming years, as the two rising Asian powers continue their upward trajectory toward great-power status. Given their combined human resources and economic potentials, their shared past experiences and newfound paths to development, prosperity, and power, the two countries can make important contributions to regional and global peace. At the same time, unresolved territorial disputes, mutual suspicions of each other's intentions, and other contentious issues could threaten the sustainability and continuing improvement of a critical bilateral relationship.
From Normalization to Strategic Partnership
Sino-Indian relations suffered a serious setback after the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests as New Delhi justified its action by alleging that the so-called China threats were the main reason why it went nuclear. The strong Chinese reactions and Beijing's active diplomatic campaigns to isolate India eventually led New Delhi to seek rapprochement.[1] Sino-Indian relations gradually thawed. In June 2003, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid an official visit to China, the first in over a decade. Since then, Beijing and New Delhi not only have declared that neither country would view the other as a security threat, they also have elevated their relationship to one of strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and stability. During Chinese President Hu Jintao's November 2006 visit to India, the two countries adopted a ten-point strategy to further strengthen the bilateral relationship, accompanied by over a dozen agreements on trade, investment, energy cooperation, and cultural and educational exchanges. Beijing now views its relationship with India one of global and strategic importance that is long-term, all-round, and stable.[2]
This optimistic view of the bilateral relationship and its future prospects is shared or at least publicly echoed by Chinese and Indian officials, with both governments actively promoting full-fledged developments in political, economic, and security spheres. Both Beijing and New Delhi support a multipolar world and oppose unilateralism; they also hold common positions on issues ranging from the environment and climate change to global trade. Sino-Indian strategic dialogue, anti-terrorism consultation, and energy cooperation have further enhanced confidence and trust between the two countries and strengthened their strategic and cooperative partnership.[3]
The most noticeable progress in Sino-Indian relations, though, has been registered in growing two-way trade. From a mere $117 million in 1987, bilateral trade grew to $38.7 billion in 2007, with the two countries setting a target of $60 billion for 2010 during Prime Minister Singh's visit. In July 2006, the two countries re-opened the historical Nathu La Pass that had been close since the 1962 war to even further promote border trade.[4]
The two countries have also made progress in the area of defense cooperation. Building upon the 1993 and 1996 agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility, and developing confidence building measures in the military field, Beijing and New Delhi have in recent years expanded ties to include port calls, joint search and rescue exercises, and defense exchanges.[5] Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee's May 28-June 2, 2006 visit to China was a major milestone in Sino-Indian defense ties, signaling the two militaries' first steps towards institutionalizing bilateral military relations. The most noticeable achievement in this regard is the signing of the Sino-Indian Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation, the first such document between the two countries.[6] In addition to meeting Chinese leaders and his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Cao Gangchuan, Mukherjee also visited a number of cities and military facilities during his visit, including the Lanzhou Military Region, the first foreign defense minister to do so.[7]
Given its unique and dominating position on the subcontinent, India has always featured prominently in Beijing's South Asia strategy. During the Cold War, that strategy focused on aligning with and supporting Pakistan and developing close ties with other South Asian states to counter Indian -- and by association, Soviet -- influence in the region.[8] In recent years, India's fast economic growth and its diplomatic activism attract increasing attention from Chinese analysts. Gone are the days when China could look down upon India as a light weight and a regional power confined to South Asia. Indeed, India's rise presents serious challenges to China's security interests with regard to territorial disputes, energy security, and regional and global power realignment.[9]
The coming years will testify to whether the good will and momentum generated by the recent high-level visits can be maintained. Clearly, obstacles remain and sustained efforts at the highest political level are required to build trust between Asia's two rising powers. These include mutual suspicions and the potentials for competition and rivalry; the still unresolved territorial disputes, even though the LAC has been relatively peaceful over the last forty-six years; China's relationship with Pakistan in the regional context; and the emerging China-India-U.S. strategic triangle.[10]
Despite progress in bilateral relations over the past few years, mutual suspicions remain. This is partly due to the dynamics of the security dilemma and structural conflicts between the two Asian giants, with the lack of institutionalized and regular high-level official exchanges also playing a role.[11] The two Asian giants' continuing upward trajectory in growing economic and military power, and political influence, is bound to lead each into the other's perceived sphere of interests, meaning that conflicts may arise.[12] India has watched China's phenomenal economic and military growth with both envy and alarm. If there is one single lesson that New Delhi's security analysts drew from the 1962 war, it would be that power and strength are the only ticket to the club of great powers. For many of them, the very fact that China continues to lead India on most indicators of power poses a greater threat than its military defeat forty-six years ago.[13]
Meanwhile, China is paying close attention to India's growing military power and its nuclear and missile developments. New Delhi's successful test of the Agni-III ballistic missile further extends its ability to reach Chinese targets inland.[14] Beijing is also wary of New Delhi's eastward strategy of developing greater economic and military ties with Japan and the ASEAN countries. Indeed, the increasingly warm ties between New Delhi and Tokyo have been carefully watched by strategic analysts in Beijing.[15]
Territorial disputes remain a sensitive and occasional touchy issue between the two countries. There remain lingering suspicion and distrust, and the scar of the 1962 war has yet to be healed. The Chinese side has suggested that the Line of Actual Control (LAC), with some minor modifications, could be the starting point for negotiating a final settlement. While the appointment of special representatives during Vajpayee's 2003 visit to China was an important indication that the two governments were determined to resolve this issue, progress remains painfully slow. After twelve rounds of talks between the special representatives, the two sides remain deadlocked and no prospects of breakthrough seem to be in sight.[16]
In a recent incident, Beijing declined to issue a visa to an official from Arunachal Pradesh, stating that the official in question was a permanent resident of China's territory and therefore did not require a visa to enter China, causing New Delhi to call off the scheduled visit by a 107-member delegation of the IAS (India Administrative Service). This serves as a clear reminder that until the border disputes are settled, normalization will not be complete.[17]
While the territorial disputes remain deadlocked, they are at least manageable as any use of force to regain claims is too costly for either Beijing or New Delhi to entertain. India's growing power and its foreign policy orientation, though, are of growing strategic significance and command much closer scrutiny by Chinese analysts. The first concerns China's energy security. India occupies a unique geostrategic position in the Indian Ocean, straddling the natural junction of the busy international shipping lanes. According to Chinese analysts, since the early 1990s India has been implementing the so-called "Indian Ocean dominance strategy" by establishing absolute military supremacy over countries in the region and deterrence against major maritime powers in their attempts to extend influence and/or establish outposts in the region.[18]
Chinese analysts are particularly attentive to what they see as New Delhi's ambitions for building a blue-water navy: a fleet of 145 ocean-going surface ships by 2015, capable of operating beyond the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy has shifted from the past doctrine of active defense to a new one of offensive defense. Chinese media suggest that India has an ambitious plan to control the Strait of Malacca with its eastern naval command and the so-called Project Seabird, including the consolidation and expansion of the Kadamba naval base to control the IO. India maintains two important overseas territories: Andaman Islands and Nicobar Islands that can be used to block the Malacca Strait and control the entire Bay of Bengal. Once India controls the area, it controls the arteries of the global economy.[19]
Beijing's growing attention to the Indian Ocean has been driven by broader strategic considerations. Concerns over potential blockades against choke points in the IOR by hostile powers aside, China's Indian Ocean strategy has always been and likely will continue to be informed by its relationships with India, Pakistan, and the smaller South Asian countries. China claims the right to develop and maintain cordial relationships with states in what New Delhi may regard as its sphere of influence, through trade, investment, and military assistance. Indeed, Beijing's efforts to make inroads in South Asia mirrors New Delhi's "Look East Policy"; both reflect the two Asian powers' perceptions of each other's intents, and their pursuit of opportunities and relative power.[20]
In recent years, China has become increasingly involved in projects -- in Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, among others -- that appear to aim at developing alternative land routes for oil transports should maritime passages be disrupted.[21] Chinese activities in the IOR have drawn growing attention to and speculation about Beijing's intentions, in particular by Indian analysts.[22] Some analysts argue that China's strategy toward the Indian Ocean forms part of its grand strategy and long-term objectives of undermining U.S. influence in the region and establishing and consolidating its own.[23] They point to Chinese initiatives over the past decades, in particular Beijing's efforts to establish what has now been described as a "string of pearls" with ongoing and proposed construction of sea ports and pipelines -- a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence in Indian Ocean littorals.[24]
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Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India
Jing-dong Yuan | Bio | 30 Nov 2008
World Politics Review
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Sino-Pakistani ties continue to cast a shadow over the China-India entente, despite Beijing's efforts to address New Delhi's concerns. While China's neutrality during the 1999 Kargil crisis demonstrates a more balanced Chinese South Asia policy, that gesture has yet to translate into good will and confidence on India's part that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is not targeted at India. New Delhi remains suspicious of the so-called "all-weather" Sino-Pakistani relationship, in particular their defense cooperation -- such as the joint development of advanced fighter aircraft -- and Chinese assistance in constructing strategic port facilities for Pakistan in Gwadar.[25]
China's special ties with Pakistan have undergone noticeable changes since the end of the Cold War and in particular with the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. While in the past, strategic necessities and mutual interests led China to lend its support to Pakistan on almost all positions that Islamabad considered critical, that unconditional support no longer applies in today's much changed strategic environment. Beijing's attitude toward the Kashmir issue, for instance, reflects its changing priorities and broader security interests in South Asia. Indeed, China's Kashmir policy has come full circle: from the stance of neutrality in the early 1950s; to the pro-Pakistan position of the 1960s and 1970s; to a mixed UN resolutions plus the Simla agreement balancing act of the 1980s (as Beijing was seeking rapprochement with New Delhi but continued to maintain entente with Islamabad); to the current position, adopted since the early 1990s, on characterizing the Kashmir issue as a bilateral matter.
China's Kashmir policy must be understood within the broader contexts of its South Asia policy in general, and where this policy fits in Beijing's global strategies and its bilateral relationships with India and Pakistan in particular.[26] One of the key objectives of Beijing's post-Cold War global strategy has been to develop a peaceful environment for economic development. Within this context, China has sought to resolve contentious issues, including boundary disputes with a number of its neighboring countries, from the former Soviet Union to Vietnam. That general posture of good neighborly policy has also been applied to the South Asian region, where Beijing has sought rapprochement with India since the late 1980s.
As China re-orients its foreign policy and security posture in the post-Cold War era, with a focus on East Asia and a possible military conflict with the United States over the Taiwan Strait, it has growing interests in seeing a stable South Asia and a better relationship with India. That explains Beijing's more unequivocal position on the Kashmir issue clearly in favor of India's position. That decision is firmly grounded in the belief that the only realistic way to resolve the Kashmir conflict is through peaceful negotiation between India and Pakistan. As Islamabad's trusted friend, Beijing could and should use its influence to convince Pakistan why it is also in its interest to resolve the issue peacefully.
However, these policy shifts do not mean that Beijing is abandoning Islamabad. On the contrary, China continues to provide crucial support -- moral as well as material -- to Pakistan, for at least three reasons. First, a stable Pakistan and one that manages its relationship with India provides stability to China's southwest periphery. Second, with ethnic separatism and religious extremism on the rise in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Beijing needs the full understanding and assistance from the Pakistani government to prevent terrorist groups from using Pakistan as a training base and launch pad to undermine China's national unity. Third, as a major Muslim country, Pakistan plays a unique role in serving as a conduit to the broader Islamic world for China. Clearly, new thinking and renewed energies are needed to develop an all-round relationship that goes beyond the narrow defense linkage.[27]
Chinese security analysts are also debating the significance and implications of a warming U.S.-India relationship that spans from nuclear cooperation to the building of a so-called democracy arch. Washington and New Delhi share normative values (democracy) and strategic interests while Beijing's ties with both are more driven by contingent rather than structural interests.[28] In this context, the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the warming strategic relationship are viewed within the broader context of Washington's global strategic calculations. The Bush administration is seen as seeking to enlist India to balance against China's rapid rise. In addition, the U.S. also recognizes the value of India as an emerging market and would like to see India succeed economically as an alternative model -- based on a market economy and democracy -- to the so-called "Beijing Consensus" (i.e., economic success with relatively tight political control). This may also explain why Washington is more liberal regarding relaxation of controls on high-tech transfers to India, but not to China.[29]
Chinese analysts focus on the expansion of U.S.-India ties, in particular in the areas of defense and energy cooperation, as well as economic relations. According to Chinese analyses, the Bush administration seeks to consolidate the U.S.-India relationship by focusing on three key areas. The first involves forming a strong politico-strategic partnership by emphasizing their shared values as the world's oldest and largest democracies along with their common interests in combating global terrorism, achieving energy security, and maintaining regional stability. The second focuses on expanding bilateral trade to achieve the $50 billion target in three years. The two countries have already had extensive interdependence in software development, service outsourcing, and investments in infrastructure and manufacturing.[30]
But perhaps the most significant aspect of this growing cooperation, apart from the nuclear deal, is enhanced defense and space cooperation, and the emerging U.S.-India military ties that span from arms sales to joint military exercises. Chinese sources point to an October 2002 Pentagon report on Indo-U.S. military relations that indicates major shifts of U.S. policy toward India, defining and recognizing it as a major rising power, and helping it to achieve that status in anticipation of its endorsement of key U.S. policy objectives. These range from anti-terrorism, protection of critical sea lanes of communication, to interception of WMD-related shipment and missile defenses. During Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee's visit to the U.S. in June 2005, the Pentagon signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with India in which the U.S. would provide a broad range of defense equipment and military technologies, including fighter aircraft (F-16 and F-18) and joint research and development.[31] Chinese analysts suggest the reason for the U.S. policy change from restriction and control to one of relaxation and even preferential treatment is largely driven by a desire to balance China's growing power. At the same time, India's growing defense budget and arms acquisitions also make it an attractive customer for U.S. arms exports.[32]
Conclusion
Sino-Indian relations have experienced significant improvement over the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi are making concerted efforts to further the bilateral strategic and cooperative partnership that serves the long-term interests of both countries. From China's perspective, developing a stable relationship with India contributes to its broader policy toward South Asia and forms an integral part of its overall strategic orientation.
But Beijing is not impervious to the problems and challenges ahead. These include the need to broaden the scope and depth of strategic dialogue and continued confidence building measures to minimize and dispel mutual suspicions and threat perceptions. In particular, the two countries should seek to promote common interests through the emerging China-India-U.S. triangle rather than to take advantage of their respective bilateral ties with the world's only superpower to undermine the other's security interests. In addition, China and India should consult more on international and regional issues where they share common interests. These could include a fair and equitable international political and economic order, non-intervention, environment, disarmament, and anti-terrorism. Increasingly, the two countries are also expanding cooperation in the energy sector.
But full and complete normalization, let alone the development of the strategic and cooperative partnership between Asia's two rising powers, is possible only if China and India can set a clearly defined timetable for the resolution of the border dispute. Beijing and New Delhi must also manage well the China-India-Pakistan triangle and prevent conflicts in the Indian Ocean as both recognize the growing importance of energy security.
Dr. Jing-dong Yuan is Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and Associate Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he teaches Chinese security and foreign policy, East Asian security and arms control, and U.S. Asia Policy. He is the co-author of "China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?" (Lynne Rienners Publisher, 2003) and is currently writing a book on China's security policy since the end of the Cold War.
Photo: Chinese President Hu Jintao, November 2004. Photo by U. Dettmar for Agência Brasil. (Licensed under the Creative Commons License Attribution 2.5 Brazil license.)
Notes:
1. John W. Garver, "The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity Following India's Nuclear Tests," The China Quarterly 168 (December 2001), pp. 865-889.
2. Ambassador Zhang Yan, "Perspective on India and China-India Relations," speech at the Asia Society, June 18, 2008, Hong Kong, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t466857.htm; Cheng Ruisheng, "Prospect of China-India Relations after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Visit," China Report 44:1 (2008), p. 60.
3. Cheng Ruisheng, "Lun zhongyin zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi [On Sino-Indian Strategic and Cooperative Partnership]," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies Quarterly], no. 1 (2007), pp. 13-18.
4. Amb. Zhang, op cit.
5. P.S. Suryanarayana, "On the Right Track," Frontline, 21:9 (April 24-May 7, 2004), http://www.flonnet.com/fl2109/stories/20040507002504600.htm
6. Pallavi Aiyar, "India, China MoU on Military Ties." The Hindu. 30 May 2006. Accessed using the Foreign Broadcast Information Service www.opensource.gov, 3 July 2006.
7. "Indian defense minister visited numerous military facilities in China," Zhongguowang [www.china.org.cn], June 1, 2006, at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/HIAW/1226024.htm; Chen Jihui and Qian Feng, "Yindu fangzhang jielian fang zhongri [Indian Defense Minister Visits Japan, China]," Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], May 29, 2006, p. 2, at http://paper.people.com.cn/hqsb/html/2006-05/29/content_6001646.htm.
8. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001).
9. Zhao Gancheng, "Zhongguo dui yindu zhanlue qianxi [An Analysis of China's Strategy toward India]," Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian Studies], no. 1 (2008), pp. 3-8.
10. Gareth Price, "China and India: Cooperation and Competition," Asia Programme Briefing Paper, Chatham House, May 2007, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/download/-/id/474; Zhang Guihong, "Sino-Indian Security Relations: Bilateral Issues, External Factors and Regional Implications," South Asian Survey 12:1 (2005), pp. 61-74.
11. John W. Garver, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations," India Review 1:4 (October 2002), pp.1-38; David Scott, "Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century," Asian Security 4:3 (2008), pp. 244-270; Han Hua, "Youhao linbang heshi anquan weixie—zhongyin ruhe kandai duifang [Good Neighbor or Security Threat: How China and India View Each Other]," Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies] 73 (2002), pp.6-13.
12. Jaideep Saikia, "Quest for a Chindian Arc: Leadership in the Asian Century," Defense & Security Analysis 22:4 (December 2006), pp. 421-434; Greg Sheridan, "East Meets East: The Sino-Indian Rivalry," The National Interest 86 (November/December 2006), pp. 92-96.
13. Song Dexing, "21 shiji de zhongyin guanxi: yindu de genben zhanlue guanqie jiqi luoji qidian [Sino-Indian Relations in the 21st Century: India's Fundamental Strategic Concerns and Their Logical Premises]," Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian Studies], no. 2 (2007), pp. 3-8; Tang Lu, "Yindu rengwei zouchu zhongyin zhanzheng yinying [India Still under Shadow of '62 War]," Guoji Xianqu Daobao [International Herald Leader], November 28, 2008, online edition, http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2008-11/28/content_10423612.htm.
14. Raj Chengappa, "Building India's Missile Muscle," India Today International, April 30, 2007, pp. 36-39; Siddharth Srivastava, "India Has China in its Range," Asia Times, April 14, 2007.
15. Saurabh Shukla, "Love with Tokyo," India Today International, June 11, 2007, pp. 42-43; Zhao Hong, "India's Changing Relations with ASEAN: From China's Perspective," Journal of East Asian Affairs 20:2 (Fall/Winter 2006), pp. 141-170; Shi Hongyuan, "Yinri guanxi chixu shengwen jiqi dongyin [The Continuing Warming Indo-Japanese Ties and Their Genesis], Guoji Ziliao Xinxi [International Information], no. 8 (2007), pp. 7-11.
16. Gurmeet Kanwal, "India-China Territorial Dispute Little Progress despite Prolonged Negotiations," South Asia Monitor: A Perspective on the Region, February 2008, http://www.southasiamonitor.org/2008/Feb/news/gur.shtml.
17. Saurabh Shukla, "Beijing Turns Truant Again," India Today International, June 11, 2007, p. 7; Jo Johnson, "India Cancels Diplomatic Visit to China," Financial Times, May 27, 2007.
18. Xu Hua, "Yindu zhongshi haiyang junshi weishe [India Emphasizes Maritime Deterrence]," Xiandai Junshi [Conmilit] (April 2000), pp. 54-56.
19. Chen Jihui, "Yindu haijun yaoguan maliujia [INS Wants to Control Malacca Strait]," Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times], March 1, 2006, http://world.people.com.cn/GB/14549/4152188.html; Lai Yang, "Yindu quanmian tisheng junshi shili [India Enhances Overall Military Capabilities]," Shijie Xinwenbao [World News Journal], March 4, 2008, http://gb.cri.cn/12764/2008/03/04/2945@1964796.htm (accessed on May 8, 2008).
20. On Sino-Indian rivalry in the Indian Ocean from a historical perspective, see Garver, Protracted Contest, chapter 10. On Chinese views of India's Look East Policy, see Zhao Gancheng, "Yindu 'dongxiang' zhengce de fazhan ji yiyi [The Evolution and Implications of India's Look East Policy]," Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], no. 8 (2007), pp. 10-16, 64.
21. John W. Garver, "Development of China's Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-west and South Asia," The China Quarterly (2006), pp. 1-22.
22. "Into the Wide Blue Yonder," The Economist, June 7, 2008, pp. 53-54; Khurana, "China's 'String of Pearls'."
23. David Walgreen, "China in the Indian Ocean Region: Lessons in PRC Grand Strategy," Comparative Strategy 25 (2006), pp. 55-73.
24. Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power across the Asian Littoral (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2006); Sudha Ramachandran, "India Chases the Dragon in Sri Lanka," Asia Times Online, July 10, 2008, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JG10Df03.html (accessed on July 17, 2008).
25. David Montero, "China, Pakistan Team Up on Energy," Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 2007; Henry Chu, "China's Footprint in Pakistan," Los Angeles Times, April 1, 2006; Ziad Haider, "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6:1 (Winter 2005), pp. 95-103.
26. On this point, see Michael Yahuda, "China and the Kashmir Crisis," BBC World News, June 2, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2020788.stm
27. Zhou Rong, "Zhongba zhanlue hezuo xu zhuru xinde huoli [Sino-Pak Strategic Cooperation Needs New Vitality]," Nanya Yanjiu Jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], no. 1 (2007), pp. 24-27.
28. For an excellent analysis, see John W. Garver, "The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," NBR Analysis 13:5 (October 2002), pp.5-56. See also, Lisa Curtis, "The Triangular Dynamics in Asia: The U.S., India, and China," Heritage Lectures, April 11, 2007; Siddharth Srivastava, "China Looks on at the US-India Lockstep," Asia Times, June 30, 2007; Daniel Twining, "The New Great Game: Why the Bush Administration Has Embraced India," The Weekly Standard, December 25, 2006, pp. 15-19; Amit Gupta, "U.S.-India-China: Assessing Tripolarity," China Report 42:1 (2006), pp. 69-83.
