INDIA/NEPAL:Call for Hindu Nepal at Mumbai meet
Kathmandu, May 10 (IANS): A three-day religious meet that kicked off in India is seeking fresh action to restore Nepal as a Hindu state.
The international meet on Hinduism that began Sunday in Mumbai is being addressed by the chief of Nepal’s only openly royalist party, Kamal Thapa, and Indian politicians like Bal Thackeray, former chief minister of Maharashtra Manohar Joshi and senior Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Gopinath Munde.
Thapa heads the Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal, the only party that contested the historic election in 2008 campaigning for a Hindu kingdom in Nepal, going against the popular political wave led by the former Maoist guerrillas. The election resulted in the abolition of monarchy and Nepal being declared a secular republic.
“At the Mumbai meet, to be attended by over 1,500 delegates from all over the world, Thapa will be arguing for the restoration of a Hindu state in Nepal,” said Rajaram Shrestha, former mayor of Kathmandu and prominent leader of the royalist party.
The Mumbai meet is also being addressed by former Nepali minister Khum Bahadur Khadka, whose ruling Nepali Congress party is divided over the issues of state religion and monarchy.
Khadka has been advocating the restoration of monarchy and a Hindu state in Nepal.
Two months ago, BJP’s former chief Rajnath Singh had visited Kathmandu when he announced his party’s support for a Hindu state in Nepal.
Thapa’s party has said it will oppose the new constitution – that is expected to bring peace in Nepal – unless the government holds a referendum before it to decisively settle the issues of monarchy and a Hindu state.
Nepal’s deposed king Gyanendra, who left his throne after a pro-democracy movement in 2006, has also said recently that Nepal should become a Hindu state again and monarchy could return if people wanted it.
The pro-Hindutva group has been strengthened by the failure of the major parties to work in harmony and the new constitution is now not likely to be ready by its deadline of May 28.
Should that happen, Thapa is asking for fresh elections where royalists hope to make greater gains than in the 2008 polls when they were mostly defeated.
Tuesday, 11 May 2010
Sunday, 9 May 2010
OPINION: State Formation of the Indian Union
Source:THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE]
BY DARJMAN
07 May: The final analytical work of Hillman –the Analyst in Constitutionally determining the long aspired statehood for the Darjeeling hill peoples is slowly coming to a glorious and final end in the immediate days ahead during or after the Sixth Tripartite Meeting contemplated on 25 May 2010. The substance of this analysis is contemplated in prelude and in anticipation of the coming meet which should change the entire history of Darjeeling District in times to come. Even if no deliberate results proceed from this meeting it is constitutionally perceivable that the Sixth Tripartite meet is expected to be the final initiation in breathing a fresh breath of life to the Darjeeling hill people, to once again carry on life with the much inspired dreams and aspirations withheld in breath for a very long time. Constitutionally speaking since 1950 when the Constitution of India was promulgated to awaken the toiling masses of India from the slumbering, debilitating rule of foreign invaders.
Unfortunately for Darjeeling District and many such ‘Backward Tracts’ (1870-1935) in rest of the country administratively referred to as ‘Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas’, independence in 1947 and the relevancy of the Constitution in 1950, was incomparable in contrast to the rest of the country. The change in difference was hardly noticeable. The foreign rule was imperceptible while contrasting to the rule projected by our own countrymen infact if relative comparisons of the change in time is attempted many who have participated in both time period consider the basic happiness index was more appreciable than the present times wherein development and progress is always gaged with expenditure than the net life style gain. To illustrate this with an example is the sheer impact of population explosion not only in the entire country but visibly so in the Darjeeling hills whose natural beauty of mountains, rivers and forest are on the verge being reversibly impacted by the genie of development without even a side glance to the social and physical environmental impacts.
All the hill towns Darjeeling, Kurseong, Kalimpong as well as the smaller village town are on the brink of social, cultural and economic disaster at the humane end at the cost of the ecology while attempting to environmentally balance the ecological equation. This effort is nowhere in sight in claiming its achievement. Rather on the contrary the vision for the future, without any doubt perceivably and statistically is pessimistic. This being the present scenario with no possible constructive solution in sight, the only adventure is to attempt, at a last resort, holding on to even a straw, in order to salvage what remains of the hills by obtaining its own state, space, mind and perseverance in order to bail out the future generations before the gates of heaven finally closes. That is to obtain the state which it is only discovered, that obtaining it was a Constitutional right enshrined in the August book to deliver the Darjeeling hill peoples before the count of disaster. It seems the bell had already rung at the time of independence but made obvious only in 1950 by the provisions of the Constitution wherein the future of Darjeeling District was already written as the writings on the wall in the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936 declaring it as a ‘Partially Excluded Area’. This simple phrase remained undeciphered and insignificant till it was only recently discovered that its implication was very profound. The meaning and its delivery is yet not understood by the very people for whom it was implied to protect and preserve. No doubt the ruling ethnic majority had understood its meaning and implications in the very inception itself. Understanding which much backdoor politics and money may have changed hands in order to delude the innocent herd of sheep not as the proverbial shepherd but to sacrifice them at the alter.
Ad the adage goes truth cannot be hidden for long so the implication of ‘Partially Excluded Area’ relevant to Darjeeling District is now being understood by the sacrificial lamb who can now escape from the wrath, and save its life and in time its soul, by the translating the meaning of Partially Excluded Area in the provisions of the Constitution for the final deliverance.
The V and VI Schedule are the basic features incorporated in the Constitution for new state formations and that too provided only for the territorial areas of India identified since the time of East India Company territories were gradually being converted into administrative areas under provisions of the Regulating Act of 1773 onwards. Darjeeling District formally considered as an administrative unit in 1866 was kept out of the purview of the reforms process, like similar areas considered inhabited by tribes and hill peoples, and accordingly these areas were never ever administratively nor territorially attached to the Indian Provinces, so to say.
These areas were known as Non Regulated Areas and for all practical purposes even at the point of independence, and the transfer of power from the British to Indian sovereignty was normally formalized by the provisions of The (Foreign) Jurisdiction Act 1947 which seemed to have allowed the Central govt. jurisdiction in relation to areas outside India (namely, Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas) now understood to mean provisions for the administration of Scheduled Tribes and Tribal Areas (Scheduled Areas) within the meaning and provisions of the V and VI Schedules, which is the only provision in the Constitution allowing state formation and that too for areas previously identified and defined in the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936.
All the tribal areas so identified more or less have perceived to have been concluded their constitutional right by forming 14 States and 7 Union Territory (UT) out of Excluded Areas (EA), Partially Excluded Areas (PEA), Centrally Administered Areas (CAA), UT and 17 States out of V Schedule (12) and VI Schedule (5).
Somehow the right of tiny Darjeeling District have been inadvertently or rather advertently been left out not acts of omission or commission but actually in fact by devious means and misconceptions introduced by the vestment of the state to deny the constitutional right of the Darjeeling hill peoples for the benefit of the state however contrived and discriminatory. This resulting in the long years of the Darjeeling hill people grouping and grappling in the darkness of Gorkhaland illusion which though a magic word to garner the hill people in directing a united stand but on the other hand drastically implying closing the very doors of the Constitution by the implication of the terminology. The implication of the application of Nepali language in determining the Tribes in Census 1931 to the 26 tribes’ communities at the time seemed to have delisted practically all the Nepali speaking tribes to non tribes when the majority tribe population of Census 1931 was reduced to a minority tribes population in 1941. The delisted communities, no doubt genuine tribes, have applied for the tribe status once again. This was similarly expressed earlier by Subhash Ghissing and now the same stance has been repeated by Bimal Gurung in order to effect statuesque anti Census 1931. The delisting of many tribes except the Bhutias and Lepchas was a gargantuan blunder which denied Darjeeling District the large population majority required now to attempt statehood. The mistake has been a costly blunder and which no doubt the state has utilized it to its full advantage But the day of the awakening is at hand, and no matter what stands ahead the road is cleared for the future of Darjeeling hill peoples now to claim its constitutional right.
Having referred to the Constitution deeply it is in understanding, already stated earlier, the V and VI Schedule provisions of the Constitution are the state formation process applicable to all those Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Areas already mentioned in view of the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936. In order to find out the applicability of the two provisions V and VI Schedule, one is required to refer the Constituent Assembly debates and find the slot for its attachment.
The V Schedule area was discussed by the Advisory Committee’s Sub Committee on Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas other than Assam chaired by A.V.Thakkar in the interim report submitted on 18 Aug 1947. Darjeeling District being in Bengal, outside Assam, was discussed by this Committee and therefore its right to obtain statehood is provided therein – the V Schedule.
So it would be a constitutional fallacy if the provision of VI Schedule is applied to Darjeeling District as is being formented by certain political parties not with any ulterior motive but misunderstanding the entire issue by identifying Darjeeling District regionally with Assam. Infact it is guessed that the reason why the VI Schedule, now lying in suspended animation in Parliament, is seen to have been directed to be so remain after the protagonist discovered that the entire event was unconstitutional and had been mistakenly misplaced. It required being withdrawn before it became a bill itself and attempting at all costs to derail it becoming an act. Having controlled the damage and lest it at rest, it is believed now the true constitutional plank is being laid.
Now the entire format applied by the concerned seems to be, and properly so the V Scehdule. However Darjeeling District has a factorial deficiency wherein the actual requirement consists of two qualifications, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Areas. Only the former is applied to Darjeeling District because the latter is deficient in content and hence requires enlargement by appealing for recognition of more Scheduled Tribes in order to complete the program to obtain a state. With only one factor, the Schedule Tribes, the immediate attempt can only effect a Union Territory status and which it is believed to be so being implied at the moment as an Interim arrangement till the point of time the other members of the Darjeeling hill people achieve larger population to qualify as Scheduled Area, which when achieved can eventually complete the statehood formation process in time. Till such time Darjeeling District shall remain a Union Territory.
The Union Govt. and the President of India being the guardian of the Constitution is now perceived to be quite convinced that it is the right moment for the history of Darjeeling to be conferred its rightful constitutional provision by allowing it initially, as an interim arrangement, to form a Union Territory preceding statehood.
