Nepal asks China to extend railway line
FROM SOUTH ASIAN MEDIA NET
KATHMANDU: In a demand that may have strategic geopolitical implications for India, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal has asked China to extend the Beijing-Lhasa railway line to Kathmandu. “The economic ties between Nepal and China could be taken to a new height if the railway line that has reached upto Lhasa from mainland China could be extended upto Kathmandu, and economic infrastructure could be developed on the Himalayan transit points between Nepal and China,” Prime Minister Nepal noted.
The 1956 km long Qinghai-Tibet railway is a high altitude line that connects Xining in Qinghai to Lhasa, capital of Tibet Autonomous region. This railway is the first to connect China proper with the remote Tibetan region.
Nepal is committed not to allow anti-China activity from its soil, the Prime said.
Monday, 12 October 2009
Nepal’s Deteriorating Home, Defense and Foreign Policy
BY DIRGHA RAJ PRASAI
Since 1990, Nepali congress government is trying to change Nepalese foreign policy one sided, though previously it was quite balanced. More correctly after popular movement of 2005, home, defence and foreign policy of Nepal has been completely failed. Pro-Indian foreign policy is crisis on existence of Nepal. Bhutan is bordered with China. India is always against the good friendly bilateral relationship between China and Bhutan. Bhutan is protected by India. Nepal is also bordered with China. India does not wish friendly bilateral relationship between Nepal and China. Indian leaders frequently visit Nepal. But if any Chinese leader visits Nepal, it becomes matter of headache for India. Actually India wants Nepal under its control.
After the establishment of democracy in Nepal, nationalists protested against unequal treaty of 1950 (made by India) and Delhi agreement. Nepalese people protesting against Delhi Agreement were accused of communists. Communist Party was also banned with same issue. Later in 1956, King Mahendra lifted the ban over the Communist Party. Even after the general election of 1958-59, India did not abandon exhibiting its bad intensions towards Nepal. As the existence of Nepal was endangered, King Mahendra dissolved the Parliament in 1960 and safeguarded the Nepalese nationality. If King would not have been there, the existence of Nepal would have ended up. On the initiation of King Mahendra, Indian army check posts that were kept for security after Delhi Agreement were sent back from northern Nepal. India could not speak because Nepal had very good relationships with China and other world powers. In deed, Nepalese monarch and northern neighbour China have contributed foe saving Nepal.
Initially, India was afraid of communists. Due Chinese terror, India started to use communists. Nepalese communists, being whatever revolutionary, could not get rid of India game. It is said former premier Man Mohan Adhikari was being paid on the name of freedom fighter of India. India understood that Nepali communists can be used in favour of India. After 1990’s popular movement, as Congress and UML rise to government, India found open way to interfere in Nepal. But only leader Madan Bhandari of UML protested the Indian imposition. India thought him a barrier and after his murder again India was happy. Still as India could not do as it wanted with Congress and UML, then in 2005 India convinced Maoists and now India is free for naked interference. The intensions of RAW and CIA were unified to destroy United China in the name of Free Tibet since the beginning of 2000. In between Nepal is entrapped. India always tries to maintain its supremacy either in non-aligned foreign policy or in SAARC. So, Nepal needs to resign from non-aligned policy and SAARC.
Chinese are simple and they understand the things slowly. Due to this delayed understanding by China, Nepal is in difficult situation. The strategic unification of RAW and CIA in this region is dangerous indicator for China and Nepal. Therefore China should openly come out to protest the conspiracy of imperialists against Nepal. Chinese communist leader Mao Ze Dong, never took confidence of Nepali communists. He was in favour of Nepalese monarch because monarch always fought against imperialists. Now India is trying to capture Nepal by behaving like Ostrich with China, being broker of US and UN, and using so called Nepalese political parties. Even in 1989, India tried to capture Nepalese foreign, defence and home policies by terrorizing then King Birendra with popular movements. Even India tried to make confused the King Gyanendra with expectation to control movement of 2005. However India was unsuccessful in doing so. Apart from surrendering to foreigners, King Gyanendra happily handed over the power to Nepalese people.
India constructed 40 km long tunnel investing billions of rupees in between Jammu and Srinagar valley. But Kasmiries did not favour India. We know, India has invested huge aid in every field but because of the ill-intention of the Indians, anti-Indian sentiment is increasing day by day. If Indian interests in Nepal are like that of to Bhutan and Sikkim, India won’t be safe. It is because terrorism can be institutionalized in this situation which will be harmful to India. Therefore we warn India to correct itself from such blunders. Indian interest is to make Nepalese defence and foreign policy in accordance to India. Since 2006, Nepal is being guided by pro-India party leaders. After the downfall of Maoist led government in May 2009, women defence minister (UML) and foreign minister (daughter of Girija), who have no diplomatic capabilities, both are pro-Indian. It seems this could be a strategy to surrender Nepalese foreign and defence policy to India. If you see list of ambassadors of Nepal to be sent to friend country, you will find smugglers, murderers and criminals who have no idea of foreign affairs. Therefore Nepalese foreign policy is shameful status in international level.
After 1990, Nepalese people never became free though were called sovereign. As the King was separated from sovereignty, in 1974 in Sikkim, under the leadership of Lendup Dorji Sikkim parliament decided to unify with India in 10 April 1975. Similarly in Nepal, using Girija Prasad (former PM), Madhav nepal (PM) and few Maoists, India is trying to capture Nepal. The factors behind failed foreign policy of Nepal are betrayer leaders of Nepal and ever continuing interference of India. India is always involved in conspiracy to shrunken the Nepal. Nepal is situated in between large China in north and India in south. Nepal is bordered to India in east, west and south with 1880 km boarder. Besides, there is open border. Due to this, India is always engaged in attacking the Nepalese territory and also some Indian citizens commit crime in Nepal and hide in India. Indians enter Nepal with small and large scale business and ultimately demand for Nepalese citizenship. In 2006, 4 million Indians succeed in taking Nepalese citizenship. Being landlocked country Nepal must have transportation facility in accordance to international treaties and traditions. But India violated it and wants to control over Nepal.
Late King Prithvi Narayan Shah is a creator of Nepal. Nepalese monarch was established fighting against imperialist power. In order to remain protected in between large China India, even in those times Prithvi Narayan Shah preached (1768) – ‘Nepal is just like a Yam (tuber) between the two stones’. We are sandwiched between giant India and China. So, we are bound to have a balanced understanding between them. The nation builder had preached us the same fact. “Establish good and amicable relation with China, have relation with the emperor of south understanding well that he is very clever. If the investors from foreign (India) come to Nepal, they will make our people poorer. In deed, ideology of Prithvi Narayan Shah is immortal. Therefore the monarch of Nepal and China has incredible contribution to save the country.
India was being destroyed by Muslims for some 800 years. Such 200 years India was attacked by English imperialism in the name of East India Company. They had clear intension to demolish and left Hinduism and establish imperialism in this region. Communists do not believe in religion. JNU is popular for producing Extreme Leftists. It was Indian Congress government and policy makers like SD Muni who not only assisted but funded Nepal Maoists to wage a war against Hinduism. However Prithvi Narayan was only one who protested it. He raised Nepalese flag, maintained originality of Himbatkhand and unified the great Nepal. From the beginning of Prithvi Narayan Shah Regime in 1868, the balanced Nepalese relationship with China and India was maintained by every Kings till 2005. Nepalese Kings never afraid of imperial powers. Nepalese Kings never sold the country in any crisis. The balanced foreign policy and patronization of nationality is due to combined effort of King and people of Nepal. Nepal’s foreign policy is focused to get rid of Indian conspiracy. If foreign policy of a country fails that means the sovereignty of the country can be finished. Therefore the nationalist Nepalese people along with the King should stand up in one side so that Indian interference could be protested.
BY DIRGHA RAJ PRASAI
Since 1990, Nepali congress government is trying to change Nepalese foreign policy one sided, though previously it was quite balanced. More correctly after popular movement of 2005, home, defence and foreign policy of Nepal has been completely failed. Pro-Indian foreign policy is crisis on existence of Nepal. Bhutan is bordered with China. India is always against the good friendly bilateral relationship between China and Bhutan. Bhutan is protected by India. Nepal is also bordered with China. India does not wish friendly bilateral relationship between Nepal and China. Indian leaders frequently visit Nepal. But if any Chinese leader visits Nepal, it becomes matter of headache for India. Actually India wants Nepal under its control.
After the establishment of democracy in Nepal, nationalists protested against unequal treaty of 1950 (made by India) and Delhi agreement. Nepalese people protesting against Delhi Agreement were accused of communists. Communist Party was also banned with same issue. Later in 1956, King Mahendra lifted the ban over the Communist Party. Even after the general election of 1958-59, India did not abandon exhibiting its bad intensions towards Nepal. As the existence of Nepal was endangered, King Mahendra dissolved the Parliament in 1960 and safeguarded the Nepalese nationality. If King would not have been there, the existence of Nepal would have ended up. On the initiation of King Mahendra, Indian army check posts that were kept for security after Delhi Agreement were sent back from northern Nepal. India could not speak because Nepal had very good relationships with China and other world powers. In deed, Nepalese monarch and northern neighbour China have contributed foe saving Nepal.
Initially, India was afraid of communists. Due Chinese terror, India started to use communists. Nepalese communists, being whatever revolutionary, could not get rid of India game. It is said former premier Man Mohan Adhikari was being paid on the name of freedom fighter of India. India understood that Nepali communists can be used in favour of India. After 1990’s popular movement, as Congress and UML rise to government, India found open way to interfere in Nepal. But only leader Madan Bhandari of UML protested the Indian imposition. India thought him a barrier and after his murder again India was happy. Still as India could not do as it wanted with Congress and UML, then in 2005 India convinced Maoists and now India is free for naked interference. The intensions of RAW and CIA were unified to destroy United China in the name of Free Tibet since the beginning of 2000. In between Nepal is entrapped. India always tries to maintain its supremacy either in non-aligned foreign policy or in SAARC. So, Nepal needs to resign from non-aligned policy and SAARC.
Chinese are simple and they understand the things slowly. Due to this delayed understanding by China, Nepal is in difficult situation. The strategic unification of RAW and CIA in this region is dangerous indicator for China and Nepal. Therefore China should openly come out to protest the conspiracy of imperialists against Nepal. Chinese communist leader Mao Ze Dong, never took confidence of Nepali communists. He was in favour of Nepalese monarch because monarch always fought against imperialists. Now India is trying to capture Nepal by behaving like Ostrich with China, being broker of US and UN, and using so called Nepalese political parties. Even in 1989, India tried to capture Nepalese foreign, defence and home policies by terrorizing then King Birendra with popular movements. Even India tried to make confused the King Gyanendra with expectation to control movement of 2005. However India was unsuccessful in doing so. Apart from surrendering to foreigners, King Gyanendra happily handed over the power to Nepalese people.
India constructed 40 km long tunnel investing billions of rupees in between Jammu and Srinagar valley. But Kasmiries did not favour India. We know, India has invested huge aid in every field but because of the ill-intention of the Indians, anti-Indian sentiment is increasing day by day. If Indian interests in Nepal are like that of to Bhutan and Sikkim, India won’t be safe. It is because terrorism can be institutionalized in this situation which will be harmful to India. Therefore we warn India to correct itself from such blunders. Indian interest is to make Nepalese defence and foreign policy in accordance to India. Since 2006, Nepal is being guided by pro-India party leaders. After the downfall of Maoist led government in May 2009, women defence minister (UML) and foreign minister (daughter of Girija), who have no diplomatic capabilities, both are pro-Indian. It seems this could be a strategy to surrender Nepalese foreign and defence policy to India. If you see list of ambassadors of Nepal to be sent to friend country, you will find smugglers, murderers and criminals who have no idea of foreign affairs. Therefore Nepalese foreign policy is shameful status in international level.