29. Zhan Dexiong, "Bushi zai qiangdiao meiyin guanxi [Bush Again Adjusts the US-Indian Relations]," Liaowang Xingwen Zhoukan [Outlook Weekly], March 6, 2006, p. 85; Zhang Zhenqiang, "Meiguo weihe xia zhongzhu tuidong meiyin hezuo [Why Is U.S. Investing So Much to Promote U.S.-India Cooperation]?" Lianhe Zaobaowang [zaobao.com], March 10, 2006, http://www.zaobao.com/special/forum/pages3/forum_lx060310c.html.
30. People's Daily Online, March 6, 2006. http://world.people.com.cn/GB/4168062.html
31. Xinhuawang [Xinhua News Online], "Meiguo wujiao daolou xuanbu xiang yindu chushou xianjin zhandouji [Pentagon Announces Sales of Advanced Fighter Aircraft to India]," March 2, 2006. http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2006-03/03/content_4251167.htm; Liu Li, "Gongtong erzhi zhongguo: meiyin qiaoding shinian junshi hezuo [Jointly Containing China: U.S. and India Nail Ten-Year Military Cooperation Package]," Dongfang Zaobao [Oriental Morning Post], June 30, 2005, http://news.cphotos.net/Articles/guoji/200506302130900.htm; Zhang Li, "Cong 'hexieyi' jiedu yinmei guanxi [The Nuclear Deal and the Indo-U.S. Strategic Relationship]," Nanya Yanjiu Jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], No. 3 (2005), pp. 43-50.
32. Hou Hongyu, "Shixi meiguo duiyin junbei chukou zhengze de bianhua [An Analysis of Changes in U.S. Arms Export Policy toward India]," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 12 (2005), pp. 13-16.
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News/Analysis Opinion December 27, 2008 Browse by Regions and/or Topics Select an author Peter Doran Jeff Abramson David Agren Jon B. Alterman Iason Athanasiadis David Axe Jayshree Bajoria Marcelo Ballvé Thomas P.M. Barnett Guy Ben-Ari Davide Berretta M.K. Bhadrakumar Sam Brannen Shawn Brimley Bartle Breese Bull Phil Cain Brian Calvert Ted Galen Carpenter Mike Ceaser Marek Jan Chodakiewicz Liam Cochrane Charles Crain Patrick de Saint-Exupéry Alan W. Dowd Don Duncan Adrian Erlinger Nathan Field Bernard I. Finel Roland Flamini Joshua Foust Urs Gehriger Lauren Gelfand Gian P. Gentile Frida Ghitis Wendy Glauser Peter C. Glover Glenna Gordon Judah Grunstein Marianna Gurtovnik Nikolas Gvosdev Michael Wahid Hanna Kelly Hearn Adam Hebert Matt Homer Ahmed Humayun Eric Hundman Luke Hunt Alice Hunt Malou Innocent Jack Kem Parag Khanna Peter Kiernan Henry Kippin Aidan Kirby Joseph Kirschke Matthias Küntzel Kanchan Lakshman Blake Lambert Ben Lando Robert Latona Kevin Daniel Leahy Graham Lees John Liebhardt Matthew Light Marc Lynch Christina L. Madden Petra Marquardt-Bigman Steve Mbogo Brian McCartan Seth McLaughlin Dorian Merina Jason Miks Henry I. Miller Anastasia Moloney Jason Motlagh Mxolisi Ncube José Orozco Prashanth Parameswaran Nirav Patel Marissa Payne Kurt Pelda Walid Phares Juliana Geran Pilon Roque Planas Ravi R. Prasad Arif Rafiq Carl Robichaud John Rosenthal Simon Roughneen Vivian Salama Handan T. Satiroglu Fabio Scarpello Blake Schmidt Neil Shea Michelle Sieff Vikram Singh Daria Solovieva Sebastian Sprenger Matthew Stein Hampton Stephens Jason Strother Guy Taylor Dan Teng'o Juliette Terzieff Lee Hudson Teslik David Trilling Sanjay Upadhya Richard Weitz William Wheeler Michael Wilkerson Brian Glyn Williams Tina Wolfe Adam Wolfe Patrick Wrigley Babak Yektafar Jing-dong Yuan Ibrahim Zabad Select a region North America Latin America Western Europe Eastern Europe Middle East Africa Central Asia Caucasus Asia South Asia Southeast Asia Pacific China Afghanistan India Iran Iraq North Korea Russia Select an issue Culture Defense and Military Diplomacy and Strategy Domestic Politics Economics and Business Geography and Resources Health History Homeland Security Aid and Development Human Rights Intelligence International Law Islamism Media and Communications Crime Political Theory Public Diplomacy and Propaganda Radical Movements Technology Terrorism Transportation and Cargo U.S. Foreign Policy War and Conflict WMD Environment Home | Feature| Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India
Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India
Jing-dong Yuan | Bio | 30 Nov 2008
World Politics Review
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Sino-Pakistani ties continue to cast a shadow over the China-India entente, despite Beijing's efforts to address New Delhi's concerns. While China's neutrality during the 1999 Kargil crisis demonstrates a more balanced Chinese South Asia policy, that gesture has yet to translate into good will and confidence on India's part that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is not targeted at India. New Delhi remains suspicious of the so-called "all-weather" Sino-Pakistani relationship, in particular their defense cooperation -- such as the joint development of advanced fighter aircraft -- and Chinese assistance in constructing strategic port facilities for Pakistan in Gwadar.[25]
China's special ties with Pakistan have undergone noticeable changes since the end of the Cold War and in particular with the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. While in the past, strategic necessities and mutual interests led China to lend its support to Pakistan on almost all positions that Islamabad considered critical, that unconditional support no longer applies in today's much changed strategic environment. Beijing's attitude toward the Kashmir issue, for instance, reflects its changing priorities and broader security interests in South Asia. Indeed, China's Kashmir policy has come full circle: from the stance of neutrality in the early 1950s; to the pro-Pakistan position of the 1960s and 1970s; to a mixed UN resolutions plus the Simla agreement balancing act of the 1980s (as Beijing was seeking rapprochement with New Delhi but continued to maintain entente with Islamabad); to the current position, adopted since the early 1990s, on characterizing the Kashmir issue as a bilateral matter.
China's Kashmir policy must be understood within the broader contexts of its South Asia policy in general, and where this policy fits in Beijing's global strategies and its bilateral relationships with India and Pakistan in particular.[26] One of the key objectives of Beijing's post-Cold War global strategy has been to develop a peaceful environment for economic development. Within this context, China has sought to resolve contentious issues, including boundary disputes with a number of its neighboring countries, from the former Soviet Union to Vietnam. That general posture of good neighborly policy has also been applied to the South Asian region, where Beijing has sought rapprochement with India since the late 1980s.
As China re-orients its foreign policy and security posture in the post-Cold War era, with a focus on East Asia and a possible military conflict with the United States over the Taiwan Strait, it has growing interests in seeing a stable South Asia and a better relationship with India. That explains Beijing's more unequivocal position on the Kashmir issue clearly in favor of India's position. That decision is firmly grounded in the belief that the only realistic way to resolve the Kashmir conflict is through peaceful negotiation between India and Pakistan. As Islamabad's trusted friend, Beijing could and should use its influence to convince Pakistan why it is also in its interest to resolve the issue peacefully.
However, these policy shifts do not mean that Beijing is abandoning Islamabad. On the contrary, China continues to provide crucial support -- moral as well as material -- to Pakistan, for at least three reasons. First, a stable Pakistan and one that manages its relationship with India provides stability to China's southwest periphery. Second, with ethnic separatism and religious extremism on the rise in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Beijing needs the full understanding and assistance from the Pakistani government to prevent terrorist groups from using Pakistan as a training base and launch pad to undermine China's national unity. Third, as a major Muslim country, Pakistan plays a unique role in serving as a conduit to the broader Islamic world for China. Clearly, new thinking and renewed energies are needed to develop an all-round relationship that goes beyond the narrow defense linkage.[27]
Chinese security analysts are also debating the significance and implications of a warming U.S.-India relationship that spans from nuclear cooperation to the building of a so-called democracy arch. Washington and New Delhi share normative values (democracy) and strategic interests while Beijing's ties with both are more driven by contingent rather than structural interests.[28] In this context, the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the warming strategic relationship are viewed within the broader context of Washington's global strategic calculations. The Bush administration is seen as seeking to enlist India to balance against China's rapid rise. In addition, the U.S. also recognizes the value of India as an emerging market and would like to see India succeed economically as an alternative model -- based on a market economy and democracy -- to the so-called "Beijing Consensus" (i.e., economic success with relatively tight political control). This may also explain why Washington is more liberal regarding relaxation of controls on high-tech transfers to India, but not to China.[29]
Chinese analysts focus on the expansion of U.S.-India ties, in particular in the areas of defense and energy cooperation, as well as economic relations. According to Chinese analyses, the Bush administration seeks to consolidate the U.S.-India relationship by focusing on three key areas. The first involves forming a strong politico-strategic partnership by emphasizing their shared values as the world's oldest and largest democracies along with their common interests in combating global terrorism, achieving energy security, and maintaining regional stability. The second focuses on expanding bilateral trade to achieve the $50 billion target in three years. The two countries have already had extensive interdependence in software development, service outsourcing, and investments in infrastructure and manufacturing.[30]
But perhaps the most significant aspect of this growing cooperation, apart from the nuclear deal, is enhanced defense and space cooperation, and the emerging U.S.-India military ties that span from arms sales to joint military exercises. Chinese sources point to an October 2002 Pentagon report on Indo-U.S. military relations that indicates major shifts of U.S. policy toward India, defining and recognizing it as a major rising power, and helping it to achieve that status in anticipation of its endorsement of key U.S. policy objectives. These range from anti-terrorism, protection of critical sea lanes of communication, to interception of WMD-related shipment and missile defenses. During Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee's visit to the U.S. in June 2005, the Pentagon signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with India in which the U.S. would provide a broad range of defense equipment and military technologies, including fighter aircraft (F-16 and F-18) and joint research and development.[31] Chinese analysts suggest the reason for the U.S. policy change from restriction and control to one of relaxation and even preferential treatment is largely driven by a desire to balance China's growing power. At the same time, India's growing defense budget and arms acquisitions also make it an attractive customer for U.S. arms exports.[32]
Conclusion
Sino-Indian relations have experienced significant improvement over the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi are making concerted efforts to further the bilateral strategic and cooperative partnership that serves the long-term interests of both countries. From China's perspective, developing a stable relationship with India contributes to its broader policy toward South Asia and forms an integral part of its overall strategic orientation.
But Beijing is not impervious to the problems and challenges ahead. These include the need to broaden the scope and depth of strategic dialogue and continued confidence building measures to minimize and dispel mutual suspicions and threat perceptions. In particular, the two countries should seek to promote common interests through the emerging China-India-U.S. triangle rather than to take advantage of their respective bilateral ties with the world's only superpower to undermine the other's security interests. In addition, China and India should consult more on international and regional issues where they share common interests. These could include a fair and equitable international political and economic order, non-intervention, environment, disarmament, and anti-terrorism. Increasingly, the two countries are also expanding cooperation in the energy sector.
But full and complete normalization, let alone the development of the strategic and cooperative partnership between Asia's two rising powers, is possible only if China and India can set a clearly defined timetable for the resolution of the border dispute. Beijing and New Delhi must also manage well the China-India-Pakistan triangle and prevent conflicts in the Indian Ocean as both recognize the growing importance of energy security.
Sino-Pakistani ties continue to cast a shadow over the China-India entente, despite Beijing's efforts to address New Delhi's concerns. While China's neutrality during the 1999 Kargil crisis demonstrates a more balanced Chinese South Asia policy, that gesture has yet to translate into good will and confidence on India's part that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is not targeted at India. New Delhi remains suspicious of the so-called "all-weather" Sino-Pakistani relationship, in particular their defense cooperation -- such as the joint development of advanced fighter aircraft -- and Chinese assistance in constructing strategic port facilities for Pakistan in Gwadar.[25]
China's special ties with Pakistan have undergone noticeable changes since the end of the Cold War and in particular with the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. While in the past, strategic necessities and mutual interests led China to lend its support to Pakistan on almost all positions that Islamabad considered critical, that unconditional support no longer applies in today's much changed strategic environment. Beijing's attitude toward the Kashmir issue, for instance, reflects its changing priorities and broader security interests in South Asia. Indeed, China's Kashmir policy has come full circle: from the stance of neutrality in the early 1950s; to the pro-Pakistan position of the 1960s and 1970s; to a mixed UN resolutions plus the Simla agreement balancing act of the 1980s (as Beijing was seeking rapprochement with New Delhi but continued to maintain entente with Islamabad); to the current position, adopted since the early 1990s, on characterizing the Kashmir issue as a bilateral matter.
China's Kashmir policy must be understood within the broader contexts of its South Asia policy in general, and where this policy fits in Beijing's global strategies and its bilateral relationships with India and Pakistan in particular.[26] One of the key objectives of Beijing's post-Cold War global strategy has been to develop a peaceful environment for economic development. Within this context, China has sought to resolve contentious issues, including boundary disputes with a number of its neighboring countries, from the former Soviet Union to Vietnam. That general posture of good neighborly policy has also been applied to the South Asian region, where Beijing has sought rapprochement with India since the late 1980s.
As China re-orients its foreign policy and security posture in the post-Cold War era, with a focus on East Asia and a possible military conflict with the United States over the Taiwan Strait, it has growing interests in seeing a stable South Asia and a better relationship with India. That explains Beijing's more unequivocal position on the Kashmir issue clearly in favor of India's position. That decision is firmly grounded in the belief that the only realistic way to resolve the Kashmir conflict is through peaceful negotiation between India and Pakistan. As Islamabad's trusted friend, Beijing could and should use its influence to convince Pakistan why it is also in its interest to resolve the issue peacefully.
However, these policy shifts do not mean that Beijing is abandoning Islamabad. On the contrary, China continues to provide crucial support -- moral as well as material -- to Pakistan, for at least three reasons. First, a stable Pakistan and one that manages its relationship with India provides stability to China's southwest periphery. Second, with ethnic separatism and religious extremism on the rise in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Beijing needs the full understanding and assistance from the Pakistani government to prevent terrorist groups from using Pakistan as a training base and launch pad to undermine China's national unity. Third, as a major Muslim country, Pakistan plays a unique role in serving as a conduit to the broader Islamic world for China. Clearly, new thinking and renewed energies are needed to develop an all-round relationship that goes beyond the narrow defense linkage.[27]
Chinese security analysts are also debating the significance and implications of a warming U.S.-India relationship that spans from nuclear cooperation to the building of a so-called democracy arch. Washington and New Delhi share normative values (democracy) and strategic interests while Beijing's ties with both are more driven by contingent rather than structural interests.[28] In this context, the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the warming strategic relationship are viewed within the broader context of Washington's global strategic calculations. The Bush administration is seen as seeking to enlist India to balance against China's rapid rise. In addition, the U.S. also recognizes the value of India as an emerging market and would like to see India succeed economically as an alternative model -- based on a market economy and democracy -- to the so-called "Beijing Consensus" (i.e., economic success with relatively tight political control). This may also explain why Washington is more liberal regarding relaxation of controls on high-tech transfers to India, but not to China.[29]
Chinese analysts focus on the expansion of U.S.-India ties, in particular in the areas of defense and energy cooperation, as well as economic relations. According to Chinese analyses, the Bush administration seeks to consolidate the U.S.-India relationship by focusing on three key areas. The first involves forming a strong politico-strategic partnership by emphasizing their shared values as the world's oldest and largest democracies along with their common interests in combating global terrorism, achieving energy security, and maintaining regional stability. The second focuses on expanding bilateral trade to achieve the $50 billion target in three years. The two countries have already had extensive interdependence in software development, service outsourcing, and investments in infrastructure and manufacturing.[30]
But perhaps the most significant aspect of this growing cooperation, apart from the nuclear deal, is enhanced defense and space cooperation, and the emerging U.S.-India military ties that span from arms sales to joint military exercises. Chinese sources point to an October 2002 Pentagon report on Indo-U.S. military relations that indicates major shifts of U.S. policy toward India, defining and recognizing it as a major rising power, and helping it to achieve that status in anticipation of its endorsement of key U.S. policy objectives. These range from anti-terrorism, protection of critical sea lanes of communication, to interception of WMD-related shipment and missile defenses. During Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee's visit to the U.S. in June 2005, the Pentagon signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with India in which the U.S. would provide a broad range of defense equipment and military technologies, including fighter aircraft (F-16 and F-18) and joint research and development.[31] Chinese analysts suggest the reason for the U.S. policy change from restriction and control to one of relaxation and even preferential treatment is largely driven by a desire to balance China's growing power. At the same time, India's growing defense budget and arms acquisitions also make it an attractive customer for U.S. arms exports.[32]
Conclusion
Sino-Indian relations have experienced significant improvement over the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi are making concerted efforts to further the bilateral strategic and cooperative partnership that serves the long-term interests of both countries. From China's perspective, developing a stable relationship with India contributes to its broader policy toward South Asia and forms an integral part of its overall strategic orientation.
But Beijing is not impervious to the problems and challenges ahead. These include the need to broaden the scope and depth of strategic dialogue and continued confidence building measures to minimize and dispel mutual suspicions and threat perceptions. In particular, the two countries should seek to promote common interests through the emerging China-India-U.S. triangle rather than to take advantage of their respective bilateral ties with the world's only superpower to undermine the other's security interests. In addition, China and India should consult more on international and regional issues where they share common interests. These could include a fair and equitable international political and economic order, non-intervention, environment, disarmament, and anti-terrorism. Increasingly, the two countries are also expanding cooperation in the energy sector.
But full and complete normalization, let alone the development of the strategic and cooperative partnership between Asia's two rising powers, is possible only if China and India can set a clearly defined timetable for the resolution of the border dispute. Beijing and New Delhi must also manage well the China-India-Pakistan triangle and prevent conflicts in the Indian Ocean as both recognize the growing importance of energy security.
Dr. Jing-dong Yuan is Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and Associate Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he teaches Chinese security and foreign policy, East Asian security and arms control, and U.S. Asia Policy. He is the co-author of "China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?" (Lynne Rienners Publisher, 2003) and is currently writing a book on China's security policy since the end of the Cold War.
World Politics Review
Sino-Indian relations have registered significant progress in the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi have engaged in a series of summit meetings, frequent high-level visits, joint anti-terrorism training exercises between the two militaries, and fast-growing bilateral trade. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to China in January 2008, the two countries issued a joint document on a Shared Vision for the 21st Century, pledging to promote a harmonious world of peace and stability and further strengthen the Sino-Indian Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. These developments have encouraged analysts across the Himalaya to talk about the return of the 1950s Panchsheel and the prospects of "Chindia" in the coming decades.
A closer look at Chinese perspectives on India's rise is therefore warranted, as well as an assessment of both the promises of further cooperation and the potential pitfalls of conflict in the coming years, as the two rising Asian powers continue their upward trajectory toward great-power status. Given their combined human resources and economic potentials, their shared past experiences and newfound paths to development, prosperity, and power, the two countries can make important contributions to regional and global peace. At the same time, unresolved territorial disputes, mutual suspicions of each other's intentions, and other contentious issues could threaten the sustainability and continuing improvement of a critical bilateral relationship.