One of the most contentious issue is posed by the question of Centre agreeing to included the Dooars of Darjeeling District into any concept of the new dispensation. The issue of Dooars is a difficult proposition for the Centre to accept as Jalpaiguri District itself of which the Dooars form a part, does not come under any provisions of neither the V or the VI Schedule since the District was left out of the ambit Govt. of India Act 1935 as including Dooars with Darjeeling District becomes unconstitutional for the Centre to accept. The proper way to go about is to create another unit of Jalpaiguri District jointly advanced by the hill tribes and the plain tribes to obtain another state. In effect to create two states of Darjeeling District which is already conferred by the constitution of India and in due time, after certain formalities are complied to approach the Centre for another state of Jalpaiguri District which again in reference to Census 1931 will be found to be a genuine demand. This is a futuristic appellation and a design, not at all considered to divide Bengal, but allowing the much deprived people of North Bengal to find its own bearings and moors. This should complete the entire map of North east states as the nine jewels of the tribes of East India.
The Indian Independence Act 1947 requires to be cited here to engage all concerned to deliberate on both the issues of Darjeeling District and Jalpaiguri District forming into state/states to finally close the chapter of the entire country of India having integrated into a whole republic after the departure of the foreign rulers in 1947. What is most puzzling is the constitutional vacuum wherein on what basis West Bengal can holds remaining a state if the Darjeleing tribes are delineated which seems to be the factor on basis of which the state was conceived out of erstwhile Bengal. This is in consideration of the fact, East Bengal (East Pakistan now Bangladesh) is perceived to have been created based on the rights of the indigenous minorities the Chakma tribes. It is felt this tribe was inadvertently as well as tragically included in forming East Bengal despite the fact the tribe consisted of a population inhabitants of 87% Buddhists incorporated with an Islamic state, both being anathema and dislike each other since the advent of Islam in India. Infact Indian history relates the final annihilation of Buddhism in India was after the invasion of India by Islamic rulers. If at all this allusion is sensible it would be a shame in the history of India as well as its leaders to account for this perceived blame if at all true.
ANNEXATIONS:
1. Formation of States
2. Acts 1773 – 2011
Source:THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE]
BY DARJMAN
07 May: The final analytical work of Hillman –the Analyst in Constitutionally determining the long aspired statehood for the Darjeeling hill peoples is slowly coming to a glorious and final end in the immediate days ahead during or after the Sixth Tripartite Meeting contemplated on 25 May 2010. The substance of this analysis is contemplated in prelude and in anticipation of the coming meet which should change the entire history of Darjeeling District in times to come. Even if no deliberate results proceed from this meeting it is constitutionally perceivable that the Sixth Tripartite meet is expected to be the final initiation in breathing a fresh breath of life to the Darjeeling hill people, to once again carry on life with the much inspired dreams and aspirations withheld in breath for a very long time. Constitutionally speaking since 1950 when the Constitution of India was promulgated to awaken the toiling masses of India from the slumbering, debilitating rule of foreign invaders.
Unfortunately for Darjeeling District and many such ‘Backward Tracts’ (1870-1935) in rest of the country administratively referred to as ‘Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas’, independence in 1947 and the relevancy of the Constitution in 1950, was incomparable in contrast to the rest of the country. The change in difference was hardly noticeable. The foreign rule was imperceptible while contrasting to the rule projected by our own countrymen infact if relative comparisons of the change in time is attempted many who have participated in both time period consider the basic happiness index was more appreciable than the present times wherein development and progress is always gaged with expenditure than the net life style gain. To illustrate this with an example is the sheer impact of population explosion not only in the entire country but visibly so in the Darjeeling hills whose natural beauty of mountains, rivers and forest are on the verge being reversibly impacted by the genie of development without even a side glance to the social and physical environmental impacts.
All the hill towns Darjeeling, Kurseong, Kalimpong as well as the smaller village town are on the brink of social, cultural and economic disaster at the humane end at the cost of the ecology while attempting to environmentally balance the ecological equation. This effort is nowhere in sight in claiming its achievement. Rather on the contrary the vision for the future, without any doubt perceivably and statistically is pessimistic. This being the present scenario with no possible constructive solution in sight, the only adventure is to attempt, at a last resort, holding on to even a straw, in order to salvage what remains of the hills by obtaining its own state, space, mind and perseverance in order to bail out the future generations before the gates of heaven finally closes. That is to obtain the state which it is only discovered, that obtaining it was a Constitutional right enshrined in the August book to deliver the Darjeeling hill peoples before the count of disaster. It seems the bell had already rung at the time of independence but made obvious only in 1950 by the provisions of the Constitution wherein the future of Darjeeling District was already written as the writings on the wall in the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936 declaring it as a ‘Partially Excluded Area’. This simple phrase remained undeciphered and insignificant till it was only recently discovered that its implication was very profound. The meaning and its delivery is yet not understood by the very people for whom it was implied to protect and preserve. No doubt the ruling ethnic majority had understood its meaning and implications in the very inception itself. Understanding which much backdoor politics and money may have changed hands in order to delude the innocent herd of sheep not as the proverbial shepherd but to sacrifice them at the alter.
Ad the adage goes truth cannot be hidden for long so the implication of ‘Partially Excluded Area’ relevant to Darjeeling District is now being understood by the sacrificial lamb who can now escape from the wrath, and save its life and in time its soul, by the translating the meaning of Partially Excluded Area in the provisions of the Constitution for the final deliverance.
The V and VI Schedule are the basic features incorporated in the Constitution for new state formations and that too provided only for the territorial areas of India identified since the time of East India Company territories were gradually being converted into administrative areas under provisions of the Regulating Act of 1773 onwards. Darjeeling District formally considered as an administrative unit in 1866 was kept out of the purview of the reforms process, like similar areas considered inhabited by tribes and hill peoples, and accordingly these areas were never ever administratively nor territorially attached to the Indian Provinces, so to say.
These areas were known as Non Regulated Areas and for all practical purposes even at the point of independence, and the transfer of power from the British to Indian sovereignty was normally formalized by the provisions of The (Foreign) Jurisdiction Act 1947 which seemed to have allowed the Central govt. jurisdiction in relation to areas outside India (namely, Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas) now understood to mean provisions for the administration of Scheduled Tribes and Tribal Areas (Scheduled Areas) within the meaning and provisions of the V and VI Schedules, which is the only provision in the Constitution allowing state formation and that too for areas previously identified and defined in the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936.
All the tribal areas so identified more or less have perceived to have been concluded their constitutional right by forming 14 States and 7 Union Territory (UT) out of Excluded Areas (EA), Partially Excluded Areas (PEA), Centrally Administered Areas (CAA), UT and 17 States out of V Schedule (12) and VI Schedule (5).
Somehow the right of tiny Darjeeling District have been inadvertently or rather advertently been left out not acts of omission or commission but actually in fact by devious means and misconceptions introduced by the vestment of the state to deny the constitutional right of the Darjeeling hill peoples for the benefit of the state however contrived and discriminatory. This resulting in the long years of the Darjeeling hill people grouping and grappling in the darkness of Gorkhaland illusion which though a magic word to garner the hill people in directing a united stand but on the other hand drastically implying closing the very doors of the Constitution by the implication of the terminology. The implication of the application of Nepali language in determining the Tribes in Census 1931 to the 26 tribes’ communities at the time seemed to have delisted practically all the Nepali speaking tribes to non tribes when the majority tribe population of Census 1931 was reduced to a minority tribes population in 1941. The delisted communities, no doubt genuine tribes, have applied for the tribe status once again. This was similarly expressed earlier by Subhash Ghissing and now the same stance has been repeated by Bimal Gurung in order to effect statuesque anti Census 1931. The delisting of many tribes except the Bhutias and Lepchas was a gargantuan blunder which denied Darjeeling District the large population majority required now to attempt statehood. The mistake has been a costly blunder and which no doubt the state has utilized it to its full advantage But the day of the awakening is at hand, and no matter what stands ahead the road is cleared for the future of Darjeeling hill peoples now to claim its constitutional right.
Having referred to the Constitution deeply it is in understanding, already stated earlier, the V and VI Schedule provisions of the Constitution are the state formation process applicable to all those Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Areas already mentioned in view of the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936. In order to find out the applicability of the two provisions V and VI Schedule, one is required to refer the Constituent Assembly debates and find the slot for its attachment.
The V Schedule area was discussed by the Advisory Committee’s Sub Committee on Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas other than Assam chaired by A.V.Thakkar in the interim report submitted on 18 Aug 1947. Darjeeling District being in Bengal, outside Assam, was discussed by this Committee and therefore its right to obtain statehood is provided therein – the V Schedule.
So it would be a constitutional fallacy if the provision of VI Schedule is applied to Darjeeling District as is being formented by certain political parties not with any ulterior motive but misunderstanding the entire issue by identifying Darjeeling District regionally with Assam. Infact it is guessed that the reason why the VI Schedule, now lying in suspended animation in Parliament, is seen to have been directed to be so remain after the protagonist discovered that the entire event was unconstitutional and had been mistakenly misplaced. It required being withdrawn before it became a bill itself and attempting at all costs to derail it becoming an act. Having controlled the damage and lest it at rest, it is believed now the true constitutional plank is being laid.
Now the entire format applied by the concerned seems to be, and properly so the V Scehdule. However Darjeeling District has a factorial deficiency wherein the actual requirement consists of two qualifications, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Areas. Only the former is applied to Darjeeling District because the latter is deficient in content and hence requires enlargement by appealing for recognition of more Scheduled Tribes in order to complete the program to obtain a state. With only one factor, the Schedule Tribes, the immediate attempt can only effect a Union Territory status and which it is believed to be so being implied at the moment as an Interim arrangement till the point of time the other members of the Darjeeling hill people achieve larger population to qualify as Scheduled Area, which when achieved can eventually complete the statehood formation process in time. Till such time Darjeeling District shall remain a Union Territory.
The Union Govt. and the President of India being the guardian of the Constitution is now perceived to be quite convinced that it is the right moment for the history of Darjeeling to be conferred its rightful constitutional provision by allowing it initially, as an interim arrangement, to form a Union Territory preceding statehood.