After 1990, Nepalese people never became free though were called sovereign. As the King was separated from sovereignty, in 1974 in Sikkim, under the leadership of Lendup Dorji Sikkim parliament decided to unify with India in 10 April 1975. Similarly in Nepal, using Girija Prasad (former PM), Madhav nepal (PM) and few Maoists, India is trying to capture Nepal. The factors behind failed foreign policy of Nepal are betrayer leaders of Nepal and ever continuing interference of India. India is always involved in conspiracy to shrunken the Nepal. Nepal is situated in between large China in north and India in south. Nepal is bordered to India in east, west and south with 1880 km boarder. Besides, there is open border. Due to this, India is always engaged in attacking the Nepalese territory and also some Indian citizens commit crime in Nepal and hide in India. Indians enter Nepal with small and large scale business and ultimately demand for Nepalese citizenship. In 2006, 4 million Indians succeed in taking Nepalese citizenship. Being landlocked country Nepal must have transportation facility in accordance to international treaties and traditions. But India violated it and wants to control over Nepal.
Late King Prithvi Narayan Shah is a creator of Nepal. Nepalese monarch was established fighting against imperialist power. In order to remain protected in between large China India, even in those times Prithvi Narayan Shah preached (1768) – ‘Nepal is just like a Yam (tuber) between the two stones’. We are sandwiched between giant India and China. So, we are bound to have a balanced understanding between them. The nation builder had preached us the same fact. “Establish good and amicable relation with China, have relation with the emperor of south understanding well that he is very clever. If the investors from foreign (India) come to Nepal, they will make our people poorer. In deed, ideology of Prithvi Narayan Shah is immortal. Therefore the monarch of Nepal and China has incredible contribution to save the country.
India was being destroyed by Muslims for some 800 years. Such 200 years India was attacked by English imperialism in the name of East India Company. They had clear intension to demolish and left Hinduism and establish imperialism in this region. Communists do not believe in religion. JNU is popular for producing Extreme Leftists. It was Indian Congress government and policy makers like SD Muni who not only assisted but funded Nepal Maoists to wage a war against Hinduism. However Prithvi Narayan was only one who protested it. He raised Nepalese flag, maintained originality of Himbatkhand and unified the great Nepal. From the beginning of Prithvi Narayan Shah Regime in 1868, the balanced Nepalese relationship with China and India was maintained by every Kings till 2005. Nepalese Kings never afraid of imperial powers. Nepalese Kings never sold the country in any crisis. The balanced foreign policy and patronization of nationality is due to combined effort of King and people of Nepal. Nepal’s foreign policy is focused to get rid of Indian conspiracy. If foreign policy of a country fails that means the sovereignty of the country can be finished. Therefore the nationalist Nepalese people along with the King should stand up in one side so that Indian interference could be protested.
NATIONAL: Chinese Threat on Border and India’s Defence Preparedness
BY AMITAVA MUKHERJEE
Notwithstanding the assertion made by S.M. Krishna, the Indian External Affairs Minister, that the India-China boundary happens to be one of the most peaceful of our borders, continued Chinese incursions along the Line of Actual Control and the series of strategic moves being undertaken by Beijing in regard to its relations with some smaller countries of the subcontinent, point to a sinister Chinese design of encircling India. It appears that Beijing still rues its decision of voluntarily withdrawing from the 90,000 sq km of Indian territory it had occupied in 1962 and has been harbouring a desire to make up the loss at an opportune moment.
China wears an inscrutable mask and India has so far been unable to see through it as it did in 1962. China is now India’s largest trading partner and the amount of transaction between the two countries touched a whopping $ 52 billion last year. This has possibly given India a comforting idea that China would never choose to go for an all-out war in spite of the fact that the Chinese Army has been carrying on incursions into Indian territories not just in the western and central sectors but in Sikkim too where the border is now undisputed.
But the Government of India is trying to keep the people in the dark about some serious moves of the Chinese Army. Recently they penetrated deep inside Ladakh and painted the word China on rocks and boulders in an area which is not very far from the Pangong-Tso lake, a highly sensitive point near the international boundary. But long before there were reports that China had built a helipad in an area in the Arunachal Pradesh sector which, in fact, belongs to India. There is nothing new about the Chinese presence in Ladakh as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has often been violating the boundary in the Pangong-Tso lake which is situated in the neighbourhood of the Chushul mountains acoross the Changla Pass in the northeast of Leh. Forty per cent of this lake belongs to India while the rest sixty per cent is Chinese domain. But China’s patrol boats often penetrate deep into Indian waters and they sometimes willingly barge into Indian naval vessels. Intelligence reports, quoted by the national as well as regional media, have pointed out quite sometime back that China has built its own road network inside Ladakh.
The Government of India is well aware of the Chinese moves along the border and in recent past it has, on quite a few occasions, hurriedly moved Army units away from the Jammu and Kashmir border and posted them along the boundary with China. This happened sometime ago when Beijing had suddenly increased the strength of its Army near a mountain ridge which is very close to the trijunction of India, Bhutan and China. But the most inexplicable side of the whole story is the hush-hush atmosphere which India prefers to drape over the whole issue.
A.K. Antony, the Indian Defence Minister, was perfectly right when he had voiced his concerns sometime back about the unsatisfactory state of communication network on the Indian side of the border. He had reasons to do so as China has not only been strengthening its communication system in the area but trying to attract some smaller subcontinental countries in such a type of patron- client relationship which would go a long way towards putting India in a disadvantageous position.
This forms China’s policy of ‘encirclement’, a diplomatic-military initiative Beijing has been practising for a long time. In line with this, China has been gradually pushing its outposts nearer to the Indian border, the most important example being Xigatse, the second most important city of Tibet which has been put on the Golmud-Lhasa extended railway line. Xigatse has now become a bustling centre of not only trade and commerce but Chinese espionage activity as well. So far as Nepal is concerned, in addition to the Kodari highway, which was built with Chinese assistance in 1960, a second highway connecting Nepal and Tibet has come up. Although the Maoists are no more part of the Nepalese Government, yet there are valid reasons to believe that the bashing of Indian priests by the Maoists at the Pashupatinath temple may have had Chinese blessings.
China is now one of the most important patrons of Pakistan in international politics and in return Pakistan has allowed Beijing to open at least four link roads from the Karakoram Highway one of which will connect the Gwadar deep- sea port which China has built for Pakistan. In the world energy market Beijing is now in brisk business of securing energy supplies most of which pass through the Persian Gulf. By using the Gwadar port China gets an automatic access to the Persian Gulf where it has substantially increased its naval strength in recent times. For Myanmar, it has developed the Irrawady corridor thereby creating a netwok of roads, rails and waterways. This corridor is extremely important for China as it would give its landlocked areas an access to the Bay of Bengal where Beijing is rapidly increasing its naval strength. In competition India has also agreed to invest $ 100 million for upgrading the Sittwe port and developing the Kaladan river system of Myanmar. However, in matters of respective bilateral relations China has left India way behind. Beijing’s relations with the Myanmar military junta are extremely cozy and it has always stood up for Yangon to block sanctions against the junta in international organi-sations. China has already secured rights for free use of Myanmar’s river systems. Due to this facility it has been able to build up surveillance stations on the Coco Island near the Andamans. That India has recognised the probable Chinese threat from the sea becomes clear from New Delhi’s decision to upgrade its naval station in the Andamans.
¨
The military threat from China is real. The numerical strength of its Army is 2.5 million, more than double that of India, while the range of its missiles is more than its Indian counterparts. Quite a good number of Chinese missiles in Tibet carry nuclear warheads. This year China’s defence expenditure has increased by 14.9 per cent. This would push up Beijing’s defence budget to $ 70.2 billion, an increase of $ 9.1 billion from the previous year. While India lags far behind in this respect, China now stands very near to Japan, Russia and the UK in respect of military spending. Chinese experts are always at pains to point out that their country spends only about 1.5 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for defence. But China’s GDP has been growing by more than 10 per cent annually. It has no staggering inflation and its currency is stable.
This has enabled China to build its war industry. China now not only produces arms and ammunitions for its own use but supplies them to a good number of other countries also. They include, apart from Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, Tanzania, Albania, Iran, Iraq and Sri Lanka. In 2007 China successfully carried out its anti-satellite test. It has acquired technology for construction of aircraft carriers, for carrying out air-to-air refuelling and for developing anti-tank missiles. While its MiG- 33 is much superior to the accident prone MiG-21 which the Indian Air Force uses, it has also developed a multi-role fighter aircraft christened CAC-J7 which is widely used not only by Pakistan but Myanmar and Bangladesh as well. Another very important arsenal rolling out of China is the basic jet trainer-cum-light attack aircraft, a product of the Hongdu Aviation Industry. Its export variety is called K-8 in Pakistan which uses it extensively and has a 45 per cent share in its joint production with China. China’s participation in the production of the Jalalat class missile fast attack naval craft in the Pakistan Navy Dockyard at Karachi is too well known. Nowadays Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh use large numbers of patrol boats, fast attack crafts and vessels for amphibious operations either designed or built by China. India’s presence in this field is minimal, the only noteworthy example being the Hindustan Shipyard-built 1890 tonne patrol vessel “Shaurya” which is used by the Sri Lankan Navy.
China now considers itself a great power and a clash of interests with India is inevitable. It looks upon the Asia-Pacific region as its hegemony. As a consequence it s likely to come into conflict with India’s “look East” policy. So there are enough grounds, strewn all over, for escalation of tension between India and China, the most important of them being the unresolved border question with Beijing not accepting the Line of Actual Control and the Mcmahon Line. New Delhi recognises the danger and therefore it has recently decided on a series of steps like stationing of Sukhoi-30 aircraft at Tejpur, revival of abandoned airfields in Ladakh, posting of two Army divisions for the defence of Tawang and building of all-weather roads upto the farthest Army post in the border. Defence experts, however, opine that due to the Pakistan-centric defence policy pursued so long, not an illogical thing either, India’s defence preparedness has to be improved considerably to meet the Chinese might in the extreme heights of the Himalayas.
Unfortunately the biggest impediment before such an important task is the attitude and self-deception of the Indian ruling class. Although George Fernandes, the Defence Minister during the NDA regime, always voiced concern about Chinese intentions, he did not get sufficient support from other members of the Vajpaiyee Cabinet. Manmohan Singh, the present Prime Minister, is also advising restraint with respect to the attitude towards China. Obviously he is trying to sweep every uncomfortable information beneath the carpet. Manmohan Singh has reasons to do so as he is in the best position to know how unprepared his government is to match China force by force.
Some honest confessions are also emerging. Sometime back Admiral Sureesh Mehta, the former Naval Chief, was honest enough to admit the inadequacies of the Indian Navy. The other day Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik, the incumbent Chief of the Indian Air Force, has said that the IAF is only one-third the size of its Chinese counterpart. But the political tribe is desperate to hide its failure.
Indira Gandhi always tried to keep herself posted with latest indepth information about the security affairs of her country. The same should be expected from Manmohan Singh. If he is honest enough he should ask explanations from Pranab Mukherjee, the Defence Minister for a large part of the previous UPA Government, about infra-structural development along the LAC and inade-quacies of the armed forces. What has now prompted A.K. Antony and the Naval as well as Air Chiefs to admit serious drawbacks about India’s defence preparedness?
Let Manmohan Singh be reminded of a hilarious assumption by the people of Sikkim. The condition of the road from Gangtok to Nathu La is atrocious. But local drivers who ply their vehicles along this road proffer a different reason for this. In the event of a war in the Nathu La sector the Indian side will be vanquished and swept aside by the Chinese Army within a few days. The Indian Army and the Government of India know this. So they do not repair the road to Gangtok in the hope that bad roads might ultimately turn out to be the only defence against the might of Beijing, the drivers point out.
BY AMITAVA MUKHERJEE
Notwithstanding the assertion made by S.M. Krishna, the Indian External Affairs Minister, that the India-China boundary happens to be one of the most peaceful of our borders, continued Chinese incursions along the Line of Actual Control and the series of strategic moves being undertaken by Beijing in regard to its relations with some smaller countries of the subcontinent, point to a sinister Chinese design of encircling India. It appears that Beijing still rues its decision of voluntarily withdrawing from the 90,000 sq km of Indian territory it had occupied in 1962 and has been harbouring a desire to make up the loss at an opportune moment.