From Normalization to Strategic Partnership
Sino-Indian relations suffered a serious setback after the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests as New Delhi justified its action by alleging that the so-called China threats were the main reason why it went nuclear. The strong Chinese reactions and Beijing's active diplomatic campaigns to isolate India eventually led New Delhi to seek rapprochement.[1] Sino-Indian relations gradually thawed. In June 2003, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid an official visit to China, the first in over a decade. Since then, Beijing and New Delhi not only have declared that neither country would view the other as a security threat, they also have elevated their relationship to one of strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and stability. During Chinese President Hu Jintao's November 2006 visit to India, the two countries adopted a ten-point strategy to further strengthen the bilateral relationship, accompanied by over a dozen agreements on trade, investment, energy cooperation, and cultural and educational exchanges. Beijing now views its relationship with India one of global and strategic importance that is long-term, all-round, and stable.[2]
This optimistic view of the bilateral relationship and its future prospects is shared or at least publicly echoed by Chinese and Indian officials, with both governments actively promoting full-fledged developments in political, economic, and security spheres. Both Beijing and New Delhi support a multipolar world and oppose unilateralism; they also hold common positions on issues ranging from the environment and climate change to global trade. Sino-Indian strategic dialogue, anti-terrorism consultation, and energy cooperation have further enhanced confidence and trust between the two countries and strengthened their strategic and cooperative partnership.[3]
The most noticeable progress in Sino-Indian relations, though, has been registered in growing two-way trade. From a mere $117 million in 1987, bilateral trade grew to $38.7 billion in 2007, with the two countries setting a target of $60 billion for 2010 during Prime Minister Singh's visit. In July 2006, the two countries re-opened the historical Nathu La Pass that had been close since the 1962 war to even further promote border trade.[4]
The two countries have also made progress in the area of defense cooperation. Building upon the 1993 and 1996 agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility, and developing confidence building measures in the military field, Beijing and New Delhi have in recent years expanded ties to include port calls, joint search and rescue exercises, and defense exchanges.[5] Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee's May 28-June 2, 2006 visit to China was a major milestone in Sino-Indian defense ties, signaling the two militaries' first steps towards institutionalizing bilateral military relations. The most noticeable achievement in this regard is the signing of the Sino-Indian Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation, the first such document between the two countries.[6] In addition to meeting Chinese leaders and his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Cao Gangchuan, Mukherjee also visited a number of cities and military facilities during his visit, including the Lanzhou Military Region, the first foreign defense minister to do so.[7]
Given its unique and dominating position on the subcontinent, India has always featured prominently in Beijing's South Asia strategy. During the Cold War, that strategy focused on aligning with and supporting Pakistan and developing close ties with other South Asian states to counter Indian -- and by association, Soviet -- influence in the region.[8] In recent years, India's fast economic growth and its diplomatic activism attract increasing attention from Chinese analysts. Gone are the days when China could look down upon India as a light weight and a regional power confined to South Asia. Indeed, India's rise presents serious challenges to China's security interests with regard to territorial disputes, energy security, and regional and global power realignment.[9]
The coming years will testify to whether the good will and momentum generated by the recent high-level visits can be maintained. Clearly, obstacles remain and sustained efforts at the highest political level are required to build trust between Asia's two rising powers. These include mutual suspicions and the potentials for competition and rivalry; the still unresolved territorial disputes, even though the LAC has been relatively peaceful over the last forty-six years; China's relationship with Pakistan in the regional context; and the emerging China-India-U.S. strategic triangle.[10]
Despite progress in bilateral relations over the past few years, mutual suspicions remain. This is partly due to the dynamics of the security dilemma and structural conflicts between the two Asian giants, with the lack of institutionalized and regular high-level official exchanges also playing a role.[11] The two Asian giants' continuing upward trajectory in growing economic and military power, and political influence, is bound to lead each into the other's perceived sphere of interests, meaning that conflicts may arise.[12] India has watched China's phenomenal economic and military growth with both envy and alarm. If there is one single lesson that New Delhi's security analysts drew from the 1962 war, it would be that power and strength are the only ticket to the club of great powers. For many of them, the very fact that China continues to lead India on most indicators of power poses a greater threat than its military defeat forty-six years ago.[13]
Meanwhile, China is paying close attention to India's growing military power and its nuclear and missile developments. New Delhi's successful test of the Agni-III ballistic missile further extends its ability to reach Chinese targets inland.[14] Beijing is also wary of New Delhi's eastward strategy of developing greater economic and military ties with Japan and the ASEAN countries. Indeed, the increasingly warm ties between New Delhi and Tokyo have been carefully watched by strategic analysts in Beijing.[15]
Territorial disputes remain a sensitive and occasional touchy issue between the two countries. There remain lingering suspicion and distrust, and the scar of the 1962 war has yet to be healed. The Chinese side has suggested that the Line of Actual Control (LAC), with some minor modifications, could be the starting point for negotiating a final settlement. While the appointment of special representatives during Vajpayee's 2003 visit to China was an important indication that the two governments were determined to resolve this issue, progress remains painfully slow. After twelve rounds of talks between the special representatives, the two sides remain deadlocked and no prospects of breakthrough seem to be in sight.[16]
In a recent incident, Beijing declined to issue a visa to an official from Arunachal Pradesh, stating that the official in question was a permanent resident of China's territory and therefore did not require a visa to enter China, causing New Delhi to call off the scheduled visit by a 107-member delegation of the IAS (India Administrative Service). This serves as a clear reminder that until the border disputes are settled, normalization will not be complete.[17]
While the territorial disputes remain deadlocked, they are at least manageable as any use of force to regain claims is too costly for either Beijing or New Delhi to entertain. India's growing power and its foreign policy orientation, though, are of growing strategic significance and command much closer scrutiny by Chinese analysts. The first concerns China's energy security. India occupies a unique geostrategic position in the Indian Ocean, straddling the natural junction of the busy international shipping lanes. According to Chinese analysts, since the early 1990s India has been implementing the so-called "Indian Ocean dominance strategy" by establishing absolute military supremacy over countries in the region and deterrence against major maritime powers in their attempts to extend influence and/or establish outposts in the region.[18]
Chinese analysts are particularly attentive to what they see as New Delhi's ambitions for building a blue-water navy: a fleet of 145 ocean-going surface ships by 2015, capable of operating beyond the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy has shifted from the past doctrine of active defense to a new one of offensive defense. Chinese media suggest that India has an ambitious plan to control the Strait of Malacca with its eastern naval command and the so-called Project Seabird, including the consolidation and expansion of the Kadamba naval base to control the IO. India maintains two important overseas territories: Andaman Islands and Nicobar Islands that can be used to block the Malacca Strait and control the entire Bay of Bengal. Once India controls the area, it controls the arteries of the global economy.[19]
Beijing's growing attention to the Indian Ocean has been driven by broader strategic considerations. Concerns over potential blockades against choke points in the IOR by hostile powers aside, China's Indian Ocean strategy has always been and likely will continue to be informed by its relationships with India, Pakistan, and the smaller South Asian countries. China claims the right to develop and maintain cordial relationships with states in what New Delhi may regard as its sphere of influence, through trade, investment, and military assistance. Indeed, Beijing's efforts to make inroads in South Asia mirrors New Delhi's "Look East Policy"; both reflect the two Asian powers' perceptions of each other's intents, and their pursuit of opportunities and relative power.[20]
In recent years, China has become increasingly involved in projects -- in Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, among others -- that appear to aim at developing alternative land routes for oil transports should maritime passages be disrupted.[21] Chinese activities in the IOR have drawn growing attention to and speculation about Beijing's intentions, in particular by Indian analysts.[22] Some analysts argue that China's strategy toward the Indian Ocean forms part of its grand strategy and long-term objectives of undermining U.S. influence in the region and establishing and consolidating its own.[23] They point to Chinese initiatives over the past decades, in particular Beijing's efforts to establish what has now been described as a "string of pearls" with ongoing and proposed construction of sea ports and pipelines -- a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence in Indian Ocean littorals.[24]
Sphere: Related Content
Print Email to a Friend Discuss this article Most Emailed Articles
Central Asia's Energy Chessboard
Military Rivalry in Central Asia
Et Tu, Tutu?
China's Aircraft Carrier Envy
The Lincoln Brigade in Georgia
Russian Missile Test Goes South
Military Solutions
War Is Boring: Good News, Bad News in Somali Islamists' Return
India Wary of U.S. 'Regional Approach'
World Citizen: Europe, Too, Faces Pakistan-Linked Terrorism
Sri Lanka's Information War: Part I
Mexico's Calderón Faces More Obstacles Ahead
defense
mali
colombia
north
EU
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© 2008, World Politics Review LLC. All rights reserved.Terms of Use : Privacy Policy : About World Politics Review
News/Analysis Opinion December 27, 2008 Browse by Regions and/or Topics Select an author Peter Doran Jeff Abramson David Agren Jon B. Alterman Iason Athanasiadis David Axe Jayshree Bajoria Marcelo Ballvé Thomas P.M. Barnett Guy Ben-Ari Davide Berretta M.K. Bhadrakumar Sam Brannen Shawn Brimley Bartle Breese Bull Phil Cain Brian Calvert Ted Galen Carpenter Mike Ceaser Marek Jan Chodakiewicz Liam Cochrane Charles Crain Patrick de Saint-Exupéry Alan W. Dowd Don Duncan Adrian Erlinger Nathan Field Bernard I. Finel Roland Flamini Joshua Foust Urs Gehriger Lauren Gelfand Gian P. Gentile Frida Ghitis Wendy Glauser Peter C. Glover Glenna Gordon Judah Grunstein Marianna Gurtovnik Nikolas Gvosdev Michael Wahid Hanna Kelly Hearn Adam Hebert Matt Homer Ahmed Humayun Eric Hundman Luke Hunt Alice Hunt Malou Innocent Jack Kem Parag Khanna Peter Kiernan Henry Kippin Aidan Kirby Joseph Kirschke Matthias Küntzel Kanchan Lakshman Blake Lambert Ben Lando Robert Latona Kevin Daniel Leahy Graham Lees John Liebhardt Matthew Light Marc Lynch Christina L. Madden Petra Marquardt-Bigman Steve Mbogo Brian McCartan Seth McLaughlin Dorian Merina Jason Miks Henry I. Miller Anastasia Moloney Jason Motlagh Mxolisi Ncube José Orozco Prashanth Parameswaran Nirav Patel Marissa Payne Kurt Pelda Walid Phares Juliana Geran Pilon Roque Planas Ravi R. Prasad Arif Rafiq Carl Robichaud John Rosenthal Simon Roughneen Vivian Salama Handan T. Satiroglu Fabio Scarpello Blake Schmidt Neil Shea Michelle Sieff Vikram Singh Daria Solovieva Sebastian Sprenger Matthew Stein Hampton Stephens Jason Strother Guy Taylor Dan Teng'o Juliette Terzieff Lee Hudson Teslik David Trilling Sanjay Upadhya Richard Weitz William Wheeler Michael Wilkerson Brian Glyn Williams Tina Wolfe Adam Wolfe Patrick Wrigley Babak Yektafar Jing-dong Yuan Ibrahim Zabad Select a region North America Latin America Western Europe Eastern Europe Middle East Africa Central Asia Caucasus Asia South Asia Southeast Asia Pacific China Afghanistan India Iran Iraq North Korea Russia Select an issue Culture Defense and Military Diplomacy and Strategy Domestic Politics Economics and Business Geography and Resources Health History Homeland Security Aid and Development Human Rights Intelligence International Law Islamism Media and Communications Crime Political Theory Public Diplomacy and Propaganda Radical Movements Technology Terrorism Transportation and Cargo U.S. Foreign Policy War and Conflict WMD Environment Home | Feature| Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India
Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India
Jing-dong Yuan | Bio | 30 Nov 2008
World Politics Review
Continue: << Prev Page | 1 | 2 | 3
Sino-Pakistani ties continue to cast a shadow over the China-India entente, despite Beijing's efforts to address New Delhi's concerns. While China's neutrality during the 1999 Kargil crisis demonstrates a more balanced Chinese South Asia policy, that gesture has yet to translate into good will and confidence on India's part that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is not targeted at India. New Delhi remains suspicious of the so-called "all-weather" Sino-Pakistani relationship, in particular their defense cooperation -- such as the joint development of advanced fighter aircraft -- and Chinese assistance in constructing strategic port facilities for Pakistan in Gwadar.[25]
China's special ties with Pakistan have undergone noticeable changes since the end of the Cold War and in particular with the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. While in the past, strategic necessities and mutual interests led China to lend its support to Pakistan on almost all positions that Islamabad considered critical, that unconditional support no longer applies in today's much changed strategic environment. Beijing's attitude toward the Kashmir issue, for instance, reflects its changing priorities and broader security interests in South Asia. Indeed, China's Kashmir policy has come full circle: from the stance of neutrality in the early 1950s; to the pro-Pakistan position of the 1960s and 1970s; to a mixed UN resolutions plus the Simla agreement balancing act of the 1980s (as Beijing was seeking rapprochement with New Delhi but continued to maintain entente with Islamabad); to the current position, adopted since the early 1990s, on characterizing the Kashmir issue as a bilateral matter.
China's Kashmir policy must be understood within the broader contexts of its South Asia policy in general, and where this policy fits in Beijing's global strategies and its bilateral relationships with India and Pakistan in particular.[26] One of the key objectives of Beijing's post-Cold War global strategy has been to develop a peaceful environment for economic development. Within this context, China has sought to resolve contentious issues, including boundary disputes with a number of its neighboring countries, from the former Soviet Union to Vietnam. That general posture of good neighborly policy has also been applied to the South Asian region, where Beijing has sought rapprochement with India since the late 1980s.
As China re-orients its foreign policy and security posture in the post-Cold War era, with a focus on East Asia and a possible military conflict with the United States over the Taiwan Strait, it has growing interests in seeing a stable South Asia and a better relationship with India. That explains Beijing's more unequivocal position on the Kashmir issue clearly in favor of India's position. That decision is firmly grounded in the belief that the only realistic way to resolve the Kashmir conflict is through peaceful negotiation between India and Pakistan. As Islamabad's trusted friend, Beijing could and should use its influence to convince Pakistan why it is also in its interest to resolve the issue peacefully.
However, these policy shifts do not mean that Beijing is abandoning Islamabad. On the contrary, China continues to provide crucial support -- moral as well as material -- to Pakistan, for at least three reasons. First, a stable Pakistan and one that manages its relationship with India provides stability to China's southwest periphery. Second, with ethnic separatism and religious extremism on the rise in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Beijing needs the full understanding and assistance from the Pakistani government to prevent terrorist groups from using Pakistan as a training base and launch pad to undermine China's national unity. Third, as a major Muslim country, Pakistan plays a unique role in serving as a conduit to the broader Islamic world for China. Clearly, new thinking and renewed energies are needed to develop an all-round relationship that goes beyond the narrow defense linkage.[27]
Chinese security analysts are also debating the significance and implications of a warming U.S.-India relationship that spans from nuclear cooperation to the building of a so-called democracy arch. Washington and New Delhi share normative values (democracy) and strategic interests while Beijing's ties with both are more driven by contingent rather than structural interests.[28] In this context, the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the warming strategic relationship are viewed within the broader context of Washington's global strategic calculations. The Bush administration is seen as seeking to enlist India to balance against China's rapid rise. In addition, the U.S. also recognizes the value of India as an emerging market and would like to see India succeed economically as an alternative model -- based on a market economy and democracy -- to the so-called "Beijing Consensus" (i.e., economic success with relatively tight political control). This may also explain why Washington is more liberal regarding relaxation of controls on high-tech transfers to India, but not to China.[29]
Chinese analysts focus on the expansion of U.S.-India ties, in particular in the areas of defense and energy cooperation, as well as economic relations. According to Chinese analyses, the Bush administration seeks to consolidate the U.S.-India relationship by focusing on three key areas. The first involves forming a strong politico-strategic partnership by emphasizing their shared values as the world's oldest and largest democracies along with their common interests in combating global terrorism, achieving energy security, and maintaining regional stability. The second focuses on expanding bilateral trade to achieve the $50 billion target in three years. The two countries have already had extensive interdependence in software development, service outsourcing, and investments in infrastructure and manufacturing.[30]
But perhaps the most significant aspect of this growing cooperation, apart from the nuclear deal, is enhanced defense and space cooperation, and the emerging U.S.-India military ties that span from arms sales to joint military exercises. Chinese sources point to an October 2002 Pentagon report on Indo-U.S. military relations that indicates major shifts of U.S. policy toward India, defining and recognizing it as a major rising power, and helping it to achieve that status in anticipation of its endorsement of key U.S. policy objectives. These range from anti-terrorism, protection of critical sea lanes of communication, to interception of WMD-related shipment and missile defenses. During Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee's visit to the U.S. in June 2005, the Pentagon signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with India in which the U.S. would provide a broad range of defense equipment and military technologies, including fighter aircraft (F-16 and F-18) and joint research and development.[31] Chinese analysts suggest the reason for the U.S. policy change from restriction and control to one of relaxation and even preferential treatment is largely driven by a desire to balance China's growing power. At the same time, India's growing defense budget and arms acquisitions also make it an attractive customer for U.S. arms exports.[32]
Conclusion
Sino-Indian relations have experienced significant improvement over the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi are making concerted efforts to further the bilateral strategic and cooperative partnership that serves the long-term interests of both countries. From China's perspective, developing a stable relationship with India contributes to its broader policy toward South Asia and forms an integral part of its overall strategic orientation.
But Beijing is not impervious to the problems and challenges ahead. These include the need to broaden the scope and depth of strategic dialogue and continued confidence building measures to minimize and dispel mutual suspicions and threat perceptions. In particular, the two countries should seek to promote common interests through the emerging China-India-U.S. triangle rather than to take advantage of their respective bilateral ties with the world's only superpower to undermine the other's security interests. In addition, China and India should consult more on international and regional issues where they share common interests. These could include a fair and equitable international political and economic order, non-intervention, environment, disarmament, and anti-terrorism. Increasingly, the two countries are also expanding cooperation in the energy sector.
But full and complete normalization, let alone the development of the strategic and cooperative partnership between Asia's two rising powers, is possible only if China and India can set a clearly defined timetable for the resolution of the border dispute. Beijing and New Delhi must also manage well the China-India-Pakistan triangle and prevent conflicts in the Indian Ocean as both recognize the growing importance of energy security.
Dr. Jing-dong Yuan is Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and Associate Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he teaches Chinese security and foreign policy, East Asian security and arms control, and U.S. Asia Policy. He is the co-author of "China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?" (Lynne Rienners Publisher, 2003) and is currently writing a book on China's security policy since the end of the Cold War.
Photo: Chinese President Hu Jintao, November 2004. Photo by U. Dettmar for Agência Brasil. (Licensed under the Creative Commons License Attribution 2.5 Brazil license.)
Notes:
1. John W. Garver, "The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity Following India's Nuclear Tests," The China Quarterly 168 (December 2001), pp. 865-889.
2. Ambassador Zhang Yan, "Perspective on India and China-India Relations," speech at the Asia Society, June 18, 2008, Hong Kong, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t466857.htm; Cheng Ruisheng, "Prospect of China-India Relations after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Visit," China Report 44:1 (2008), p. 60.
3. Cheng Ruisheng, "Lun zhongyin zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi [On Sino-Indian Strategic and Cooperative Partnership]," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies Quarterly], no. 1 (2007), pp. 13-18.
4. Amb. Zhang, op cit.
5. P.S. Suryanarayana, "On the Right Track," Frontline, 21:9 (April 24-May 7, 2004), http://www.flonnet.com/fl2109/stories/20040507002504600.htm
6. Pallavi Aiyar, "India, China MoU on Military Ties." The Hindu. 30 May 2006. Accessed using the Foreign Broadcast Information Service www.opensource.gov, 3 July 2006.
7. "Indian defense minister visited numerous military facilities in China," Zhongguowang [www.china.org.cn], June 1, 2006, at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/HIAW/1226024.htm; Chen Jihui and Qian Feng, "Yindu fangzhang jielian fang zhongri [Indian Defense Minister Visits Japan, China]," Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], May 29, 2006, p. 2, at http://paper.people.com.cn/hqsb/html/2006-05/29/content_6001646.htm.
8. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001).
9. Zhao Gancheng, "Zhongguo dui yindu zhanlue qianxi [An Analysis of China's Strategy toward India]," Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian Studies], no. 1 (2008), pp. 3-8.
10. Gareth Price, "China and India: Cooperation and Competition," Asia Programme Briefing Paper, Chatham House, May 2007, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/download/-/id/474; Zhang Guihong, "Sino-Indian Security Relations: Bilateral Issues, External Factors and Regional Implications," South Asian Survey 12:1 (2005), pp. 61-74.
11. John W. Garver, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations," India Review 1:4 (October 2002), pp.1-38; David Scott, "Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century," Asian Security 4:3 (2008), pp. 244-270; Han Hua, "Youhao linbang heshi anquan weixie—zhongyin ruhe kandai duifang [Good Neighbor or Security Threat: How China and India View Each Other]," Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies] 73 (2002), pp.6-13.
12. Jaideep Saikia, "Quest for a Chindian Arc: Leadership in the Asian Century," Defense & Security Analysis 22:4 (December 2006), pp. 421-434; Greg Sheridan, "East Meets East: The Sino-Indian Rivalry," The National Interest 86 (November/December 2006), pp. 92-96.
13. Song Dexing, "21 shiji de zhongyin guanxi: yindu de genben zhanlue guanqie jiqi luoji qidian [Sino-Indian Relations in the 21st Century: India's Fundamental Strategic Concerns and Their Logical Premises]," Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian Studies], no. 2 (2007), pp. 3-8; Tang Lu, "Yindu rengwei zouchu zhongyin zhanzheng yinying [India Still under Shadow of '62 War]," Guoji Xianqu Daobao [International Herald Leader], November 28, 2008, online edition, http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2008-11/28/content_10423612.htm.
14. Raj Chengappa, "Building India's Missile Muscle," India Today International, April 30, 2007, pp. 36-39; Siddharth Srivastava, "India Has China in its Range," Asia Times, April 14, 2007.
15. Saurabh Shukla, "Love with Tokyo," India Today International, June 11, 2007, pp. 42-43; Zhao Hong, "India's Changing Relations with ASEAN: From China's Perspective," Journal of East Asian Affairs 20:2 (Fall/Winter 2006), pp. 141-170; Shi Hongyuan, "Yinri guanxi chixu shengwen jiqi dongyin [The Continuing Warming Indo-Japanese Ties and Their Genesis], Guoji Ziliao Xinxi [International Information], no. 8 (2007), pp. 7-11.
16. Gurmeet Kanwal, "India-China Territorial Dispute Little Progress despite Prolonged Negotiations," South Asia Monitor: A Perspective on the Region, February 2008, http://www.southasiamonitor.org/2008/Feb/news/gur.shtml.
17. Saurabh Shukla, "Beijing Turns Truant Again," India Today International, June 11, 2007, p. 7; Jo Johnson, "India Cancels Diplomatic Visit to China," Financial Times, May 27, 2007.
18. Xu Hua, "Yindu zhongshi haiyang junshi weishe [India Emphasizes Maritime Deterrence]," Xiandai Junshi [Conmilit] (April 2000), pp. 54-56.
19. Chen Jihui, "Yindu haijun yaoguan maliujia [INS Wants to Control Malacca Strait]," Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times], March 1, 2006, http://world.people.com.cn/GB/14549/4152188.html; Lai Yang, "Yindu quanmian tisheng junshi shili [India Enhances Overall Military Capabilities]," Shijie Xinwenbao [World News Journal], March 4, 2008, http://gb.cri.cn/12764/2008/03/04/2945@1964796.htm (accessed on May 8, 2008).
20. On Sino-Indian rivalry in the Indian Ocean from a historical perspective, see Garver, Protracted Contest, chapter 10. On Chinese views of India's Look East Policy, see Zhao Gancheng, "Yindu 'dongxiang' zhengce de fazhan ji yiyi [The Evolution and Implications of India's Look East Policy]," Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], no. 8 (2007), pp. 10-16, 64.
21. John W. Garver, "Development of China's Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-west and South Asia," The China Quarterly (2006), pp. 1-22.
22. "Into the Wide Blue Yonder," The Economist, June 7, 2008, pp. 53-54; Khurana, "China's 'String of Pearls'."
23. David Walgreen, "China in the Indian Ocean Region: Lessons in PRC Grand Strategy," Comparative Strategy 25 (2006), pp. 55-73.
24. Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power across the Asian Littoral (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2006); Sudha Ramachandran, "India Chases the Dragon in Sri Lanka," Asia Times Online, July 10, 2008, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JG10Df03.html (accessed on July 17, 2008).
25. David Montero, "China, Pakistan Team Up on Energy," Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 2007; Henry Chu, "China's Footprint in Pakistan," Los Angeles Times, April 1, 2006; Ziad Haider, "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6:1 (Winter 2005), pp. 95-103.
26. On this point, see Michael Yahuda, "China and the Kashmir Crisis," BBC World News, June 2, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2020788.stm
27. Zhou Rong, "Zhongba zhanlue hezuo xu zhuru xinde huoli [Sino-Pak Strategic Cooperation Needs New Vitality]," Nanya Yanjiu Jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], no. 1 (2007), pp. 24-27.