One of the most contentious issue is posed by the question of Centre agreeing to included the Dooars of Darjeeling District into any concept of the new dispensation. The issue of Dooars is a difficult proposition for the Centre to accept as Jalpaiguri District itself of which the Dooars form a part, does not come under any provisions of neither the V or the VI Schedule since the District was left out of the ambit Govt. of India Act 1935 as including Dooars with Darjeeling District becomes unconstitutional for the Centre to accept. The proper way to go about is to create another unit of Jalpaiguri District jointly advanced by the hill tribes and the plain tribes to obtain another state. In effect to create two states of Darjeeling District which is already conferred by the constitution of India and in due time, after certain formalities are complied to approach the Centre for another state of Jalpaiguri District which again in reference to Census 1931 will be found to be a genuine demand. This is a futuristic appellation and a design, not at all considered to divide Bengal, but allowing the much deprived people of North Bengal to find its own bearings and moors. This should complete the entire map of North east states as the nine jewels of the tribes of East India.
The Indian Independence Act 1947 requires to be cited here to engage all concerned to deliberate on both the issues of Darjeeling District and Jalpaiguri District forming into state/states to finally close the chapter of the entire country of India having integrated into a whole republic after the departure of the foreign rulers in 1947. What is most puzzling is the constitutional vacuum wherein on what basis West Bengal can holds remaining a state if the Darjeleing tribes are delineated which seems to be the factor on basis of which the state was conceived out of erstwhile Bengal. This is in consideration of the fact, East Bengal (East Pakistan now Bangladesh) is perceived to have been created based on the rights of the indigenous minorities the Chakma tribes. It is felt this tribe was inadvertently as well as tragically included in forming East Bengal despite the fact the tribe consisted of a population inhabitants of 87% Buddhists incorporated with an Islamic state, both being anathema and dislike each other since the advent of Islam in India. Infact Indian history relates the final annihilation of Buddhism in India was after the invasion of India by Islamic rulers. If at all this allusion is sensible it would be a shame in the history of India as well as its leaders to account for this perceived blame if at all true.
ANNEXATIONS:
1. Formation of States
2. Acts 1773 – 2011
Monday, 3 May 2010
India closes ranks with Hamid Karzai
by M. K. Bhadrakumar
The talks in Delhi have made it quite clear that India will remain an effective partner for the Afghan government in the difficult period ahead, no matter the vicissitudes of the United States' AfPak diplomacy.
The Afghan President Hamid Karzai's two-day visit to New Delhi last week took place at a defining moment in the Afghan civil war. Mr. Karzai is about to embark on a crucial peace and reconciliation project. He just completed talks in three important regional capitals — Islamabad, Tehran and Beijing — explaining his strategy, for the success of which he needs the understanding from the regional powers. Tehran and Beijing were forthcoming in their support of the Afghan government whereas Islamabad views him as a rival claimant to piloting the peace process.
Secondly, “Afghanisation” is set to surge to the centre stage. The foreign minister-level meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) held in Tallinn, the Estonian capital, on April 23 officially set in motion a process to roll back the alliance's operations in Afghanistan. While this would be a natural process and not a “run for the exit,” as NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it, the political reality is that the western allies have reached agreement on basic guidelines for commencing the hand-over of responsibility for security to the Afghan forces on a case-by-case basis within this year. The international conference, slated to be held in Kabul in June, will further “tweak” the NATO's approach. Mr. Karzai formally invited India to take part in the conference.
The talks in Delhi have made it quite clear that India will remain an effective partner for the Afghan government in the difficult period ahead no matter the vicissitudes of the United States' AfPak diplomacy; the worsening security situation inside Afghanistan; the Pakistani military's undisguised power projection for “strategic depth”; and, least of all, the physical threat from Pakistani agents to the Indian presence in Afghanistan.
Dr. Singh summed up that his discussions with Mr. Karzai were “extremely productive.” Delhi underlined their strategic character by including Defence Minister A.K. Antony in the Indian delegation at the talks. Dr. Singh pointedly articulated India's “deep admiration” for Mr. Karzai's “courageous leadership in difficult times,” probably administering a word of advice to the Barack Obama administration to have a sense of proportions in judging the highly complex Afghan political situation. Broadly speaking, the Indian viewpoint has been consistently that there is an organic linkage between creating an enabling security environment and setting high yardsticks about an expansion of the footprint of the Afghan government or its accelerated progress on governance issues.
Interestingly, a lowering of the anti-Karzai rhetoric and grandstanding is of late visible in certain quarters within the Obama administration. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton conspicuously voiced a rethink recently. The big question, however, is how far down the ladder Ms Clinton's fair-minded estimation trickles down. Delhi would very much hope that her helpful words translate as U.S. policies on the ground in the aftermath of Mr. Karzai's visit to Washington on May 10-14 — although a systematic Pakistani attempt to queer the pitch of the visit is already afoot.
Two topics dominated Mr. Karzai's talks in Delhi — placing India's development and strategic partnership with Afghanistan within the “Afghanisation” process and, secondly, India's perspectives on the “reintegration” and reconciliation of the Taliban. Dr. Singh said, “India is ready to augment its assistance for capacity building and for its skills and human resource development to help strengthen public institutions in Afghanistan.”
India's assistance for Afghanistan already touches a massive figure of $1.3 billion. India can train Afghan specialists in various fields, provide training and equipment to the Afghan army and cooperate in a range of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotic activities. However, Delhi would be aware that any military deployment in Afghanistan is bound to be a potentially exhausting military mission and needs to be avoided. The Indian stance is strikingly similar to that of Russia or China, which also refuse to get militarily involved in Afghanistan. The challenge facing Indian diplomacy will be to figure out how economic expansion can be the key element of India's security strategy in Afghanistan. Arguably, emulating China's model, which places emphasis on making investments in resource-based projects will be a step forward for India. This could be done in collaboration with Afghan partners.
Without doubt, Mr. Karzai's visit helped to further refine the Indian thinking apropos the contours of an Afghan settlement. The Indian thinking rests on the following assessments. One, India regards the forthcoming jirga (tribal assembly) in May in Kabul and the Afghan parliamentary elections in September to be “important milestones.” Delhi agrees with Mr. Karzai's stance that in order for these processes to be legitimate and enduring, they should be Afghan-led. Two, these political processes can be optimal only if they go hand in hand with the international community's long term commitment to stability, peace and development in Afghanistan.
Three, the deterioration in the security situation is a hard reality and it needs to be firmly tackled on a priority basis within Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan, where the syndicate of terrorist organisations and other extremist groups operating in the region enjoy support and sustenance. Towards this end, apart from the NATO's surge, the Afghan security forces should be enlarged and developed in a professional manner and provided with adequate resources, combat equipment and enablers and training.
It would appear that Mr. Karzai allayed the Indian apprehensions regarding the strategy of “reintegration” of the Taliban. Delhi takes a cautious view of the process since in its view the Taliban may exploit the political space to capture power with Pakistani support, creating a fait accompli for the region, which was how the ISI implemented a phase-by-phase agenda of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan during 1994-97. Therefore, Delhi would expect the reintegration process to be “tackled with prudence, the benefit of hindsight, foresight and caution.” Also, Delhi stresses that any integration process should be “inclusive and transparent,” which is predicated on the assessment that Afghanistan is a plural society and the majority opinion is not only vehemently against the Taliban's extremist ideology but also staunchly opposes any role for the outsiders to covertly dictate peace.
Mr. Karzai shared his thinking apropos the upcoming jirga with Dr. Singh and it appears that there are no serious contradictions between the two sides. Significantly, Mr. Karzai made it a point to underline “our common struggle against terrorism and extremism.” The joint statement also underlined the two countries' “determination…to combat the forces of terrorism which pose a particular threat to the region.”
There has been a latent sense of uneasiness among sections of the Indian strategic community that Mr. Karzai appeared to be in a mood to “compromise” or “appease” the Taliban in a self-seeking manner in anticipation of a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Much of this misperception stemmed from the western propaganda — often pre-cooked in the ISI's kitchen — intended to dissimulate or to create an impression that Mr. Karzai is raring to go to accommodate the Taliban leadership and if anything at all is holding him back, it is only Mr. Obama's scepticism about the reconciliation strategy.
Delhi seems to understand well enough that what is unfolding is rather a grim struggle for the control of the Afghan peace process itself. Unsurprisingly, Mr. Karzai insists on his prerogative as the elected head of state to lead his country's peace process. On the contrary, Pakistani military would like to cast Mr. Karzai as merely one of the Afghan protagonists. Ostensibly, the Pakistani military wishes to work exclusively with the U.S. to reconcile the Taliban but in reality it wishes to seize control of the peace process or to dominate it, while extracting concessions from Washington in the form of military and economic aid. The Pakistani military banks on exploiting Mr.Obama's haste to effect a drawdown of the U.S. combat troops by mid-2011.
The ISI has not only shed its “strategic ambiguity” regarding its nexus with the Taliban but of late openly flaunts its influence with the hardline “Quetta Shura” and the Haqqani network, making it clear that Rawalpindi is capable of torpedoing any peace process which is left to the Afghans. Ironically, this nexus with elements expressly banned by the United Nations (at the instance of the George W. Bush administration) ought to make Pakistan a rogue state but the U.S. has been pragmatic about it and instead chooses to solicit the Pakistani military's help. An added factor is that influential figures within Mr. Obama's AfPak team who are vestiges of the Afghan jihad, enjoy old links with the Pakistani security establishment and willingly subserve the ISI's agenda pitting Mr. Karzai as the “problem” in any national reconciliation process.
Curiously, this political theatre is unfolding against a backdrop where “almost all Afghans, including Karzai's Pashtun supporters, the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance and even the Taliban oppose any major role for the ISI,” to quote Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani commentator, in a recent article in the Washington Post. Quite obviously, the Pakistani military's control of the foreign and security policies is at a high level in Islamabad. Delhi will do well to figure out that Mr. Karzai deserves all the support he needs at this juncture.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
source; the hindu
by M. K. Bhadrakumar
The talks in Delhi have made it quite clear that India will remain an effective partner for the Afghan government in the difficult period ahead, no matter the vicissitudes of the United States' AfPak diplomacy.
