HIMALAYAN WATCH

2010-07-17T10:15:00.001-07:00

Nepal entangled with the United Nations

FROM ASIA TIMES

BY DHRUBA ADHIKARY

KATHMANDU: The wrangling in Nepal over forming an interim coalition to replace the government that quit on June 30 has projected some of the country’s politicians as small-minded, and seemingly unwilling to take the country out of its tension-fraught transition.

To make matters worse, some politicians have picked a quarrel with the United Nations, accusing its field mission of taking sides with former Maoist insurgents on the question of integration into the Nepal army.

The United Nations Mission In Nepal (UNMIN) was set up in early 2007 at the request of political parties, including the Maoists, to facilitate the implementation of a peace process that entered into a decisive phase at the end of king Gyanendra’s direct rule in April 2006.

The mission helped with elections in April 2008; its remaining job is to provide assistance that might be required in work associated with monitoring the country’s arms and armies, that is, the regular army and former Maoist guerrillas.

The UNMIN’s present mandate, which was initially renewed every six months, expires in mid-September. While the latest United Nations Security Council resolution to this effect was adopted in May, some political leaders and media outlets perceive that the UNMIN is looking for a pretext to prolong its stay indefinitely. Leading the vocal group is none other than caretaker Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, who resigned as premier in June.

The group cites UNMIN’s publication of a 60-week work plan on the integration and rehabilitation of former combatants as glaring evidence of the UN’s real intentions. Two newspapers owned by one leading publisher printed the controversial work plan on July 9.

Sushil Koirala, head of the Nepali Congress, a party in the outgoing coalition, has publicly criticized the UN’s seeming “interference” in the peace process. He also used harsh words about the UN mission remaining tight-lipped over the “unabated violent activities” of the Maoists, even after their signing of a series of agreements aimed at ushering in an era of peaceful, competitive politics.

True, there have been a couple of incidents in which former rebels sneaked out of their holding camps and carried out violent attacks on civilians. While the UNMIN issued statements condemning such activities, officials at the mission have argued that they do not have the mandate or the logistical support to handle problems of this nature. Theirs is a political mission, not a full-fledged peacekeeping operation, they claim.

Meanwhile, Peace and Reconstruction Minister Rakam Chemjong directed a senior official to send an urgent missive to Karin Landgren, UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon’s representative in Nepal, telling her how “deeply concerned” the government was over the work plan for former combatants, who number 19,600.

Landgren swiftly sent her response, with a clarification that her mission did not push through any action plan or roadmap for integration and rehabilitation; whatever was handed over to the leaders of three major parties was a “non-paper” that could be construed as reference material aimed at helping the parties make a decision.

A “non-paper”, according to a dictionary definition, is an authoritative but unofficial document that is often used to test the reaction of concerned parties. The term is frequently used by such bodies as the UN and the European Union. The timeline mentioned in the document indicated that it was “hypothetical”.

Subsequently, the dispute reached UN headquarters in New York, where associate spokesperson Farhan Haq told a media briefing on Monday that prior consultations with the main parties of Nepal about the non-paper with a timeline in it “had taken place with the full knowledge of the government of Nepal”.

The completion of the UNMIN’s arms-monitoring mandate, the spokesperson added, in large part was contingent on the parties agreeing on a plan to address the future of Maoist army personnel.

Back in Kathmandu, officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared reluctant to talk about the issue as their ministry was not taken into the confidence of the political leaders.

Independent observers unhesitatingly ridicule the government for its ineptitude, but they also do not have kind words for the UNMIN.

Wittingly or otherwise, the UNMIN circulated a non-paper with a timeline of 60 weeks just eight or nine weeks before its own current term expired. Such an initiative was bound to create an impression that the UNMIN was keen to delay its departure. It could also be interpreted as a move to be sympathetic to the Maoists, whose desire is to have most, if not all, of their ex-combatants integrated into the Nepal Army – a proposition fiercely resisted by the army thus far.

The UNMIN is also aware that the extended tenure of the Constituent Assembly requires it to issue a new constitution by May 28, 2011. The new statute cannot leave any space for a provision that would allow two armies in one country. At this point, the UNMIN would certainly have outlived its purpose.

Some political parties perceived as pro-Indian believe the UN mission has already lost its relevance in Nepal. However, others want the UNMIN to maintain its presence until the ongoing peace process reaches its logical conclusion, believing it prevents interference by India.

“By displaying intolerance and arrogance towards the UNMIN, the incumbent government as well as non-Maoist political parties are proving their diplomatic immaturity,” said Kesharbahadur Bhandari, a retired army officer, in a comment printed in Kantipur newspaper on Thursday. It is an irony, he added, that these leaders tolerated the clear interference of diplomats from India but sought to humiliate UNMIN personnel.

Dhruba Adhikary is a Kathmandu-based journalist.

2010-06-29T19:22:00.001-07:00

The 30-Year War in Afghanistan

June 29, 2010 | 0858 GMT

By George Friedman

The Afghan War is the longest war in U.S. history. It began in 1980 and continues to rage. It began under Democrats but has been fought under both Republican and Democratic administrations, making it truly a bipartisan war. The conflict is an odd obsession of U.S. foreign policy, one that never goes away and never seems to end. As the resignation of Gen. Stanley McChrystal reminds us, the Afghan War is now in its fourth phase.

The Afghan War’s First Three Phases
The first phase of the Afghan War began with the Soviet invasion in December 1979, when the United States, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, organized and sustained Afghan resistance to the Soviets. This resistance was built around mujahideen, fighters motivated by Islam. Washington’s purpose had little to do with Afghanistan and everything to do with U.S.-Soviet competition. The United States wanted to block the Soviets from using Afghanistan as a base for further expansion and wanted to bog the Soviets down in a debilitating guerrilla war. The United States did not so much fight the war as facilitate it. The strategy worked. The Soviets were blocked and bogged down. This phase lasted until 1989, when Soviet troops were withdrawn.