28. For an excellent analysis, see John W. Garver, "The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," NBR Analysis 13:5 (October 2002), pp.5-56. See also, Lisa Curtis, "The Triangular Dynamics in Asia: The U.S., India, and China," Heritage Lectures, April 11, 2007; Siddharth Srivastava, "China Looks on at the US-India Lockstep," Asia Times, June 30, 2007; Daniel Twining, "The New Great Game: Why the Bush Administration Has Embraced India," The Weekly Standard, December 25, 2006, pp. 15-19; Amit Gupta, "U.S.-India-China: Assessing Tripolarity," China Report 42:1 (2006), pp. 69-83.
29. Zhan Dexiong, "Bushi zai qiangdiao meiyin guanxi [Bush Again Adjusts the US-Indian Relations]," Liaowang Xingwen Zhoukan [Outlook Weekly], March 6, 2006, p. 85; Zhang Zhenqiang, "Meiguo weihe xia zhongzhu tuidong meiyin hezuo [Why Is U.S. Investing So Much to Promote U.S.-India Cooperation]?" Lianhe Zaobaowang [zaobao.com], March 10, 2006, http://www.zaobao.com/special/forum/pages3/forum_lx060310c.html.
30. People's Daily Online, March 6, 2006. http://world.people.com.cn/GB/4168062.html
31. Xinhuawang [Xinhua News Online], "Meiguo wujiao daolou xuanbu xiang yindu chushou xianjin zhandouji [Pentagon Announces Sales of Advanced Fighter Aircraft to India]," March 2, 2006. http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2006-03/03/content_4251167.htm; Liu Li, "Gongtong erzhi zhongguo: meiyin qiaoding shinian junshi hezuo [Jointly Containing China: U.S. and India Nail Ten-Year Military Cooperation Package]," Dongfang Zaobao [Oriental Morning Post], June 30, 2005, http://news.cphotos.net/Articles/guoji/200506302130900.htm; Zhang Li, "Cong 'hexieyi' jiedu yinmei guanxi [The Nuclear Deal and the Indo-U.S. Strategic Relationship]," Nanya Yanjiu Jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], No. 3 (2005), pp. 43-50.
32. Hou Hongyu, "Shixi meiguo duiyin junbei chukou zhengze de bianhua [An Analysis of Changes in U.S. Arms Export Policy toward India]," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 12 (2005), pp. 13-16.
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Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India
Jing-dong Yuan | Bio | 30 Nov 2008
World Politics Review
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Sino-Pakistani ties continue to cast a shadow over the China-India entente, despite Beijing's efforts to address New Delhi's concerns. While China's neutrality during the 1999 Kargil crisis demonstrates a more balanced Chinese South Asia policy, that gesture has yet to translate into good will and confidence on India's part that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is not targeted at India. New Delhi remains suspicious of the so-called "all-weather" Sino-Pakistani relationship, in particular their defense cooperation -- such as the joint development of advanced fighter aircraft -- and Chinese assistance in constructing strategic port facilities for Pakistan in Gwadar.[25]
China's special ties with Pakistan have undergone noticeable changes since the end of the Cold War and in particular with the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. While in the past, strategic necessities and mutual interests led China to lend its support to Pakistan on almost all positions that Islamabad considered critical, that unconditional support no longer applies in today's much changed strategic environment. Beijing's attitude toward the Kashmir issue, for instance, reflects its changing priorities and broader security interests in South Asia. Indeed, China's Kashmir policy has come full circle: from the stance of neutrality in the early 1950s; to the pro-Pakistan position of the 1960s and 1970s; to a mixed UN resolutions plus the Simla agreement balancing act of the 1980s (as Beijing was seeking rapprochement with New Delhi but continued to maintain entente with Islamabad); to the current position, adopted since the early 1990s, on characterizing the Kashmir issue as a bilateral matter.
China's Kashmir policy must be understood within the broader contexts of its South Asia policy in general, and where this policy fits in Beijing's global strategies and its bilateral relationships with India and Pakistan in particular.[26] One of the key objectives of Beijing's post-Cold War global strategy has been to develop a peaceful environment for economic development. Within this context, China has sought to resolve contentious issues, including boundary disputes with a number of its neighboring countries, from the former Soviet Union to Vietnam. That general posture of good neighborly policy has also been applied to the South Asian region, where Beijing has sought rapprochement with India since the late 1980s.
As China re-orients its foreign policy and security posture in the post-Cold War era, with a focus on East Asia and a possible military conflict with the United States over the Taiwan Strait, it has growing interests in seeing a stable South Asia and a better relationship with India. That explains Beijing's more unequivocal position on the Kashmir issue clearly in favor of India's position. That decision is firmly grounded in the belief that the only realistic way to resolve the Kashmir conflict is through peaceful negotiation between India and Pakistan. As Islamabad's trusted friend, Beijing could and should use its influence to convince Pakistan why it is also in its interest to resolve the issue peacefully.
However, these policy shifts do not mean that Beijing is abandoning Islamabad. On the contrary, China continues to provide crucial support -- moral as well as material -- to Pakistan, for at least three reasons. First, a stable Pakistan and one that manages its relationship with India provides stability to China's southwest periphery. Second, with ethnic separatism and religious extremism on the rise in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Beijing needs the full understanding and assistance from the Pakistani government to prevent terrorist groups from using Pakistan as a training base and launch pad to undermine China's national unity. Third, as a major Muslim country, Pakistan plays a unique role in serving as a conduit to the broader Islamic world for China. Clearly, new thinking and renewed energies are needed to develop an all-round relationship that goes beyond the narrow defense linkage.[27]
Chinese security analysts are also debating the significance and implications of a warming U.S.-India relationship that spans from nuclear cooperation to the building of a so-called democracy arch. Washington and New Delhi share normative values (democracy) and strategic interests while Beijing's ties with both are more driven by contingent rather than structural interests.[28] In this context, the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the warming strategic relationship are viewed within the broader context of Washington's global strategic calculations. The Bush administration is seen as seeking to enlist India to balance against China's rapid rise. In addition, the U.S. also recognizes the value of India as an emerging market and would like to see India succeed economically as an alternative model -- based on a market economy and democracy -- to the so-called "Beijing Consensus" (i.e., economic success with relatively tight political control). This may also explain why Washington is more liberal regarding relaxation of controls on high-tech transfers to India, but not to China.[29]
Chinese analysts focus on the expansion of U.S.-India ties, in particular in the areas of defense and energy cooperation, as well as economic relations. According to Chinese analyses, the Bush administration seeks to consolidate the U.S.-India relationship by focusing on three key areas. The first involves forming a strong politico-strategic partnership by emphasizing their shared values as the world's oldest and largest democracies along with their common interests in combating global terrorism, achieving energy security, and maintaining regional stability. The second focuses on expanding bilateral trade to achieve the $50 billion target in three years. The two countries have already had extensive interdependence in software development, service outsourcing, and investments in infrastructure and manufacturing.[30]
But perhaps the most significant aspect of this growing cooperation, apart from the nuclear deal, is enhanced defense and space cooperation, and the emerging U.S.-India military ties that span from arms sales to joint military exercises. Chinese sources point to an October 2002 Pentagon report on Indo-U.S. military relations that indicates major shifts of U.S. policy toward India, defining and recognizing it as a major rising power, and helping it to achieve that status in anticipation of its endorsement of key U.S. policy objectives. These range from anti-terrorism, protection of critical sea lanes of communication, to interception of WMD-related shipment and missile defenses. During Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee's visit to the U.S. in June 2005, the Pentagon signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with India in which the U.S. would provide a broad range of defense equipment and military technologies, including fighter aircraft (F-16 and F-18) and joint research and development.[31] Chinese analysts suggest the reason for the U.S. policy change from restriction and control to one of relaxation and even preferential treatment is largely driven by a desire to balance China's growing power. At the same time, India's growing defense budget and arms acquisitions also make it an attractive customer for U.S. arms exports.[32]
Conclusion
Sino-Indian relations have experienced significant improvement over the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi are making concerted efforts to further the bilateral strategic and cooperative partnership that serves the long-term interests of both countries. From China's perspective, developing a stable relationship with India contributes to its broader policy toward South Asia and forms an integral part of its overall strategic orientation.
But Beijing is not impervious to the problems and challenges ahead. These include the need to broaden the scope and depth of strategic dialogue and continued confidence building measures to minimize and dispel mutual suspicions and threat perceptions. In particular, the two countries should seek to promote common interests through the emerging China-India-U.S. triangle rather than to take advantage of their respective bilateral ties with the world's only superpower to undermine the other's security interests. In addition, China and India should consult more on international and regional issues where they share common interests. These could include a fair and equitable international political and economic order, non-intervention, environment, disarmament, and anti-terrorism. Increasingly, the two countries are also expanding cooperation in the energy sector.
But full and complete normalization, let alone the development of the strategic and cooperative partnership between Asia's two rising powers, is possible only if China and India can set a clearly defined timetable for the resolution of the border dispute. Beijing and New Delhi must also manage well the China-India-Pakistan triangle and prevent conflicts in the Indian Ocean as both recognize the growing importance of energy security.
Sino-Pakistani ties continue to cast a shadow over the China-India entente, despite Beijing's efforts to address New Delhi's concerns. While China's neutrality during the 1999 Kargil crisis demonstrates a more balanced Chinese South Asia policy, that gesture has yet to translate into good will and confidence on India's part that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is not targeted at India. New Delhi remains suspicious of the so-called "all-weather" Sino-Pakistani relationship, in particular their defense cooperation -- such as the joint development of advanced fighter aircraft -- and Chinese assistance in constructing strategic port facilities for Pakistan in Gwadar.[25]
China's special ties with Pakistan have undergone noticeable changes since the end of the Cold War and in particular with the improvement in Sino-Indian relations. While in the past, strategic necessities and mutual interests led China to lend its support to Pakistan on almost all positions that Islamabad considered critical, that unconditional support no longer applies in today's much changed strategic environment. Beijing's attitude toward the Kashmir issue, for instance, reflects its changing priorities and broader security interests in South Asia. Indeed, China's Kashmir policy has come full circle: from the stance of neutrality in the early 1950s; to the pro-Pakistan position of the 1960s and 1970s; to a mixed UN resolutions plus the Simla agreement balancing act of the 1980s (as Beijing was seeking rapprochement with New Delhi but continued to maintain entente with Islamabad); to the current position, adopted since the early 1990s, on characterizing the Kashmir issue as a bilateral matter.
China's Kashmir policy must be understood within the broader contexts of its South Asia policy in general, and where this policy fits in Beijing's global strategies and its bilateral relationships with India and Pakistan in particular.[26] One of the key objectives of Beijing's post-Cold War global strategy has been to develop a peaceful environment for economic development. Within this context, China has sought to resolve contentious issues, including boundary disputes with a number of its neighboring countries, from the former Soviet Union to Vietnam. That general posture of good neighborly policy has also been applied to the South Asian region, where Beijing has sought rapprochement with India since the late 1980s.
As China re-orients its foreign policy and security posture in the post-Cold War era, with a focus on East Asia and a possible military conflict with the United States over the Taiwan Strait, it has growing interests in seeing a stable South Asia and a better relationship with India. That explains Beijing's more unequivocal position on the Kashmir issue clearly in favor of India's position. That decision is firmly grounded in the belief that the only realistic way to resolve the Kashmir conflict is through peaceful negotiation between India and Pakistan. As Islamabad's trusted friend, Beijing could and should use its influence to convince Pakistan why it is also in its interest to resolve the issue peacefully.
However, these policy shifts do not mean that Beijing is abandoning Islamabad. On the contrary, China continues to provide crucial support -- moral as well as material -- to Pakistan, for at least three reasons. First, a stable Pakistan and one that manages its relationship with India provides stability to China's southwest periphery. Second, with ethnic separatism and religious extremism on the rise in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Beijing needs the full understanding and assistance from the Pakistani government to prevent terrorist groups from using Pakistan as a training base and launch pad to undermine China's national unity. Third, as a major Muslim country, Pakistan plays a unique role in serving as a conduit to the broader Islamic world for China. Clearly, new thinking and renewed energies are needed to develop an all-round relationship that goes beyond the narrow defense linkage.[27]
Chinese security analysts are also debating the significance and implications of a warming U.S.-India relationship that spans from nuclear cooperation to the building of a so-called democracy arch. Washington and New Delhi share normative values (democracy) and strategic interests while Beijing's ties with both are more driven by contingent rather than structural interests.[28] In this context, the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the warming strategic relationship are viewed within the broader context of Washington's global strategic calculations. The Bush administration is seen as seeking to enlist India to balance against China's rapid rise. In addition, the U.S. also recognizes the value of India as an emerging market and would like to see India succeed economically as an alternative model -- based on a market economy and democracy -- to the so-called "Beijing Consensus" (i.e., economic success with relatively tight political control). This may also explain why Washington is more liberal regarding relaxation of controls on high-tech transfers to India, but not to China.[29]
Chinese analysts focus on the expansion of U.S.-India ties, in particular in the areas of defense and energy cooperation, as well as economic relations. According to Chinese analyses, the Bush administration seeks to consolidate the U.S.-India relationship by focusing on three key areas. The first involves forming a strong politico-strategic partnership by emphasizing their shared values as the world's oldest and largest democracies along with their common interests in combating global terrorism, achieving energy security, and maintaining regional stability. The second focuses on expanding bilateral trade to achieve the $50 billion target in three years. The two countries have already had extensive interdependence in software development, service outsourcing, and investments in infrastructure and manufacturing.[30]
But perhaps the most significant aspect of this growing cooperation, apart from the nuclear deal, is enhanced defense and space cooperation, and the emerging U.S.-India military ties that span from arms sales to joint military exercises. Chinese sources point to an October 2002 Pentagon report on Indo-U.S. military relations that indicates major shifts of U.S. policy toward India, defining and recognizing it as a major rising power, and helping it to achieve that status in anticipation of its endorsement of key U.S. policy objectives. These range from anti-terrorism, protection of critical sea lanes of communication, to interception of WMD-related shipment and missile defenses. During Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee's visit to the U.S. in June 2005, the Pentagon signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with India in which the U.S. would provide a broad range of defense equipment and military technologies, including fighter aircraft (F-16 and F-18) and joint research and development.[31] Chinese analysts suggest the reason for the U.S. policy change from restriction and control to one of relaxation and even preferential treatment is largely driven by a desire to balance China's growing power. At the same time, India's growing defense budget and arms acquisitions also make it an attractive customer for U.S. arms exports.[32]
Conclusion
Sino-Indian relations have experienced significant improvement over the past five years. Beijing and New Delhi are making concerted efforts to further the bilateral strategic and cooperative partnership that serves the long-term interests of both countries. From China's perspective, developing a stable relationship with India contributes to its broader policy toward South Asia and forms an integral part of its overall strategic orientation.
But Beijing is not impervious to the problems and challenges ahead. These include the need to broaden the scope and depth of strategic dialogue and continued confidence building measures to minimize and dispel mutual suspicions and threat perceptions. In particular, the two countries should seek to promote common interests through the emerging China-India-U.S. triangle rather than to take advantage of their respective bilateral ties with the world's only superpower to undermine the other's security interests. In addition, China and India should consult more on international and regional issues where they share common interests. These could include a fair and equitable international political and economic order, non-intervention, environment, disarmament, and anti-terrorism. Increasingly, the two countries are also expanding cooperation in the energy sector.
But full and complete normalization, let alone the development of the strategic and cooperative partnership between Asia's two rising powers, is possible only if China and India can set a clearly defined timetable for the resolution of the border dispute. Beijing and New Delhi must also manage well the China-India-Pakistan triangle and prevent conflicts in the Indian Ocean as both recognize the growing importance of energy security.
Dr. Jing-dong Yuan is Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and Associate Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he teaches Chinese security and foreign policy, East Asian security and arms control, and U.S. Asia Policy. He is the co-author of "China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?" (Lynne Rienners Publisher, 2003) and is currently writing a book on China's security policy since the end of the Cold War.
Military Diplomacy: The Future of Sino-Indian Military Relations?
Military Diplomacy: The Future of Sino-Indian Military Relations?
Publication: China Brief Volume: 8 Issue: 23December 8, 2008 10:59 AM
Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Military relations between rising powers are often caught in a conflictual cycle. Yet Sino–Indian military relations is an exception in spite of wariness on both sides of the others strategic intentions. While the two states have been at odds for much of the Cold War following the Sino–Indian border war in 1962, the two sides have fashioned their bilateral relations in a commendable manner during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government. Part of the credit should go to on-going military diplomacy, engineered in stages between the two countries, which have allowed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Indian Armed Forces to manage disputes and maintain peace along the disputed borders. The simultaneous visit by the Indian Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal Fali H. Major, to Beijing with the Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), General Wu Shengli, to New Delhi in the first fortnight of November 2008 reinforced the strength of this initiative in promoting Sino–Indian relations. While many more such initiatives are in the offing, it is open to question if such steps ‘alone’ will help in the settlement of the border dispute, remove the perception of China as a long-term threat among Indian defense planners and engender permanent peace between China and India.
Expanding Military Diplomacy
During the Cold War, barring the clashes in 1967 at Nathu La and in 1987 at Sumdurong Chu, the two militaries largely maintained a non-confrontational posture along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988 has been credited as unleashing a period of rapprochement. While there were some military interactions as a follow up, the first major step in military diplomacy was the path-breaking Agreement in Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC in September 1993, followed by the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in the Military Field along the LAC. During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to New Delhi in April 2005, additional CBMs were added to the 1996 agreement. These included, among others, border meeting points at Kibithu–Damai in the eastern sector and Lipulekh Pass in the Middle Sector; exchanges between the relevant military regions of China and army commands of India; and exchanges between institutions of training, sports and culture of the two armed forces [1].
These agreements laid down the foundations for bilateral engagement between the militaries of the two countries. For the first time, the navies of the two countries participated in joint exercises off the Shanghai coast in China in 2003. They met again in 2005 in the Arabian Sea off the Malabar Coast and in 2007 off the cost of Qingdao [2]. The Chinese were also invited as observers during the Indian Army’s war game exercises in the western sector in 2005. India sent observers to the China– Russia joint exercises in August 2005 at the invitation of the Chinese [3].
A comprehensive push on promoting bilateral military diplomacy was on track after the visit by the former Indian defense minister, Pranab Mukherjee, to China in May 2006. This was the first time New Delhi demonstrated the political will to distance itself from its earlier isolation and inward orientation and reach out to China [4]. The visit led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that called for the institutionalization of frequent exchanges between the officials of the Ministries and the armed forces through an annual defense dialogue, in addition to developing an annual calendar for joint exercises and training programs [5]. As a follow up exercise, former Indian Army Chief General J. J. Singh visited China in May 2007. The first meeting of India–China Defense Dialogue was held in Beijing from November 12-13, 2007 [6]. Also, China and India held their first mil-to-mil exercise ‘Hand-in-Hand 2007’ near the Kunming Military Academy in China’s Yunnan Province in December 2007. The two armies will be meeting again for a follow up joint exercise in December 2008, this time at Belgaum in India’s Karnataka Province. This could be followed up by a joint exercise between the air forces of the two countries [7].
Gains from Military Diplomacy
It is worthwhile to discuss a few of the visible gains from Sino–Indian engagement through military diplomacy are worth mentioning. First, military diplomacy has led to the graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT) between China and India. Political relations have become less hostile and the LAC between the two countries has become relatively stable compared to the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan. Vary rarely are there reports in Indian newspapers about cross-fire between Chinese and Indian forces. The relative peace on the Chinese front has allowed India to redesign its force mobilization and redeploy them in Jammu and Kashmir and northeast for counter-insurgency operations. Second, clandestine activities by the PLA near LAC are reportedly far less than by the Pakistan Army near the LoC. While there are cases of Chinese troops making regular incursions into Indian territories, they desist from supporting secessionist elements in crossing the border or in the supply of arms. Third, in the last few years at least, Chinese and Indian forces have engaged each other near the LAC in a series of interactive activities such as mountaineering expeditions, celebration of national days, cultural and sporting activities. Such activities are yet to be inaugurated near the LoC (Rediff, December 31, 2007).
In the long term, India can benefit from military diplomacy on several fronts. First, not much is known about the PLA's modernization plans, its funding and budgetary process and its overall strategic objectives. India still relies heavily upon western intelligence and academic sources to develop its perspective on China’s military preparedness [8]. As stakeholders in India's national security, the Indian defense forces are entrusted with the duty to acquire new knowledge about the PLA's functionaries, its combat preparedness and operational reach in the Asia-Pacific region. Military diplomacy will facilitate such ‘knowledge development’. Second, Sino–Indian military diplomacy may relieve India from the specter of having to face a ‘two-front’ war with China and Pakistan, at least in the near future. During the 1999 Kargil War, it may have been due to India’s improved relations with China through some confidence building measures on the LAC that kept Beijing from siding with Pakistan [9]. Third, it has given India some breathing space and confidence for a negotiated settlement of the vexed issue of the border. The protracted talks with no conclusion have often challenged the patience of policy makers as well as the public at large, but the relative peace on the borders has enabled diplomats on both sides to discuss the issue without any external constraint. Fourth, military diplomacy has enabled the two countries to move away from the position of bilateral confrontation to explore the potential of being stakeholders in the emerging Asian security architecture. Both the countries have identified terrorism, maritime piracy, drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, security of sea lanes and humanitarian response as issues that require sharing of resources and expertise. In discussing these issues, China and India are willing partners in multilateral military-diplomatic platforms like the Shangri La Dialogue and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).
Limits of Military Diplomacy
While military diplomacy has certainly yielded dividends as ‘immediate relief’, too much should not be read into these exchanges. First, military diplomacy is just one of the tools in conflict resolution that provides a congenial atmosphere for other tools such as political and diplomatic corps to carry forward. Second, barring a recent spate of engagements with the United States and other Asian countries, achievements by India's military diplomacy pale in comparison to those of China, where the PLA has established military contacts with almost every country of any significance [10]. Part of the reason could be that, unlike China, the civilian control of India's foreign policy decision-making process is complete, with hardly any role available for the military establishment. Third, the extent and the scope of military diplomacy between China and India is limited and has not moved beyond symbolism. Even though the two countries are nuclear powers, there are no institutional arrangements to prevent a nuclear crisis through mutual contact at the top level. Further, China scoffs at India’s diplomatic engagements with the militaries of other countries such as the United States, Japan and even Singapore. Fourth, the Sino–Indian border problem is too vast and complex and military diplomacy may have a limited role. The joint group of military experts that was entrusted to exchange a mutually agreed map of the LAC has not moved beyond the middle sector. The more contentious eastern and western sectors have not been addressed. Fifth, China continues to indulge in regular incursions across the LAC. At times it could be deliberate and other times it is because of differing perceptions of LAC and at times due to confusion among troops on the ground, especially when units change and new units get posted there.