The Afghan President Hamid Karzai's two-day visit to New Delhi last week took place at a defining moment in the Afghan civil war. Mr. Karzai is about to embark on a crucial peace and reconciliation project. He just completed talks in three important regional capitals — Islamabad, Tehran and Beijing — explaining his strategy, for the success of which he needs the understanding from the regional powers. Tehran and Beijing were forthcoming in their support of the Afghan government whereas Islamabad views him as a rival claimant to piloting the peace process.
Secondly, “Afghanisation” is set to surge to the centre stage. The foreign minister-level meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) held in Tallinn, the Estonian capital, on April 23 officially set in motion a process to roll back the alliance's operations in Afghanistan. While this would be a natural process and not a “run for the exit,” as NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it, the political reality is that the western allies have reached agreement on basic guidelines for commencing the hand-over of responsibility for security to the Afghan forces on a case-by-case basis within this year. The international conference, slated to be held in Kabul in June, will further “tweak” the NATO's approach. Mr. Karzai formally invited India to take part in the conference.
The talks in Delhi have made it quite clear that India will remain an effective partner for the Afghan government in the difficult period ahead no matter the vicissitudes of the United States' AfPak diplomacy; the worsening security situation inside Afghanistan; the Pakistani military's undisguised power projection for “strategic depth”; and, least of all, the physical threat from Pakistani agents to the Indian presence in Afghanistan.
Dr. Singh summed up that his discussions with Mr. Karzai were “extremely productive.” Delhi underlined their strategic character by including Defence Minister A.K. Antony in the Indian delegation at the talks. Dr. Singh pointedly articulated India's “deep admiration” for Mr. Karzai's “courageous leadership in difficult times,” probably administering a word of advice to the Barack Obama administration to have a sense of proportions in judging the highly complex Afghan political situation. Broadly speaking, the Indian viewpoint has been consistently that there is an organic linkage between creating an enabling security environment and setting high yardsticks about an expansion of the footprint of the Afghan government or its accelerated progress on governance issues.
Interestingly, a lowering of the anti-Karzai rhetoric and grandstanding is of late visible in certain quarters within the Obama administration. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton conspicuously voiced a rethink recently. The big question, however, is how far down the ladder Ms Clinton's fair-minded estimation trickles down. Delhi would very much hope that her helpful words translate as U.S. policies on the ground in the aftermath of Mr. Karzai's visit to Washington on May 10-14 — although a systematic Pakistani attempt to queer the pitch of the visit is already afoot.
Two topics dominated Mr. Karzai's talks in Delhi — placing India's development and strategic partnership with Afghanistan within the “Afghanisation” process and, secondly, India's perspectives on the “reintegration” and reconciliation of the Taliban. Dr. Singh said, “India is ready to augment its assistance for capacity building and for its skills and human resource development to help strengthen public institutions in Afghanistan.”
India's assistance for Afghanistan already touches a massive figure of $1.3 billion. India can train Afghan specialists in various fields, provide training and equipment to the Afghan army and cooperate in a range of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotic activities. However, Delhi would be aware that any military deployment in Afghanistan is bound to be a potentially exhausting military mission and needs to be avoided. The Indian stance is strikingly similar to that of Russia or China, which also refuse to get militarily involved in Afghanistan. The challenge facing Indian diplomacy will be to figure out how economic expansion can be the key element of India's security strategy in Afghanistan. Arguably, emulating China's model, which places emphasis on making investments in resource-based projects will be a step forward for India. This could be done in collaboration with Afghan partners.
Without doubt, Mr. Karzai's visit helped to further refine the Indian thinking apropos the contours of an Afghan settlement. The Indian thinking rests on the following assessments. One, India regards the forthcoming jirga (tribal assembly) in May in Kabul and the Afghan parliamentary elections in September to be “important milestones.” Delhi agrees with Mr. Karzai's stance that in order for these processes to be legitimate and enduring, they should be Afghan-led. Two, these political processes can be optimal only if they go hand in hand with the international community's long term commitment to stability, peace and development in Afghanistan.
Three, the deterioration in the security situation is a hard reality and it needs to be firmly tackled on a priority basis within Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan, where the syndicate of terrorist organisations and other extremist groups operating in the region enjoy support and sustenance. Towards this end, apart from the NATO's surge, the Afghan security forces should be enlarged and developed in a professional manner and provided with adequate resources, combat equipment and enablers and training.
It would appear that Mr. Karzai allayed the Indian apprehensions regarding the strategy of “reintegration” of the Taliban. Delhi takes a cautious view of the process since in its view the Taliban may exploit the political space to capture power with Pakistani support, creating a fait accompli for the region, which was how the ISI implemented a phase-by-phase agenda of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan during 1994-97. Therefore, Delhi would expect the reintegration process to be “tackled with prudence, the benefit of hindsight, foresight and caution.” Also, Delhi stresses that any integration process should be “inclusive and transparent,” which is predicated on the assessment that Afghanistan is a plural society and the majority opinion is not only vehemently against the Taliban's extremist ideology but also staunchly opposes any role for the outsiders to covertly dictate peace.
Mr. Karzai shared his thinking apropos the upcoming jirga with Dr. Singh and it appears that there are no serious contradictions between the two sides. Significantly, Mr. Karzai made it a point to underline “our common struggle against terrorism and extremism.” The joint statement also underlined the two countries' “determination…to combat the forces of terrorism which pose a particular threat to the region.”
There has been a latent sense of uneasiness among sections of the Indian strategic community that Mr. Karzai appeared to be in a mood to “compromise” or “appease” the Taliban in a self-seeking manner in anticipation of a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Much of this misperception stemmed from the western propaganda — often pre-cooked in the ISI's kitchen — intended to dissimulate or to create an impression that Mr. Karzai is raring to go to accommodate the Taliban leadership and if anything at all is holding him back, it is only Mr. Obama's scepticism about the reconciliation strategy.
Delhi seems to understand well enough that what is unfolding is rather a grim struggle for the control of the Afghan peace process itself. Unsurprisingly, Mr. Karzai insists on his prerogative as the elected head of state to lead his country's peace process. On the contrary, Pakistani military would like to cast Mr. Karzai as merely one of the Afghan protagonists. Ostensibly, the Pakistani military wishes to work exclusively with the U.S. to reconcile the Taliban but in reality it wishes to seize control of the peace process or to dominate it, while extracting concessions from Washington in the form of military and economic aid. The Pakistani military banks on exploiting Mr.Obama's haste to effect a drawdown of the U.S. combat troops by mid-2011.
The ISI has not only shed its “strategic ambiguity” regarding its nexus with the Taliban but of late openly flaunts its influence with the hardline “Quetta Shura” and the Haqqani network, making it clear that Rawalpindi is capable of torpedoing any peace process which is left to the Afghans. Ironically, this nexus with elements expressly banned by the United Nations (at the instance of the George W. Bush administration) ought to make Pakistan a rogue state but the U.S. has been pragmatic about it and instead chooses to solicit the Pakistani military's help. An added factor is that influential figures within Mr. Obama's AfPak team who are vestiges of the Afghan jihad, enjoy old links with the Pakistani security establishment and willingly subserve the ISI's agenda pitting Mr. Karzai as the “problem” in any national reconciliation process.
Curiously, this political theatre is unfolding against a backdrop where “almost all Afghans, including Karzai's Pashtun supporters, the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance and even the Taliban oppose any major role for the ISI,” to quote Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani commentator, in a recent article in the Washington Post. Quite obviously, the Pakistani military's control of the foreign and security policies is at a high level in Islamabad. Delhi will do well to figure out that Mr. Karzai deserves all the support he needs at this juncture.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
source; the hindu
Saturday, 10 April 2010
NEPAL: I am getting married on June 19 but its not arranged marriage – Manisha Koirala
FROM INDIAROCKS.COM
BY SUBHASH K. JHA
After her marriage Manisha Koirala will now spend more time in her home-town Kathmandu than in Mumbai.
One of Bollywood’s most beautiful and footloose divas, Manisha Koirala is all set to get married finally. Just back in Mumbai after an extensive shoot in Kerala for Malayalam film Manisha can barely contain her excitement.
She says, “Yes, I’m getting married to Samrat. He’s from Nepal, like me. But please, it is not an arranged marriage. Yes, our families know one another for some years now. So there was a comfort level between me and Samrat for a very long time. Gradually the bonding grew from friendship to love. And when Samrat asked me to marry him I agreed.”
Manisha returned to Mumbai from Kerala on Wednesday morning to the news of her marriage all over the place.
She laughs, “I was totally cut off in Kerala shooting for Shayam Prasad’s Malayalam film. I had no idea my marriage plans were being discussed in my absence. Now I see dates and venue in the papers. Like I said the wedding is on June 19. It will take place in Kathmandu and will be attended by Samrat’s and my close family and friends.”
Manisha will now spend more time in Kathmandu. “That’s where Samrat is based. He is into many kind of business ventures including a project in alternate energy. So yes, one thing will change. Mumbai used to be my first home. Now Kathmandu will be my first home. But I’ll continue to be a Mumbai girl at heart and will have a home here.”
So is her dream of a home in Paris over? “No way!” says the fiery Nepali beauty. “My dream home in Paris has just been postponed for a while. Now instead of me alone it will be my husband and I sharing a Parisian home.”
In fact the couple plans to honeymoon in France.
Speaking on cutting down her work Manisha says, “I’ve been cutting down my assignments for a few years now. So it’s not as if I’ve been working frantically. I will continue to do selected films after marriage.”
As forthright as ever, Manisha volunteers the information that she broke up with her last boyfriend, the American Chris Dolan long ago. “We split quite some time ago. But we continue to be friends. That’s the way I like it in my life. Even when a relationships ends the friendship continues. I don’t like any negativity around me. I’d like all my friends to wish Samrat and me a happy married life.”