The second phase lasted from 1989 until 2001. The forces the United States and its allies had trained and armed now fought each other in complex coalitions for control of Afghanistan. Though the United States did not take part in this war directly, it did not lose all interest in Afghanistan. Rather, it was prepared to exert its influence through allies, particularly Pakistan. Most important, it was prepared to accept that the Islamic fighters it had organized against the Soviets would govern Afghanistan. There were many factions, but with Pakistani support, a coalition called the Taliban took power in 1996. The Taliban in turn provided sanctuary for a group of international jihadists called al Qaeda, and this led to increased tensions with the Taliban following jihadist attacks on U.S. facilities abroad by al Qaeda.

The third phase began on Sept. 11, 2001, when al Qaeda launched attacks on the mainland United States. Given al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, the United States launched operations designed to destroy or disrupt al Qaeda and dislodge the Taliban. The United States commenced operations barely 30 days after Sept. 11, which was not enough time to mount an invasion using U.S. troops as the primary instrument. Rather, the United States made arrangements with factions that were opposed to the Taliban (and defeated in the Afghan civil war). This included organizations such as the Northern Alliance, which had remained close to the Russians; Shiite groups in the west that were close to the Iranians and India; and other groups or subgroups in other regions. These groups supported the United States out of hostility to the Taliban and/or due to substantial bribes paid by the United States.

The overwhelming majority of ground forces opposing the Taliban in 2001 were Afghan. The United States did, however, insert special operations forces teams to work with these groups and to identify targets for U.S. airpower, the primary American contribution to the war. The use of U.S. B-52s against Taliban forces massed around cities in the north caused the Taliban to abandon any thought of resisting the Northern Alliance and others, even though the Taliban had defeated them in the civil war.

Unable to hold fixed positions against airstrikes, the Taliban withdrew from the cities and dispersed. The Taliban were not defeated, however; they merely declined to fight on U.S. terms. Instead, they redefined the war, preserving their forces and regrouping. The Taliban understood that the cities were not the key to Afghanistan. Instead, the countryside would ultimately provide control of the cities. From the Taliban point of view, the battle would be waged in the countryside, while the cities increasingly would be isolated.

The United States simply did not have sufficient force to identify, engage and destroy the Taliban as a whole. The United States did succeed in damaging and dislodging al Qaeda, with the jihadist group’s command cell becoming isolated in northwestern Pakistan. But as with the Taliban, the United States did not defeat al Qaeda because the United States lacked significant forces on the ground. Even so, al Qaeda prime, the original command cell, was no longer in a position to mount 9/11-style attacks.

During the Bush administration, U.S. goals for Afghanistan were modest. First, the Americans intended to keep al Qaeda bottled up and to impose as much damage as possible on the group. Second, they intended to establish an Afghan government, regardless of how ineffective it might be, to serve as a symbolic core. Third, they planned very limited operations against the Taliban, which had regrouped and increasingly controlled the countryside. The Bush administration was basically in a holding operation in Afghanistan. It accepted that U.S. forces were neither going to be able to impose a political solution on Afghanistan nor create a coalition large enough control the country. U.S. strategy was extremely modest under Bush: to harass al Qaeda from bases in Afghanistan, maintain control of cities and logistics routes, and accept the limits of U.S. interests and power.

The three phases of American involvement in Afghanistan had a common point: All three were heavily dependent on non-U.S. forces to do the heavy lifting. In the first phase, the mujahideen performed this task. In the second phase, the United States relied on Pakistan to manage Afghanistan’s civil war. In the third phase, especially in the beginning, the United States depended on Afghan forces to fight the Taliban. Later, when greater numbers of American and allied forces arrived, the United States had limited objectives beyond preserving the Afghan government and engaging al Qaeda wherever it might be found (and in any event, by 2003, Iraq had taken priority over Afghanistan). In no case did the Americans use their main force to achieve their goals.

The Fourth Phase of the Afghan War
The fourth phase of the war began in 2009, when U.S. President Barack Obama decided to pursue a more aggressive strategy in Afghanistan. Though the Bush administration had toyed with this idea, it was Obama who implemented it fully. During the 2008 election campaign, Obama asserted that he would pay greater attention to Afghanistan. The Obama administration began with the premise that while the Iraq War was a mistake, the Afghan War had to be prosecuted. It reasoned that unlike Iraq, which had a tenuous connection to al Qaeda at best, Afghanistan was the group’s original base. He argued that Afghanistan therefore should be the focus of U.S. military operations. In doing so, he shifted a strategy that had been in place for 30 years by making U.S. forces the main combatants in the war.

Though Obama’s goals were not altogether clear, they might be stated as follows:

1.Deny al Qaeda a base in Afghanistan.
2.Create an exit strategy from Afghanistan similar to the one in Iraq by creating the conditions for negotiating with the Taliban; make denying al Qaeda a base a condition for the resulting ruling coalition.
3.Begin withdrawal by 2011.
To do this, there would be three steps:

1.Increase the number and aggressiveness of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
2.Create Afghan security forces under the current government to take over from the Americans.
3.Increase pressure on the Taliban by driving a wedge between them and the population and creating intra-insurgent rifts via effective counterinsurgency tactics.
In analyzing this strategy, there is an obvious issue: While al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan in 2001, Afghanistan is no longer its primary base of operations. The group has shifted to Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and other countries. As al Qaeda is thus not dependent on any one country for its operational base, denying it bases in Afghanistan does not address the reality of its dispersion. Securing Afghanistan, in other words, is no longer the solution to al Qaeda.