Challenges from China's Military Modernization
While the two militaries engage one another, China’s military modernization has crossed many milestones, which has caused fresh concerns about China's strategic ambitions. The functional and geopolitical expansions of the PLA's army, navy and space modernization are well documented [11]. Yet while New Delhi is keenly aware of the likely implications of Chinese military modernization on India's national security, it is ill equipped to face another Chinese onslaught on the border. While China’s major force concentration is on the Eastern seaboard facing Japan and Taiwan, its capability to mobilize troops on the LAC is far more effective than India, which has only woken up to the need of developing infrastructure along the border [12]. Despite a bitter history of war, New Delhi’s war doctrine, until recently, was not even geared on the realist lines and was too confident about handling China [13]. Border apart, China’s growing presence in the oceanic waters aimed at treating India as a secondary player and consolidating China’s dominance in the Asia–Pacific poses discreet competition for power and influence between the two rising great powers in the region.
Therefore, the ‘current package’ of military diplomacy, while bringing relative peace between China and India, does not address India’s security dilemma vis-à-vis China. The unresolved border dispute coupled with China’s enhanced military prowess might lure it to seek a military solution for vexing political issues. Border apart, internal problems in China could also force it on a war path with India. China can choose the vulnerable Chicken’s Neck (the narrow Siliguri Corridor connecting Chumbi valley to Bangladesh), the central plains of Bihar and UP or could decide to choke India in the Malacca Straits. Even without a full fledged war, China can constrain India’s power and influence and render it helpless as witnessed though its maritime activities off the Myanmar (Burma) coast.
As China rises militarily, India needs to avoid an open confrontation with China. Hence, the focus should be on expanding the CBMs so that more interactive platforms and communication channels are available with China. In the next 20-25 years, as India enters a crucial phase of economic growth, the defense forces will have a critical role to play in maintaining a peaceful strategic environment in its neighborhood and ensuring unhindered economic growth. Higher level exchanges provide an opportunity to learn from global developments in military technology, weaponry and emerging military doctrines.
Military diplomacy, in the final analysis, cannot be a substitute for India's military modernization. With so many ambiguities surrounding PLA’s strategic objectives, expenditure and role in foreign–policy decision making, India needs to supplement military diplomacy with concurrent military modernization to retain the option of an ‘alternative future’ with China. Only that will enable India to live in peace with China and compete in the emerging power and influence game in the Asia–Pacific region.
Notes
1. See the text, "Protocol between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China Border Areas," April 11, 2005, www.meaindia.nic.in.
2. Bhartendu Kumar Singh, "Military Diplomacy and Sino–Indian Relations," Art. No. 2309, June 5, 2007, www.ipcs.org.
3. "Militaries of India, China to Interact More on Border Areas," www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp, February 22, 2006.
4. C. Raja Mohan, "India’s Changing Strategic Profile in East and Southeast Asia," presented at the Regional Outlook Forum 2008, organized by Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, January 8, 2008, Singapore.
5. See the text of "Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of India and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China for Exchanges and Cooperation in the field of Defense," May 29, 2006, www.mea.nic.in
6. The Indian delegation was led by Mr. Bimal Julka, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defense while the Chinese side was led by Maj Gen Qian Lihua, Director General, Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defense.
7. "India, China to Hold Joint Army Exercise in December," November 7, 2008, www.india-defence.com/reports-4071
8. Bhartendu Kumar Singh, "Whither China’s Military Modernization," Review Essay, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 4, July 2008, pp. 677-684.
9. Bhartendu Kumar Singh and Satyajit Mohanty, "Contexualizing Kargil Within China’s Security Paradigm" in Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna (Retired) and P.R. Chari, Kargil: The Tables Turned (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001), pp. 221-232.
10. The only exception is India’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations since 1953. Presently, India has 9000 soldiers in five missions.
11. See, U.S. Department of Defence, "Annual Report to Congress: Military power of the People’s Republic of China 2008," www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf; M. Taylor Fravel, "China’s search for military power," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, Summer 2008, pp. 125-141; Ashley J. Tellis, "China’s military space strategy," Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 41-72; Andrew S. Erickson, "The Growth of China’s Navy: Implications for Indian Ocean Security," Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No 4, July 2008, pp. 655-676.
12. "Annual Report: 2005-2006," Ministry of Defense, India, mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Publication: China Brief Volume: 8 Issue: 23December 8, 2008 10:59 AM
Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Military relations between rising powers are often caught in a conflictual cycle. Yet Sino–Indian military relations is an exception in spite of wariness on both sides of the others strategic intentions. While the two states have been at odds for much of the Cold War following the Sino–Indian border war in 1962, the two sides have fashioned their bilateral relations in a commendable manner during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government. Part of the credit should go to on-going military diplomacy, engineered in stages between the two countries, which have allowed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Indian Armed Forces to manage disputes and maintain peace along the disputed borders. The simultaneous visit by the Indian Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal Fali H. Major, to Beijing with the Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), General Wu Shengli, to New Delhi in the first fortnight of November 2008 reinforced the strength of this initiative in promoting Sino–Indian relations. While many more such initiatives are in the offing, it is open to question if such steps ‘alone’ will help in the settlement of the border dispute, remove the perception of China as a long-term threat among Indian defense planners and engender permanent peace between China and India.
Expanding Military Diplomacy
During the Cold War, barring the clashes in 1967 at Nathu La and in 1987 at Sumdurong Chu, the two militaries largely maintained a non-confrontational posture along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988 has been credited as unleashing a period of rapprochement. While there were some military interactions as a follow up, the first major step in military diplomacy was the path-breaking Agreement in Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC in September 1993, followed by the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in the Military Field along the LAC. During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to New Delhi in April 2005, additional CBMs were added to the 1996 agreement. These included, among others, border meeting points at Kibithu–Damai in the eastern sector and Lipulekh Pass in the Middle Sector; exchanges between the relevant military regions of China and army commands of India; and exchanges between institutions of training, sports and culture of the two armed forces [1].
These agreements laid down the foundations for bilateral engagement between the militaries of the two countries. For the first time, the navies of the two countries participated in joint exercises off the Shanghai coast in China in 2003. They met again in 2005 in the Arabian Sea off the Malabar Coast and in 2007 off the cost of Qingdao [2]. The Chinese were also invited as observers during the Indian Army’s war game exercises in the western sector in 2005. India sent observers to the China– Russia joint exercises in August 2005 at the invitation of the Chinese [3].
A comprehensive push on promoting bilateral military diplomacy was on track after the visit by the former Indian defense minister, Pranab Mukherjee, to China in May 2006. This was the first time New Delhi demonstrated the political will to distance itself from its earlier isolation and inward orientation and reach out to China [4]. The visit led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that called for the institutionalization of frequent exchanges between the officials of the Ministries and the armed forces through an annual defense dialogue, in addition to developing an annual calendar for joint exercises and training programs [5]. As a follow up exercise, former Indian Army Chief General J. J. Singh visited China in May 2007. The first meeting of India–China Defense Dialogue was held in Beijing from November 12-13, 2007 [6]. Also, China and India held their first mil-to-mil exercise ‘Hand-in-Hand 2007’ near the Kunming Military Academy in China’s Yunnan Province in December 2007. The two armies will be meeting again for a follow up joint exercise in December 2008, this time at Belgaum in India’s Karnataka Province. This could be followed up by a joint exercise between the air forces of the two countries [7].
Gains from Military Diplomacy
It is worthwhile to discuss a few of the visible gains from Sino–Indian engagement through military diplomacy are worth mentioning. First, military diplomacy has led to the graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT) between China and India. Political relations have become less hostile and the LAC between the two countries has become relatively stable compared to the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan. Vary rarely are there reports in Indian newspapers about cross-fire between Chinese and Indian forces. The relative peace on the Chinese front has allowed India to redesign its force mobilization and redeploy them in Jammu and Kashmir and northeast for counter-insurgency operations. Second, clandestine activities by the PLA near LAC are reportedly far less than by the Pakistan Army near the LoC. While there are cases of Chinese troops making regular incursions into Indian territories, they desist from supporting secessionist elements in crossing the border or in the supply of arms. Third, in the last few years at least, Chinese and Indian forces have engaged each other near the LAC in a series of interactive activities such as mountaineering expeditions, celebration of national days, cultural and sporting activities. Such activities are yet to be inaugurated near the LoC (Rediff, December 31, 2007).
In the long term, India can benefit from military diplomacy on several fronts. First, not much is known about the PLA's modernization plans, its funding and budgetary process and its overall strategic objectives. India still relies heavily upon western intelligence and academic sources to develop its perspective on China’s military preparedness [8]. As stakeholders in India's national security, the Indian defense forces are entrusted with the duty to acquire new knowledge about the PLA's functionaries, its combat preparedness and operational reach in the Asia-Pacific region. Military diplomacy will facilitate such ‘knowledge development’. Second, Sino–Indian military diplomacy may relieve India from the specter of having to face a ‘two-front’ war with China and Pakistan, at least in the near future. During the 1999 Kargil War, it may have been due to India’s improved relations with China through some confidence building measures on the LAC that kept Beijing from siding with Pakistan [9]. Third, it has given India some breathing space and confidence for a negotiated settlement of the vexed issue of the border. The protracted talks with no conclusion have often challenged the patience of policy makers as well as the public at large, but the relative peace on the borders has enabled diplomats on both sides to discuss the issue without any external constraint. Fourth, military diplomacy has enabled the two countries to move away from the position of bilateral confrontation to explore the potential of being stakeholders in the emerging Asian security architecture. Both the countries have identified terrorism, maritime piracy, drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, security of sea lanes and humanitarian response as issues that require sharing of resources and expertise. In discussing these issues, China and India are willing partners in multilateral military-diplomatic platforms like the Shangri La Dialogue and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).
Limits of Military Diplomacy
While military diplomacy has certainly yielded dividends as ‘immediate relief’, too much should not be read into these exchanges. First, military diplomacy is just one of the tools in conflict resolution that provides a congenial atmosphere for other tools such as political and diplomatic corps to carry forward. Second, barring a recent spate of engagements with the United States and other Asian countries, achievements by India's military diplomacy pale in comparison to those of China, where the PLA has established military contacts with almost every country of any significance [10]. Part of the reason could be that, unlike China, the civilian control of India's foreign policy decision-making process is complete, with hardly any role available for the military establishment. Third, the extent and the scope of military diplomacy between China and India is limited and has not moved beyond symbolism. Even though the two countries are nuclear powers, there are no institutional arrangements to prevent a nuclear crisis through mutual contact at the top level. Further, China scoffs at India’s diplomatic engagements with the militaries of other countries such as the United States, Japan and even Singapore. Fourth, the Sino–Indian border problem is too vast and complex and military diplomacy may have a limited role. The joint group of military experts that was entrusted to exchange a mutually agreed map of the LAC has not moved beyond the middle sector. The more contentious eastern and western sectors have not been addressed. Fifth, China continues to indulge in regular incursions across the LAC. At times it could be deliberate and other times it is because of differing perceptions of LAC and at times due to confusion among troops on the ground, especially when units change and new units get posted there.
Challenges from China's Military Modernization
While the two militaries engage one another, China’s military modernization has crossed many milestones, which has caused fresh concerns about China's strategic ambitions. The functional and geopolitical expansions of the PLA's army, navy and space modernization are well documented [11]. Yet while New Delhi is keenly aware of the likely implications of Chinese military modernization on India's national security, it is ill equipped to face another Chinese onslaught on the border. While China’s major force concentration is on the Eastern seaboard facing Japan and Taiwan, its capability to mobilize troops on the LAC is far more effective than India, which has only woken up to the need of developing infrastructure along the border [12]. Despite a bitter history of war, New Delhi’s war doctrine, until recently, was not even geared on the realist lines and was too confident about handling China [13]. Border apart, China’s growing presence in the oceanic waters aimed at treating India as a secondary player and consolidating China’s dominance in the Asia–Pacific poses discreet competition for power and influence between the two rising great powers in the region.
Therefore, the ‘current package’ of military diplomacy, while bringing relative peace between China and India, does not address India’s security dilemma vis-à-vis China. The unresolved border dispute coupled with China’s enhanced military prowess might lure it to seek a military solution for vexing political issues. Border apart, internal problems in China could also force it on a war path with India. China can choose the vulnerable Chicken’s Neck (the narrow Siliguri Corridor connecting Chumbi valley to Bangladesh), the central plains of Bihar and UP or could decide to choke India in the Malacca Straits. Even without a full fledged war, China can constrain India’s power and influence and render it helpless as witnessed though its maritime activities off the Myanmar (Burma) coast.
As China rises militarily, India needs to avoid an open confrontation with China. Hence, the focus should be on expanding the CBMs so that more interactive platforms and communication channels are available with China. In the next 20-25 years, as India enters a crucial phase of economic growth, the defense forces will have a critical role to play in maintaining a peaceful strategic environment in its neighborhood and ensuring unhindered economic growth. Higher level exchanges provide an opportunity to learn from global developments in military technology, weaponry and emerging military doctrines.
Military diplomacy, in the final analysis, cannot be a substitute for India's military modernization. With so many ambiguities surrounding PLA’s strategic objectives, expenditure and role in foreign–policy decision making, India needs to supplement military diplomacy with concurrent military modernization to retain the option of an ‘alternative future’ with China. Only that will enable India to live in peace with China and compete in the emerging power and influence game in the Asia–Pacific region.
Notes
1. See the text, "Protocol between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China Border Areas," April 11, 2005, www.meaindia.nic.in.
2. Bhartendu Kumar Singh, "Military Diplomacy and Sino–Indian Relations," Art. No. 2309, June 5, 2007, www.ipcs.org.
3. "Militaries of India, China to Interact More on Border Areas," www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp, February 22, 2006.
4. C. Raja Mohan, "India’s Changing Strategic Profile in East and Southeast Asia," presented at the Regional Outlook Forum 2008, organized by Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, January 8, 2008, Singapore.
5. See the text of "Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of India and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China for Exchanges and Cooperation in the field of Defense," May 29, 2006, www.mea.nic.in
6. The Indian delegation was led by Mr. Bimal Julka, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defense while the Chinese side was led by Maj Gen Qian Lihua, Director General, Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defense.
7. "India, China to Hold Joint Army Exercise in December," November 7, 2008, www.india-defence.com/reports-4071
8. Bhartendu Kumar Singh, "Whither China’s Military Modernization," Review Essay, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 4, July 2008, pp. 677-684.
9. Bhartendu Kumar Singh and Satyajit Mohanty, "Contexualizing Kargil Within China’s Security Paradigm" in Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna (Retired) and P.R. Chari, Kargil: The Tables Turned (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001), pp. 221-232.
10. The only exception is India’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations since 1953. Presently, India has 9000 soldiers in five missions.
11. See, U.S. Department of Defence, "Annual Report to Congress: Military power of the People’s Republic of China 2008," www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf; M. Taylor Fravel, "China’s search for military power," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, Summer 2008, pp. 125-141; Ashley J. Tellis, "China’s military space strategy," Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 41-72; Andrew S. Erickson, "The Growth of China’s Navy: Implications for Indian Ocean Security," Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No 4, July 2008, pp. 655-676.
12. "Annual Report: 2005-2006," Ministry of Defense, India, mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wednesday, 24 December 2008
Pak can’t afford a war with India: Analysts
Expressindia » Story
Pak can’t afford a war with India: Analysts
Dec 24, 2008 at 1356 hrs IST
Islamabad War between India and Pakistan over last month's militant attacks on the Indian city of Mumbai is seen as highly unlikely.
Nevertheless, with tension high and fiery rhetoric coming from various quarters on both sides, conflict between the neighbours who have fought three wars since 1947 cannot be ruled out. Here is a look at some possible scenarios for Pakistan in the event of war:
Political
- War would bring a wave of patriotism and national unity, analysts say. However, the authority of the civilian government that came to power this year after nine years of military rule, and had been trying to improve ties with India, would be undermined as the military would take charge of key decision-making.
- At the end of a war, assuming the country has not been flattened by Indian nuclear strikes, the government would be under huge pressure to deal with the economic consequences.
- Efforts to establish stable and sustainable civilian rule could be set back by years.
- India could try to stir up trouble in regions such as the energy-rich province of Baluchistan, where Pakistan says India has been meddling for years in support of separatist rebels fighting a low-key insurgency.
- Similarly, Afghans, perhaps egged on by close ally India, could revive calls for a greater "Pashtunistan" (Afghanistan has never recognised the border with Pakistan, imposed by British colonialists in the 19th century, which divided ethnic Pashtuns).
- Such developments in Baluchistan and the Pashtun-dominated northwest would revive deep-seated Pakistani fears of the break-up of their country.
Security
- The Pakistani military would effectively give up its part in the US-led war on terrorism, analysts say, as it pulls troops off the western border with Afghanistan, where they have been battling militants, and deploys them on the eastern border with India.
- Pakistani Taliban militants have already said they would rally to help the Pakistani military in the event of war against India.
- Pakistani efforts to rein in militant groups fighting Indian rule in the disputed Kashmir region would likely be reversed and the groups would be given a green light, or official support, to raise funds, recruit fighters and infiltrate India.
- Public sympathy and support for militant groups would soar as they would be seen as national defenders against the "real enemy", India.
- That would be the death knell for government attempts to convince a sceptical public that militancy has to be rooted out, and efforts to tackle it are for the good of the country and not just doing America's bidding.
Economy
- The economy was rescued from the brink by a $7.6 billion IMF loan agreed last month. The benchmarks and reforms involved in the IMF package, as well as lower fuel and food prices, have offered a glimmer of hope of recovery in 2009/10 but war would dash that hope and the slowdown would be prolonged.
- Several economic analysts said war was highly unlikely but even greater fear of war would lead to a flight of capital as both Pakistani and foreign investors get their money out of the country.
- There would be no hope of attracting much-needed foreign investment which is required to bridge a current account deficit.
- The Indian navy would most likely try to block Pakistan's main port at Karachi to choke off imports including fuel, though that would also disrupt supplies bound for US forces in Afghanistan.
- Analysts said they doubted authorities would freeze foreign currency accounts, as they did in 1998 after Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, in the absence of full-scale war because the country's reserve position as well as external account situation was improving with the IMF programme. However, that could not be ruled out if war broke out.
Pak can’t afford a war with India: Analysts
Dec 24, 2008 at 1356 hrs IST
Islamabad War between India and Pakistan over last month's militant attacks on the Indian city of Mumbai is seen as highly unlikely.
Nevertheless, with tension high and fiery rhetoric coming from various quarters on both sides, conflict between the neighbours who have fought three wars since 1947 cannot be ruled out. Here is a look at some possible scenarios for Pakistan in the event of war:
Political
- War would bring a wave of patriotism and national unity, analysts say. However, the authority of the civilian government that came to power this year after nine years of military rule, and had been trying to improve ties with India, would be undermined as the military would take charge of key decision-making.
- At the end of a war, assuming the country has not been flattened by Indian nuclear strikes, the government would be under huge pressure to deal with the economic consequences.
- Efforts to establish stable and sustainable civilian rule could be set back by years.
- India could try to stir up trouble in regions such as the energy-rich province of Baluchistan, where Pakistan says India has been meddling for years in support of separatist rebels fighting a low-key insurgency.
- Similarly, Afghans, perhaps egged on by close ally India, could revive calls for a greater "Pashtunistan" (Afghanistan has never recognised the border with Pakistan, imposed by British colonialists in the 19th century, which divided ethnic Pashtuns).
- Such developments in Baluchistan and the Pashtun-dominated northwest would revive deep-seated Pakistani fears of the break-up of their country.
Security
- The Pakistani military would effectively give up its part in the US-led war on terrorism, analysts say, as it pulls troops off the western border with Afghanistan, where they have been battling militants, and deploys them on the eastern border with India.
- Pakistani Taliban militants have already said they would rally to help the Pakistani military in the event of war against India.
- Pakistani efforts to rein in militant groups fighting Indian rule in the disputed Kashmir region would likely be reversed and the groups would be given a green light, or official support, to raise funds, recruit fighters and infiltrate India.
- Public sympathy and support for militant groups would soar as they would be seen as national defenders against the "real enemy", India.
- That would be the death knell for government attempts to convince a sceptical public that militancy has to be rooted out, and efforts to tackle it are for the good of the country and not just doing America's bidding.
Economy
- The economy was rescued from the brink by a $7.6 billion IMF loan agreed last month. The benchmarks and reforms involved in the IMF package, as well as lower fuel and food prices, have offered a glimmer of hope of recovery in 2009/10 but war would dash that hope and the slowdown would be prolonged.
- Several economic analysts said war was highly unlikely but even greater fear of war would lead to a flight of capital as both Pakistani and foreign investors get their money out of the country.
- There would be no hope of attracting much-needed foreign investment which is required to bridge a current account deficit.
- The Indian navy would most likely try to block Pakistan's main port at Karachi to choke off imports including fuel, though that would also disrupt supplies bound for US forces in Afghanistan.
- Analysts said they doubted authorities would freeze foreign currency accounts, as they did in 1998 after Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, in the absence of full-scale war because the country's reserve position as well as external account situation was improving with the IMF programme. However, that could not be ruled out if war broke out.
Sunday, 21 December 2008
Sikkim doing pivotal role in regional integration
Sikkim doing pivotal role in regional integration
December 21st, 2008
Gangtok, Sikkim: An international discourse on ‘Regionalism Approach to Regional Integration in South Asia: Prospects and Opportunities’ organized by Sikkim University was held on Friday at Chintan Bhavan which was presided by Mr.P.D.Rai, Deputy Chairman of Sikkim State Planning Commission.
Mr. Rai, in his address said “Sikkim is doing a pivotal role under the leadership of Chief Minister Pawan Chamling in regional integration”. Recently Sikkim was awarded 4th J.R.D.Tata award on 14 different disciplines including social justice, good governance, health and environment conservation. Besides, it got Rastriya Nirmal Puruskar on sanitation and brought Buddha’s relic from Thailand. These are all the regional manifestations, he said.
Speaking on financial crisis and terrorism, Mr.Rai said the world is seriously affected by present financial crisis and global terrorism and Sikkim is also a part of the global village.
He said at a time when there is hue and cry about global warming, ‘Sikkim has taken number of initiatives to conserve the environment’.
Prof. Mahendra P.Lama, Vice Chancellor of Sikkim University said, “South Asia as a whole has the hydle power potential of 19, 4310 MW, whereas we have hardly harnessed 41577 MW i.e, 21.39 percent of the total. There is tremendous scope in regional cooperation in energy sector”.