China wears an inscrutable mask and India has so far been unable to see through it as it did in 1962. China is now India’s largest trading partner and the amount of transaction between the two countries touched a whopping $ 52 billion last year. This has possibly given India a comforting idea that China would never choose to go for an all-out war in spite of the fact that the Chinese Army has been carrying on incursions into Indian territories not just in the western and central sectors but in Sikkim too where the border is now undisputed.
But the Government of India is trying to keep the people in the dark about some serious moves of the Chinese Army. Recently they penetrated deep inside Ladakh and painted the word China on rocks and boulders in an area which is not very far from the Pangong-Tso lake, a highly sensitive point near the international boundary. But long before there were reports that China had built a helipad in an area in the Arunachal Pradesh sector which, in fact, belongs to India. There is nothing new about the Chinese presence in Ladakh as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has often been violating the boundary in the Pangong-Tso lake which is situated in the neighbourhood of the Chushul mountains acoross the Changla Pass in the northeast of Leh. Forty per cent of this lake belongs to India while the rest sixty per cent is Chinese domain. But China’s patrol boats often penetrate deep into Indian waters and they sometimes willingly barge into Indian naval vessels. Intelligence reports, quoted by the national as well as regional media, have pointed out quite sometime back that China has built its own road network inside Ladakh.
The Government of India is well aware of the Chinese moves along the border and in recent past it has, on quite a few occasions, hurriedly moved Army units away from the Jammu and Kashmir border and posted them along the boundary with China. This happened sometime ago when Beijing had suddenly increased the strength of its Army near a mountain ridge which is very close to the trijunction of India, Bhutan and China. But the most inexplicable side of the whole story is the hush-hush atmosphere which India prefers to drape over the whole issue.
A.K. Antony, the Indian Defence Minister, was perfectly right when he had voiced his concerns sometime back about the unsatisfactory state of communication network on the Indian side of the border. He had reasons to do so as China has not only been strengthening its communication system in the area but trying to attract some smaller subcontinental countries in such a type of patron- client relationship which would go a long way towards putting India in a disadvantageous position.
This forms China’s policy of ‘encirclement’, a diplomatic-military initiative Beijing has been practising for a long time. In line with this, China has been gradually pushing its outposts nearer to the Indian border, the most important example being Xigatse, the second most important city of Tibet which has been put on the Golmud-Lhasa extended railway line. Xigatse has now become a bustling centre of not only trade and commerce but Chinese espionage activity as well. So far as Nepal is concerned, in addition to the Kodari highway, which was built with Chinese assistance in 1960, a second highway connecting Nepal and Tibet has come up. Although the Maoists are no more part of the Nepalese Government, yet there are valid reasons to believe that the bashing of Indian priests by the Maoists at the Pashupatinath temple may have had Chinese blessings.
China is now one of the most important patrons of Pakistan in international politics and in return Pakistan has allowed Beijing to open at least four link roads from the Karakoram Highway one of which will connect the Gwadar deep- sea port which China has built for Pakistan. In the world energy market Beijing is now in brisk business of securing energy supplies most of which pass through the Persian Gulf. By using the Gwadar port China gets an automatic access to the Persian Gulf where it has substantially increased its naval strength in recent times. For Myanmar, it has developed the Irrawady corridor thereby creating a netwok of roads, rails and waterways. This corridor is extremely important for China as it would give its landlocked areas an access to the Bay of Bengal where Beijing is rapidly increasing its naval strength. In competition India has also agreed to invest $ 100 million for upgrading the Sittwe port and developing the Kaladan river system of Myanmar. However, in matters of respective bilateral relations China has left India way behind. Beijing’s relations with the Myanmar military junta are extremely cozy and it has always stood up for Yangon to block sanctions against the junta in international organi-sations. China has already secured rights for free use of Myanmar’s river systems. Due to this facility it has been able to build up surveillance stations on the Coco Island near the Andamans. That India has recognised the probable Chinese threat from the sea becomes clear from New Delhi’s decision to upgrade its naval station in the Andamans.
¨
The military threat from China is real. The numerical strength of its Army is 2.5 million, more than double that of India, while the range of its missiles is more than its Indian counterparts. Quite a good number of Chinese missiles in Tibet carry nuclear warheads. This year China’s defence expenditure has increased by 14.9 per cent. This would push up Beijing’s defence budget to $ 70.2 billion, an increase of $ 9.1 billion from the previous year. While India lags far behind in this respect, China now stands very near to Japan, Russia and the UK in respect of military spending. Chinese experts are always at pains to point out that their country spends only about 1.5 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for defence. But China’s GDP has been growing by more than 10 per cent annually. It has no staggering inflation and its currency is stable.
This has enabled China to build its war industry. China now not only produces arms and ammunitions for its own use but supplies them to a good number of other countries also. They include, apart from Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, Tanzania, Albania, Iran, Iraq and Sri Lanka. In 2007 China successfully carried out its anti-satellite test. It has acquired technology for construction of aircraft carriers, for carrying out air-to-air refuelling and for developing anti-tank missiles. While its MiG- 33 is much superior to the accident prone MiG-21 which the Indian Air Force uses, it has also developed a multi-role fighter aircraft christened CAC-J7 which is widely used not only by Pakistan but Myanmar and Bangladesh as well. Another very important arsenal rolling out of China is the basic jet trainer-cum-light attack aircraft, a product of the Hongdu Aviation Industry. Its export variety is called K-8 in Pakistan which uses it extensively and has a 45 per cent share in its joint production with China. China’s participation in the production of the Jalalat class missile fast attack naval craft in the Pakistan Navy Dockyard at Karachi is too well known. Nowadays Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh use large numbers of patrol boats, fast attack crafts and vessels for amphibious operations either designed or built by China. India’s presence in this field is minimal, the only noteworthy example being the Hindustan Shipyard-built 1890 tonne patrol vessel “Shaurya” which is used by the Sri Lankan Navy.
China now considers itself a great power and a clash of interests with India is inevitable. It looks upon the Asia-Pacific region as its hegemony. As a consequence it s likely to come into conflict with India’s “look East” policy. So there are enough grounds, strewn all over, for escalation of tension between India and China, the most important of them being the unresolved border question with Beijing not accepting the Line of Actual Control and the Mcmahon Line. New Delhi recognises the danger and therefore it has recently decided on a series of steps like stationing of Sukhoi-30 aircraft at Tejpur, revival of abandoned airfields in Ladakh, posting of two Army divisions for the defence of Tawang and building of all-weather roads upto the farthest Army post in the border. Defence experts, however, opine that due to the Pakistan-centric defence policy pursued so long, not an illogical thing either, India’s defence preparedness has to be improved considerably to meet the Chinese might in the extreme heights of the Himalayas.
Unfortunately the biggest impediment before such an important task is the attitude and self-deception of the Indian ruling class. Although George Fernandes, the Defence Minister during the NDA regime, always voiced concern about Chinese intentions, he did not get sufficient support from other members of the Vajpaiyee Cabinet. Manmohan Singh, the present Prime Minister, is also advising restraint with respect to the attitude towards China. Obviously he is trying to sweep every uncomfortable information beneath the carpet. Manmohan Singh has reasons to do so as he is in the best position to know how unprepared his government is to match China force by force.
Some honest confessions are also emerging. Sometime back Admiral Sureesh Mehta, the former Naval Chief, was honest enough to admit the inadequacies of the Indian Navy. The other day Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik, the incumbent Chief of the Indian Air Force, has said that the IAF is only one-third the size of its Chinese counterpart. But the political tribe is desperate to hide its failure.
Indira Gandhi always tried to keep herself posted with latest indepth information about the security affairs of her country. The same should be expected from Manmohan Singh. If he is honest enough he should ask explanations from Pranab Mukherjee, the Defence Minister for a large part of the previous UPA Government, about infra-structural development along the LAC and inade-quacies of the armed forces. What has now prompted A.K. Antony and the Naval as well as Air Chiefs to admit serious drawbacks about India’s defence preparedness?
Let Manmohan Singh be reminded of a hilarious assumption by the people of Sikkim. The condition of the road from Gangtok to Nathu La is atrocious. But local drivers who ply their vehicles along this road proffer a different reason for this. In the event of a war in the Nathu La sector the Indian side will be vanquished and swept aside by the Chinese Army within a few days. The Indian Army and the Government of India know this. So they do not repair the road to Gangtok in the hope that bad roads might ultimately turn out to be the only defence against the might of Beijing, the drivers point out.
Sunday, 11 October 2009
WHY INDIA FEARS CHINA
By Jeremy Kahn | NEWSWEEK
Published Oct 10, 2009
From the magazine issue dated Oct 19, 2009
On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along the northwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China. India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game has played out on the 4,057-kilometer India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon." Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have dominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines.
China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months.
Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan.
The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.
Beijing appears increasingly concerned about the safe haven India provides to the Dalai Lama and to tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles, including increasingly militant supporters of Tibetan independence. These younger Tibetans, many born outside Tibet, are growing impatient with the Dalai Lama's "middle way" approach—a willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in return for true autonomy—and commitment to nonviolence. If these groups were to use India as a base for armed insurrection against China, as Tibetan exiles did throughout the 1960s, then China might retaliate against India. By force or demand, Beijing might also seek to gain possession of important Tibetan Buddhist monasteries that lie in Indian territory close to the border. Both politically and culturally, these monasteries are seen as key nodes in the Tibetan resistance to Chinese authority.
Already Beijing has launched a diplomatic offensive aimed at undercutting Indian sovereignty over the areas China claims, particularly the northeast state of Arunachal Pradesh and one of its key cities, Tawang, birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama in the 17th century and home to several important Tibetan monasteries. Tibet ceded Tawang and the area around it to British India in 1914. China has recently denied visas to the state's residents; lodged a formal complaint after Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the state in 2008; and tried to block a $2.9 billion Asian Development Bank loan to India because some of the money was earmarked for an irrigation project in the state. All these moves are best understood in the context of China's recent troubles in Tibet, with Beijing increasingly concerned that any acceptance of the 1914 border will amount to an implicit acknowledgment that Tibet was once independent of China—a serious blow to the legitimacy of China's control over the region and potentially other minority areas as well.
The reports of Chinese incursions can be read as a signal that it is deadly serious about its territorial claims. The exact border has never been mutually agreed on—meaning one side's incursion is another side's routine patrol—but the Chinese have clearly stepped up their activity along the frontier. The Indian military reported a record 270 Chinese border violations last year—nearly double the figure from the year before and more than three times the number of incidents in 2006, says Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic studies at New Delhi's Centre for Policy Research, an independent think tank. Noting that there was a reported incursion nearly every day this summer, Chellaney says this amounts to "a pattern of Chinese belligerence." In June the People's Daily criticized recent moves by India to strengthen its border defenses and declared: "China will not make any compromises in its border disputes with India." It asked if India had properly weighed "the consequences of a potential confrontation with China."
To many Indians, China is an expansionist power bent on thwarting India's rise as a serious challenge to Beijing's influence in Asia. They are haunted by memories of India's 1962 war with China, in which China launched a massive invasion along the length of the frontier, routing the Indians before unilaterally halting at what today remains the de facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They are fearful of China's expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean, seeing its widening network of naval bases as a noose that could be used to strangle India. They blast Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for alleged weakness in the face of this growing threat. Bharat Verma, editor of the Indian Defence Review, predicted in a widely publicized essay this summer that China would attack India sometime before 2012. With social unrest rising within China due to the worldwide economic slump, he says, the leadership in Beijing needs "a small military victory" to unify the nation, and India is "a soft target," due to Singh's fecklessness. In recent weeks India's defense minister and the heads of the Army and Air Force have felt compelled to reassure the public that "there will be no repeat of 1962."