Obviously, Obama’s planners fully understood this. Therefore, sanctuary denial for al Qaeda had to be, at best, a secondary strategic goal. The primary strategic goal was to create an exit strategy for the United States based on a negotiated settlement with the Taliban and a resulting coalition government. The al Qaeda issue depended on this settlement, but could never be guaranteed. In fact, neither the long-term survival of a coalition government nor the Taliban policing al Qaeda could be guaranteed.

The exit of U.S. forces represents a bid to reinstate the American strategy of the past 30 years, namely, having Afghan forces reassume the primary burden of fighting. The creation of an Afghan military is not the key to this strategy. Afghans fight for their clans and ethnic groups. The United States is trying to invent a national army where no nation exists, a task that assumes the primary loyalty of Afghans will shift from their clans to a national government, an unlikely proposition.

The Real U.S. Strategy
Rather than trying to strengthen the Karzai government, the real strategy is to return to the historical principles of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan: alliance with indigenous forces. These indigenous forces would pursue strategies in the American interest for their own reasons, or because they are paid, and would be strong enough to stand up to the Taliban in a coalition. As CIA Director Leon Panetta put it this weekend, however, this is proving harder to do than expected.

The American strategy is, therefore, to maintain a sufficient force to shape the political evolution on the ground, and to use that force to motivate and intimidate while also using economic incentives to draw together a coalition in the countryside. Operations like those in Helmand province — where even Washington acknowledges that progress has been elusive and slower than anticipated — clearly are designed to try to draw regional forces into regional coalitions that eventually can enter a coalition with the Taliban without immediately being overwhelmed. If this strategy proceeds, the Taliban in theory will be spurred to negotiate out of concern that this process eventually could leave it marginalized.

There is an anomaly in this strategy, however. Where the United States previously had devolved operational responsibility to allied groups, or simply hunkered down, this strategy tries to return to devolved responsibilities by first surging U.S. operations. The fourth phase actually increases U.S. operational responsibility in order to reduce it.

From the grand strategic point of view, the United States needs to withdraw from Afghanistan, a landlocked country where U.S. forces are dependent on tortuous supply lines. Whatever Afghanistan’s vast mineral riches, mining them in the midst of war is not going to happen. More important, the United States is overcommitted in the region and lacks a strategic reserve of ground forces. Afghanistan ultimately is not strategically essential, and this is why the United States has not historically used its own forces there.

Obama’s attempt to return to that track after first increasing U.S. forces to set the stage for the political settlement that will allow a U.S. withdrawal is hampered by the need to begin terminating the operation by 2011 (although there is no fixed termination date). It will be difficult to draw coalition partners into local structures when the foundation — U.S. protection — is withdrawing. Strengthening local forces by 2011 will be difficult. Moreover, the Taliban’s motivation to enter into talks is limited by the early withdrawal. At the same time, with no ground combat strategic reserve, the United States is vulnerable elsewhere in the world, and the longer the Afghan drawdown takes, the more vulnerable it becomes (hence the 2011 deadline in Obama’s war plan).

In sum, this is the quandary inherent in the strategy: It is necessary to withdraw as early as possible, but early withdrawal undermines both coalition building and negotiations. The recruitment and use of indigenous Afghan forces must move extremely rapidly to hit the deadline (though officially on track quantitatively, there are serious questions about qualitative measures) — hence, the aggressive operations that have been mounted over recent months. But the correlation of forces is such that the United States probably will not be able to impose an acceptable political reality in the time frame available. Thus, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is said to be opening channels directly to the Taliban, while the Pakistanis are increasing their presence. Where a vacuum is created, regardless of how much activity there is, someone will fill it.

Therefore, the problem is to define how important Afghanistan is to American global strategy, bearing in mind that the forces absorbed in Iraq and Afghanistan have left the United States vulnerable elsewhere in the world. The current strategy defines the Islamic world as the focus of all U.S. military attention. But the world has rarely been so considerate as to wait until the United States is finished with one war before starting another. Though unknowns remain unknowable, a principle of warfare is to never commit all of your reserves in a battle — one should always maintain a reserve for the unexpected. Strategically, it is imperative that the United States begin to free up forces and re-establish its ground reserves.

Given the time frame the Obama administration’s grand strategy imposes, and given the capabilities of the Taliban, it is difficult to see how it will all work out. But the ultimate question is about the American obsession with Afghanistan. For 30 years, the United States has been involved in a country that is virtually inaccessible for the United States. Washington has allied itself with radical Islamists, fought against radical Islamists or tried to negotiate with radical Islamists. What the United States has never tried to do is impose a political solution through the direct application of American force. This is a new and radically different phase of America’s Afghan obsession. The questions are whether it will work and whether it is even worth it.

2010-06-29T16:44:00.001-07:00

APROPOS: Supporting the issue of Darjeeling Sikkim unification is suicidal – G.M.Rai.

source:THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE]

BY DARJ MAN

Sub: In response to Post Barun Roy 21 June 2010, from Haalkhabar.net article Darjeeling/Sikkim: Supporting the issue of Darjeeling Sikkim unification is suicidal -G.M.Rai.

Title: Probably the Khas-Khasis- the original Gushan -Gurkhan, Gurkha/Gorkha.