Mr. Gem Thsering, general manager of Bhutan Power Corporation, Thimpu, also attended the programme. He said Bhutan is the youngest democracy of the world. “India as a big brother is cooperating small brother Bhutan which is a global example”, he remarked. From Sichuan University, Prof. Li Tao, executive Dean of the university and Prof. Chandan Mahanta of Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, also addressed the session.
Earlier in a technical session of the same programme organized held at Conference Hall of Chintan Bhavan Governor Mr. B.P.Singh said the world is moving to a greater degree of co-operation in facing political and economic changes and “today, issues like health and education are also being addressed on a global scale”. Sub-regions have the advantages of geographical proximity, social cultural cohesiveness and economic complementary. Economic and social malaise can be tackled effectively by sharing resources and experience, he noted.
Source: Sikkim Reporter
December 21st, 2008
Gangtok, Sikkim: An international discourse on ‘Regionalism Approach to Regional Integration in South Asia: Prospects and Opportunities’ organized by Sikkim University was held on Friday at Chintan Bhavan which was presided by Mr.P.D.Rai, Deputy Chairman of Sikkim State Planning Commission.
Mr. Rai, in his address said “Sikkim is doing a pivotal role under the leadership of Chief Minister Pawan Chamling in regional integration”. Recently Sikkim was awarded 4th J.R.D.Tata award on 14 different disciplines including social justice, good governance, health and environment conservation. Besides, it got Rastriya Nirmal Puruskar on sanitation and brought Buddha’s relic from Thailand. These are all the regional manifestations, he said.
Speaking on financial crisis and terrorism, Mr.Rai said the world is seriously affected by present financial crisis and global terrorism and Sikkim is also a part of the global village.
He said at a time when there is hue and cry about global warming, ‘Sikkim has taken number of initiatives to conserve the environment’.
Prof. Mahendra P.Lama, Vice Chancellor of Sikkim University said, “South Asia as a whole has the hydle power potential of 19, 4310 MW, whereas we have hardly harnessed 41577 MW i.e, 21.39 percent of the total. There is tremendous scope in regional cooperation in energy sector”.
Mr. Gem Thsering, general manager of Bhutan Power Corporation, Thimpu, also attended the programme. He said Bhutan is the youngest democracy of the world. “India as a big brother is cooperating small brother Bhutan which is a global example”, he remarked. From Sichuan University, Prof. Li Tao, executive Dean of the university and Prof. Chandan Mahanta of Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, also addressed the session.
Earlier in a technical session of the same programme organized held at Conference Hall of Chintan Bhavan Governor Mr. B.P.Singh said the world is moving to a greater degree of co-operation in facing political and economic changes and “today, issues like health and education are also being addressed on a global scale”. Sub-regions have the advantages of geographical proximity, social cultural cohesiveness and economic complementary. Economic and social malaise can be tackled effectively by sharing resources and experience, he noted.
Source: Sikkim Reporter
Thursday, 20 November 2008
A B Vajpayee- Handshake Accross the Himalayas
Handshake across the Himalayas
The “Handshake across the Himalayas” – Vajpayee and China : Part I1
In the first years after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned India and China spearheading a “resurgent Asia [1].” The two largest countries in Asia were breaking out of decades of European dominance, and he felt that they should cooperate to lead the region towards peace and stability in the aftermath of World War II. Nehru was initially optimistic about relations with China, particularly after receiving a warm reception during a 1954 visit. However, his hopes for a “resurgent Asia” quickly collapsed as border disputes and Cold War positioning turned the two countries into rivals. Relations between India and China remained strained throughout the Cold War’s duration and in the decade that followed. Although leaders from both sides persisted with bilateral talks to negotiate a resolution of the border questions, no lasting progress was made. India’s nuclear test in 1998 did little to ease the tensions, particularly after Prime Minister Vajpayee suggested that China was a factor in conducting the test at Pokhran.
In 1998, just as in 1974, China did not perceive a nuclear India as a grave threat. China still had a larger, more advanced military and a more extensive nuclear stockpile. The tests themselves did not anger China so much as the letter that Vajpayee wrote to President Clinton shortly after, meant as a private correspondence but leaked to the New York Times. Without explicitly mentioning China, the letter clearly used it as a justification for the nuclear tests:
We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem . . . that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state [55].
Adding to China’s anger was the comment by the Minister of Defense, Georges Fernandes, who publicly called China “India’s threat number one [56].” The Chinese were infuriated by what it saw as India’s hawkish, unnecessary rhetoric. In response, China took advantage of American anger about the tests and joined with the US to condemn the nuclear tests on the international scene. Holding the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council at the time, it promoted Resolution 1172, which condemned the tests of both India and Pakistan. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Zhu Bangzao, called India’s action “a hard blow . . . It will entail serious consequences to the peace and stability in South Asia and the world at large [57].” China did not respond physically, but it used its rising status in the global arena to remind India of its power advantage.
Vajpayee was perfectly aware of China’s power, and his humiliation from 1962 and 1979 offered a plausible motivation to try and challenge that power. Indeed, Vajpayee had strongly supported acquiring nuclear weapons following the 1962 war, so approving them in 1998 and signaling out a Chinese threat was not a departure from his past. While he knew that a nuclear weapon would not unequivocally put India on the bar with China, it could suggest India’s intent to defend itself if necessary, as well as add to its status on the world scene. China was a long-time member of the nuclear weapons club; for India to join would be a way of playing “catch-up” to China’s progress.
Yet, at the same time, Vajpayee was reluctant to isolate China and unravel the achievements that had essentially started with his visit in 1979. He understood that agitating China would not remove it as a threat, nor would it enhance the levels of trade and exchange that the earlier agreements had jumpstarted. China was a neighbor and too important of a partner to isolate. Hence Vajpayee initiated diplomatic efforts to mitigate the situation. He dispatched Jaswant Singh to Beijing in July 1999 and consulted closely with National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, a China expert who made a strong effort to assure the Chinese that India did not see it as an enemy [58]. The joint working groups soon resumed, and the two countries recommitted themselves to cooperation.
As the ministerial visits revitalized the diplomatic progress, India and China prepared to build cooperation to an even higher level. President K. R. Narayanan visited China in May 2000, where he and Chinese President Jiang Zemin launched the first bilateral security dialogue between the two countries. The dialogue was devoted to global and regional security issues and was followed by two more such dialogues in 2001 and 2002. Zemin and Narayanan also initiated a bilateral Eminent Persons Group consisting of scientists, scholars, and diplomats from both sides to counsel relations [59]. The various dialogues and other groups hoped to replace past hostilities with more constructive methods for establishing peace. If India and China could cooperate in matters of mutual concern, they could see each other more as partners and less as rivals – thereby easing regional tensions.
But the crucial groundwork for peace was economics. Vajpayee saw trade as a bridge builder: If there was mutual interest at stake, the risk of conflict would decrease. The increased visits between the two countries produced new trade deals and bolstered economic ties. In 1991, bilateral trade amounted to $265 million; in 2001, three years after the Pokhran fallout, that figure was at $3.6 billion – with an increase of just over 23% in 2000-2001 alone [60]. The mutual economic interests served a larger purpose: to foster a better environment for the more difficult issue, the border. That issue would be the center of Vajpayee’s own visit to China in 2003.
Panchsheel Revisited
Almost twenty-five years after his visit to China as Minister of External Affairs, Vajpayee returned to China on a six-day trip, the first such trip since Rao’s in 1993. As with the 1979 visit, this new effort was not expected to resolve the border issue. However, it was an attempt to use improved relations to come to some kind of agreement. It was also meant to symbolize the progress made between the two former enemies.
The leaders used economics as the heart of all agreements. Vajpayee himself was accompanied by a delegation of Indian businessmen and made two speeches at business events to reiterate the importance of trade as a bridge builder [61]. A milestone came with the Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade, which reopened Nathu Lu in Sikkim as a trading pass; this marked the first time that China recognized Sikkim as a part of India. In exchange for that recognition, Vajpayee recognized Tibet as an autonomous region in China; Vajpayee furthermore assured the Chinese that India would “not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-Chinese activity in India [62].” Changgu in Sikkim and Renqinggang in Tibet were also established as trade ports, commemorating the significant change in border policy [63]. Vajpayee found himself in a situation similar to Nehru’s in 1954. Tibet had historic and economic ties to India, but China was more essential to Indian interests. Respecting China’s position on Tibet, no matter how controversial, was easier than angering it by treating the region as sovereign. The core difference between Panchsheel in 1954 and Vajpayee’s visit in 2003 was that “mutual respect of territorial integrity” went in both directions. Vajpayee acknowledged Tibet, but in so doing, succeeded in getting the Chinese to acknowledge Sikkim. He did not leave Beijing empty-handed.
Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh remained unresolved, but they were naturally more difficult to negotiate. Those had been the regions over which the Indians and Chinese had fought in 1962. Nevertheless, Vajpayee and his homologue Wen Jiabao committed to a continuing effort towards a resolution. Their Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China mandated special representatives from each country to engage in boundary talks; while not an official treaty, it espoused a framework for future discussion on the issue. Furthermore, it recommitted India and China to joint cooperation in order to promote the interests of developing countries, particularly in global trade organs like the World Trade Organization. Notably, they voiced support for a multipolar world, one that would allow both countries to have influence on the world scene [64]. Just as in the first years of the post-colonial era, neither India nor China wanted to assert their power in Asia and not be dominated by a superpower. India and China were “resurging” economically and politically in the global arena, and they did not want their ascendance to be limited.
The Declaration’s components thus echoed Nehru’s dream of “resurgent Asia” in its commitment to Sino-Indian cooperation to facilitate stability and empowerment in the developing world. It also called to mind the Panchsheel’s Five Principles, working towards a “peaceful coexistence.” The Declaration explicitly stated that “[t]he common interest of the two sides outweigh their differences. The two countries are not a threat to each other [65].” While it left the border question unanswered, the deal brokered a better setting in which it could be considered, as well as a greatly reduced probability of going to war again over the territories.
In fact, the two countries once again cooperated in the international community, stressing their commitment to a multipolar world order. In multinational organizations, both countries shied away from criticizing each other on sensitive issues. Despite Western outcry about China’s presence in Tibet, India never publicly broached the issue. When Pakistan complained about Indian human rights abuses in Kashmir, China pressured it to drop its demands for a UN resolution on the subject [66]. India and China intentionally tried to keep their most contentious regional issues from becoming international ones. Neither wanted to see a third party interfere or mediate in Tibet or Kashmir, and they united to defend that common interest. Fifty years earlier, Nehru had hoped that this would be a cornerstone of the Sino-Indian relationship. In 2003, Vajpayee helped it to become a reality.
The magnitude of Vajpayee’s visit was immediately acknowledged. The newspaper China Daily hailed Vajpayee’s visit as “a handshake across the Himalayas [67].” It signified a marked improvement in bilateral relations and set a strong base for future cooperation. It greatly increased trade, setting China on track to become India’s largest trading partner [68], and it made noteworthy compromises on at least one part of the border. Most remarkable was that Vajpayee was the prime minister to initiate it all. In his early years as a Member of Parliament, he had been extremely critical of what he considered Nehru’s conciliatory tone towards China; he had also encouraged the development of nuclear weapons in order to counter China. Vajpayee had seemed an unlikely bridge builder between India and China. But as a pragmatist, he understood that India stood to gain from a good relationship with China, in terms of economics, politics, and security. Vajpayee disagreed with Nehru’s China policies, but he agreed that India had more to lose by ignoring China.
He also felt that he could pursue better relations with China while promoting India’s interests above everything else. He was quick to reconcile with China after the Pokhran tests, but he still refused to negotiate India’s need to protect itself in a nuclear neighborhood. Perhaps recollecting the shame after the 1962 defeat, he made it clear that India’s defense and territory could not be compromised. He assured China that India would acknowledge its sovereignty over Tibet, but made that contingent on China’s acceptance of an Indian Sikkim. In contrast to other Indian leaders, he did not see the Sino-Indian relationship as zero-sum. Vajpayee simultaneously pursued stronger ties with both China and the US, so that India could benefit from both partnerships but not be overwhelmingly influenced by one side or the other. This came as the US-Chinese relationship strained because of their increased rivalry. Without taking a side, Vajpayee maintained good ties to both. Similarly, he did not consider China’s support of Pakistan to be a deal-breaker. He did not welcome the continuation of a “Chinese Israel,” but he saw the reality that China was not going to reverse its policy. It would serve India no purpose to have tense relations with both countries at the same time. Vajpayee’s viewpoint was significant. In the Cold War era, the Sino-Soviet relationship or the Chinese-Pakistani cooperation prevented India and China from having productive relations; in the post-Cold War era, zero-sum relationships were simply impractical.
Vajpayee provided India and China with a framework for future cooperation. His initiatives allowed the countries to focus on economic ties first and foremost, creating common ground for cooperation in other, more problematic areas. India and China have since profited greatly from bilateral trade, with annual revenues in the billions. The border working groups continue as well. In September 2007, the eleventh round of talks by the 2003 Declaration’s mandated special representatives was held in Beijing [69]. Talks remain inconclusive, but symbolize an improvement from the many years of cynicism and minimal communication. Furthermore, the enhanced ties make it all the more unlikely that the two countries will go to war again in the future, even if a final agreement is still far in the distance.
India and China continue to differ greatly in several issues besides the border, yet the very scope of their trade dissuades the severing of relations. India and China view each other as partners too valuable to renounce. Vajpayee contributed greatly to that view through his economic and strategic initiatives. A man who had once been a vocal skeptic of China’s intentions was also a man who made India a viable partner of China, something that Nehru himself had been unable to do.
Vajpayee’s view of China was less idealistic than Nehru’s. He was fully aware of the country’s dynamic economic and political expansion, not only in Asia but on the global scale. China was, in Vajpayee’s perspective, as much of a rival for global power and influence as it was a partner. Despite this worldview, Vajpayee would be successful in alleviating many of the past and present tensions, making an acclaimed visit in 2003 and moving towards a workable solution for the border issues. When he left office the next year, he left having set the groundwork for enhanced cooperation between the two neighbors. The disputes did not disappear, but, because of Vajpayee’s initiatives, they no longer stood in the way of a “resurgent Asia” between the two most populous, expanding states in the world.
“Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai”? War between Brothers
In 1954, when Prime Minister Nehru visited Beijing, citizens from both India and China celebrated the partnership between the two countries, cheering, “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai!” – “India and China are brothers!” These two ancient civilizations, whose first interactions occurred as early as the first century with the spread of Buddhism [2], were now emerging into the post-World War and post-colonial era. Many hoped that the two countries could cooperate and reestablish their past power and glory.
Absent from the celebrations but present in the politics was the underlying reason for Nehru’s visit. India and China shared another historical legacy, inherited from colonialism: an unresolved border.
In the nineteenth century, Britain established “buffer states” to protect its territory in India. One such case occurred in 1865, when Britain imposed the Johnson Line in the northern part of India. The Johnson Line incorporated the desert region of Aksai Chin as part of the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir. The British never consulted China, who considered Aksai Chin as its own. When the British finally did offer an agreement in 1899, China did not sign. The British interpreted this silence as tacit acceptance [3].
In the early twentieth century, British attention shifted to Tibet, the Buddhist Himalayan kingdom that separated India from China and which China also claimed. The British had previously acquired the neighboring tea-producing lands of Assam and Sikkim from wars in the early nineteenth century; wanting to expand their influence in the region, they invaded Tibet in 1903. Britain and Tibet signed a treaty in late 1904 that set the border between Tibet and Sikkim, granted the British unlimited trading rights, and prohibited Tibet from engaging in foreign relations [4]. A year later, the British signed another treaty with Russia that decreed that China was the suzerain of Tibet [5]. China used these treaties to justify its claim that Tibet was not a sovereign state, but an autonomous region in China.
However, in the following years, China experienced internal turmoil as its Qing dynasty collapsed. The Dalai Lama, the ruler of Tibet, took advantage of the situation and expelled Chinese troops in 1912. The British again scrambled to defend their interests amid the regional instability. In 1914, at a convention in Simla, Britain and Tibet decided on a new boundary, the McMahon Line. In addition, Britain claimed some of the Himalayan region for itself (the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh). Britain and Tibet signed the treaty, but China refused, arguing that Tibet was not a sovereign state [6]. There was an obvious dispute, but Britain’s involvement in the World Wars and China’s civil war took precedence over the next decades.
Two disputed territories, Aksai Chin (left) and Arunachal Pradesh (right) continue to cause tension in India-China relations.
As the post-War era began, the border question remained in the background, at least initially. During the war, Nehru had established a good relationship with the Chairman of the Nationalist Government of China, General Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang vocally supported India’s independence movement and encouraged the British to grant it independence [7]. After this was realized in 1947, it looked as if India and China were destined to have promising relations. The war marked the end of imperial control in both countries, British in India and Japanese in China. The Europeans were out of the picture, allowing the two to reassert their ancient heritage and chart their own course into the modern era.
Chiang, though, would not be the one to lead China into the post-colonial years. After decades of civil war, the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) defeated Chiang’s government, which fled to Formosa (present-day Taiwan). The new leadership took root under the Chinese Communist Party president Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai. Despite this change, Nehru considered China a potential global partner. While India adopted a democratic form of government and China a communist one, both sought to develop without foreign influence. In that sense, Nehru thought that China could be a non-aligned ally vis-à-vis the two superpowers of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union.
Nehru also had a practical reason to court China rather than isolate it. China was larger than India, had a stronger military, and had its own ambitions to become an Asian power. If India and China went to war against each other, India would not be able to defend itself without outside help. Nehru was determined not to allow India to rely on foreign powers [8]. It was therefore more convenient for India to become an ally of China, not a rival.
Nehru’s first initiatives towards China thus embodied both optimism and realism, intending to demonstrate goodwill and even solidarity. On December 30, 1949, India became the second non-communist country to recognize the PRC [9], and it later lobbied for the PRC to hold the seat for China in the United Nations, instead of Chiang’s Republic of China government in Formosa [10]. These gestures rebuffed the Western bloc while stressing India’s support for its neighbor.
Externally, then, India and China appeared to be united against the lines drawn by the Cold War. Internally, though, each country desired to assert itself as a capable power. That meant a confrontation with one of the lasting relics of the colonial past, the unresolved border.
Both countries took a different approach to the issue. India wanted to keep the land and trade benefits it had held as part of the British Empire, so it accepted the de facto borders that had previously been established by the Johnson and McMahon Lines [11]. It subsequently kept the border regions of Assam and Sikkim, and part of the Himalayas, the latter of which became known as the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA); it furthermore expected to uphold all of the trading privileges that Tibet had allotted to Britain [12]. The Tibetans protested but ultimately could not eject the Indians.
Mao and Zhou shared Nehru’s contempt of foreign influence, but their interpretation of such nationalism was to completely reject all of the boundaries imposed by the European imperialists. They saw Nehru’s acceptance of the colonial boundaries hypocritical [13]. Nehru had fought for independence from the British Empire but was upholding the territorial status quo. He now proclaimed himself a leader of the non-aligned, post-colonial Asia but was using Western, imperial claims to assert India’s status. To China, these paradoxes cast doubt on Nehru’s commitment to a “resurgent Asia.” When Nehru declared his support for the old boundaries, China initially remained silent, saying that the Tibet question was not urgent at the moment and that China had “no time to study the solution [14].” Nehru, for his part, saw China’s silence as acceptance of India’s claim.
The reality was that China had all but rejected his stance. Anxious to quell any potential separatist movements, China invaded Tibet in 1950 and easily annexed it in 1951, Tibet being in no position to resist. The Indian prime minister found himself in a difficult position. India had economic ties to Tibet, which the Chinese presence now threatened. Furthermore, Nehru had avowed to rid Asia of imperialism, which the takeover of Tibet arguably exhibited. Accepting China’s actions without protest could thwart Nehru’s hopes of becoming a true post-colonial leader.
Map of Tibet
Moreover, members of his own Congress Party called for a harder stance on China. Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel feared that China had imperialistic intentions, and that Tibet was only its first conquest. He argued that India should do all that it could to build up a strong defense against it: “[China] is united and strong . . . In the guise of ideological expansion lies concealed racial, national, or historical claims [15].” Patel specifically worried that the unresolved borders would become China’s next focus. For him and others, Nehru’s idealism and dreams of a “resurgent Asia” facilitated by India and China seemed unrealistic. China’s territorial pursuits showed that it was not committed to ending imperialism in Asia after all. It was a rising power in the region, and it wanted to be the main power in the region. Instead of trying to win over China, some believed, India should prepare to resist it.
Nehru had already acknowledged that China was a rising power, but he feared military confrontation. Much to the dismay of Patel and others in Parliament, Nehru gave a muted response. In a diplomatic note to Premier Zhou, Nehru criticized the invasion of Tibet and said that China had “acted rather foolishly [16].” Then, so as not to anger the Chinese, he accepted Zhou’s reply that “the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of China [17]” and made an effort to support China on the world stage. At the United Nations, he continued to lobby for the PRC’s seat and voted against labeling it as the aggressor of the Korean War [18]. Nehru’s actions embodied both his optimism for good relations and his determination to avoid war with his larger, more populous neighbor. Either way, strained relations were not in India’s national interest. As he affirmed:
I have always thought that it is important, even essential if you like, that these two countries of Asia, India and China, should have friendly and as far as possible cooperative relations [19].
In Nehru’s point of view, Tibet’s defeat was the price to pay for friendly, cooperative relations. For India’s sake, it was better to accept the invasion rather than risk war by coming to Tibet’s defense. In 1954, Nehru recognized Tibet as a part of China and called for “peaceful negotiations adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty [20].” On April 29, 1954, he and Zhou signed the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India, more commonly known as the Panchsheel Agreement. Panchsheel had two components -- a preamble, which established “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” and the body, which outlined regulations for Indo-Tibetan trade and rights for Indian and Tibetan pilgrims [21]. This agreement accepted the Chinese position on Tibet, but it also produced an idealistic framework for future cooperation between India and China. That framework, the “Five Principles” found in the preamble, remains the most cited part of Panchsheel. The Five Principles called for:
Mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty
Mutual non-aggression
Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs
Equality and mutual benefit
Peaceful coexistence [22].