Samrat apparently is shy of the limelight. “He had his picture removed from a social networking website as soon as our marriage was announced. Samrat will have to get used to public attention after we get married.”
FROM INDIAROCKS.COM
BY SUBHASH K. JHA
After her marriage Manisha Koirala will now spend more time in her home-town Kathmandu than in Mumbai.
One of Bollywood’s most beautiful and footloose divas, Manisha Koirala is all set to get married finally. Just back in Mumbai after an extensive shoot in Kerala for Malayalam film Manisha can barely contain her excitement.
She says, “Yes, I’m getting married to Samrat. He’s from Nepal, like me. But please, it is not an arranged marriage. Yes, our families know one another for some years now. So there was a comfort level between me and Samrat for a very long time. Gradually the bonding grew from friendship to love. And when Samrat asked me to marry him I agreed.”
Manisha returned to Mumbai from Kerala on Wednesday morning to the news of her marriage all over the place.
She laughs, “I was totally cut off in Kerala shooting for Shayam Prasad’s Malayalam film. I had no idea my marriage plans were being discussed in my absence. Now I see dates and venue in the papers. Like I said the wedding is on June 19. It will take place in Kathmandu and will be attended by Samrat’s and my close family and friends.”
Manisha will now spend more time in Kathmandu. “That’s where Samrat is based. He is into many kind of business ventures including a project in alternate energy. So yes, one thing will change. Mumbai used to be my first home. Now Kathmandu will be my first home. But I’ll continue to be a Mumbai girl at heart and will have a home here.”
So is her dream of a home in Paris over? “No way!” says the fiery Nepali beauty. “My dream home in Paris has just been postponed for a while. Now instead of me alone it will be my husband and I sharing a Parisian home.”
In fact the couple plans to honeymoon in France.
Speaking on cutting down her work Manisha says, “I’ve been cutting down my assignments for a few years now. So it’s not as if I’ve been working frantically. I will continue to do selected films after marriage.”
As forthright as ever, Manisha volunteers the information that she broke up with her last boyfriend, the American Chris Dolan long ago. “We split quite some time ago. But we continue to be friends. That’s the way I like it in my life. Even when a relationships ends the friendship continues. I don’t like any negativity around me. I’d like all my friends to wish Samrat and me a happy married life.”
Samrat apparently is shy of the limelight. “He had his picture removed from a social networking website as soon as our marriage was announced. Samrat will have to get used to public attention after we get married.”
ESSAY: Tamangs are different
Subjugated and abused by Nepal’s first Hindu monarch, willfully referred to as ‘Tamangs’, this community has suffered much and continues to worry about what else must come, writes Furba Lama
MAHAYANA is one type of Buddhism and the other, Nyingmapa, was created by Gurupadmasamva, affectionately called Guru Rinpoche by Tibetans in Tibet, in the seventh century. Before this, there no Buddhism in Tibet and all Tibetan communities and sub-sects were followers of Bon Dharma. The Tamags were the first Tibetan sub-sect to embrace Nyingmapa Buddhism in Tibet at Palyul, where the first Nyingmapa Buddhist gompas (monasteries) were built. The word Tamang is wrong; neither is it a Nepali nor a Tibetan word. In fact, Tamag is the correct word and its pronounciation is correctly mentioned in the Tibetan-to-English dictionary (page 980) prepared and published by Sarat Chandra Das of Lhasa Villa, Darjeeling, in 1834 and it is also mentioned in the same dictionary (pages 780 and 781) that fifth Panchen Rinpoche invited Das to Tibet in 1879 and 1881. It also mentions that Panchen Rinpoche died of smallpox in 1882 and that the sixth Panchen Rinpoche took over as an infant in 1883.
The veracity of the word Tamag can be proven from its meaning: Ra-ta-ta=Ta; Dau-ma-ga-mag=Mag; therefore, the letter or word Ta, meaning horse, and Mag meaning army, gives the word Tamag, meaning Mounted Army (in Nepali Ghorchari Sena, Risalla, Aswarohi Sena). There were so many Tibetan sub-sects of which the Tamags were the main security and protection force of the palace and king. That is why Tamag is a Tibetan word that was willfully mispronounced and intentionally changed to Tamang by the so-called first Hindu monarch just after the creation of Nepal. Tamang is neither a Nepali word nor a Tibetan one.
Before the creation of Nepal, there were Tamags in the Temal Hill in the seventh century and since Nepal is not more than 244 years old, it means and proves that Nepal was created in 1767 after the tribal kings of different buffer states were subjugated by the so-called Hindu king who integrated their holdings into one nation called Nepal. But even after this unification, there was no common language in this newly created country. Of course, there were the Khas and Parbatay languages that were spoken by the Kamis, Damais and Sarkis, and even the Chettris, Bahoons and Thakuris spoke the Rajput and Rajasthani languages in 1767 when these were introduced in those buffer tribal states by the Rajasthani Rajput King of the Saha clan.
Nepali poet Bhanu Bhakta also belonged to the Bahoon community, also an intruder from Rajasthan, and the common mother tongue and language of these people were Rajasthani and Hindi. When these communities intruded into those tribal buffer states where the Khan and Parbatay languages were used by the Kamis, Damais and Sarkis, they introduced their languages which Bhanu Bhakta employed and translated the Ramayan in a very easy language which he called Nepali. Bhakta collected the script from Deonagari Lipi of Hindi and prepared the Nepali script and wrote on home-made Nepali paper. At the time that Bhakta created his language — called Nepali by the first Hindu king of the first Hindu country called Nepal 244 years ago — he was 29 years old. Therefore, from the 193rd birth anniversary celebrated by Nepalis all over the world on 13 July 2009 we can easily find that the age of the Nepali language is thus: 193-29 (Bhakta’s age at the time) = 164 years.
The Tamag community and their language is more than 1,067 years older than that of the Nepali/Gorkha community and their language, culture, costumes their religion. Therefore, this proves that the Tamags are a different tribal community, with their own spoken language and script that is approved by the Language Research Institute, government of India, at Mysore (Karnataka): Tamyig language. Since 2005 this language has been implemented in schools in Sikkim, and for which that state government has appointed Tamyig language teachers in different schools. Tamags have their own costumes, culture and eating habits. The community embraces and follows Nyingmapa Buddhism. In the seventh century, the Tamags were compelled by the so-called first Hindu king of “unified” Nepal in 1767 to give up their culture, costumes, language and main festivals (Sonam Lochar). Defiance invited severe punishment from the so-called Hindu King’s forces, who intruded from Kanauj (Rajasthan) and included the Rajputh communities of Chettris and Bahoons. This explains why the Tamags lost everything after the unification of Nepal.
Therefore, we still have doubts here in the Darjeeling Hill areas. Will the same be repeated here? Will Tamags be safe and secure, allowed to retain their culture, language, costumes, religions beliefs? The present Tamag generation is just uplifting itself, developing in Darjeeling, Sikkim, Assam, the Dooars and so many places elsewhere.
Tamags should come forward and do something about the preservation of Nyingpapa Buddhism and their culture, rituals and lifestyle. If these vanish, all Tamags will face an identity crisis. Each and every Tamag must keep in mind that they different than the other communities.
source; The Statesman
Subjugated and abused by Nepal’s first Hindu monarch, willfully referred to as ‘Tamangs’, this community has suffered much and continues to worry about what else must come, writes Furba Lama
MAHAYANA is one type of Buddhism and the other, Nyingmapa, was created by Gurupadmasamva, affectionately called Guru Rinpoche by Tibetans in Tibet, in the seventh century. Before this, there no Buddhism in Tibet and all Tibetan communities and sub-sects were followers of Bon Dharma. The Tamags were the first Tibetan sub-sect to embrace Nyingmapa Buddhism in Tibet at Palyul, where the first Nyingmapa Buddhist gompas (monasteries) were built. The word Tamang is wrong; neither is it a Nepali nor a Tibetan word. In fact, Tamag is the correct word and its pronounciation is correctly mentioned in the Tibetan-to-English dictionary (page 980) prepared and published by Sarat Chandra Das of Lhasa Villa, Darjeeling, in 1834 and it is also mentioned in the same dictionary (pages 780 and 781) that fifth Panchen Rinpoche invited Das to Tibet in 1879 and 1881. It also mentions that Panchen Rinpoche died of smallpox in 1882 and that the sixth Panchen Rinpoche took over as an infant in 1883.
The veracity of the word Tamag can be proven from its meaning: Ra-ta-ta=Ta; Dau-ma-ga-mag=Mag; therefore, the letter or word Ta, meaning horse, and Mag meaning army, gives the word Tamag, meaning Mounted Army (in Nepali Ghorchari Sena, Risalla, Aswarohi Sena). There were so many Tibetan sub-sects of which the Tamags were the main security and protection force of the palace and king. That is why Tamag is a Tibetan word that was willfully mispronounced and intentionally changed to Tamang by the so-called first Hindu monarch just after the creation of Nepal. Tamang is neither a Nepali word nor a Tibetan one.
Before the creation of Nepal, there were Tamags in the Temal Hill in the seventh century and since Nepal is not more than 244 years old, it means and proves that Nepal was created in 1767 after the tribal kings of different buffer states were subjugated by the so-called Hindu king who integrated their holdings into one nation called Nepal. But even after this unification, there was no common language in this newly created country. Of course, there were the Khas and Parbatay languages that were spoken by the Kamis, Damais and Sarkis, and even the Chettris, Bahoons and Thakuris spoke the Rajput and Rajasthani languages in 1767 when these were introduced in those buffer tribal states by the Rajasthani Rajput King of the Saha clan.
Nepali poet Bhanu Bhakta also belonged to the Bahoon community, also an intruder from Rajasthan, and the common mother tongue and language of these people were Rajasthani and Hindi. When these communities intruded into those tribal buffer states where the Khan and Parbatay languages were used by the Kamis, Damais and Sarkis, they introduced their languages which Bhanu Bhakta employed and translated the Ramayan in a very easy language which he called Nepali. Bhakta collected the script from Deonagari Lipi of Hindi and prepared the Nepali script and wrote on home-made Nepali paper. At the time that Bhakta created his language — called Nepali by the first Hindu king of the first Hindu country called Nepal 244 years ago — he was 29 years old. Therefore, from the 193rd birth anniversary celebrated by Nepalis all over the world on 13 July 2009 we can easily find that the age of the Nepali language is thus: 193-29 (Bhakta’s age at the time) = 164 years.