Before approaching the question of the proposed merger of Darjeeling District in Sikkim the protagonist of the concept need address a few pertinent questions on the very foundations in order to lay the idea. The historical relevancy and its application in entirety, Darjeeling-Sikkim state is controversial even if the title is juggled to identify the larger parental area as ‘Sikkim Darjeeling’ nomenclature. The idea no matter how feasible may not be entirely acceptable to the Sikkimese although the inhabitants are closely linked in the broad spectrum of the Sikkim Himalayan cultural background. However the concept is playing into the hands dealt out by Bengal – division of Darjeeling District into Sikkim Darjeeling (1835) and Bhutanese-Kalimpong (1865) which areas belonged to the respective foreign countries amalgamated to form the present District of the same name.

For the moment this is the point of stress needed to be relieved from the process of contemplated fragmentation of Darjeeling District by West Bengal by carving out DGHC area (1988 by Subhas Ghissing, President GNLF) to divide Siliguri subdivision into a separate administrative unit in the District and gradually over period of time amalgamated visibly into Jalpaiguri District already seen in the economic plan of Siliguri-Jalpaiguri Development Corporation eventually converted into a statutory authority including the Siliguri Municipality Corporation (SMC) within the Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad All this backstage acts being rehearsed without an inkling of suspicion aroused in the minds of the hill people without any scheme of their own for implementation in the fertile Terai land now converted into a gold mine of real estate wheeling and dealing. These areas though originally belonging to Sikkim at the moment belongs to the Darjeeling hill peoples with or without the consensus of the ethnic ruling majority community of the state in which the hill people never belonged (Govt. of India Absorbed Area (Laws) Act 1954), on the contrary, besides some of the plains tribes the rest of the population are recent migrants after independence and the inflow begun then is now an endless chain entirely marginalizing the original hill tribes. It is retold in history at the time of the Darjeeling Grant in 1835 the Sikkim king while ceding Darjeeling to East India Company, infact understood acceptance of Grant in exchange for the Siliguri Terai plains land which was diplomatically sidelined by Major Lloyd deputed by Lord William Bentinck to negotiate the proposed cession.

Bengal as a matter of fact seems advantaged from the recurring use of the Gorkha appellation designated to imply, whether properly or improperly, reference to describe the ethnology of the constellation of hill communities, genuinely the Darjeeling ‘hill people’. This reference was conspicuously implied in the drafting the Constitution of India in 1946 (Cripps Cabinet Mission). In the question of debating Darjeeling District as a “Partially Excluded Area” (Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936) is contained in the process of forwarding the District in the provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution.

The future of Darjeeling District was earmarked in the Final Interim Report submitted to the Advisory Committee of the Union Constituent Assembly of India, by the Chairman A.V.Thakkar of the Sub Committee on “Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam)” in 18 Aug 1947. Darjeeling District was forwarded with the provisions of a “Partially Excluded Area”, particularly, it was argued, “the hill peoples” required a measure of protection while in contact with the more advanced people from the plains land.

So true and sagacious were the foresight of the fathers of the Constitution realizing this scene in advance, which, unfortunately is being undermined in subservience to the wishes of Bengal by frequently applying the Gorkhaland mantra merely to advance its political authority, infact not sanctioned by the constitutional writ wherein the Darjeeling tribes and the ‘hill people’ are provided protection under the Fifth Schedule. This otherwise unbefittingly, like Major Lloyd, is misused in disadvantaging the people for which the provision was made.

It is perceived, believed somehow, applying Gorkha designation to ensure symbolic relevance, ethnic, linguistic or cultural to Darjeeling District and Sikkim (in India) is alluded to raise more controversy than otherwise gain recognition while attempting to address issues anywhere in the Himalayas including Nepali from whence the word originated. The word is identified, peculiarly in reference to the Kings of the Gorkha under Shah dynasty since 1769 which period the indigenous people, the Newari Malla rulers of Katmandu valley and the adjoining tribes were overcome by Prithivinarayan Shan the Gorkha king. The monarchial dynastic rule ended in 2007 by overthrowing the ruling Gorkha king Birendra Bikram Shah by a popular Maoist doctrinated uprising under ‘Prachanda’ Pushpa Kumar .Dahal adventing a democratic federal republic nation. Paradoxically the sole aim of the Nepali Maoist was targeted to bring down the 238 years rule of the Gorkha kings, the only Hindu theocratic nation in the world, while on the other hand strangely enough Gorkha symbolism is asserted in adventuring recognition of Nepali/Gorkha as Indian identity. The paradox ends on the grounds if ethnic emigrant Indians having settled in Gorkha, the immediate ancestors of Prithivinarayan Shah are considered domiciled Nepalese.

Extract from Travels of Fah-Hian and Sung-Yun from China to India translated from the Chinese by Samuel Beal : In about 30 BC the five tribes of the great Yuchi (who had been driven by their enemies in the northern frontiers of India) united the five tribes under Khieu-tsiu-ki, the chief of the Gushan (Kuei-shang) horde: quote, “ proceeded to advance further south to the conquest of Kashmir and Cabul (Kabul). It is conjectured that the same chief who consolidated the power of the Yuchi, is the same as Hyrkodes of the coins. Who probably effected his conquest about 50 BC and died at 35 BC at 84 years of age. The chieftain left the throne to his son, Yen-kao-ching, to whom the Chinese assign the conquest of India to the west of the Jamuna. He has been identified with Hima Kadphises of the coins. His successor was Kanishka (about 15 BC) to whom frequent allusion is made in the following memoirs. From the Raja Tarangini (History of Kashmir) we learn that Kanishka and his two brothers, Hushka and Jushka ruled over Kashmir for 60 years”. The Gushan horde could possibly be the Gurkhans and later the Gurkhas of the present times.