Nehru and Zhou vowed to uphold those principles while building stronger relations. Nehru, for his part, was optimistic that the close ties and cooperation espoused by the agreement would be the basis for his “resurgent Asia,” a strong and peaceful Asian voice on the world stage. “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai” became the motto of Panchsheel [23]. It embodied both the physical border between the countries as well as Nehru’s hopes that they could jointly become the leaders of a rising Asia.
The physical border quickly proved itself to be the greatest obstacle to Panchsheel’s realization. Each side wanted to resolve it, and in its own favor. Just a few months after signing Panchsheel, Nehru commissioned new maps of India that included Aksai Chin as Indian territory. When he visited China in October 1954, he brought up the border question to Zhou, who had seen the maps. Zhou did not appear outraged at India’s claims, but acknowledged that China had many unsettled borders with its neighbors and thus had “no basis for fixing the boundary lines [24].” For the time being, the “mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty” of Panchsheel amounted to recognition of the issue but no urgency to settle it permanently. That passivity would reap severe consequences on Sino-Indian relations in the decades to come.
In the mid-1950s, China began constructing National Highway 219 in Aksai Chin, a military road linking Tibet with the Chinese province of Xinjiang [25]. Zhou approved the road, despite the Indian maps and despite Zhou’s seeming indifference to setting a boundary. India itself had not paid much attention to the remote region and only discovered the Chinese road when it was featured in a 1958 map published by China’s official magazine, China Pictorial. This map not only claimed Aksai Chin for China, but the NEFA as well [26]. Zhou justified the map with the same position that China had always held: The Johnson and McMahon lines were illegal and imposed by imperial Britain; China had never accepted them, and China never would accept them
Nehru protested but was still reluctant to forcefully respond. He and Zhou continued to communicate but did not come close to a resolution.
Events in Tibet made a resolution all the more unlikely, anyway. In 1956, Buddhist monks angry with China’s land redistribution policy rebelled. China’s army, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), finally squashed it in 1959, as the Dalai Lama fled to India. The Chinese accused India of interfering in its domestic affairs, though Nehru assured them that the Dalai Lama would not be accorded political powers. This did not ameliorate the uproar, particularly as members of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) were demanding that India ally with the United States to free Tibet from Chinese expansionism [28]. The goodwill from Panchsheel eroded amid the tensions, and both countries erected more border posts as a warning. Since the borders had never been bilaterally demarcated to begin with, the stage was set for the physical conflict that Nehru had tried to avoid.
Soon enough, skirmishes did start to occur. An October 20, 1959 confrontation in Kongka La, Aksai Chin, resulted in the death of nine Indian soldiers and the capture of seven [29]. Public opinion in India expressed outrage against China, and Nehru’s political opposition blasted the government’s inaction. Vajpayee, by now a rising figure in the BJS, led the opposition in demanding Nehru to release a White Paper documenting all government contact with China [30]. Facing increasing pressure, the government complied.
When the White Paper was released, Parliament was stunned by the extent of China’s territorial claims and was all the more infuriated with Nehru’s inaction. Most vocal in its anger was the BJS, whose president urged a counterattack against the Chinese: “[India’s] self-interests and honour demand early and effective action to free the Indian soil from Chinese aggression [31].” To nationalist party members such as Vajpayee, India’s security was at stake, and the Chinese needed to be stopped before it became too late. Patel’s warning from nearly a decade earlier was proving true. India’s leadership had allowed it to become the next target of expansionist China.
The anti-China feeling in both Parliament and the Indian public compelled Nehru to act. His first measure was to employ what would be termed his “Forward Policy,” the placement of Indian troops in military posts within the disputed areas. However, that policy proved ineffective because the posts were poorly equipped. While the PLA had trucks and automatic rifles, the Indian Army moved by foot and used World War I-era rifles [32]. His next step was to invite Zhou to Delhi for negotiations. Many in the BJS feared that negotiations would cost India some of its territory, and the party held a protest in front of Nehru’s home just five days before the Chinese premier arrived [33]. The talks produced no resolution, as the two sides failed to agree on a common border.
As the talks with China stalemated and pressure from the opposition mounted, the Indian prime minister increased the posts in the disputed areas and made Chinese withdrawal from Aksai Chin the precondition for any future negotiation with China [34]. His harder stance was emboldened by India’s 1961 takeover of Goa, a tiny Portuguese colony on India’s west coast. It was a symbolic victory that gave a sense of invincibility. If India could easily defeat the last European imperialist on the subcontinent, it could surely defeat the first new Asian imperialist. In fact, the Goa success was drastically exaggerated. The Portuguese were even more poorly equipped than the Indians (one battalion fought in gym shoes), and had withdrawn without much of a fight. However, patriotism overshadowed reality and inspired confidence against the Chinese. Home Minister Lal Baladur Shastri swore that “[i]f the Chinese will not vacate the areas India will have to repeat what she did in Goa [35].”
India’s tougher position did not persuade China to reverse its own course. The Goa takeover confirmed to them that Nehru was the next Asian imperialist. Just as Patel and others had feared that Tibet would be the first step in Chinese empire-building, the Chinese feared that Goa was the first step in Indian empire-building. Unlike India, though, the Chinese were prepared to act decisively.
On October 10, 1962, the PLA surprised India with an attack in the NEFA. The Indian Army was caught off-guard and totally unprepared. His troops still fighting with antiquated weapons, Nehru asked the United States for military equipment [36]. On November 20, after six weeks of bloody combat and ultimately a Chinese victory in both the NEFA and Aksai Chin, a ceasefire was declared. China kept Aksai Chin and gave the NEFA (which later became the state of Arunachal Pradesh) to India, and both sides retreated 20 kilometers behind what was called the Line of Actual Control, the line that continues to serve as the India-China border today [37]. Despite conceding the NEFA, China emerged as the clear winner. While China had captured almost 4,000 Indian soldiers, India had been unable to take a single Chinese prisoner-of-war [38].
The Sino-Indian War of 1962 was a serious blow for India, which had lost men, territory, and prestige. Nehru was humiliated. Accepting Tibet, supporting China internationally, and pledging to cooperate for “peaceful coexistence” ultimately failed to prevent war. His hopes of a “resurgent Asia” collapsed, as the two Asian powers became enemies. His vision of an India completely independent from the superpowers was also challenged when he asked for and accepted US aid against China – which still could not carry India to victory. Nehru was not alone in his humiliation. For nationalists like Vajpayee, it was certainly a low point for Indian prestige, underlining how far India still had to go before it could be considered a power.
Skirmishes, Visits, and a Smiling Buddha
In the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War, relations between the two countries remained cold. The bitter feelings from the war were compounded by nuclear developments and Cold War alignments.
Soon after the ceasefire was declared in 1962, the BJS began to push a nuclear agenda. Embarrassed by the Indian Army’s apparent weaknesses, the BJS adamantly wanted to develop a strong defense, particularly against China, which was rapidly solidifying its military advantage. The Chinese had previously received assistance from the Soviet Union for constructing a nuclear program, and most observers felt that it would only be a matter of time before China acquired a nuclear weapon. Sure enough, China conducted its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964.
More disturbing to India was China’s lean towards Pakistan. China and Pakistan had had their own border disputes, but the Sino-Indian War motivated the two countries to cooperate against their common enemy. They soon resolved their dispute, and China began to take Pakistan’s side in any Indo-Pakistani conflict. From 1965 on, Pakistan received the largest amount of Chinese aid, which took the form of money, missiles, and nuclear technology. As South Asian expert Stephen P. Cohen noted, “Pakistan is China’s Israel [40].” India was infuriated with China’s support for Pakistan, but, militarily, India had no options.
In this context, Vajpayee led the BJS in calling for a motion in the Lok Sabha that supported developing nuclear weapons in India. It failed, but Vajpayee received much attention and support [41]. India found itself surrounded by security threats, and it did not want to be as vulnerable as it had been in 1962. The momentum to go nuclear increased, and in 1974, Operation Smiling Buddha, approved by Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi, marked India’s entrance into nuclear capabilities.
While India’s nuclear tests annoyed China, the source of most ill-will during the 1970s was its cooperation with the Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet relations had collapsed more than a decade earlier, as ideological differences wedged the two communist countries apart. In the late 1950s, the Soviets halted all nuclear assistance to China and pulled out its economic advisors. In the 1960s, the Soviets also fought a border war with China along the Amur and Ussuri rivers [42]. China began to pursue warmer relations with the US soon after, and both countries supported Pakistan in the 1971 war. Although Nehru had intended for India to remain independent of Cold War divisions, the circumstances encouraged Indo-Soviet cooperation. The Soviets supported India in its conflicts with Pakistan, in addition to supplying industrial assistance. The cooperation was reaffirmed in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation [43]. Instead of unity, the two Asian countries were falling into the very Cold War poles that they had avowed to avoid.
When the Cold War dynamics were removed, though, Sino-Indian relations improved slightly. The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan created a rift in its relations with India, removing one barrier to cooperation. At the same time, China was in the process of reform under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Deng wanted to modernize the Chinese economy and open it up to foreign trade. He was thus willing to pursue better relations with India. In February 1979, Minister of External Affairs Vajpayee made the first high-level trip to China since Vice President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in 1958 [44]. The fact that Vajpayee was even in China at all was notable, having been a staunch China critic in Parliament and profoundly upset by the 1962 defeat. But Prime Minister Desai wanted to establish “genuine non-alignment:” While keeping good ties with the Soviets, India would seek better relations with China, moving away from Indira Gandhi’s pro-Soviet lean [45].
Vajpayee appeared cognizant of the changing geopolitical environment and relaxed his previously hard-line stance against China. He asserted that India’s foreign policy should be “capable of replying to changing situations in the world [46]” and was willing to reach out to China if it was in India’s best interest. Nonetheless, nobody expected a major breakthrough in the longstanding border conflict; Vajpayee himself called the trip a “probing mission [47].” Still, the visit was acknowledged by both sides as a change from the past and a possible step forward to the future.
As predicted, the “probing mission” did not solve the core differences between the two countries, but Vajpayee did achieve some positive results. He had been able to procure pilgrimage rights for Indians to Mt. Kailash and Lake Mansarovar, Hindu holy sites located in Tibet that had been closed by Chinese authorities after the Dalai Lama’s flight in 1959 [48]. Vajpayee also reprimanded Deng for China’s pro-Pakistan stance, saying that it only created “an additional and unnecessary complication to the prospects of Sino-Indian relations.” The very next year, Deng publicly called the Kashmir conflict a “bilateral dispute,” thereby lessening its overwhelming support for Pakistan [49]. The visit progressed until China suddenly invaded Vietnam on February 17, which came as a surprise and an embarrassment to India [50]. The abrupt invasion reminded Vajpayee of the unexpected invasion in 1962. Once again, India had been caught off guard by the Chinese despite India’s efforts to cooperate.
In 1962, it was Nehru who had seen his diplomatic efforts end in unexpected war; in 1979, it was Vajpayee who was stunned by Chinese incursions. He canceled the rest of the trip out of protest, and his departure marked the last time a high-level Indian representative would visit China for nearly a decade.
Nevertheless, the geopolitical realties of the time dissuaded both governments from breaking ties. The Soviet Union was weakening and no longer a reliable supporter or a barrier to relations. India still could not challenge China militarily, and without a sufficient ally in the region, needed to continue diplomatic relations with its neighbor if it wanted to prevent war. Visits continued throughout the 1980s; although they were limited to ministers and envoys, and still did not settle the border issue, they did keep India and China in contact rather than at war.
Cordial relations almost ended in 1986 when border clashes broke out again, this time in the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. Both sides increased their number of troops and patrols. India asked the Soviet Union for support, but none came. Instead, Deng Xiaoping sent Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi a message via US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger: Unless India stopped “nibbling” at Chinese territory, China would “teach India a lesson [51].” Gandhi took the message seriously and called for intense, bilateral discussions to resolve the crisis. In December 1988, he made the first trip to China by an Indian prime minister since his grandfather Nehru. He and Deng made remarkable progress, re-emphasizing the Five Principles of Panchsheel and committing to more bilateral cooperation. Gandhi’s visit produced two joint working groups specifically for the border issues, calls for increased trade and cultural exchange, and agreements to cooperate in civil aviation, science, and technology [52]. For Sino-Indian relations, this was a definite breakthrough from the past. While it still did not answer the border question, it fostered closer ties that would be harder to break.
The relationship continued to strengthen, with Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to India in 1991 and Indian President Ramaswami Venkataraman’s visit to China in 1992. But the next milestone came with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s 1993 visit to China. The countries signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), whereupon both sides agreed to respect the LAC, reduce troop levels, and increase bilateral talks to address the border issue [53].
This was followed by the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC, which called for further troop reductions and a pledge to not use military force against the other side [54]. Knowing that the border issue would be difficult to resolve, the countries opted for such treaties to lessen the chance of military conflict. The agreements continued the bilateral progress, but when Vajpayee became Prime Minister in 1998 and approved the nuclear tests at Pokhran, Sino-Indian relations faced a new challenge.
The “Handshake across the Himalayas” – Vajpayee and China : Part I1
In the first years after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned India and China spearheading a “resurgent Asia [1].” The two largest countries in Asia were breaking out of decades of European dominance, and he felt that they should cooperate to lead the region towards peace and stability in the aftermath of World War II. Nehru was initially optimistic about relations with China, particularly after receiving a warm reception during a 1954 visit. However, his hopes for a “resurgent Asia” quickly collapsed as border disputes and Cold War positioning turned the two countries into rivals. Relations between India and China remained strained throughout the Cold War’s duration and in the decade that followed. Although leaders from both sides persisted with bilateral talks to negotiate a resolution of the border questions, no lasting progress was made. India’s nuclear test in 1998 did little to ease the tensions, particularly after Prime Minister Vajpayee suggested that China was a factor in conducting the test at Pokhran.
In 1998, just as in 1974, China did not perceive a nuclear India as a grave threat. China still had a larger, more advanced military and a more extensive nuclear stockpile. The tests themselves did not anger China so much as the letter that Vajpayee wrote to President Clinton shortly after, meant as a private correspondence but leaked to the New York Times. Without explicitly mentioning China, the letter clearly used it as a justification for the nuclear tests:
We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem . . . that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state [55].
Adding to China’s anger was the comment by the Minister of Defense, Georges Fernandes, who publicly called China “India’s threat number one [56].” The Chinese were infuriated by what it saw as India’s hawkish, unnecessary rhetoric. In response, China took advantage of American anger about the tests and joined with the US to condemn the nuclear tests on the international scene. Holding the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council at the time, it promoted Resolution 1172, which condemned the tests of both India and Pakistan. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Zhu Bangzao, called India’s action “a hard blow . . . It will entail serious consequences to the peace and stability in South Asia and the world at large [57].” China did not respond physically, but it used its rising status in the global arena to remind India of its power advantage.
Vajpayee was perfectly aware of China’s power, and his humiliation from 1962 and 1979 offered a plausible motivation to try and challenge that power. Indeed, Vajpayee had strongly supported acquiring nuclear weapons following the 1962 war, so approving them in 1998 and signaling out a Chinese threat was not a departure from his past. While he knew that a nuclear weapon would not unequivocally put India on the bar with China, it could suggest India’s intent to defend itself if necessary, as well as add to its status on the world scene. China was a long-time member of the nuclear weapons club; for India to join would be a way of playing “catch-up” to China’s progress.
Yet, at the same time, Vajpayee was reluctant to isolate China and unravel the achievements that had essentially started with his visit in 1979. He understood that agitating China would not remove it as a threat, nor would it enhance the levels of trade and exchange that the earlier agreements had jumpstarted. China was a neighbor and too important of a partner to isolate. Hence Vajpayee initiated diplomatic efforts to mitigate the situation. He dispatched Jaswant Singh to Beijing in July 1999 and consulted closely with National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, a China expert who made a strong effort to assure the Chinese that India did not see it as an enemy [58]. The joint working groups soon resumed, and the two countries recommitted themselves to cooperation.
As the ministerial visits revitalized the diplomatic progress, India and China prepared to build cooperation to an even higher level. President K. R. Narayanan visited China in May 2000, where he and Chinese President Jiang Zemin launched the first bilateral security dialogue between the two countries. The dialogue was devoted to global and regional security issues and was followed by two more such dialogues in 2001 and 2002. Zemin and Narayanan also initiated a bilateral Eminent Persons Group consisting of scientists, scholars, and diplomats from both sides to counsel relations [59]. The various dialogues and other groups hoped to replace past hostilities with more constructive methods for establishing peace. If India and China could cooperate in matters of mutual concern, they could see each other more as partners and less as rivals – thereby easing regional tensions.
But the crucial groundwork for peace was economics. Vajpayee saw trade as a bridge builder: If there was mutual interest at stake, the risk of conflict would decrease. The increased visits between the two countries produced new trade deals and bolstered economic ties. In 1991, bilateral trade amounted to $265 million; in 2001, three years after the Pokhran fallout, that figure was at $3.6 billion – with an increase of just over 23% in 2000-2001 alone [60]. The mutual economic interests served a larger purpose: to foster a better environment for the more difficult issue, the border. That issue would be the center of Vajpayee’s own visit to China in 2003.
Panchsheel Revisited
Almost twenty-five years after his visit to China as Minister of External Affairs, Vajpayee returned to China on a six-day trip, the first such trip since Rao’s in 1993. As with the 1979 visit, this new effort was not expected to resolve the border issue. However, it was an attempt to use improved relations to come to some kind of agreement. It was also meant to symbolize the progress made between the two former enemies.
The leaders used economics as the heart of all agreements. Vajpayee himself was accompanied by a delegation of Indian businessmen and made two speeches at business events to reiterate the importance of trade as a bridge builder [61]. A milestone came with the Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade, which reopened Nathu Lu in Sikkim as a trading pass; this marked the first time that China recognized Sikkim as a part of India. In exchange for that recognition, Vajpayee recognized Tibet as an autonomous region in China; Vajpayee furthermore assured the Chinese that India would “not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-Chinese activity in India [62].” Changgu in Sikkim and Renqinggang in Tibet were also established as trade ports, commemorating the significant change in border policy [63]. Vajpayee found himself in a situation similar to Nehru’s in 1954. Tibet had historic and economic ties to India, but China was more essential to Indian interests. Respecting China’s position on Tibet, no matter how controversial, was easier than angering it by treating the region as sovereign. The core difference between Panchsheel in 1954 and Vajpayee’s visit in 2003 was that “mutual respect of territorial integrity” went in both directions. Vajpayee acknowledged Tibet, but in so doing, succeeded in getting the Chinese to acknowledge Sikkim. He did not leave Beijing empty-handed.
Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh remained unresolved, but they were naturally more difficult to negotiate. Those had been the regions over which the Indians and Chinese had fought in 1962. Nevertheless, Vajpayee and his homologue Wen Jiabao committed to a continuing effort towards a resolution. Their Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China mandated special representatives from each country to engage in boundary talks; while not an official treaty, it espoused a framework for future discussion on the issue. Furthermore, it recommitted India and China to joint cooperation in order to promote the interests of developing countries, particularly in global trade organs like the World Trade Organization. Notably, they voiced support for a multipolar world, one that would allow both countries to have influence on the world scene [64]. Just as in the first years of the post-colonial era, neither India nor China wanted to assert their power in Asia and not be dominated by a superpower. India and China were “resurging” economically and politically in the global arena, and they did not want their ascendance to be limited.
The Declaration’s components thus echoed Nehru’s dream of “resurgent Asia” in its commitment to Sino-Indian cooperation to facilitate stability and empowerment in the developing world. It also called to mind the Panchsheel’s Five Principles, working towards a “peaceful coexistence.” The Declaration explicitly stated that “[t]he common interest of the two sides outweigh their differences. The two countries are not a threat to each other [65].” While it left the border question unanswered, the deal brokered a better setting in which it could be considered, as well as a greatly reduced probability of going to war again over the territories.
In fact, the two countries once again cooperated in the international community, stressing their commitment to a multipolar world order. In multinational organizations, both countries shied away from criticizing each other on sensitive issues. Despite Western outcry about China’s presence in Tibet, India never publicly broached the issue. When Pakistan complained about Indian human rights abuses in Kashmir, China pressured it to drop its demands for a UN resolution on the subject [66]. India and China intentionally tried to keep their most contentious regional issues from becoming international ones. Neither wanted to see a third party interfere or mediate in Tibet or Kashmir, and they united to defend that common interest. Fifty years earlier, Nehru had hoped that this would be a cornerstone of the Sino-Indian relationship. In 2003, Vajpayee helped it to become a reality.
The magnitude of Vajpayee’s visit was immediately acknowledged. The newspaper China Daily hailed Vajpayee’s visit as “a handshake across the Himalayas [67].” It signified a marked improvement in bilateral relations and set a strong base for future cooperation. It greatly increased trade, setting China on track to become India’s largest trading partner [68], and it made noteworthy compromises on at least one part of the border. Most remarkable was that Vajpayee was the prime minister to initiate it all. In his early years as a Member of Parliament, he had been extremely critical of what he considered Nehru’s conciliatory tone towards China; he had also encouraged the development of nuclear weapons in order to counter China. Vajpayee had seemed an unlikely bridge builder between India and China. But as a pragmatist, he understood that India stood to gain from a good relationship with China, in terms of economics, politics, and security. Vajpayee disagreed with Nehru’s China policies, but he agreed that India had more to lose by ignoring China.
He also felt that he could pursue better relations with China while promoting India’s interests above everything else. He was quick to reconcile with China after the Pokhran tests, but he still refused to negotiate India’s need to protect itself in a nuclear neighborhood. Perhaps recollecting the shame after the 1962 defeat, he made it clear that India’s defense and territory could not be compromised. He assured China that India would acknowledge its sovereignty over Tibet, but made that contingent on China’s acceptance of an Indian Sikkim. In contrast to other Indian leaders, he did not see the Sino-Indian relationship as zero-sum. Vajpayee simultaneously pursued stronger ties with both China and the US, so that India could benefit from both partnerships but not be overwhelmingly influenced by one side or the other. This came as the US-Chinese relationship strained because of their increased rivalry. Without taking a side, Vajpayee maintained good ties to both. Similarly, he did not consider China’s support of Pakistan to be a deal-breaker. He did not welcome the continuation of a “Chinese Israel,” but he saw the reality that China was not going to reverse its policy. It would serve India no purpose to have tense relations with both countries at the same time. Vajpayee’s viewpoint was significant. In the Cold War era, the Sino-Soviet relationship or the Chinese-Pakistani cooperation prevented India and China from having productive relations; in the post-Cold War era, zero-sum relationships were simply impractical.