These warnings completely misread China's intent. While India worries about the larger army and wealth of China, China worries about the larger military and economy of the United States. In Asia, its stated aim is to follow a "peaceful rise" that benefits all its neighbors, India included, and there's little reason to doubt this goal. Beijing is an insecure power, not an aggressive one, because of the real threat of social and economic unrest at home. China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean reflects a legitimate interest in protecting the sea lanes upon which Beijing depends for its supply of oil and natural resources from Africa and the Middle East. The border movements should be seen in the same light: it's not about an external threat from India per se, but India's relationship to the internal threat from Tibet.
Still, if Tibet is the new Taiwan, it requires extremely delicate diplomacy. If anything, the West tends to under-estimate China's willingness to fight independence moves in Taiwan—it has fired missile warning shots as recently as 1996—and the same may now be said of Tibet. Taiwan, however, has maintained the parlous status quo by arming itself to the teeth, while avoiding any rhetoric or action that crosses Beijing's red lines.
India is trying a similar approach. Last year it denied the Dalai Lama permission to visit Tawang—ostensibly because of parliamentary elections—and now he has scheduled another trip in November. It would be prudent for New Delhi—and perhaps others with influence on the Dalai Lama, such as the United States—to find a face-saving reason for the Dalai Lama to indefinitely postpone the trip. India needs to be especially vigilant against militant activity within the Tibetan exile community, the single most likely trigger for a Chinese attack, and it might be wise to end the policy of simply avoiding any discussion of Tibet in its dealings with China. "There are ways to highlight the centrality of Tibet without being provocative or confrontational," says Chellaney. "If New Delhi were to say in public that Tibet has ceased to be the political buffer between India and China, and India would like Tibet to be the political bridge between New Delhi and Beijing, that, in one stroke, would change the narrative fundamentally."
India's position in talks needs to be backed by strength in arms. New Delhi has already started repositioning border forces, launched a road-building program to match the roads and airfields that China has built on its side, and recently conducted a three-day combined air-and-land war game, seemingly designed to show that it is on guard. But India needs to be careful not to overreact: it views with alarm the tens of thousands of troops China has deployed to the border region since the 2008 Lhasa riots, but most of these moves are designed to reassert control over Tibet. M. Taylor Fravel, an MIT expert on the India-China border dispute, says many of the troops deployed in Tibet are internal-security forces, lacking heavy armor or artillery, representing less of a threat to India than Indian hawks believe.
India would be wise to invest in -longer-range weapons—such as missiles and advanced-strike aircraft—that allow it to maintain a standoff deterrent, without the need to go toe-to-toe with Chinese troops on the border. India has also begun deploying sophisticated radar systems along its frontier with China—a way to police inhospitable terrain while avoiding direct confrontation. India might also seek to share intelligence with other nations—such as the United States, Japan, and Taiwan—about China's actions and troop movements in Tibet, both to prevent being taken by surprise and to avoid an accidental conflict.
A final lesson from Taiwan is that New Delhi should pursue ways to open the border to commerce and communication, binding itself closer to China. Shirk says China is now opening ties to Taiwan, as part of an effort to "win the hearts and minds of the people," raising hopes that China may eventually pursue a more tolerant approach toward Tibet and other minority regions. Amid all the reports of border incursions, both India and China have sought to lower the volume. Chinese military officials invited Indian generals from all three of the regional commands that face off against it across the LAC to visit China for confidence-building measures, including a rare visit to Lhasa. Indian officials have pleaded with news organizations to tone down reporting on border incursions. Indian national-security adviser M. K. Narayanan warned that the beating of war drums might become a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading to "an unwarranted incident or accident" with China. This is now an issue that should be handled at the highest levels—not left to hotheads—on all sides.
Published Oct 10, 2009
From the magazine issue dated Oct 19, 2009
On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along the northwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China. India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game has played out on the 4,057-kilometer India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon." Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have dominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines.
China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months.
Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan.
The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.
Beijing appears increasingly concerned about the safe haven India provides to the Dalai Lama and to tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles, including increasingly militant supporters of Tibetan independence. These younger Tibetans, many born outside Tibet, are growing impatient with the Dalai Lama's "middle way" approach—a willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in return for true autonomy—and commitment to nonviolence. If these groups were to use India as a base for armed insurrection against China, as Tibetan exiles did throughout the 1960s, then China might retaliate against India. By force or demand, Beijing might also seek to gain possession of important Tibetan Buddhist monasteries that lie in Indian territory close to the border. Both politically and culturally, these monasteries are seen as key nodes in the Tibetan resistance to Chinese authority.
Already Beijing has launched a diplomatic offensive aimed at undercutting Indian sovereignty over the areas China claims, particularly the northeast state of Arunachal Pradesh and one of its key cities, Tawang, birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama in the 17th century and home to several important Tibetan monasteries. Tibet ceded Tawang and the area around it to British India in 1914. China has recently denied visas to the state's residents; lodged a formal complaint after Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the state in 2008; and tried to block a $2.9 billion Asian Development Bank loan to India because some of the money was earmarked for an irrigation project in the state. All these moves are best understood in the context of China's recent troubles in Tibet, with Beijing increasingly concerned that any acceptance of the 1914 border will amount to an implicit acknowledgment that Tibet was once independent of China—a serious blow to the legitimacy of China's control over the region and potentially other minority areas as well.
The reports of Chinese incursions can be read as a signal that it is deadly serious about its territorial claims. The exact border has never been mutually agreed on—meaning one side's incursion is another side's routine patrol—but the Chinese have clearly stepped up their activity along the frontier. The Indian military reported a record 270 Chinese border violations last year—nearly double the figure from the year before and more than three times the number of incidents in 2006, says Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic studies at New Delhi's Centre for Policy Research, an independent think tank. Noting that there was a reported incursion nearly every day this summer, Chellaney says this amounts to "a pattern of Chinese belligerence." In June the People's Daily criticized recent moves by India to strengthen its border defenses and declared: "China will not make any compromises in its border disputes with India." It asked if India had properly weighed "the consequences of a potential confrontation with China."
To many Indians, China is an expansionist power bent on thwarting India's rise as a serious challenge to Beijing's influence in Asia. They are haunted by memories of India's 1962 war with China, in which China launched a massive invasion along the length of the frontier, routing the Indians before unilaterally halting at what today remains the de facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They are fearful of China's expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean, seeing its widening network of naval bases as a noose that could be used to strangle India. They blast Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for alleged weakness in the face of this growing threat. Bharat Verma, editor of the Indian Defence Review, predicted in a widely publicized essay this summer that China would attack India sometime before 2012. With social unrest rising within China due to the worldwide economic slump, he says, the leadership in Beijing needs "a small military victory" to unify the nation, and India is "a soft target," due to Singh's fecklessness. In recent weeks India's defense minister and the heads of the Army and Air Force have felt compelled to reassure the public that "there will be no repeat of 1962."
These warnings completely misread China's intent. While India worries about the larger army and wealth of China, China worries about the larger military and economy of the United States. In Asia, its stated aim is to follow a "peaceful rise" that benefits all its neighbors, India included, and there's little reason to doubt this goal. Beijing is an insecure power, not an aggressive one, because of the real threat of social and economic unrest at home. China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean reflects a legitimate interest in protecting the sea lanes upon which Beijing depends for its supply of oil and natural resources from Africa and the Middle East. The border movements should be seen in the same light: it's not about an external threat from India per se, but India's relationship to the internal threat from Tibet.
Still, if Tibet is the new Taiwan, it requires extremely delicate diplomacy. If anything, the West tends to under-estimate China's willingness to fight independence moves in Taiwan—it has fired missile warning shots as recently as 1996—and the same may now be said of Tibet. Taiwan, however, has maintained the parlous status quo by arming itself to the teeth, while avoiding any rhetoric or action that crosses Beijing's red lines.
India is trying a similar approach. Last year it denied the Dalai Lama permission to visit Tawang—ostensibly because of parliamentary elections—and now he has scheduled another trip in November. It would be prudent for New Delhi—and perhaps others with influence on the Dalai Lama, such as the United States—to find a face-saving reason for the Dalai Lama to indefinitely postpone the trip. India needs to be especially vigilant against militant activity within the Tibetan exile community, the single most likely trigger for a Chinese attack, and it might be wise to end the policy of simply avoiding any discussion of Tibet in its dealings with China. "There are ways to highlight the centrality of Tibet without being provocative or confrontational," says Chellaney. "If New Delhi were to say in public that Tibet has ceased to be the political buffer between India and China, and India would like Tibet to be the political bridge between New Delhi and Beijing, that, in one stroke, would change the narrative fundamentally."
India's position in talks needs to be backed by strength in arms. New Delhi has already started repositioning border forces, launched a road-building program to match the roads and airfields that China has built on its side, and recently conducted a three-day combined air-and-land war game, seemingly designed to show that it is on guard. But India needs to be careful not to overreact: it views with alarm the tens of thousands of troops China has deployed to the border region since the 2008 Lhasa riots, but most of these moves are designed to reassert control over Tibet. M. Taylor Fravel, an MIT expert on the India-China border dispute, says many of the troops deployed in Tibet are internal-security forces, lacking heavy armor or artillery, representing less of a threat to India than Indian hawks believe.
India would be wise to invest in -longer-range weapons—such as missiles and advanced-strike aircraft—that allow it to maintain a standoff deterrent, without the need to go toe-to-toe with Chinese troops on the border. India has also begun deploying sophisticated radar systems along its frontier with China—a way to police inhospitable terrain while avoiding direct confrontation. India might also seek to share intelligence with other nations—such as the United States, Japan, and Taiwan—about China's actions and troop movements in Tibet, both to prevent being taken by surprise and to avoid an accidental conflict.
A final lesson from Taiwan is that New Delhi should pursue ways to open the border to commerce and communication, binding itself closer to China. Shirk says China is now opening ties to Taiwan, as part of an effort to "win the hearts and minds of the people," raising hopes that China may eventually pursue a more tolerant approach toward Tibet and other minority regions. Amid all the reports of border incursions, both India and China have sought to lower the volume. Chinese military officials invited Indian generals from all three of the regional commands that face off against it across the LAC to visit China for confidence-building measures, including a rare visit to Lhasa. Indian officials have pleaded with news organizations to tone down reporting on border incursions. Indian national-security adviser M. K. Narayanan warned that the beating of war drums might become a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading to "an unwarranted incident or accident" with China. This is now an issue that should be handled at the highest levels—not left to hotheads—on all sides.
Friday, 9 October 2009
India’s illegal occupation of independent Sikkim has to be reversed
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Posted by Shital Pradhan on Wednesday, August 19, 2009
sikkim history Extracted from Pakistan Defence
India’s “Chief Executive” in Gangtok wrote: “Sikkim’s merger was necessary for Indian national interest. And we worked to that end. Maybe if the Chogyal had been smarter, and played his cards better, it wouldn’t have turned out the way it did.”
It is also said that the real battle was not between the Chogyal and Kazi Lendup Dorji, but between their wives. On one side was Queen Hope Cook, the American wife of the Chogyal and on the other was the Belgian wife of the Kazi, Elisa-Maria Standford. “This was a proxy war between the American and the Belgian,” says former chief minister, BB Gurung. But there was a third woman involved: Indira Gandhi in New Delhi.
Chogyal Palden met the 24-year-old New Yorker, Hope Cook, in Darjeeling in 1963 and married her. For Cook, this was a dream come true: to become the queen of an independent kingdom in Shangrila. She started taking the message of Sikkimese independence to the youth, and the allegations started flying thick and fast that she was a CIA agent. These were the coldest years of the Cold War, and there was a tendency in India to see a “foreign hand” behind everything so it was not unusual for the American queen to be labelled a CIA agent. However, as Hope Cook’s relations with Delhi deteriorated, so did her marriage with the Chogyal. In 1973, she took her two children and went back to New York. She hasn’t returned to Sikkim since.
Then there was Elisa-Maria, daughter of a Belgian father and German mother who left her Scottish husband in Burma and married LD Kaji in Delhi in 1957. The two couldn’t have been more different. Elisa-Maria wanted to be Sikkim’s First Lady, but Hope Cook stood in the way. “She didn’t just want to be the wife of an Indian chief minister, she wanted to be the wife of the prime minister of an independent Sikkim.” With that kind of an ambition, it was not surprising that with annexation, neither Hope Cook nor Elisa-Maria got what they wanted.