There is also an element of speculation in considering Gorkha was ruled by Khan kings (not necessarily religious Muslims) which meaning was transferred to the Shah designation (Khan=Shah) whereas it is inferred the Khan was in reference to Gur-Khans (Gorkhas) meaning King of kings in Mongolian language. This is an extract from I.S.Chemjong’s book History and culture of Kirat People (2003 4th Edition) which is believed to be banned for sale in Nepal. Interesting however is his finding the Gur-khans ancestral homeland was the Tarim river basin along the infamous Silk Route to China via the Takla Makan desert presently the Chinese province of Sinkiang. The Gur-Khans had their capital in Kashgar(h) meaning the fort of the Khas people (referring to the Khus Parbhatiyas) of western Nepal.

In order to understand the ancient history of the Khas of Nepal dating possibly before the Christian era the formation of the caste by crossing recent migrants from India Rajputs or Brahmins and the Khas Mongolian women of the country, being the infamous progeny of a Brahmin and a Mlechha, to whom, in greater defiance of their creed, communicated the rank of second order of Hinduism, as Kshatriyas with the patronymic title of the first order.

It is this writer’s view point the word Khus, Khas, Khasi, Khasis is an abbreviation of Khus are totally different from the neighbouring hill tribes, though presently occupying space as an autochthones of Meghalaya. In the historical past the tribe inhabiting in Meghalaya and Tripura as Khasi probably were displaced from North West India and migrated to different parts of the country under new nomenclatures suitable to the new area. The new names under which their original tribal identity persists are mentioned in the table:

States ST/SC No. Names of Tribes / Caste
Assam ST 6 Khasi, Pnar, War, others (4)
Andhra Pradesh SC 22 Ghasi, others (3)
Bihar SC 12 Ghasi
Chattisgarh SC 25 Ghasi, Ghasia
Gujarat ST 4 Bhil, Bhil Garasia, etc
Meghalaya ST 6 Khasi,Pnar, War, others (4)
Mizoram ST 6 Khasi,Pnar, War, others (4)
Maharashtra ST 23 Ghasi, Ghasia;
Madhya Pradesh SC 26 Ghasi, Ghasia
Orissa ST 31 Ghasi, Ghasia
Rajasthan ST 5 Garasia (excld. Rajput Garasia)

Earlier having mentioned the Khasis is said to have inhabited Northwest India as the Khas in western Nepal, also seems to have close affinity with the Mon-Khmer (Burma and Cambodian tribes) as well as the Lalung tribe of North Burma. The Khasis who are linguistically connected with the group once known as Kolarian in the Indian peninsula, but now generally known as Munda inhabiting the hilly regions of Chutia Nagpur and parts of Satpura Range in the Central provinces. In physical character the indo Chinese Khasis differ greatly with the Mundas. But the points of resemblance in the languages and in some of the institutions cannot be denied.

It does not seem coincidental the War tribes close to Khasis, too is believed to have inhabited and close proximity to the former since ancient times, both the tribes being displaced by pouring hoards of Indo Aryan immigrants from the west. The Wars now inhabit the North East states of Meghalaya, Mizoram and Assam co-jointly with the others as tribes. Like the Khasis, the Wars too intermingled in marriage with other tribes in India of both Austric and Dravidic stock with implications of changed nomenclatures as given below in the table:

States ST/SC No. Names of Tribes / Caste
Andhra Pradesh ST 4 Chenchu, Chenchwar ;
Bihar ST 15 Kharia (16). Kharwar
Chattisgarh ST 20 Kawar Kanwar, others (5); (21) Khairwar, Kondar (22). Kharia
Chandigarh SC 19 Khatik
Delhi SC 21 Khatik
Himachal Pradesh SC 34 Khatik
Jharkhand ST 15 Kharia (16). Kharwar
Madhya Pradesh ST 14 Dhanwar (20). Kawar, Kanwar, others (5).(22) Khairwar,Kondar (23). Kharia
Maharashtra ST 23 Khairwar (24). Kharia
Orissa ST 28 Kawar (29). Kharia, Kharian (30) Kharwar
Punjab SC 20 Khatik
Rajasthan SC 36 Khatik
Tripura SC 20 Kharia
Uttarkhand SC 44 Karwal (45). Kharatia (46).Kharwar (excld. Vanwasi)(47). Khatik
Uttar Pradesh SC 44 Karwal (45). Khairaha (46). Kharwar (excld Bendansi) (47).Khatik
West Bengal SC 33 Khaira (34).Khatik (37).Konwar
ST 17 Kharwar

States ST/SC No. Names of Tribes / Caste
Andhra Pradesh SC 35 Mala(36).Maladasi(37).Maladasu(38).Malahannai(39).Malajangam (40). Malamasti (41). Malasale (42). Mala Sanyasi
ST 20 Malis (excld. 9 dists )
Bihar ST 23 Malpariya
Delhi SC 25 Malla
Jharkhand ST 23 Malpariya
Karnataka ST 65 Mala Maladasi (66). Malahannai (67).Malajangam (68).Malamasti

(69). Malasale (70). Malaka (71).Malasanyasi

Kerela SC 45 Palan (46) Palluvan
ST 23 Malakkuravan (24).Malasar (25).Malayan (26).Malayarayar
Maharashtra SC 39 Mala (40).Maladasi (41).Malahannai (42).Malajangam

(43).Malamasti (44).Malasale, Netkani (45).Mala Sanyasi

Orissa SC 56 Mala, Mala, Jhala, (Zala)
Pondicherry SC 7 Mala, Malamasti
Tamil Nadu SC 40 Mala
ST 23 Malakkuravan (24) Malasar (25) Malayali (26) Malayekandi
Tripura SC 27 Mali
West Bengal SC 43 Mallah
44 Mallah
ST 28 Malpahariya