The Tamag community and their language is more than 1,067 years older than that of the Nepali/Gorkha community and their language, culture, costumes their religion. Therefore, this proves that the Tamags are a different tribal community, with their own spoken language and script that is approved by the Language Research Institute, government of India, at Mysore (Karnataka): Tamyig language. Since 2005 this language has been implemented in schools in Sikkim, and for which that state government has appointed Tamyig language teachers in different schools. Tamags have their own costumes, culture and eating habits. The community embraces and follows Nyingmapa Buddhism. In the seventh century, the Tamags were compelled by the so-called first Hindu king of “unified” Nepal in 1767 to give up their culture, costumes, language and main festivals (Sonam Lochar). Defiance invited severe punishment from the so-called Hindu King’s forces, who intruded from Kanauj (Rajasthan) and included the Rajputh communities of Chettris and Bahoons. This explains why the Tamags lost everything after the unification of Nepal.
Therefore, we still have doubts here in the Darjeeling Hill areas. Will the same be repeated here? Will Tamags be safe and secure, allowed to retain their culture, language, costumes, religions beliefs? The present Tamag generation is just uplifting itself, developing in Darjeeling, Sikkim, Assam, the Dooars and so many places elsewhere.
Tamags should come forward and do something about the preservation of Nyingpapa Buddhism and their culture, rituals and lifestyle. If these vanish, all Tamags will face an identity crisis. Each and every Tamag must keep in mind that they different than the other communities.
source; The Statesman
Friday, 9 April 2010
SDF governement violated Article 371 F – SNPP
The Sikkim National People’s Party takes strong exception to the statement made by the Chief Minister that the provisions and safeguards of article 371F are fully protected despite the holding of the Municipal elections in Sikkim. The party draws the attention of the public to the fact that Clause (b)of Article 371F gives recognition to the Assembly of Sikkim elected in 1974 and reads as follows:
(b) as from the date of commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereafter in this article referred to as the appointed day)-
(i) the Assembly for Sikkim formed as a result of the elections held in Sikkim in April, 1974 with thirty-two members elected in the said elections (hereinafter referred to as the sitting members) shall be deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly constituted under this Constitution;
(ii) the sitting members shall be deemed to the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly elected under this Constitution; and
(iii) the said Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Legislative Assembly of a State under this Constitution;
The Party wishes to reiterate that this Assembly of 1974 was elected with seats reserved for the Sikkimese of Nepali Origin (SNO) and was recognized by the Indian Constitution. Despite this fact the seat reservations for the SNO’s were done away with fraudulently and against the objectives and spirit of the 8th May Agreement of 1973. Despite the fact that the Nepali seats were declared general, for the last three decades there was an “unwritten understanding” that these general seats were for the SNO’s and no political party had come forward to break this understanding. But today the SDF Government by officially giving party tickets to non-SNO’s has not only completely violated the spirit of Article 371F, which calls for equality of treatment among all Sikkimese, but also directly affected the sentiments of the SNO’s, of which the CM himself is a member. It can be seen that the Chief Minister has never taken up the issue of restoration of seat for the SNO’s in the past and now in one blow he has opened the floodgates for a period of turbulence in Sikkimese politics by making the SNO’s even more insecure..
The party has already condemned and boycotted the Municipal Elections due to the fact that Article 371F is being repeatedly violated both in letter and in spirit, and with the distribution of the party tickets by the ruling SDF, a new and dangerous twist has been introduced to the never ending attack on the identity of the Sikkimese with scant regards to the one and only agreement which the Sikkimese people have with the Government of India.
The party therefore resolves:
1. To condemn the recently held Municipal elections as a meaningless exercise and a direct attack on the identity of the Sikkimese of Nepali Origin and appeals to the people of Sikkim to boycott and not co-operate with these new institutions which have been thrust upon the people trampling their Constitutional Guarantees.
The Sikkim National People’s Party takes strong exception to the statement made by the Chief Minister that the provisions and safeguards of article 371F are fully protected despite the holding of the Municipal elections in Sikkim. The party draws the attention of the public to the fact that Clause (b)of Article 371F gives recognition to the Assembly of Sikkim elected in 1974 and reads as follows:
(b) as from the date of commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereafter in this article referred to as the appointed day)-
(i) the Assembly for Sikkim formed as a result of the elections held in Sikkim in April, 1974 with thirty-two members elected in the said elections (hereinafter referred to as the sitting members) shall be deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly constituted under this Constitution;
(ii) the sitting members shall be deemed to the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly elected under this Constitution; and
(iii) the said Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Legislative Assembly of a State under this Constitution;
The Party wishes to reiterate that this Assembly of 1974 was elected with seats reserved for the Sikkimese of Nepali Origin (SNO) and was recognized by the Indian Constitution. Despite this fact the seat reservations for the SNO’s were done away with fraudulently and against the objectives and spirit of the 8th May Agreement of 1973. Despite the fact that the Nepali seats were declared general, for the last three decades there was an “unwritten understanding” that these general seats were for the SNO’s and no political party had come forward to break this understanding. But today the SDF Government by officially giving party tickets to non-SNO’s has not only completely violated the spirit of Article 371F, which calls for equality of treatment among all Sikkimese, but also directly affected the sentiments of the SNO’s, of which the CM himself is a member. It can be seen that the Chief Minister has never taken up the issue of restoration of seat for the SNO’s in the past and now in one blow he has opened the floodgates for a period of turbulence in Sikkimese politics by making the SNO’s even more insecure..
The party has already condemned and boycotted the Municipal Elections due to the fact that Article 371F is being repeatedly violated both in letter and in spirit, and with the distribution of the party tickets by the ruling SDF, a new and dangerous twist has been introduced to the never ending attack on the identity of the Sikkimese with scant regards to the one and only agreement which the Sikkimese people have with the Government of India.
The party therefore resolves:
1. To condemn the recently held Municipal elections as a meaningless exercise and a direct attack on the identity of the Sikkimese of Nepali Origin and appeals to the people of Sikkim to boycott and not co-operate with these new institutions which have been thrust upon the people trampling their Constitutional Guarantees.
Thursday, 8 April 2010
India and Iran's Afpak policy
BY Atul Aneja
How does India propose to get back into the game of realignments beginning to unfold in and around Afghanistan?
Iran's recent hyper-activism in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan has caused considerable consternation in large parts of the globe. In media circles, think-tanks and world chanceries, high-browed mandarins and their well-healed affiliates are trying to make sense of the latest, seemingly inscrutable piece of the Persian puzzle.
Yet Iran's deft moves in an area that the Persians have known well for thousands of years originate from deeply deliberated and well-grounded fundamentals. Ever since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has been ceaselessly battling the threat of a direct American attack or an invasion by a third country that is backed by the United States. The Iraq war of 2003 brought the American forces in an eyeball-to-eyeball face-off along Iran's western borders, while the entry of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan became a potential cross-border threat to Iran from the east.
Since 2003, the Iranians have been seeking the exit of American forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of their aspirations have a good chance of realisation, as the bulk of the forces are slated to leave Iraq next year. The U.S. exit from Afghanistan could begin in July 2011.
While the exit of foreign forces would mark a substantial advance, the Iranians have been looking further ahead to a post-exit scenario, in anticipation of a political vacuum that is likely to emerge once the American troops depart. Viscerally opposed to any repositioning by extra-regional players , Iran is working vigorously to establish a de facto alliance of regional countries that will dominate the geopolitical arena stretching from Turkey in the west to China in the east.
It is in this larger context of regionalising the geopolitical space that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set foot on Afghan soil on March 10. Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai — who fought running battles with the Americans who were more inclined to favour his rival Abdullah Abdullah during the recent Afghan elections — received the Iranian President warmly. Like the Iranians, Mr. Karzai has concluded that the Americans are tiring in Afghanistan and that the time has come to explore deeper alignments in an alternative camp that includes Iran, and has China, Pakistan, Central Asian republics and Russia as potential allies.
While engaging the Afghans on a new footing, the Iranians have also begun to cultivate Pakistan. A major shift in the contours of their relationship can be traced to October 2009, when the Pakistan-based Jundallah group, led by Abdolmalek Rigi, killed Nour-Ali Shoushtari, and other senior commanders of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). Incensed by these high-profile assassinations, in the Pishin area of the Sistan-Balochistan province, the Iranians sent a few days later their Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar to Islamabad, with the demand for Rigi's handover. Subsequently, Rigi was nabbed in a dramatic fashion when the Iranians forced a Kyrgyzstan airlines plane in which he was travelling from Dubai to Bishkek, to land in the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas. Influential voices in Pakistan say that Islamabad gave the vital tip off that led to Rigi's arrest. The Iranians, however, insist that the arrest was possible on account of their meticulous intelligence work, without any foreign involvement whatsoever.
Since the 2009-10 winter war in Gaza, during which Turkey openly distanced itself from Israel, the relationship between Tehran and Ankara has been warming up. Political goodwill is being translated into significant energy cooperation and both sides, despite resistance from several influential quarters, are looking at participating in the Nabucco pipeline, which will carry huge quantities of gas to Europe.
As the geopolitical alignments ahead of the U.S. pullout begin to emerge, India's absence is glaring. Piqued by India's high profile in Kabul, Pakistan's military establishment has been looking for openings that would allow it to achieve its maximalist objective of seeking India's hasty, and preferably unseemly, exit from Afghanistan.
However, two major hurdles have been impeding Pakistan's path so far. First, the rapid improvement in Indo-U.S. ties during the Bush presidency firmly deterred it from taking India head-on in Afghanistan. Second, the Afghan presidency, closely tied to New Delhi since 2001, was hostile to Islamabad.