Meanwhile in New Delhi, Indira Gandhi was going from strength to strength, and India was flexing its muscles. The 1971 Bangladesh war and the atomic test in 1974 gave Delhi the confidence to take care of Sikkim once and for all. Indira Gandhi was concerned that Sikkim may show independent tendencies and become a UN member like Bhutan did in 1971, and she also didn’t take kindly to the three Himalayan kingdoms, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, getting too cosy with each other. The Chogyal attended King Birendra’s coronation in Kathmandu in 1975 and hobnobbed with the Pakistanis and the Chinese, and there was a lobby in Delhi that felt Sikkim may get Chinese help to become independent.
In his book on the Indian intelligence agency, Inside RAW, The story of India’s secret service, Ashok Raina writes that New Delhi had taken the decision to annex Sikkim in 1971, andthat the RAW used the next two years to create the right conditions within Sikkim to make that happen. The key here was to use the predominantly-Hindu Sikkimese of Nepali origin who complained of discrimination from the Buddhist king and elite to rise up. “What we felt then was that the Chogyal was unjust to us,” says CD Rai, editor of Gangtok Times and ex-minister. “We thought it may be better to be Indian than to be oppressed by the king.”
So, when the Indian troops moved in there was general jubilation on the streets of Gangtok. It was in fact in faraway Kathmandu that there were reverberations. Beijing expressed grave concern. But in the absence of popular protests against the Indian move, there was only muted reaction at the United Nations in New York. It was only later that there were contrary opinions within India-Morarji Desai said in 1978 that the merger was a mistake. Even Sikkimese political leaders who fought for the merger said it was a blunder and worked to roll it back. But by then it was too late.
http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/31975-india-s-illegal-occupation-independent-sikkim-has-reversed.html
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Posted by Shital Pradhan on Wednesday, August 19, 2009
sikkim history Extracted from Pakistan Defence
India’s “Chief Executive” in Gangtok wrote: “Sikkim’s merger was necessary for Indian national interest. And we worked to that end. Maybe if the Chogyal had been smarter, and played his cards better, it wouldn’t have turned out the way it did.”
It is also said that the real battle was not between the Chogyal and Kazi Lendup Dorji, but between their wives. On one side was Queen Hope Cook, the American wife of the Chogyal and on the other was the Belgian wife of the Kazi, Elisa-Maria Standford. “This was a proxy war between the American and the Belgian,” says former chief minister, BB Gurung. But there was a third woman involved: Indira Gandhi in New Delhi.
Chogyal Palden met the 24-year-old New Yorker, Hope Cook, in Darjeeling in 1963 and married her. For Cook, this was a dream come true: to become the queen of an independent kingdom in Shangrila. She started taking the message of Sikkimese independence to the youth, and the allegations started flying thick and fast that she was a CIA agent. These were the coldest years of the Cold War, and there was a tendency in India to see a “foreign hand” behind everything so it was not unusual for the American queen to be labelled a CIA agent. However, as Hope Cook’s relations with Delhi deteriorated, so did her marriage with the Chogyal. In 1973, she took her two children and went back to New York. She hasn’t returned to Sikkim since.
Then there was Elisa-Maria, daughter of a Belgian father and German mother who left her Scottish husband in Burma and married LD Kaji in Delhi in 1957. The two couldn’t have been more different. Elisa-Maria wanted to be Sikkim’s First Lady, but Hope Cook stood in the way. “She didn’t just want to be the wife of an Indian chief minister, she wanted to be the wife of the prime minister of an independent Sikkim.” With that kind of an ambition, it was not surprising that with annexation, neither Hope Cook nor Elisa-Maria got what they wanted.
Meanwhile in New Delhi, Indira Gandhi was going from strength to strength, and India was flexing its muscles. The 1971 Bangladesh war and the atomic test in 1974 gave Delhi the confidence to take care of Sikkim once and for all. Indira Gandhi was concerned that Sikkim may show independent tendencies and become a UN member like Bhutan did in 1971, and she also didn’t take kindly to the three Himalayan kingdoms, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, getting too cosy with each other. The Chogyal attended King Birendra’s coronation in Kathmandu in 1975 and hobnobbed with the Pakistanis and the Chinese, and there was a lobby in Delhi that felt Sikkim may get Chinese help to become independent.
In his book on the Indian intelligence agency, Inside RAW, The story of India’s secret service, Ashok Raina writes that New Delhi had taken the decision to annex Sikkim in 1971, andthat the RAW used the next two years to create the right conditions within Sikkim to make that happen. The key here was to use the predominantly-Hindu Sikkimese of Nepali origin who complained of discrimination from the Buddhist king and elite to rise up. “What we felt then was that the Chogyal was unjust to us,” says CD Rai, editor of Gangtok Times and ex-minister. “We thought it may be better to be Indian than to be oppressed by the king.”
So, when the Indian troops moved in there was general jubilation on the streets of Gangtok. It was in fact in faraway Kathmandu that there were reverberations. Beijing expressed grave concern. But in the absence of popular protests against the Indian move, there was only muted reaction at the United Nations in New York. It was only later that there were contrary opinions within India-Morarji Desai said in 1978 that the merger was a mistake. Even Sikkimese political leaders who fought for the merger said it was a blunder and worked to roll it back. But by then it was too late.
http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/31975-india-s-illegal-occupation-independent-sikkim-has-reversed.html
Between the lines
Stand up to China
By Kuldip Nayar
India should have encouraged the development of scores of experts capable of analysing every Chinese move.
Chenghis Khan would be proud of today’s China, the so-called socialist heir to Marx and Engels that has more in common with the marauding hordes of times past. No wonder then the portrait of Stalin was prominently displayed at the parade celebrating Beijing’s 60th anniversary. One of the world’s most tyrannical and inhuman rulers, responsible for the murders of tens of millions of Russian women and children, his picture still takes the pride of place in the office of the CPM politburo in Kolkata.
Therefore, it was not surprising that CPM secretary-general Prakash Karat underplayed China’s recent intrusions and attributed Indian criticism to the strategic alliance between India and America. Those who remain sentimental about Beijing are confusing China with communism that represented the cleansing thoughts, reformist ideals and passions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Such people cling to China with all its faults because they themselves have drifted away from the ideology of the true Left. If they had any spark of intellectual honesty left in them, they should have tried to rescue communism from China and not allow themselves to use this ideology to justify their conquests.
Both the CPI and CPM, which claim to represent the Left, still have the same reverence for Beijing as they did when the Chinese were undertaking Long March under the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung. Then the goal was to build an agrarian economy from below. Capitalism, which the country has now adopted for development, did not fit into the scheme the Chinese were pursuing at that time.
The way China is behaving towards India today invokes memories of the run up to what happened in 1962. The forcible building at that time of the infamous Aksai Chin road and the gruesome murders of our border patrol men, whose bodies were tied to the tails of horses, is a sad chapter in the history of our bilateral relations and something we hoped had been buried.
But recent incursions by the Chinese soldiers into Arunachal Pradesh have been accompanied by written boasts that they can take over the whole place in a couple of days. This is hardly a manifestation of the ‘Hindi-Chini bhai bhai’ equation. Beijing may be the beneficiary of $50 billion bilateral trade, but the Chinese officials seem to be asking how a pygmy like India can compete with the economic and military might of China.
I thought China occupied in 1962 all the territory it claimed and declared a unilateral ceasefire. It did not even agree to the Colombo proposals which suggested the withdrawal of 12.5 km from the positions the two sides held. India, even though a victim, complied with the proposals. Many years later when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, he agreed to give sanctity to the Line of Actual Control.
New problem
Over the years, the border talks between the two countries have not resulted in any firm borders either on the Ladakh or Arunachal side. But the middle sector, including Sikkim, has been recognised by China. Why has it now intruded into Sikkim and left its evidence in the shape of large red Chinese characters painted on rocks?
The latest irritation has come in the shape of visas granted to people originating from Kashmir. Instead of the standard type, the visa has been attached to a separate piece of paper stapled on to the passport. This is nothing more than a childish prank designed to convey that China can lay down the law and get away with it as well. The result has been that the students who were given the new type of visas could not go to the universities of their choice in China because India did not recognise the visa given to them.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh continues to commend a relationship of peace and goodwill despite these provocations. I concede that China is far ahead of us in military prowess. They have more conventional weapons as well as nuclear devices. Yet, India is not the same as it was in 1962. It is economically an emerging giant. It may not have allocated as much money to defence as the dangers on its borders warrant.
Jawaharlal Nehru also made the same mistake. He wanted to develop the country instead of having a large military arsenal. But if the Chinese want to articulate that power lies in the barrel of the gun, New Delhi may also be forced to re-order its priorities. Perhaps we should take a leaf out of Vietnam’s book. Here is a small country that has also suffered a border dispute with China but stood its ground and refused to kowtow.
We are not on weak ground, but what I cannot understand is the series of statements by the service chiefs one after another declaring that India could not take on China. These are not statements for public consumption. If we are ill-equipped in military strength, the chiefs can communicate this to the government, which is the right authority to take care of any inadequacies. Otherwise they are not only demoralising the people, but also misguiding the government.
One thing evident is that we do not have enough expertise on China. India by now should have encouraged the development of scores, if not hundreds, of experts capable of dissecting and analysing every Chinese move. Both Russia and Japan have, over the years, amassed sufficient information to help them deal with the Chinese. We can learn from them and see how they have been neither cowed down nor intimidated. Force, however strong, cannot and should not have the last word.
Stand up to China
By Kuldip Nayar
India should have encouraged the development of scores of experts capable of analysing every Chinese move.
Chenghis Khan would be proud of today’s China, the so-called socialist heir to Marx and Engels that has more in common with the marauding hordes of times past. No wonder then the portrait of Stalin was prominently displayed at the parade celebrating Beijing’s 60th anniversary. One of the world’s most tyrannical and inhuman rulers, responsible for the murders of tens of millions of Russian women and children, his picture still takes the pride of place in the office of the CPM politburo in Kolkata.
Therefore, it was not surprising that CPM secretary-general Prakash Karat underplayed China’s recent intrusions and attributed Indian criticism to the strategic alliance between India and America. Those who remain sentimental about Beijing are confusing China with communism that represented the cleansing thoughts, reformist ideals and passions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Such people cling to China with all its faults because they themselves have drifted away from the ideology of the true Left. If they had any spark of intellectual honesty left in them, they should have tried to rescue communism from China and not allow themselves to use this ideology to justify their conquests.
Both the CPI and CPM, which claim to represent the Left, still have the same reverence for Beijing as they did when the Chinese were undertaking Long March under the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung. Then the goal was to build an agrarian economy from below. Capitalism, which the country has now adopted for development, did not fit into the scheme the Chinese were pursuing at that time.
The way China is behaving towards India today invokes memories of the run up to what happened in 1962. The forcible building at that time of the infamous Aksai Chin road and the gruesome murders of our border patrol men, whose bodies were tied to the tails of horses, is a sad chapter in the history of our bilateral relations and something we hoped had been buried.
But recent incursions by the Chinese soldiers into Arunachal Pradesh have been accompanied by written boasts that they can take over the whole place in a couple of days. This is hardly a manifestation of the ‘Hindi-Chini bhai bhai’ equation. Beijing may be the beneficiary of $50 billion bilateral trade, but the Chinese officials seem to be asking how a pygmy like India can compete with the economic and military might of China.
I thought China occupied in 1962 all the territory it claimed and declared a unilateral ceasefire. It did not even agree to the Colombo proposals which suggested the withdrawal of 12.5 km from the positions the two sides held. India, even though a victim, complied with the proposals. Many years later when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, he agreed to give sanctity to the Line of Actual Control.
New problem
Over the years, the border talks between the two countries have not resulted in any firm borders either on the Ladakh or Arunachal side. But the middle sector, including Sikkim, has been recognised by China. Why has it now intruded into Sikkim and left its evidence in the shape of large red Chinese characters painted on rocks?