The Gnar (or Synteng) tribe of Cherrapunji who coexists with the Khasia and War tribe in the states of Assam, Meghalaya and Mizoram requires racial clarification. It could either be Austric, Dravidic or Mongolian. If it is not the last but either the first or the second it seems plausible to determine from the pronunciation of Gnar as Nayar (Nair) of Tamilnadu and Kerala. While professing aspects of South Indian Hinduism the early Malla (Mal-detailed ethnicity in attached table) kings of Katmandu valley, in order to proselytize Hinduism by inviting ethnic priests from the plains, the Nayars. The priests (Nayar/Nair/Gnar) intermingling within the Nepali social structure, besides professing religion, cohabited, possibly with the Mallas as well as with the War tribes, which contributed towards the new generation of population known as the Newars (Gnar+War) of Nepal. The usual reference citing the allusion of the South Indian community Nayar (Nair) connected by blood and name to Nepali Newar could partly be true, provided the Gnar tribe is a derivative from Nair (pronounced Gnar).

This deduction is justifiable on the basis of the fact the War tribe inhabiting present day Himachal Pradesh has historical reference whereas the Gnar tribe has been simultaneously mentioned with the War tribes simultaneously in Assam, Meghalaya and Mizoram.

It s now the duty of ethnologists to determine whether Nair community can be considered indifferent to Gnar while sieving ancient history of North India. It is possible the oft reference to the mythical sage ’Ne’ of Nepal maybe referred to the Nayar (Gnar) who may have introduced some aspect of the southern culture into the Katmandu valley. The name Nepal, referred by Huien Tsang as Ni-polo visiting India in 6th century may not have visited the valley, presently Katmandu, but Swayambunath, the self evolved deity, in reference to the eternal burning flame- day and night, may already have existed at the time. Huien Tsang however only refers to Lumbini, the birthplace of Gautama Buddha where the Mauryan king Asoka’s edict pillar, commemorating the teacher’s birthplace, was discovered by Major L.A.Wadell, the Tibetologist. It is possible Nepal as a country was first time mentioned in history by the Chinese traveler as a result of which in reference to his visit, ancient sage ‘Ne’, may have applied ‘pala’ = look after, combined to derive the name Nepala, (looked after by the sage ‘Ne’).

Could it ever be possible some bloodline of ‘Ne’ the Chinese traveler maybe lurking in the chromosomes gene pool of the Nair would be an interesting subject for investigation to understand the history of Nepal which polity is still under process of ethnological evolution to determine its political space.

This being the background the Gorkha terminology is incidental to the history of Nepal of recent origin only just as the case of Indian history where foreign invaders have left their bits of mark contributing to the diversity of the nation, formed only in 1947, sixty three years ago, comparatively still young and further evolving.

The frequent and flagrant proposition of the Gorkha appellation, in context to the socio-political administrative history of the Darjeeling hills, while identifying the movement under a Gorkha stance unseemingly suppresses the provisions of the “Partially Excluded Area” regional identity of the Darjeeling hill peoples expression to detach themselves from West Bengal seems to deter the cause in more than one ways. This message is slowly seeping into the minds of the stakeholders, although belatedly, and a new approach is advanced by way of converting all the hill communities, read as Gorkhas into Scheduled Tribes. Darjeeling hill people on its own have been guaranteed by the Constitution to demand a state by virtue of its legal precedence the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936 which provisions were transferred, after independence into the Constitution of India in 1950. Per se which Darjeeling District under the provisions of the Fifth Schedule, based on the qualification as ‘Scheduled Tribes’ has rightly appealed for an Interim Setup, anticipating a Union Territory, is a process in the right direction. The more important qualification of the Fifth Schedule as a ‘Scheduled Area’, which requires vesting more hill communities as tribes in time, which the two factors combined would eventually fulfill the provisions of the Fifth Schedule in delivering the much aspired state.

Reverting back to the subject of attempting merger of Darjeeling District to Sikkim is plausible but relatively unacceptable reading the pages of the Govt. of India Acts since the time Darjeeling District was formed in 1866 and its respective relevance to the Constitution of India, 1950. This scheme is applicable and suitable only while considering Sikkimese Darjeeling, the three subdivisions of Darjeeling, Kurseong and Siliguri which areas formed a separate unit since 1935 and 1950. Apart from that Bhutanese Kalimpong 1865, was amalgamated with the former to form Darjeeling District in 1866. Hence the issue of merging the entire Darjeeling District does not fit into the political background of the scheme. It is however, plausible to consider under the recent time and space frame with the conclusion of and in application of the updated Indo- Bhutan Friendship Treaty, 8 February 2007. The new Treaty contains no more Article 3 of the Treaty of 1949, per-se, the provision of, ‘ temporary subsidy of Rupees one lakh per annum granted in 1942 as a follow up of the Treaty of Punakha 1910 (8 Jan 1910) which itself was advanced from the Treaty of Sinchula (11 Nov 1865).

The present 2007 Treaty is clearly only an update as it neither mentions abrogation nor repeal of the 1949 Treaty is an interesting feature for a minute study of the implications in regard to the annual subsidy paid to Bhutan since British rule and continued till the updated Treaty in 2007. this is an interesting new chapter in Indo Bhutan relationship. The total cession of erstwhile Bhutanese territory of Dalimkote Kalimpong and the18 Dooars (Jalpaiguri District) is now a closed chapter. It is probable within the meaning of this understanding the entire Darjeeling District maybe allowed to be merged with Sikkim state. A feasible proposition which can be implemented if other factors prove to be agreeable.