However, the scenario changed dramatically with the exit of the Bush administration and the emergence of Barack Obama. Focussed on an exit strategy from Afghanistan, the Americans deepened their security dependence on the Pakistanis in the hope of achieving rapid success. As a result, the Indian fortress in Afghanistan which looked impregnable during the Bush era was breached. Pakistan utilised this opportunity to the hilt.
A staunch ally of India for several years, President Karzai after his re-election last year began to exhibit unusual warmth towards Pakistan. His description of India as a friend and Pakistan as a conjoined twin during his visit to Islamabad was widely seen as a demonstration of his waning affection towards New Delhi.
There has been a significant deterioration in India-Iran ties since New Delhi voted against Tehran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Iranian nuclear programme. In fact, the day India voted against Iran, it seriously jeopardised its project in Afghanistan. Without a geographically contiguous border, India can extend its reach into Afghanistan only through the Iranian corridor.
With its back to the wall, how does India propose to get back into the great game of realignments beginning to unfold in and around Afghanistan? It can draw some inspiration from its diplomatic conduct in the past — when it worked successfully with the Iranians, Russians and Central Asians, especially the Tajiks to unroll the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in 2001. With the recent visit of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to New Delhi where discussions on Afghanistan took place, India has taken its first major step in the right direction.
Mending fences with Iran has to be India's next major undertaking. However, in trying to rework its relations, India is left with only one weighty card, which it can play with good effect provided it begins to view its national interests independently and not through the tinted glasses of the U.S. With its huge requirements of energy, India needs to get back to the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project. But in doing so, it has to substantially modify the arrangement and turn it around to suit its core long-term interests.
Iran would, with considerable enthusiasm, welcome India's participation in this project, as is evident from the provisions included in the gas deal that was signed by Iran and Pakistan in Istanbul in March. Therein lies the opportunity for India to claw back into the arrangement and take it forward from there.
Instead of waiting for others like Pakistan to seize the initiative, India can benefit substantially by boldly and formally initiating the introduction of two significant players — Russia and China — into this tie up. The Russian gas giant Gazprom has already expressed its keen interest to participate in IPI. Gazprom's representative in Tehran, Abubakir Shomuzov, has called for the extension of IPI to China, in an arrangement that would tie Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran together in a giant project.
Russia's participation in the IPI would be crucial for India. With Russia firmly on its side, India can, with greater ease and confidence, engage with China in this cooperative enterprise. In the debate on the extension of IPI to China, the route that this pipeline can pursue would be of vital importance. If India has to take advantage of this extension, it has to insist that the pipeline passing through Iran and Pakistan should go through an Indian transit corridor and no other alternative route before entering China.
Such an arrangement would greatly help in making the IPI-plus arrangement more stable and workable. With China, Pakistan's all-weather friend as the final beneficiary, Islamabad would find it impossible to block supplies to India. In other words, the routing of the pipeline to China via India, and the interdependence that it would generate among the various stakeholders would become New Delhi's insurance policy for obtaining assured gas supplies from Iran via Pakistan.
There is a final diplomatic dimension which needs to be added if IPI-plus is to succeed. Critics of the IPI rightly point to the security problems that this project, in the current circumstances, is bound to encounter during the pipeline's passage through the turbulent province of Balochistan. A comprehensive dialogue may therefore be the way forward to resolve this problem. India, which in recent years has gone into a diplomatic shell, can take the high-ground and propose a comprehensive six-party process. Besides itself, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, China and Iran can become the core participants of this arrangement. Such a forum, carefully constructed, adequately resourced and energetically led can take head-on not only the question of Baluchistan, but all other issues that may stand in the way of a lasting trans-national energy partnership.
===================================================================================
Comments:
I beg to differ on this. First of all, Pakistan and Afganistan (AF-PAK/PAK-AF) is one region that's not going to stabilise now or ever. Pakistan was born with one thing in mind, "hate India" The jihad ideology will one day create civil unrest and mayhem in Pakistan, better not to get involved with a failed state and better to secure the borders.
from: sachin nair
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 01:18 IST
All issues considered, perhaps the shallow sea route through Pakistani waters on to mainland India and then on to China through Myanmar may be the best route for the pipeline. Of course, the pipeline would also involve passage through the shallow waters of Bangladesh. Bangladesh probably presents less of a hurdle to this route than Pakistan. The security aspects based on Pakistan's instability could thus be overcome by routing the Pakistani supply through an off-shoot from the main supply line from the sea.
from: Brahm Prasher
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 03:48 IST
Very good thought about having stability in Asia. I may also add, besides IPI+link there can ba a railway link among all Asean countries. Let the ancient civilisations come together so their populations could have better understaning of all the mythical cultures.
from: Kashmir Singh Bains
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 03:56 IST
The IPI pipeline is a non-starter in the short term, due to Pakistan's adverserial relationship. Though the pipeline extension from India to China sounds good in theory, there is no incentive for Pakistan or China to agree to this. They can go straight to China through Pakistan or the Wakhan corridor in Afghanistan, bypassing India. We still need to find ways to work with Iran and ensure the US plans of isolating it are unsuccessful, but just not through the IPI.
from: Venki
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 04:40 IST
This article is a nicely laid out analysis of ground realities of interdependent security/economic interests of multiple regional players. However,in giving a solution, the author is too optimistic in his expectation of cooperation amoung the participents. As an example,when it comes to implementation,China may not agree to depend on the pipeline transit through India, citing cost factor. Due to competing nature of the players involved,ultimately it may end up as series of BILATERAL pacts amoungst the nations involved. I hope I am wrong.
from: Vinod vinjamuri .
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 06:14 IST
I don't agree as IPI is more a headache than investment. Key for Iran lies in Russia and Israel.
from: raje
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 08:16 IST
There are interesting points in this article and I hope that in near future the union of Asian giants would happen to counter American and European influence in the world.
from: Varun Gaur
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 08:34 IST
A very good article. India's tendency to get itself tied to the apron string of US should be stopped. In the fight between US and Iran we need not tow the US line. We should have remained neutral. The IPI pipeline project is a good one but US will torpedo it somehow or other. It is already pressing Pakistan.
from: Guptan Veemboor
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 11:47 IST
The story is interesting but the analysis seems flawed. You forget the role of the US and our real long term ally, a natural one is the US not by any stretch of imagination the Islamic clergy run government. By ignoring US strategic interests we harm ourselves much more as the game plays out with Pakistan, who WE are joined at the hip with, being a major factor.
from: Varun Sood
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 12:28 IST
India should have a consistent policy towards Iran. It should not treat Iran as untouchable when it comes to the relation with US. India should back Iran in international fora such as UN and IAEA. There should be a great deal of cooperation between South Asian countries, China and Russia. If India still depends on Uncle Sam for its foreign policy issues and behaves as a regional big brother it will soon stand isolated in International area after being heavily exploited and let down by United States.
from: R. Mohanasundar
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 14:08 IST
Time and tide may change Iran's AfPak policy.India has to wait and watch and prepare its strategy in a balanced way.RADHA KUMUD DAS.
from: RADHA KUMUD DAS
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 14:11 IST
Interesting scenario! However, it is important not to abandon the links with the U.S. however tempting the Iranian pipeline is. In the final analysis, while Russia is a long time ally and a dependable one, China is not. And Iran is still under the control of extremists. Pakistan will fish in troubled waters as long as it can, but will be reined in by the U.S. who is its major donor. And Karzai can be brought back in once he realises that Pakistan is not a reliable entity.
The way to go forward is cautious diplomacy, no hasty moves.
from: Dr. Vijaya Rajiva
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 17:19 IST
IPI pipeline is a pipe dream whichever way you route it. Iran has plenty other takers for its gas. It would use the gas card to win concessions from Russia, Pak and even Afghanistan and finally in any non-nuclear energy discussions with USA too, just to keep its nuclear programme going.
Pak. has no interest in giving India what it needs - cheap energy and energy security
Similarly China has no interest and it can lay different Afghan routes.
USA has no interest either! It needs to sell all the nuclear reactor tech and some fuel too.
from: Kamesh
Posted on: Apr 8, 2010 at 05:19 IST
As an Iranian, I can assure you that Iran has not only been a threat to the world at large but a threat to Iranians. I suggest you first live with the regime in Tehran and then put out such theories.
from: Banafsheh
Posted on: Apr 8, 2010 at 09:06 IST
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE; THE HINDU
BY Atul Aneja
How does India propose to get back into the game of realignments beginning to unfold in and around Afghanistan?
Iran's recent hyper-activism in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan has caused considerable consternation in large parts of the globe. In media circles, think-tanks and world chanceries, high-browed mandarins and their well-healed affiliates are trying to make sense of the latest, seemingly inscrutable piece of the Persian puzzle.
Yet Iran's deft moves in an area that the Persians have known well for thousands of years originate from deeply deliberated and well-grounded fundamentals. Ever since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has been ceaselessly battling the threat of a direct American attack or an invasion by a third country that is backed by the United States. The Iraq war of 2003 brought the American forces in an eyeball-to-eyeball face-off along Iran's western borders, while the entry of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan became a potential cross-border threat to Iran from the east.
Since 2003, the Iranians have been seeking the exit of American forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of their aspirations have a good chance of realisation, as the bulk of the forces are slated to leave Iraq next year. The U.S. exit from Afghanistan could begin in July 2011.
While the exit of foreign forces would mark a substantial advance, the Iranians have been looking further ahead to a post-exit scenario, in anticipation of a political vacuum that is likely to emerge once the American troops depart. Viscerally opposed to any repositioning by extra-regional players , Iran is working vigorously to establish a de facto alliance of regional countries that will dominate the geopolitical arena stretching from Turkey in the west to China in the east.
It is in this larger context of regionalising the geopolitical space that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set foot on Afghan soil on March 10. Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai — who fought running battles with the Americans who were more inclined to favour his rival Abdullah Abdullah during the recent Afghan elections — received the Iranian President warmly. Like the Iranians, Mr. Karzai has concluded that the Americans are tiring in Afghanistan and that the time has come to explore deeper alignments in an alternative camp that includes Iran, and has China, Pakistan, Central Asian republics and Russia as potential allies.