The latest irritation has come in the shape of visas granted to people originating from Kashmir. Instead of the standard type, the visa has been attached to a separate piece of paper stapled on to the passport. This is nothing more than a childish prank designed to convey that China can lay down the law and get away with it as well. The result has been that the students who were given the new type of visas could not go to the universities of their choice in China because India did not recognise the visa given to them.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh continues to commend a relationship of peace and goodwill despite these provocations. I concede that China is far ahead of us in military prowess. They have more conventional weapons as well as nuclear devices. Yet, India is not the same as it was in 1962. It is economically an emerging giant. It may not have allocated as much money to defence as the dangers on its borders warrant.
Jawaharlal Nehru also made the same mistake. He wanted to develop the country instead of having a large military arsenal. But if the Chinese want to articulate that power lies in the barrel of the gun, New Delhi may also be forced to re-order its priorities. Perhaps we should take a leaf out of Vietnam’s book. Here is a small country that has also suffered a border dispute with China but stood its ground and refused to kowtow.
We are not on weak ground, but what I cannot understand is the series of statements by the service chiefs one after another declaring that India could not take on China. These are not statements for public consumption. If we are ill-equipped in military strength, the chiefs can communicate this to the government, which is the right authority to take care of any inadequacies. Otherwise they are not only demoralising the people, but also misguiding the government.
One thing evident is that we do not have enough expertise on China. India by now should have encouraged the development of scores, if not hundreds, of experts capable of dissecting and analysing every Chinese move. Both Russia and Japan have, over the years, amassed sufficient information to help them deal with the Chinese. We can learn from them and see how they have been neither cowed down nor intimidated. Force, however strong, cannot and should not have the last word.
Thursday, 8 October 2009
SERIES: HIMALAYAN JOURNALS by Joseph Dalton Hooker – Episode 26
Posted by barunroy on October 9, 2009
THIS SERIES WAS MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH THE CONTRIBUTION OF ABDUL KALAM EZANI
THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE] EXCLUSIVE
HISTORY OF SIKKIM
January 1st_, 1849.–The morning of the new year was bright and beautiful, though much snow had fallen on the mountains; and we left Sunnook for Pemiongchi, situated on the summit of a lofty spur on the opposite side of the Ratong. We descended very steeply to the bed of the river (alt. 2,480 feet) which joins the Great Rungeet below the convents. The rocks were micaceous, dipping west and north-west 45 degrees, and striking north and north-east, which direction prevailed for 1000 feet or so up the opposite spur. I had observed the same dip and stroke on the east flank of the Tassiding spur; but both the Ratong on its west side, and the Great Rungeet on the east, flow in channels that show no relation to either the dip or strike. I have generally remarked in Sikkim that the channels of the rivers when cutting through or flowing at the base of bluff cliffs, are neither parallel to nor at right angles to the strike of the rocks forming the cliffs. I do not hence conclude that there is no original connection between the directions of the rivers, and the lines of fracture; but whatever may have once subsisted between the direction of the fissures and that of the strike, it is in the Sikkim Himalaya now wholly masked by shiftings, which accompanied subsequent elevations and depressions.
Mr. Hopkins has mathematically demonstrated that the continued exertion of a force in raising superimposed strata would tend to produce two classes of fractures in those strata; those of the first order at right angles to the direction of the wave or ridge (or line of strike); those of the second order parallel to the strike.
Supposing the force to be withdrawn after the formation of the two fractures, the result would be a ridge, or mountain chain, with diverging fissures from the summit, crossed by concentric fissures; and the courses which the rivers would take in flowing down the ridge, would successively be at right angles and parallel to the strike of the strata. Now, in the Himalaya, a prevalent strike to the north-west has been recognised in all parts of the chain, but it is everywhere interfered with by mountains presenting every other direction of strike, and by their dip never remaining constant either in amount or direction. Consequently, as might be expected, the directions of the river channels bear no apparent relation to the general strike of the rocks.
We crossed the Ratong (twenty yards broad) by a cane bridge, suspended between two rocks of green chlorite, full of veins of granite. Ascending, we passed the village of Kameti on a spur, on the face of which were strewed some enormous detached blocks of white and pink stratified quartz: the rocks _in situ_ were all chlorite schist.
Looking across the valley to the flank of Mainom, the disposition of the ridges and ravines on its sides was very evident; many of the latter, throughout their westerly course, from their commencement at 10,000 feet, to their debouchure in the Great Rungeet at 2000, had a bluff, cliffy, northern flank, and a sloping southern one. The dip of the surfaces is, therefore, north-west, the exposure consequently of the villages which occupy terraces on the south flanks of the lateral valleys. The Tassiding spur presented exactly the same arrangement of its ravines, and the dip of the rocks being north-west, it follows that the planes of the sloping surfaces coincide in direction (though not in amount of inclination) with that of the dip of the subjacent strata, which is anything but a usual phenomenon in Sikkim.
The ascent to Pemiongchi continued very steep, through woods of oaks, chesnuts, and magnolias, but no tree-fern, palms, _Pothos,_ or plantain, which abound at this elevation on the moister outer ranges of Sikkim. The temple (elev. 7,083 feet) is large, eighty feet long, and in excellent order, built upon the lofty terminal point of the great east and west spur that divides the Kulhait from the Ratong and Rungbee rivers; and the great Changachelling temple and monastery stand on another eminence of the same ridge, two miles further west.
The view of the snowy range from this temple is one of the finest in Sikkim; the eye surveying at one glance the vegetation of the Tropics and the Poles. Deep in the valleys the river-beds are but 3000 feet above the sea, and are choked with fig-trees, plantains, and palms; to these succeed laurels and magnolias, and higher up still, oaks, chesnuts, birches, etc.; there is, however, no marked line between the limits of these two last forests, which form the prevailing arboreous vegetation between 4000 and 10,000 feet, and give a lurid line to the mountains. Pine forests succeed for 2000 feet higher, when they give place to a skirting of rhododendron and berberry.
Among these appear black naked rocks, rising up in cliffs, between which are gulleys, down which the snow now (on the 1st January) descended to 12,000 feet. The mountain flanks are much more steep and rocky than those at similar heights on the outer ranges, and cataracts are very numerous, and of considerable height, though small in volume.
PEMIONGCHI – FORMER CAPITAL OF SIKKIM
Pemiongchi is at the same elevation as Dorjiling, and the contrast between the shoulders of 8000 to 10,000 feet on Kinchinjunga, and those of equal height on Tendong and Tonglo, is very remarkable: looking at the latter mountains from Dorjiling, the observer sees no rock, waterfall, or pine, throughout their whole height; whereas the equally wooded flanks of these inner ranges are rocky, streaked with thread-like waterfalls, and bristling with silver firs.
This temple, the most ancient in Sikkim, is said to be 400 years old; it stands on a paved platform, and is of the same form and general character as those of Tassiding. Inside, it is most beautifully decorated, especially the beams, columns, capitals and architraves, but the designs are coarser than those of Tassiding.* [Mr. Hodgson informed me that many of the figures and emblems in this temple are those of Tantrica Boodhism, including Shiva, Devi, and other deities usually called Brahminical; Kakotak, or the snake king, a figure terminating below in a snake, is also seen; with the tiger, elephant, and curly-maned lion.] The square end of every beam in the roof is ornamented either with a lotus flower or with a Tibetan character, in endless diversity of colour and form, and the walls are completely covered with allegorical paintings of Lamas and saints expounding or in contemplation, with glories round their heads, mitred, and holding the dole and jewel.
The principal image is a large and hideous figure of Sakya-thoba, in a recess under a blue silk canopy, contrasting with a calm figure of the late Rajah, wearing a cap and coronet.
Pemiongchi was once the capital of Sikkim, and called the Sikkim Durbar: the Rajah’s residence was on a curious flat to the south of the temple, and a few hundred feet below it, where are the remains of (for this country) extensive walls and buildings. During the Nepal war, the Rajah was driven west across the Teesta, whilst the Ghorkas plundered Tassiding, Pemiongchi, Changachelling, and all the temples and convents to the east of that river. It was then that the famous history of Sikkim,* [This remarkable and beautiful manuscript was written on thick oblong sheets of Tibet paper, painted black to resist decay, and the letters were yellow and gold. The Nepalese soldiers wantonly employed the sheets to roof the sheds they erected, as a protection from the weather.] compiled by the Lamas of Pemiongchi, and kept at this temple, was destroyed, with the exception of a few sheets, with one of which Dr. Campbell and myself were each presented. We were told that the monks of Changachelling and those of this establishment had copied what remained, and were busy compiling from oral information, etc.: whatever value the original may have possessed, however, is irretrievably lost.
A magnificent copy of the Boodhist Scriptures was destroyed at the same time; it consisted of 400 volumes, each containing several hundred sheets of Daphne paper.
The ground about the temple was snowed; and we descended a few hundred feet, to encamp in a most picturesque grove, among chaits and inscribed stones, with a peep of the temples above. Nightingales warbled deliciously night and morning, which rather surprised us, as the minimum thermometer fell to 27.8 degrees, and the ground next day was covered with hoar-frost; the elevation being 6,580 feet.
These birds migrate hither in October and November, lingering in the Himalayan valleys till the cold of early spring drives them further south, to the plains of India, whence they return north in March and April.
On the 2nd of January I parted from my friend, who was obliged to hurry to the great annual fair at Titalya. I regretted much being unable to accompany Dr. Campbell to this scene of his disinterested labours, especially as the Nawab of Moorshedabad was to be present, one of the few wealthy native princes of Bengal who still keep a court worth seeing; but I was more anxious to continue my explorations northward till the latest moment: I however accompanied him for a short distance on his way towards Dorjiling. We passed the old Durbar, called Phieungoong (”Bamboo-hill,” so named from the abundance of a small bamboo, “Phieung.”) The buildings, now in ruins, occupy a little marshy flat, hemmed in by slate rocks, and covered with brambles and _Andromeda_ bushes. A wall, a bastion, and an arched gateway, are the only traces of fortifications; they are clothed with mosses, lichens, and ferns.
A steep zigzag path, descending amongst long grass and scarlet rhododendrons, leads to the Kaysing Mendong.* [Described at Chapter XII.] Here I bade adieu to Dr. Campbell, and toiled up the hill, feeling very lonely. The zest with which he had entered into all my pursuits, and the aid he had afforded me, together with the charm that always attends companionship with one who enjoys every incident of travel, had so attracted me to him that I found it difficult to recover my spirits. It is quite impossible for anyone who cannot from experience realise the solitary wandering life I had been leading for months, to appreciate the desolate feeling that follows the parting from one who has heightened every enjoyment, and taken far more than his share of every annoyance and discomfort: the few days we had spent together appeared then, and still, as months.
On my return to Pemiongchi I spent the remainder of the day sketching in the great temple, gossiping with the Lamas, and drinking salted and buttered tea-soup, which I had begun to like, when the butter was not rancid.
My route hence was to be along the south flank of Kinchinjunga, north to Jongri, which lay about four or five marches off, on the road to the long deserted pass of Kanglanamo, by which I had intended entering Sikkim from Nepal, when I found the route up the Yalloong valley impracticable. The village and ruined convents of Yoksun lay near the route, and the temples of Doobdi, Catsuperri and Molli, on the Ratong river.
I descended to the village of Tchonpong (alt. 4,980 feet), where I was detained a day to obtain rice, of which I required ten days’ supply for twenty-five people. On the way I passed groves of the paper-yielding _Edgeworthia Gardneri_: it bears round heads of fragrant, beautiful, yellow flowers, and would be a valuable acquisition to an English conservatory.
From Tchonpong we descended to the bed of the Rungbee (alt. 3,160 feet), an affluent of the Ratong, flowing in a deep galley with precipitous sides of mica schist full of garnets, dipping west and north-west 45 degrees: it was spanned by a bridge of two loose bamboo culms, about fifteen yards long, laid across without handrails; after wet sand had been thrown on it the bare-footed coolies crossed easily enough, but I, having shoes on, required a hand to steady me.