Vajpayee provided India and China with a framework for future cooperation. His initiatives allowed the countries to focus on economic ties first and foremost, creating common ground for cooperation in other, more problematic areas. India and China have since profited greatly from bilateral trade, with annual revenues in the billions. The border working groups continue as well. In September 2007, the eleventh round of talks by the 2003 Declaration’s mandated special representatives was held in Beijing [69]. Talks remain inconclusive, but symbolize an improvement from the many years of cynicism and minimal communication. Furthermore, the enhanced ties make it all the more unlikely that the two countries will go to war again in the future, even if a final agreement is still far in the distance.
India and China continue to differ greatly in several issues besides the border, yet the very scope of their trade dissuades the severing of relations. India and China view each other as partners too valuable to renounce. Vajpayee contributed greatly to that view through his economic and strategic initiatives. A man who had once been a vocal skeptic of China’s intentions was also a man who made India a viable partner of China, something that Nehru himself had been unable to do.
Vajpayee’s view of China was less idealistic than Nehru’s. He was fully aware of the country’s dynamic economic and political expansion, not only in Asia but on the global scale. China was, in Vajpayee’s perspective, as much of a rival for global power and influence as it was a partner. Despite this worldview, Vajpayee would be successful in alleviating many of the past and present tensions, making an acclaimed visit in 2003 and moving towards a workable solution for the border issues. When he left office the next year, he left having set the groundwork for enhanced cooperation between the two neighbors. The disputes did not disappear, but, because of Vajpayee’s initiatives, they no longer stood in the way of a “resurgent Asia” between the two most populous, expanding states in the world.
“Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai”? War between Brothers
In 1954, when Prime Minister Nehru visited Beijing, citizens from both India and China celebrated the partnership between the two countries, cheering, “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai!” – “India and China are brothers!” These two ancient civilizations, whose first interactions occurred as early as the first century with the spread of Buddhism [2], were now emerging into the post-World War and post-colonial era. Many hoped that the two countries could cooperate and reestablish their past power and glory.
Absent from the celebrations but present in the politics was the underlying reason for Nehru’s visit. India and China shared another historical legacy, inherited from colonialism: an unresolved border.
In the nineteenth century, Britain established “buffer states” to protect its territory in India. One such case occurred in 1865, when Britain imposed the Johnson Line in the northern part of India. The Johnson Line incorporated the desert region of Aksai Chin as part of the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir. The British never consulted China, who considered Aksai Chin as its own. When the British finally did offer an agreement in 1899, China did not sign. The British interpreted this silence as tacit acceptance [3].
In the early twentieth century, British attention shifted to Tibet, the Buddhist Himalayan kingdom that separated India from China and which China also claimed. The British had previously acquired the neighboring tea-producing lands of Assam and Sikkim from wars in the early nineteenth century; wanting to expand their influence in the region, they invaded Tibet in 1903. Britain and Tibet signed a treaty in late 1904 that set the border between Tibet and Sikkim, granted the British unlimited trading rights, and prohibited Tibet from engaging in foreign relations [4]. A year later, the British signed another treaty with Russia that decreed that China was the suzerain of Tibet [5]. China used these treaties to justify its claim that Tibet was not a sovereign state, but an autonomous region in China.
However, in the following years, China experienced internal turmoil as its Qing dynasty collapsed. The Dalai Lama, the ruler of Tibet, took advantage of the situation and expelled Chinese troops in 1912. The British again scrambled to defend their interests amid the regional instability. In 1914, at a convention in Simla, Britain and Tibet decided on a new boundary, the McMahon Line. In addition, Britain claimed some of the Himalayan region for itself (the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh). Britain and Tibet signed the treaty, but China refused, arguing that Tibet was not a sovereign state [6]. There was an obvious dispute, but Britain’s involvement in the World Wars and China’s civil war took precedence over the next decades.
Two disputed territories, Aksai Chin (left) and Arunachal Pradesh (right) continue to cause tension in India-China relations.
As the post-War era began, the border question remained in the background, at least initially. During the war, Nehru had established a good relationship with the Chairman of the Nationalist Government of China, General Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang vocally supported India’s independence movement and encouraged the British to grant it independence [7]. After this was realized in 1947, it looked as if India and China were destined to have promising relations. The war marked the end of imperial control in both countries, British in India and Japanese in China. The Europeans were out of the picture, allowing the two to reassert their ancient heritage and chart their own course into the modern era.
Chiang, though, would not be the one to lead China into the post-colonial years. After decades of civil war, the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) defeated Chiang’s government, which fled to Formosa (present-day Taiwan). The new leadership took root under the Chinese Communist Party president Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai. Despite this change, Nehru considered China a potential global partner. While India adopted a democratic form of government and China a communist one, both sought to develop without foreign influence. In that sense, Nehru thought that China could be a non-aligned ally vis-à-vis the two superpowers of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union.
Nehru also had a practical reason to court China rather than isolate it. China was larger than India, had a stronger military, and had its own ambitions to become an Asian power. If India and China went to war against each other, India would not be able to defend itself without outside help. Nehru was determined not to allow India to rely on foreign powers [8]. It was therefore more convenient for India to become an ally of China, not a rival.
Nehru’s first initiatives towards China thus embodied both optimism and realism, intending to demonstrate goodwill and even solidarity. On December 30, 1949, India became the second non-communist country to recognize the PRC [9], and it later lobbied for the PRC to hold the seat for China in the United Nations, instead of Chiang’s Republic of China government in Formosa [10]. These gestures rebuffed the Western bloc while stressing India’s support for its neighbor.
Externally, then, India and China appeared to be united against the lines drawn by the Cold War. Internally, though, each country desired to assert itself as a capable power. That meant a confrontation with one of the lasting relics of the colonial past, the unresolved border.
Both countries took a different approach to the issue. India wanted to keep the land and trade benefits it had held as part of the British Empire, so it accepted the de facto borders that had previously been established by the Johnson and McMahon Lines [11]. It subsequently kept the border regions of Assam and Sikkim, and part of the Himalayas, the latter of which became known as the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA); it furthermore expected to uphold all of the trading privileges that Tibet had allotted to Britain [12]. The Tibetans protested but ultimately could not eject the Indians.
Mao and Zhou shared Nehru’s contempt of foreign influence, but their interpretation of such nationalism was to completely reject all of the boundaries imposed by the European imperialists. They saw Nehru’s acceptance of the colonial boundaries hypocritical [13]. Nehru had fought for independence from the British Empire but was upholding the territorial status quo. He now proclaimed himself a leader of the non-aligned, post-colonial Asia but was using Western, imperial claims to assert India’s status. To China, these paradoxes cast doubt on Nehru’s commitment to a “resurgent Asia.” When Nehru declared his support for the old boundaries, China initially remained silent, saying that the Tibet question was not urgent at the moment and that China had “no time to study the solution [14].” Nehru, for his part, saw China’s silence as acceptance of India’s claim.
The reality was that China had all but rejected his stance. Anxious to quell any potential separatist movements, China invaded Tibet in 1950 and easily annexed it in 1951, Tibet being in no position to resist. The Indian prime minister found himself in a difficult position. India had economic ties to Tibet, which the Chinese presence now threatened. Furthermore, Nehru had avowed to rid Asia of imperialism, which the takeover of Tibet arguably exhibited. Accepting China’s actions without protest could thwart Nehru’s hopes of becoming a true post-colonial leader.
Map of Tibet
Moreover, members of his own Congress Party called for a harder stance on China. Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel feared that China had imperialistic intentions, and that Tibet was only its first conquest. He argued that India should do all that it could to build up a strong defense against it: “[China] is united and strong . . . In the guise of ideological expansion lies concealed racial, national, or historical claims [15].” Patel specifically worried that the unresolved borders would become China’s next focus. For him and others, Nehru’s idealism and dreams of a “resurgent Asia” facilitated by India and China seemed unrealistic. China’s territorial pursuits showed that it was not committed to ending imperialism in Asia after all. It was a rising power in the region, and it wanted to be the main power in the region. Instead of trying to win over China, some believed, India should prepare to resist it.
Nehru had already acknowledged that China was a rising power, but he feared military confrontation. Much to the dismay of Patel and others in Parliament, Nehru gave a muted response. In a diplomatic note to Premier Zhou, Nehru criticized the invasion of Tibet and said that China had “acted rather foolishly [16].” Then, so as not to anger the Chinese, he accepted Zhou’s reply that “the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of China [17]” and made an effort to support China on the world stage. At the United Nations, he continued to lobby for the PRC’s seat and voted against labeling it as the aggressor of the Korean War [18]. Nehru’s actions embodied both his optimism for good relations and his determination to avoid war with his larger, more populous neighbor. Either way, strained relations were not in India’s national interest. As he affirmed:
I have always thought that it is important, even essential if you like, that these two countries of Asia, India and China, should have friendly and as far as possible cooperative relations [19].
In Nehru’s point of view, Tibet’s defeat was the price to pay for friendly, cooperative relations. For India’s sake, it was better to accept the invasion rather than risk war by coming to Tibet’s defense. In 1954, Nehru recognized Tibet as a part of China and called for “peaceful negotiations adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty [20].” On April 29, 1954, he and Zhou signed the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India, more commonly known as the Panchsheel Agreement. Panchsheel had two components -- a preamble, which established “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” and the body, which outlined regulations for Indo-Tibetan trade and rights for Indian and Tibetan pilgrims [21]. This agreement accepted the Chinese position on Tibet, but it also produced an idealistic framework for future cooperation between India and China. That framework, the “Five Principles” found in the preamble, remains the most cited part of Panchsheel. The Five Principles called for:
Mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty
Mutual non-aggression
Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs
Equality and mutual benefit
Peaceful coexistence [22].
Nehru and Zhou vowed to uphold those principles while building stronger relations. Nehru, for his part, was optimistic that the close ties and cooperation espoused by the agreement would be the basis for his “resurgent Asia,” a strong and peaceful Asian voice on the world stage. “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai” became the motto of Panchsheel [23]. It embodied both the physical border between the countries as well as Nehru’s hopes that they could jointly become the leaders of a rising Asia.
The physical border quickly proved itself to be the greatest obstacle to Panchsheel’s realization. Each side wanted to resolve it, and in its own favor. Just a few months after signing Panchsheel, Nehru commissioned new maps of India that included Aksai Chin as Indian territory. When he visited China in October 1954, he brought up the border question to Zhou, who had seen the maps. Zhou did not appear outraged at India’s claims, but acknowledged that China had many unsettled borders with its neighbors and thus had “no basis for fixing the boundary lines [24].” For the time being, the “mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty” of Panchsheel amounted to recognition of the issue but no urgency to settle it permanently. That passivity would reap severe consequences on Sino-Indian relations in the decades to come.
In the mid-1950s, China began constructing National Highway 219 in Aksai Chin, a military road linking Tibet with the Chinese province of Xinjiang [25]. Zhou approved the road, despite the Indian maps and despite Zhou’s seeming indifference to setting a boundary. India itself had not paid much attention to the remote region and only discovered the Chinese road when it was featured in a 1958 map published by China’s official magazine, China Pictorial. This map not only claimed Aksai Chin for China, but the NEFA as well [26]. Zhou justified the map with the same position that China had always held: The Johnson and McMahon lines were illegal and imposed by imperial Britain; China had never accepted them, and China never would accept them
Nehru protested but was still reluctant to forcefully respond. He and Zhou continued to communicate but did not come close to a resolution.
Events in Tibet made a resolution all the more unlikely, anyway. In 1956, Buddhist monks angry with China’s land redistribution policy rebelled. China’s army, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), finally squashed it in 1959, as the Dalai Lama fled to India. The Chinese accused India of interfering in its domestic affairs, though Nehru assured them that the Dalai Lama would not be accorded political powers. This did not ameliorate the uproar, particularly as members of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) were demanding that India ally with the United States to free Tibet from Chinese expansionism [28]. The goodwill from Panchsheel eroded amid the tensions, and both countries erected more border posts as a warning. Since the borders had never been bilaterally demarcated to begin with, the stage was set for the physical conflict that Nehru had tried to avoid.
Soon enough, skirmishes did start to occur. An October 20, 1959 confrontation in Kongka La, Aksai Chin, resulted in the death of nine Indian soldiers and the capture of seven [29]. Public opinion in India expressed outrage against China, and Nehru’s political opposition blasted the government’s inaction. Vajpayee, by now a rising figure in the BJS, led the opposition in demanding Nehru to release a White Paper documenting all government contact with China [30]. Facing increasing pressure, the government complied.
When the White Paper was released, Parliament was stunned by the extent of China’s territorial claims and was all the more infuriated with Nehru’s inaction. Most vocal in its anger was the BJS, whose president urged a counterattack against the Chinese: “[India’s] self-interests and honour demand early and effective action to free the Indian soil from Chinese aggression [31].” To nationalist party members such as Vajpayee, India’s security was at stake, and the Chinese needed to be stopped before it became too late. Patel’s warning from nearly a decade earlier was proving true. India’s leadership had allowed it to become the next target of expansionist China.
The anti-China feeling in both Parliament and the Indian public compelled Nehru to act. His first measure was to employ what would be termed his “Forward Policy,” the placement of Indian troops in military posts within the disputed areas. However, that policy proved ineffective because the posts were poorly equipped. While the PLA had trucks and automatic rifles, the Indian Army moved by foot and used World War I-era rifles [32]. His next step was to invite Zhou to Delhi for negotiations. Many in the BJS feared that negotiations would cost India some of its territory, and the party held a protest in front of Nehru’s home just five days before the Chinese premier arrived [33]. The talks produced no resolution, as the two sides failed to agree on a common border.
As the talks with China stalemated and pressure from the opposition mounted, the Indian prime minister increased the posts in the disputed areas and made Chinese withdrawal from Aksai Chin the precondition for any future negotiation with China [34]. His harder stance was emboldened by India’s 1961 takeover of Goa, a tiny Portuguese colony on India’s west coast. It was a symbolic victory that gave a sense of invincibility. If India could easily defeat the last European imperialist on the subcontinent, it could surely defeat the first new Asian imperialist. In fact, the Goa success was drastically exaggerated. The Portuguese were even more poorly equipped than the Indians (one battalion fought in gym shoes), and had withdrawn without much of a fight. However, patriotism overshadowed reality and inspired confidence against the Chinese. Home Minister Lal Baladur Shastri swore that “[i]f the Chinese will not vacate the areas India will have to repeat what she did in Goa [35].”
India’s tougher position did not persuade China to reverse its own course. The Goa takeover confirmed to them that Nehru was the next Asian imperialist. Just as Patel and others had feared that Tibet would be the first step in Chinese empire-building, the Chinese feared that Goa was the first step in Indian empire-building. Unlike India, though, the Chinese were prepared to act decisively.
On October 10, 1962, the PLA surprised India with an attack in the NEFA. The Indian Army was caught off-guard and totally unprepared. His troops still fighting with antiquated weapons, Nehru asked the United States for military equipment [36]. On November 20, after six weeks of bloody combat and ultimately a Chinese victory in both the NEFA and Aksai Chin, a ceasefire was declared. China kept Aksai Chin and gave the NEFA (which later became the state of Arunachal Pradesh) to India, and both sides retreated 20 kilometers behind what was called the Line of Actual Control, the line that continues to serve as the India-China border today [37]. Despite conceding the NEFA, China emerged as the clear winner. While China had captured almost 4,000 Indian soldiers, India had been unable to take a single Chinese prisoner-of-war [38].
The Sino-Indian War of 1962 was a serious blow for India, which had lost men, territory, and prestige. Nehru was humiliated. Accepting Tibet, supporting China internationally, and pledging to cooperate for “peaceful coexistence” ultimately failed to prevent war. His hopes of a “resurgent Asia” collapsed, as the two Asian powers became enemies. His vision of an India completely independent from the superpowers was also challenged when he asked for and accepted US aid against China – which still could not carry India to victory. Nehru was not alone in his humiliation. For nationalists like Vajpayee, it was certainly a low point for Indian prestige, underlining how far India still had to go before it could be considered a power.
Skirmishes, Visits, and a Smiling Buddha
In the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War, relations between the two countries remained cold. The bitter feelings from the war were compounded by nuclear developments and Cold War alignments.
Soon after the ceasefire was declared in 1962, the BJS began to push a nuclear agenda. Embarrassed by the Indian Army’s apparent weaknesses, the BJS adamantly wanted to develop a strong defense, particularly against China, which was rapidly solidifying its military advantage. The Chinese had previously received assistance from the Soviet Union for constructing a nuclear program, and most observers felt that it would only be a matter of time before China acquired a nuclear weapon. Sure enough, China conducted its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964.
More disturbing to India was China’s lean towards Pakistan. China and Pakistan had had their own border disputes, but the Sino-Indian War motivated the two countries to cooperate against their common enemy. They soon resolved their dispute, and China began to take Pakistan’s side in any Indo-Pakistani conflict. From 1965 on, Pakistan received the largest amount of Chinese aid, which took the form of money, missiles, and nuclear technology. As South Asian expert Stephen P. Cohen noted, “Pakistan is China’s Israel [40].” India was infuriated with China’s support for Pakistan, but, militarily, India had no options.
In this context, Vajpayee led the BJS in calling for a motion in the Lok Sabha that supported developing nuclear weapons in India. It failed, but Vajpayee received much attention and support [41]. India found itself surrounded by security threats, and it did not want to be as vulnerable as it had been in 1962. The momentum to go nuclear increased, and in 1974, Operation Smiling Buddha, approved by Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi, marked India’s entrance into nuclear capabilities.
While India’s nuclear tests annoyed China, the source of most ill-will during the 1970s was its cooperation with the Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet relations had collapsed more than a decade earlier, as ideological differences wedged the two communist countries apart. In the late 1950s, the Soviets halted all nuclear assistance to China and pulled out its economic advisors. In the 1960s, the Soviets also fought a border war with China along the Amur and Ussuri rivers [42]. China began to pursue warmer relations with the US soon after, and both countries supported Pakistan in the 1971 war. Although Nehru had intended for India to remain independent of Cold War divisions, the circumstances encouraged Indo-Soviet cooperation. The Soviets supported India in its conflicts with Pakistan, in addition to supplying industrial assistance. The cooperation was reaffirmed in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation [43]. Instead of unity, the two Asian countries were falling into the very Cold War poles that they had avowed to avoid.
When the Cold War dynamics were removed, though, Sino-Indian relations improved slightly. The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan created a rift in its relations with India, removing one barrier to cooperation. At the same time, China was in the process of reform under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Deng wanted to modernize the Chinese economy and open it up to foreign trade. He was thus willing to pursue better relations with India. In February 1979, Minister of External Affairs Vajpayee made the first high-level trip to China since Vice President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in 1958 [44]. The fact that Vajpayee was even in China at all was notable, having been a staunch China critic in Parliament and profoundly upset by the 1962 defeat. But Prime Minister Desai wanted to establish “genuine non-alignment:” While keeping good ties with the Soviets, India would seek better relations with China, moving away from Indira Gandhi’s pro-Soviet lean [45].
Vajpayee appeared cognizant of the changing geopolitical environment and relaxed his previously hard-line stance against China. He asserted that India’s foreign policy should be “capable of replying to changing situations in the world [46]” and was willing to reach out to China if it was in India’s best interest. Nonetheless, nobody expected a major breakthrough in the longstanding border conflict; Vajpayee himself called the trip a “probing mission [47].” Still, the visit was acknowledged by both sides as a change from the past and a possible step forward to the future.
As predicted, the “probing mission” did not solve the core differences between the two countries, but Vajpayee did achieve some positive results. He had been able to procure pilgrimage rights for Indians to Mt. Kailash and Lake Mansarovar, Hindu holy sites located in Tibet that had been closed by Chinese authorities after the Dalai Lama’s flight in 1959 [48]. Vajpayee also reprimanded Deng for China’s pro-Pakistan stance, saying that it only created “an additional and unnecessary complication to the prospects of Sino-Indian relations.” The very next year, Deng publicly called the Kashmir conflict a “bilateral dispute,” thereby lessening its overwhelming support for Pakistan [49]. The visit progressed until China suddenly invaded Vietnam on February 17, which came as a surprise and an embarrassment to India [50]. The abrupt invasion reminded Vajpayee of the unexpected invasion in 1962. Once again, India had been caught off guard by the Chinese despite India’s efforts to cooperate.
In 1962, it was Nehru who had seen his diplomatic efforts end in unexpected war; in 1979, it was Vajpayee who was stunned by Chinese incursions. He canceled the rest of the trip out of protest, and his departure marked the last time a high-level Indian representative would visit China for nearly a decade.
Nevertheless, the geopolitical realties of the time dissuaded both governments from breaking ties. The Soviet Union was weakening and no longer a reliable supporter or a barrier to relations. India still could not challenge China militarily, and without a sufficient ally in the region, needed to continue diplomatic relations with its neighbor if it wanted to prevent war. Visits continued throughout the 1980s; although they were limited to ministers and envoys, and still did not settle the border issue, they did keep India and China in contact rather than at war.
Cordial relations almost ended in 1986 when border clashes broke out again, this time in the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. Both sides increased their number of troops and patrols. India asked the Soviet Union for support, but none came. Instead, Deng Xiaoping sent Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi a message via US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger: Unless India stopped “nibbling” at Chinese territory, China would “teach India a lesson [51].” Gandhi took the message seriously and called for intense, bilateral discussions to resolve the crisis. In December 1988, he made the first trip to China by an Indian prime minister since his grandfather Nehru. He and Deng made remarkable progress, re-emphasizing the Five Principles of Panchsheel and committing to more bilateral cooperation. Gandhi’s visit produced two joint working groups specifically for the border issues, calls for increased trade and cultural exchange, and agreements to cooperate in civil aviation, science, and technology [52]. For Sino-Indian relations, this was a definite breakthrough from the past. While it still did not answer the border question, it fostered closer ties that would be harder to break.
The relationship continued to strengthen, with Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to India in 1991 and Indian President Ramaswami Venkataraman’s visit to China in 1992. But the next milestone came with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s 1993 visit to China. The countries signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), whereupon both sides agreed to respect the LAC, reduce troop levels, and increase bilateral talks to address the border issue [53].
This was followed by the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC, which called for further troop reductions and a pledge to not use military force against the other side [54]. Knowing that the border issue would be difficult to resolve, the countries opted for such treaties to lessen the chance of military conflict. The agreements continued the bilateral progress, but when Vajpayee became Prime Minister in 1998 and approved the nuclear tests at Pokhran, Sino-Indian relations faced a new challenge.
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