While engaging the Afghans on a new footing, the Iranians have also begun to cultivate Pakistan. A major shift in the contours of their relationship can be traced to October 2009, when the Pakistan-based Jundallah group, led by Abdolmalek Rigi, killed Nour-Ali Shoushtari, and other senior commanders of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). Incensed by these high-profile assassinations, in the Pishin area of the Sistan-Balochistan province, the Iranians sent a few days later their Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar to Islamabad, with the demand for Rigi's handover. Subsequently, Rigi was nabbed in a dramatic fashion when the Iranians forced a Kyrgyzstan airlines plane in which he was travelling from Dubai to Bishkek, to land in the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas. Influential voices in Pakistan say that Islamabad gave the vital tip off that led to Rigi's arrest. The Iranians, however, insist that the arrest was possible on account of their meticulous intelligence work, without any foreign involvement whatsoever.
Since the 2009-10 winter war in Gaza, during which Turkey openly distanced itself from Israel, the relationship between Tehran and Ankara has been warming up. Political goodwill is being translated into significant energy cooperation and both sides, despite resistance from several influential quarters, are looking at participating in the Nabucco pipeline, which will carry huge quantities of gas to Europe.
As the geopolitical alignments ahead of the U.S. pullout begin to emerge, India's absence is glaring. Piqued by India's high profile in Kabul, Pakistan's military establishment has been looking for openings that would allow it to achieve its maximalist objective of seeking India's hasty, and preferably unseemly, exit from Afghanistan.
However, two major hurdles have been impeding Pakistan's path so far. First, the rapid improvement in Indo-U.S. ties during the Bush presidency firmly deterred it from taking India head-on in Afghanistan. Second, the Afghan presidency, closely tied to New Delhi since 2001, was hostile to Islamabad.
However, the scenario changed dramatically with the exit of the Bush administration and the emergence of Barack Obama. Focussed on an exit strategy from Afghanistan, the Americans deepened their security dependence on the Pakistanis in the hope of achieving rapid success. As a result, the Indian fortress in Afghanistan which looked impregnable during the Bush era was breached. Pakistan utilised this opportunity to the hilt.
A staunch ally of India for several years, President Karzai after his re-election last year began to exhibit unusual warmth towards Pakistan. His description of India as a friend and Pakistan as a conjoined twin during his visit to Islamabad was widely seen as a demonstration of his waning affection towards New Delhi.
There has been a significant deterioration in India-Iran ties since New Delhi voted against Tehran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Iranian nuclear programme. In fact, the day India voted against Iran, it seriously jeopardised its project in Afghanistan. Without a geographically contiguous border, India can extend its reach into Afghanistan only through the Iranian corridor.
With its back to the wall, how does India propose to get back into the great game of realignments beginning to unfold in and around Afghanistan? It can draw some inspiration from its diplomatic conduct in the past — when it worked successfully with the Iranians, Russians and Central Asians, especially the Tajiks to unroll the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in 2001. With the recent visit of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to New Delhi where discussions on Afghanistan took place, India has taken its first major step in the right direction.
Mending fences with Iran has to be India's next major undertaking. However, in trying to rework its relations, India is left with only one weighty card, which it can play with good effect provided it begins to view its national interests independently and not through the tinted glasses of the U.S. With its huge requirements of energy, India needs to get back to the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project. But in doing so, it has to substantially modify the arrangement and turn it around to suit its core long-term interests.
Iran would, with considerable enthusiasm, welcome India's participation in this project, as is evident from the provisions included in the gas deal that was signed by Iran and Pakistan in Istanbul in March. Therein lies the opportunity for India to claw back into the arrangement and take it forward from there.
Instead of waiting for others like Pakistan to seize the initiative, India can benefit substantially by boldly and formally initiating the introduction of two significant players — Russia and China — into this tie up. The Russian gas giant Gazprom has already expressed its keen interest to participate in IPI. Gazprom's representative in Tehran, Abubakir Shomuzov, has called for the extension of IPI to China, in an arrangement that would tie Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran together in a giant project.
Russia's participation in the IPI would be crucial for India. With Russia firmly on its side, India can, with greater ease and confidence, engage with China in this cooperative enterprise. In the debate on the extension of IPI to China, the route that this pipeline can pursue would be of vital importance. If India has to take advantage of this extension, it has to insist that the pipeline passing through Iran and Pakistan should go through an Indian transit corridor and no other alternative route before entering China.
Such an arrangement would greatly help in making the IPI-plus arrangement more stable and workable. With China, Pakistan's all-weather friend as the final beneficiary, Islamabad would find it impossible to block supplies to India. In other words, the routing of the pipeline to China via India, and the interdependence that it would generate among the various stakeholders would become New Delhi's insurance policy for obtaining assured gas supplies from Iran via Pakistan.
There is a final diplomatic dimension which needs to be added if IPI-plus is to succeed. Critics of the IPI rightly point to the security problems that this project, in the current circumstances, is bound to encounter during the pipeline's passage through the turbulent province of Balochistan. A comprehensive dialogue may therefore be the way forward to resolve this problem. India, which in recent years has gone into a diplomatic shell, can take the high-ground and propose a comprehensive six-party process. Besides itself, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, China and Iran can become the core participants of this arrangement. Such a forum, carefully constructed, adequately resourced and energetically led can take head-on not only the question of Baluchistan, but all other issues that may stand in the way of a lasting trans-national energy partnership.
===================================================================================
Comments:
I beg to differ on this. First of all, Pakistan and Afganistan (AF-PAK/PAK-AF) is one region that's not going to stabilise now or ever. Pakistan was born with one thing in mind, "hate India" The jihad ideology will one day create civil unrest and mayhem in Pakistan, better not to get involved with a failed state and better to secure the borders.
from: sachin nair
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 01:18 IST
All issues considered, perhaps the shallow sea route through Pakistani waters on to mainland India and then on to China through Myanmar may be the best route for the pipeline. Of course, the pipeline would also involve passage through the shallow waters of Bangladesh. Bangladesh probably presents less of a hurdle to this route than Pakistan. The security aspects based on Pakistan's instability could thus be overcome by routing the Pakistani supply through an off-shoot from the main supply line from the sea.
from: Brahm Prasher
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 03:48 IST
Very good thought about having stability in Asia. I may also add, besides IPI+link there can ba a railway link among all Asean countries. Let the ancient civilisations come together so their populations could have better understaning of all the mythical cultures.
from: Kashmir Singh Bains
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 03:56 IST
The IPI pipeline is a non-starter in the short term, due to Pakistan's adverserial relationship. Though the pipeline extension from India to China sounds good in theory, there is no incentive for Pakistan or China to agree to this. They can go straight to China through Pakistan or the Wakhan corridor in Afghanistan, bypassing India. We still need to find ways to work with Iran and ensure the US plans of isolating it are unsuccessful, but just not through the IPI.
from: Venki
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 04:40 IST
This article is a nicely laid out analysis of ground realities of interdependent security/economic interests of multiple regional players. However,in giving a solution, the author is too optimistic in his expectation of cooperation amoung the participents. As an example,when it comes to implementation,China may not agree to depend on the pipeline transit through India, citing cost factor. Due to competing nature of the players involved,ultimately it may end up as series of BILATERAL pacts amoungst the nations involved. I hope I am wrong.
from: Vinod vinjamuri .
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 06:14 IST
I don't agree as IPI is more a headache than investment. Key for Iran lies in Russia and Israel.
from: raje
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 08:16 IST
There are interesting points in this article and I hope that in near future the union of Asian giants would happen to counter American and European influence in the world.
from: Varun Gaur
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 08:34 IST
A very good article. India's tendency to get itself tied to the apron string of US should be stopped. In the fight between US and Iran we need not tow the US line. We should have remained neutral. The IPI pipeline project is a good one but US will torpedo it somehow or other. It is already pressing Pakistan.
from: Guptan Veemboor
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 11:47 IST
The story is interesting but the analysis seems flawed. You forget the role of the US and our real long term ally, a natural one is the US not by any stretch of imagination the Islamic clergy run government. By ignoring US strategic interests we harm ourselves much more as the game plays out with Pakistan, who WE are joined at the hip with, being a major factor.
from: Varun Sood
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 12:28 IST
India should have a consistent policy towards Iran. It should not treat Iran as untouchable when it comes to the relation with US. India should back Iran in international fora such as UN and IAEA. There should be a great deal of cooperation between South Asian countries, China and Russia. If India still depends on Uncle Sam for its foreign policy issues and behaves as a regional big brother it will soon stand isolated in International area after being heavily exploited and let down by United States.
from: R. Mohanasundar
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 14:08 IST
Time and tide may change Iran's AfPak policy.India has to wait and watch and prepare its strategy in a balanced way.RADHA KUMUD DAS.
from: RADHA KUMUD DAS
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 14:11 IST
Interesting scenario! However, it is important not to abandon the links with the U.S. however tempting the Iranian pipeline is. In the final analysis, while Russia is a long time ally and a dependable one, China is not. And Iran is still under the control of extremists. Pakistan will fish in troubled waters as long as it can, but will be reined in by the U.S. who is its major donor. And Karzai can be brought back in once he realises that Pakistan is not a reliable entity.
The way to go forward is cautious diplomacy, no hasty moves.
from: Dr. Vijaya Rajiva
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 17:19 IST
IPI pipeline is a pipe dream whichever way you route it. Iran has plenty other takers for its gas. It would use the gas card to win concessions from Russia, Pak and even Afghanistan and finally in any non-nuclear energy discussions with USA too, just to keep its nuclear programme going.
Pak. has no interest in giving India what it needs - cheap energy and energy security
Similarly China has no interest and it can lay different Afghan routes.
USA has no interest either! It needs to sell all the nuclear reactor tech and some fuel too.
from: Kamesh
Posted on: Apr 8, 2010 at 05:19 IST
As an Iranian, I can assure you that Iran has not only been a threat to the world at large but a threat to Iranians. I suggest you first live with the regime in Tehran and then put out such theories.
from: Banafsheh
Posted on: Apr 8, 2010 at 09:06 IST
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE; THE HINDU
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