From this point we crossed a lofty spur to the Ratong (alt. 3000 feet), where we encamped, the coolies being unable to proceed further on such very bad roads. This river descends from the snows of Kinchin, and consequently retains the low temperature 42 degrees, being fully 7 degrees colder than the Rungbee, which at an elevation of but 3000 feet appears very remarkable: it must however be observed that scarcely anywhere does the sun penetrate to the bottom of its valley.
We encamped on a gravelly flat, fifty feet above the river, strewn with water-worn boulders, and so densely covered with tall _Artemisiae,_ gigantic grasses, bamboo, plantain, fern, and acacia, that we had to clear a space in the jungle, which exhaled a rank heavy smell.
Hoar-frost formed copiously in the night, and though above the sun’s rays were very powerful, they did not reach this spot till 7.30 a.m., the frost remaining in the shade till nearly 9 a.m.; and this on plantains, and other inhabitants of hot-houses in England.
Hence I ascended to Yoksun, one of the most curious and picturesque spots in Sikkim, and the last inhabited place towards Kinchinjunga. The path was excessively steep and rocky for the first mile or two, and then alternately steep and flat. Mixed with many tropical trees, were walnuts of the common English variety; a tree, which, though planted here, is wild near Dorjiling, where it bears a full-sized fruit, as hard as a hickory-nut: those I gathered in this place were similar, whereas in Bhotan the cultivated nut is larger, thin-shelled, and the kernel is easily removed. We ascended one slope, of an angle of 36 degrees 30 minutes, which was covered with light black mould, and had been recently cleared by fire: we found millet now cultivated on it. From the top the view of the Ratong valley was very fine: to the north lay Yoksun, appearing from this height to occupy a flat, two miles long and one broad, girdled by steep mountains to the north and east, dipping very suddenly 2,200 feet to the Ratong on the west. To the right was a lofty hill, crowned with the large temple and convents of Doobdi, shadowed by beautiful weeping cypresses, and backed by lofty pine-clad mountains.
Northward, the gorge of the Ratong opened as a gloomy defile, above which rose partially snowed mountains, which shut out Kinchinjunga. To the west, massive pine-clad mountains rose steeply; while the little hamlet of Lathiang occupied a remarkable shelf overhanging the river, appearing inaccessible except by ropes from above. South-west, the long spurs of Molli and Catsuperri, each crowned with convents or temples, descended from Singalelah; and parallel to them on the south; but much longer and more lofty, was the great mountain range north of the Kulbait, with the temples and convents of Pemiongchi, and Changachelling, towering in the air. The latter range dips suddenly to the Great Rungeet, where Tassiding, with its chaits and cypresses, closed the view. The day was half cloud, half sunshine; and the various effects of light and shade, now bringing out one or other of the villages and temples, now casting the deep valleys into darker gloom, was wonderfully fine.
Yoksun was the earliest civilised corner of Sikkim, and derived its name (which signifies in Lepcha “three chiefs”) from having been the residence of three Lamas of great influence, who were the means of introducing the first Tibetan sovereign into the country. At present it boasts of but little cultivation, and a scattered population, inhabiting a few hamlets, 5,500 feet above the sea: beautiful lanes and paths wind everywhere over the gentle slopes, and through the copsewood that has replaced the timber-trees of a former period.
Mendongs and chaits are very numerous, some of great size; and there are also the ruins of two very large temples, near which are some magnificent weeping cypresses, eighty feet high. These fine trees are landmarks from all parts of the flat; they form irregular cones of pale bright green, with naked gnarled tops, the branches weep gracefully, but not like the picture in Macartney’s Embassy to China, whence originated the famous willow-pattern of our crockery.
The ultimate branchlets are very slender and pendulous; my Lepcha boys used to make elegant chaplets of them, binding the withes with scarlet worsted. The trunk is quite erect, smooth, cylindrical, and pine-like; it harbours no moss, but air-plants, Orchids, and ferns, nestle on the limbs, and pendulous lichens, like our beard-moss, wave from the branches.
WEEPING CYPRESS
In the evening I ascended to Doobdi. The path was broad, and skilfully conducted up a very steep slope covered with forest: the top, which is 6,470 feet above the sea, and nearly 1000 above Yoksun, is a broad partially paved platform, on which stand two temples, surrounded by beautiful cypresses: one of these trees (perhaps the oldest in Sikkim) measured sixteen and a half feet in girth, at five feet from the ground, and was apparently ninety feet high: it was not pyramidal, the top branches being dead and broken, and the lower limbs spreading; they were loaded with masses of white-flowered Coelogynes, and Vacciniums. The younger trees were pyramidal.
I was received by a monk of low degree, who made many apologies for the absence of his superior, who had been ordered an eight years’ penance and seclusion from the world, of which only three had passed. On inquiry, I learnt the reason for this; the holy father having found himself surrounded by a family, to which there would have been no objection, had he previously obtained a dispensation. As, however, he had omitted this preliminary, and was able to atone by prayer and payment, he had been condemned to do penance; probably at his own suggestion, as the seclusion will give him sanctity, and eventually lead to his promotion, when his error shall have been forgotten.
Both temples are remarkable for their heavily ornamented, two-storied porticos, which occupy nearly the whole of one end. The interior decorations are in a ruinous condition, and evidently very old; they have no Hindoo emblems.
The head Lama sent me a present of dried peaches, with a bag of walnuts, called “Koal-kun” by the Lepchas, and “Taga-sching” by the Bhoteeas; the two terminations alike signifying “tree.” The view of Yoksun from this height was very singular: it had the appearance of an enormous deposit banked up against a spur to the south, and mountains to the east, and apparently levelled by the action of water: this deposit seemed as though, having once completely filled the valley of the Ratong, that river had cut a gorge 2000 feet deep between it and the opposite mountain.
Although the elevation is so low, snow falls abundantly at Doobdi in winter; I was assured that it has been known of the depth of five feet, a statement I consider doubtful; the quantity is, however, certainly greater than at equal heights about Dorjiling, no doubt owing to its proximity to Kinchinjunga.
I was amused here by watching a child playing with a popgun, made of bamboo, similar to that of quill, with which most English children are familiar, which propels pellets by means of a spring-trigger made of the upper part of the quill. It is easy to conclude such resemblances between the familiar toys of different countries to be accidental, but I question their being really so. On the plains of India, men may often be seen for hours together, flying what with us are children’s kites; and I procured a jews’-harp from Tibet.
These are not the toys of savages, but the amusements of people more than half-civilised, and with whom we have had indirect communication from the earliest ages. The Lepchas play at quoits, using slate for the purpose, and at the Highland games of “putting the stone” and ”drawing the stone.” Chess, dice, draughts, Punch, hockey, and battledore and shuttlecock, are all Indo-Chinese or Tartarian; and no one familiar with the wonderful instances of similarity between the monasteries, ritual, ceremonies, attributes, vestments, and other paraphernalia of the eastern and western churches, can fail to acknowledge the importance of recording even the most trifling analogies or similarities between the manners and customs of the young as well as of the old.
Posted by barunroy on October 9, 2009
THIS SERIES WAS MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH THE CONTRIBUTION OF ABDUL KALAM EZANI
THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE] EXCLUSIVE
HISTORY OF SIKKIM
January 1st_, 1849.–The morning of the new year was bright and beautiful, though much snow had fallen on the mountains; and we left Sunnook for Pemiongchi, situated on the summit of a lofty spur on the opposite side of the Ratong. We descended very steeply to the bed of the river (alt. 2,480 feet) which joins the Great Rungeet below the convents. The rocks were micaceous, dipping west and north-west 45 degrees, and striking north and north-east, which direction prevailed for 1000 feet or so up the opposite spur. I had observed the same dip and stroke on the east flank of the Tassiding spur; but both the Ratong on its west side, and the Great Rungeet on the east, flow in channels that show no relation to either the dip or strike. I have generally remarked in Sikkim that the channels of the rivers when cutting through or flowing at the base of bluff cliffs, are neither parallel to nor at right angles to the strike of the rocks forming the cliffs. I do not hence conclude that there is no original connection between the directions of the rivers, and the lines of fracture; but whatever may have once subsisted between the direction of the fissures and that of the strike, it is in the Sikkim Himalaya now wholly masked by shiftings, which accompanied subsequent elevations and depressions.
Mr. Hopkins has mathematically demonstrated that the continued exertion of a force in raising superimposed strata would tend to produce two classes of fractures in those strata; those of the first order at right angles to the direction of the wave or ridge (or line of strike); those of the second order parallel to the strike.
Supposing the force to be withdrawn after the formation of the two fractures, the result would be a ridge, or mountain chain, with diverging fissures from the summit, crossed by concentric fissures; and the courses which the rivers would take in flowing down the ridge, would successively be at right angles and parallel to the strike of the strata. Now, in the Himalaya, a prevalent strike to the north-west has been recognised in all parts of the chain, but it is everywhere interfered with by mountains presenting every other direction of strike, and by their dip never remaining constant either in amount or direction. Consequently, as might be expected, the directions of the river channels bear no apparent relation to the general strike of the rocks.
We crossed the Ratong (twenty yards broad) by a cane bridge, suspended between two rocks of green chlorite, full of veins of granite. Ascending, we passed the village of Kameti on a spur, on the face of which were strewed some enormous detached blocks of white and pink stratified quartz: the rocks _in situ_ were all chlorite schist.
Looking across the valley to the flank of Mainom, the disposition of the ridges and ravines on its sides was very evident; many of the latter, throughout their westerly course, from their commencement at 10,000 feet, to their debouchure in the Great Rungeet at 2000, had a bluff, cliffy, northern flank, and a sloping southern one. The dip of the surfaces is, therefore, north-west, the exposure consequently of the villages which occupy terraces on the south flanks of the lateral valleys. The Tassiding spur presented exactly the same arrangement of its ravines, and the dip of the rocks being north-west, it follows that the planes of the sloping surfaces coincide in direction (though not in amount of inclination) with that of the dip of the subjacent strata, which is anything but a usual phenomenon in Sikkim.
The ascent to Pemiongchi continued very steep, through woods of oaks, chesnuts, and magnolias, but no tree-fern, palms, _Pothos,_ or plantain, which abound at this elevation on the moister outer ranges of Sikkim. The temple (elev. 7,083 feet) is large, eighty feet long, and in excellent order, built upon the lofty terminal point of the great east and west spur that divides the Kulhait from the Ratong and Rungbee rivers; and the great Changachelling temple and monastery stand on another eminence of the same ridge, two miles further west.
The view of the snowy range from this temple is one of the finest in Sikkim; the eye surveying at one glance the vegetation of the Tropics and the Poles. Deep in the valleys the river-beds are but 3000 feet above the sea, and are choked with fig-trees, plantains, and palms; to these succeed laurels and magnolias, and higher up still, oaks, chesnuts, birches, etc.; there is, however, no marked line between the limits of these two last forests, which form the prevailing arboreous vegetation between 4000 and 10,000 feet, and give a lurid line to the mountains. Pine forests succeed for 2000 feet higher, when they give place to a skirting of rhododendron and berberry.
Among these appear black naked rocks, rising up in cliffs, between which are gulleys, down which the snow now (on the 1st January) descended to 12,000 feet. The mountain flanks are much more steep and rocky than those at similar heights on the outer ranges, and cataracts are very numerous, and of considerable height, though small in volume.
PEMIONGCHI – FORMER CAPITAL OF SIKKIM
Pemiongchi is at the same elevation as Dorjiling, and the contrast between the shoulders of 8000 to 10,000 feet on Kinchinjunga, and those of equal height on Tendong and Tonglo, is very remarkable: looking at the latter mountains from Dorjiling, the observer sees no rock, waterfall, or pine, throughout their whole height; whereas the equally wooded flanks of these inner ranges are rocky, streaked with thread-like waterfalls, and bristling with silver firs.