If at all D.K.Bomzan, President, Gorkha Rashtriya Congress (GRC) is serious in his proclivity, the intended merger of Darjeeling to Sikkim requires a thorough analysis of the above two premises in order not to embark sailing on a boat without neither sails nor oars, unless otherwise he intends using his limbs in substitution – a Herculean transformation indeed.

In conclusion, GM Rai President Gorkha Prajatantrik Party (GPP) probably inspired by various Gorkha brands to wit, Bharatiya Gorkha Parishad (BGP), is a non starter neither as a social nor a political body headed by ‘have been’ politicians of yore and heralding the Nepali/Gorkha cause in the country is now messed up as a mindset, itself intending politicization of the various hill communities under the umbrella of Nepali/Gorkha brand name implied for political advantage in the rest of India. Since the formation of Akhil Bharatiya Gorkha League (ABGL) in 15 May 1943, Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) 5 April 1980 (the party was formed for the sole intention of demanding a separate state of Gorkhaland for the first time) to be followed after 27 years by the present ongoing agitation led by Bimal Gurung’s Gorkha Jan Mukti Morcha (GJMM) since August 2007.

The genesis of the appellation Gorkha has a historical background after the conclusion of the First World War in 1914-18 when retired British Gorkha ex-servicemen formed an association. An interesting sequel to the history of Darjeeling is according to Sikkim & Darjeeling by Dr. Sonam B. Wangyal that, Drs. D.K.Sarkar and D.Bhaumik version, Kalimpong Samity led by Sardar Bhimdal Dewan and the People’s Association of Darjeeling, clamoured not for ‘exclusion’ but for the ‘inclusion’ of Darjeeling into Bengal “for the obvious purpose of enjoying the fruits of constitutional reforms under the Act of 1919”. This was in exact opposition to the memorial presented to the Govt. of Bengal on 8 Nov 1917 by “Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalese representing the opinion of the people of Darjeeling District” in anticipation of the Mongatu Chelmsford Reforms Commission 1918.

The idea of the Commission was, institute primarily to study and introduce the process of reforms towards increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. Taking advantage of this consideration was the effort made by the Hillmen’s Association to retain the exclusion of Darjeeling District from the application of general administration by forwarding the application of Backward Tracts(1870) which is now understood to mean these tribal inhabited areas located throughout India were ‘outside’ British India, which later on in the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936 were referred to as Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas which implications were further forwarded to the Constitution of India in the Fifth and Sixth Schedule.

Whether at that point of time the Hillmen’s Association, Darjeeling actually understood the reasoning’s for their memorial, “the one point was creation of a separate unit comprising of the present Darjeeling District with the portion of Jalpaiguri District which was annexed from Bhutan in 1865”, the same area now applied by GJMM for the creation of a new state for the Darjeeling hill peoples, by addressing the Centre to register ‘all Gorkhas’ (whereas in substance it only applies to the Darjeeling hill communities). This has the same implication as the earlier meaning of Backward Tracts updated in 1936 and 1936 with the provisions implied in 1950 wherein in the Fifth Schedule, Scheduled Area is consonant with Backward Tracts.

Hence applying the word Gorkha to address whether issues in the Darjeeling hills or elsewhere in India is antithetic to the space occupied by the more relevant and constitutional recognized status of Scheduled Tribes. This is historically proper and constitutionally acceptable, unless and otherwise the Gorkha communities are merged in the holding of the Scheduled Tribes. This is now being accepted by GJMM as well as GNLF who infact had highlighted this program before being superseded by the former in 2007. From this argument it can now be deciphered improper application of Gorkha, except in reference to the Gorkha soldiers in Nepal as per the Britain-India-Nepal Tripartite Agreement signed 1947 concerning the rights of Gorkhas in military service, superceding it in any other context whether ethnically, socially or politically seems out of context. Although its use, unintentionally misguided since its implication to the darjeleing hills in the history just retold, has been total, somewhat in political adventurism but totally a mismatch as far as its results and implementation are concerned. Therefore it seems more proper and pertinent, in the future politics of the Darjeleing hills and Sikkim, the less the term is referred in politics, the better the stance for the concerned units.

Infact if at all anybody is truly serious to solve the Gorkha conundrum the subject requires a research level program by universities recognizing Nepali/ Gorkhali as a subject in their curriculum. It would be only proper if the universities of North Bengal, Sikkim, Kolkata take up the cudgel to settle the issue once and for all. As Darjeeling already possesses a person of Dr. Mahendra P.Lama as the Vice Chancellor of Sikkim University, it perhaps falls on his shoulders to take up the subject to its conclusive end.

There is no question, at the moment, politicians of all hues and colour have and may still extract sufficient mileage in various states where the Nepali/ Gorkha population has sizable vote bank as an asset, and which surreptiously the BJP, linked to a majority religion national party, as most of the communities concerned profess aspects of Brahmanical Hinduism, taking advantage of this situation suffices to ride piggy back during the elections. This was displayed in the recent last elections by voting BJP, MP, Jaswant Singh under the GJMM banner. The MP thrown out of the party has now been reinstated, perhaps for the good fortune of GJMM which still remains to be seen as till date there is little or no indication of formalizing the Darjeeling hill peoples demand for separation from West Bengal.

The experimental victory of BJP in Darjeeling District is now seen, and rightly so, intended forwarding its promotion to the other Himalayan states where the Nepali/Gorkha vote bank is promiscuous – Himachal Pradesh, Uttarkhand, Sikkim, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and maybe elsewhere in India too. The desire to fill the political wilderness of the communities in diaspora certainly deserves a viable concretization program but not by default exchanging the original namesake of the constellation of Himalayan communities under the Nepali/Gorkha brand. This will be better addressed instead by preserving the distinct features of the different communities under the Indian identity of their distinct community names, simply as Rai, Limbu, Tamang, Magar, Gurung and others as tribes. This is suitably acceptable for recognition and claim.