This temple, the most ancient in Sikkim, is said to be 400 years old; it stands on a paved platform, and is of the same form and general character as those of Tassiding. Inside, it is most beautifully decorated, especially the beams, columns, capitals and architraves, but the designs are coarser than those of Tassiding.* [Mr. Hodgson informed me that many of the figures and emblems in this temple are those of Tantrica Boodhism, including Shiva, Devi, and other deities usually called Brahminical; Kakotak, or the snake king, a figure terminating below in a snake, is also seen; with the tiger, elephant, and curly-maned lion.] The square end of every beam in the roof is ornamented either with a lotus flower or with a Tibetan character, in endless diversity of colour and form, and the walls are completely covered with allegorical paintings of Lamas and saints expounding or in contemplation, with glories round their heads, mitred, and holding the dole and jewel.
The principal image is a large and hideous figure of Sakya-thoba, in a recess under a blue silk canopy, contrasting with a calm figure of the late Rajah, wearing a cap and coronet.
Pemiongchi was once the capital of Sikkim, and called the Sikkim Durbar: the Rajah’s residence was on a curious flat to the south of the temple, and a few hundred feet below it, where are the remains of (for this country) extensive walls and buildings. During the Nepal war, the Rajah was driven west across the Teesta, whilst the Ghorkas plundered Tassiding, Pemiongchi, Changachelling, and all the temples and convents to the east of that river. It was then that the famous history of Sikkim,* [This remarkable and beautiful manuscript was written on thick oblong sheets of Tibet paper, painted black to resist decay, and the letters were yellow and gold. The Nepalese soldiers wantonly employed the sheets to roof the sheds they erected, as a protection from the weather.] compiled by the Lamas of Pemiongchi, and kept at this temple, was destroyed, with the exception of a few sheets, with one of which Dr. Campbell and myself were each presented. We were told that the monks of Changachelling and those of this establishment had copied what remained, and were busy compiling from oral information, etc.: whatever value the original may have possessed, however, is irretrievably lost.
A magnificent copy of the Boodhist Scriptures was destroyed at the same time; it consisted of 400 volumes, each containing several hundred sheets of Daphne paper.
The ground about the temple was snowed; and we descended a few hundred feet, to encamp in a most picturesque grove, among chaits and inscribed stones, with a peep of the temples above. Nightingales warbled deliciously night and morning, which rather surprised us, as the minimum thermometer fell to 27.8 degrees, and the ground next day was covered with hoar-frost; the elevation being 6,580 feet.
These birds migrate hither in October and November, lingering in the Himalayan valleys till the cold of early spring drives them further south, to the plains of India, whence they return north in March and April.
On the 2nd of January I parted from my friend, who was obliged to hurry to the great annual fair at Titalya. I regretted much being unable to accompany Dr. Campbell to this scene of his disinterested labours, especially as the Nawab of Moorshedabad was to be present, one of the few wealthy native princes of Bengal who still keep a court worth seeing; but I was more anxious to continue my explorations northward till the latest moment: I however accompanied him for a short distance on his way towards Dorjiling. We passed the old Durbar, called Phieungoong (”Bamboo-hill,” so named from the abundance of a small bamboo, “Phieung.”) The buildings, now in ruins, occupy a little marshy flat, hemmed in by slate rocks, and covered with brambles and _Andromeda_ bushes. A wall, a bastion, and an arched gateway, are the only traces of fortifications; they are clothed with mosses, lichens, and ferns.
A steep zigzag path, descending amongst long grass and scarlet rhododendrons, leads to the Kaysing Mendong.* [Described at Chapter XII.] Here I bade adieu to Dr. Campbell, and toiled up the hill, feeling very lonely. The zest with which he had entered into all my pursuits, and the aid he had afforded me, together with the charm that always attends companionship with one who enjoys every incident of travel, had so attracted me to him that I found it difficult to recover my spirits. It is quite impossible for anyone who cannot from experience realise the solitary wandering life I had been leading for months, to appreciate the desolate feeling that follows the parting from one who has heightened every enjoyment, and taken far more than his share of every annoyance and discomfort: the few days we had spent together appeared then, and still, as months.
On my return to Pemiongchi I spent the remainder of the day sketching in the great temple, gossiping with the Lamas, and drinking salted and buttered tea-soup, which I had begun to like, when the butter was not rancid.
My route hence was to be along the south flank of Kinchinjunga, north to Jongri, which lay about four or five marches off, on the road to the long deserted pass of Kanglanamo, by which I had intended entering Sikkim from Nepal, when I found the route up the Yalloong valley impracticable. The village and ruined convents of Yoksun lay near the route, and the temples of Doobdi, Catsuperri and Molli, on the Ratong river.
I descended to the village of Tchonpong (alt. 4,980 feet), where I was detained a day to obtain rice, of which I required ten days’ supply for twenty-five people. On the way I passed groves of the paper-yielding _Edgeworthia Gardneri_: it bears round heads of fragrant, beautiful, yellow flowers, and would be a valuable acquisition to an English conservatory.
From Tchonpong we descended to the bed of the Rungbee (alt. 3,160 feet), an affluent of the Ratong, flowing in a deep galley with precipitous sides of mica schist full of garnets, dipping west and north-west 45 degrees: it was spanned by a bridge of two loose bamboo culms, about fifteen yards long, laid across without handrails; after wet sand had been thrown on it the bare-footed coolies crossed easily enough, but I, having shoes on, required a hand to steady me.
From this point we crossed a lofty spur to the Ratong (alt. 3000 feet), where we encamped, the coolies being unable to proceed further on such very bad roads. This river descends from the snows of Kinchin, and consequently retains the low temperature 42 degrees, being fully 7 degrees colder than the Rungbee, which at an elevation of but 3000 feet appears very remarkable: it must however be observed that scarcely anywhere does the sun penetrate to the bottom of its valley.
We encamped on a gravelly flat, fifty feet above the river, strewn with water-worn boulders, and so densely covered with tall _Artemisiae,_ gigantic grasses, bamboo, plantain, fern, and acacia, that we had to clear a space in the jungle, which exhaled a rank heavy smell.
Hoar-frost formed copiously in the night, and though above the sun’s rays were very powerful, they did not reach this spot till 7.30 a.m., the frost remaining in the shade till nearly 9 a.m.; and this on plantains, and other inhabitants of hot-houses in England.
Hence I ascended to Yoksun, one of the most curious and picturesque spots in Sikkim, and the last inhabited place towards Kinchinjunga. The path was excessively steep and rocky for the first mile or two, and then alternately steep and flat. Mixed with many tropical trees, were walnuts of the common English variety; a tree, which, though planted here, is wild near Dorjiling, where it bears a full-sized fruit, as hard as a hickory-nut: those I gathered in this place were similar, whereas in Bhotan the cultivated nut is larger, thin-shelled, and the kernel is easily removed. We ascended one slope, of an angle of 36 degrees 30 minutes, which was covered with light black mould, and had been recently cleared by fire: we found millet now cultivated on it. From the top the view of the Ratong valley was very fine: to the north lay Yoksun, appearing from this height to occupy a flat, two miles long and one broad, girdled by steep mountains to the north and east, dipping very suddenly 2,200 feet to the Ratong on the west. To the right was a lofty hill, crowned with the large temple and convents of Doobdi, shadowed by beautiful weeping cypresses, and backed by lofty pine-clad mountains.
Northward, the gorge of the Ratong opened as a gloomy defile, above which rose partially snowed mountains, which shut out Kinchinjunga. To the west, massive pine-clad mountains rose steeply; while the little hamlet of Lathiang occupied a remarkable shelf overhanging the river, appearing inaccessible except by ropes from above. South-west, the long spurs of Molli and Catsuperri, each crowned with convents or temples, descended from Singalelah; and parallel to them on the south; but much longer and more lofty, was the great mountain range north of the Kulbait, with the temples and convents of Pemiongchi, and Changachelling, towering in the air. The latter range dips suddenly to the Great Rungeet, where Tassiding, with its chaits and cypresses, closed the view. The day was half cloud, half sunshine; and the various effects of light and shade, now bringing out one or other of the villages and temples, now casting the deep valleys into darker gloom, was wonderfully fine.
Yoksun was the earliest civilised corner of Sikkim, and derived its name (which signifies in Lepcha “three chiefs”) from having been the residence of three Lamas of great influence, who were the means of introducing the first Tibetan sovereign into the country. At present it boasts of but little cultivation, and a scattered population, inhabiting a few hamlets, 5,500 feet above the sea: beautiful lanes and paths wind everywhere over the gentle slopes, and through the copsewood that has replaced the timber-trees of a former period.
Mendongs and chaits are very numerous, some of great size; and there are also the ruins of two very large temples, near which are some magnificent weeping cypresses, eighty feet high. These fine trees are landmarks from all parts of the flat; they form irregular cones of pale bright green, with naked gnarled tops, the branches weep gracefully, but not like the picture in Macartney’s Embassy to China, whence originated the famous willow-pattern of our crockery.
The ultimate branchlets are very slender and pendulous; my Lepcha boys used to make elegant chaplets of them, binding the withes with scarlet worsted. The trunk is quite erect, smooth, cylindrical, and pine-like; it harbours no moss, but air-plants, Orchids, and ferns, nestle on the limbs, and pendulous lichens, like our beard-moss, wave from the branches.
WEEPING CYPRESS
In the evening I ascended to Doobdi. The path was broad, and skilfully conducted up a very steep slope covered with forest: the top, which is 6,470 feet above the sea, and nearly 1000 above Yoksun, is a broad partially paved platform, on which stand two temples, surrounded by beautiful cypresses: one of these trees (perhaps the oldest in Sikkim) measured sixteen and a half feet in girth, at five feet from the ground, and was apparently ninety feet high: it was not pyramidal, the top branches being dead and broken, and the lower limbs spreading; they were loaded with masses of white-flowered Coelogynes, and Vacciniums. The younger trees were pyramidal.
I was received by a monk of low degree, who made many apologies for the absence of his superior, who had been ordered an eight years’ penance and seclusion from the world, of which only three had passed. On inquiry, I learnt the reason for this; the holy father having found himself surrounded by a family, to which there would have been no objection, had he previously obtained a dispensation. As, however, he had omitted this preliminary, and was able to atone by prayer and payment, he had been condemned to do penance; probably at his own suggestion, as the seclusion will give him sanctity, and eventually lead to his promotion, when his error shall have been forgotten.
Both temples are remarkable for their heavily ornamented, two-storied porticos, which occupy nearly the whole of one end. The interior decorations are in a ruinous condition, and evidently very old; they have no Hindoo emblems.
The head Lama sent me a present of dried peaches, with a bag of walnuts, called “Koal-kun” by the Lepchas, and “Taga-sching” by the Bhoteeas; the two terminations alike signifying “tree.” The view of Yoksun from this height was very singular: it had the appearance of an enormous deposit banked up against a spur to the south, and mountains to the east, and apparently levelled by the action of water: this deposit seemed as though, having once completely filled the valley of the Ratong, that river had cut a gorge 2000 feet deep between it and the opposite mountain.
Although the elevation is so low, snow falls abundantly at Doobdi in winter; I was assured that it has been known of the depth of five feet, a statement I consider doubtful; the quantity is, however, certainly greater than at equal heights about Dorjiling, no doubt owing to its proximity to Kinchinjunga.
I was amused here by watching a child playing with a popgun, made of bamboo, similar to that of quill, with which most English children are familiar, which propels pellets by means of a spring-trigger made of the upper part of the quill. It is easy to conclude such resemblances between the familiar toys of different countries to be accidental, but I question their being really so. On the plains of India, men may often be seen for hours together, flying what with us are children’s kites; and I procured a jews’-harp from Tibet.
These are not the toys of savages, but the amusements of people more than half-civilised, and with whom we have had indirect communication from the earliest ages. The Lepchas play at quoits, using slate for the purpose, and at the Highland games of “putting the stone” and ”drawing the stone.” Chess, dice, draughts, Punch, hockey, and battledore and shuttlecock, are all Indo-Chinese or Tartarian; and no one familiar with the wonderful instances of similarity between the monasteries, ritual, ceremonies, attributes, vestments, and other paraphernalia of the eastern and western churches, can fail to acknowledge the importance of recording even the most trifling analogies or similarities between the manners and customs of the young as well as of the old.
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