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2010-06-29T16:41:00.000-07:00

OPINION: Tribes Conversion to Hindu Caste – in the Himalayas and Rest of India

source: THE HIMALAYAN BEACON

BY DARJ MAN

It should be pertinent, under the present situation of the renewed Gorkhaland agitation under a different banner headed by GJMM having continued the agitation since August 2007 till date deserves an undivided attention to focus on the issue of the statehood demand vis-à-vis converting ‘Gorkha’ communities into tribes. The reason why this is necessitated basically has two primary reasons both interrelated but somehow disbanded in Census 1931. Thereby creating a dismissive which frequency raised to the required decibel, in a manner of politics within the Gorkha space, rightly or wrongly, occupies a place. This has recognized to be so as an important factor in advancing it implicitly to the demand of Darjeeling District and Terai Dooars, jointly demanding a different administrative unit at a time before independence of India which post promulgation of the Constitution in 1950, is read to mean, within its framework, a state.

With the passage of each day it is slowly unfolding and with sourcing information’s at the push of a button from the internet issues are exposed at various levels of study forums. It is however of utmost importance the readings are done on an investigative basis. This is in order not to arrive at any subjective considerations but instead, on the other hand to arrive at an analytical thesis. This is an interesting point of view as much water has run under the Gorkha bridge, in forming a sea in an ocean full of misrepresentation which requires objectivity and mot subjective interpretation. Therefore the emphasis on a proper study of the topic is the need of the hour as further misapplication is seen to be more damaging than bearing fruit.

In an attempt to discover the factor which seem to have deprived the Darjeeling hill tribes endemic to the Himalayan ethnic regional identity, distinct culture, habit, tradition, religion and language constitute an entirely different civilization in contrast to the Indian plains ethnic groups. This is realized while referring to the ethnological history of The People of India by Sir Herbert Risley, 1915.

At the time of writing, obviously the case of Darjeeling hill peoples did not exist as such but the implication and meaning wherein the Governor General in 1870 was allowed to legislate separately for a Backward Tracts. Extending the position of Backward Tracts forward which implies these areas were left out from the purview of being integrated into British India. Hence Central and Provincial administrative rules and regulations were not imposed in the general administration of these areas, which besides Darjeeling District, composed of many tribal inhabited areas in India. The Backward Tracts was identified as Scheduled Districts listed in the First Schedule of the Act in the Govt. of India Scheduled Districts Act of XIV of 1874. Thus being designated as a Scheduled Area for providing special consideration in their administration. In the Constitution of India 1950, the provisions of Scheduled Areas in the Fifth Schedule implies the right to state formation within the interpretation and meaning of “Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas” in the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936 .

As Darjeeling District and Chittagong Hill Tracts only in erstwhile Province of Bengal was provided implication of the Act 1935 and Order 1936, it is derived within the framework of the constitution Darjeeling District has a right to state formation by virtue of implying the Fifth Schedule , however , without the provisions of Scheduled Area, but only as Scheduled Tribes which thereby marginalizes a complete state formation and instead provided the implication of an interim administrative setup either as a Union Territory (UT) or a Centrally Administered Area (CAA).

This above is explained in detail in order to emphasis the importance of Census 1941 which removed practically the entire constellation of Hinduised Darjeeling hill tribes communities accepting Nepali as the spoken mother tongue. Census 1931 declared the Himalayan tribal population at 68% which figure after many tribes were deregistered for the reason given above, Census 1941 shows a tribal population at 37.54%, and that too enhanced by including the population of Sikkim 29.04%. Whatever the implication of the scheme it becomes very important to deliberate on the topic in the subject to find out the reasons for tribes being converted into caste within the meaning of the Hindu religion.

It is seldom discussed why many tribal communities prefer to remain outside the tribal fold. Although at this point of time, however there is a reverse osmosis of non tribes and castes aspiring to become Scheduled Tribes. Whereas in earlier times the tribals were considered as an Mlechha (barbarian) enigma, looked upon as degraded, degenerated lot of uncivilized, basically, non-Aryan groups. In order to lift themselves from this disgrace within the aspects of the Hindu religious society of communities the non Aryan groups were accepted into the Hindu fold accepted or converted as castes within the Varna as per the code of Manusmriti.

This is in order not to repeat the infamous story of the luxury liner Titanic which in 1912 met its end with loss if 1500 lives, although considered invincible but only to sink to its historical doom in its first ever maiden voyage intended to cross the Atlantic as a ‘titan’ but on the contrary succumbed to the wrath of an unseen iceberg accidentally damaging the frontal fold, sinking it at the very onset.

In a similar fashion Gorkha invincibility has been applied in various times in the history of Darjeeling District in order to elk out a separate state. Many politicians of all hues have attempted some semblance of claim by the same application, however unsuccessfully. The last great struggle of immense magnitude was initiated by the GNLF in 1980 -2007 with loss of recorded 1200 lives but unaccounted figures estimated at over 4000 lives, only to be subjugated, like the Titanic, without sailing to the statehood journey for the Darjeeling hill people however attaining namesake instead a Gorkha ‘hills’ only within Bengal – the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council 1988.This at the cost of Darjeeling District sacrificing the Siliguri Terai the fertile plains by fragmenting Siliguri subdivision for special economic development, under the Siliguri Mahakuma as well as the Siliguri-Jalpaiguri Development Corporation. All this exercise seems premeditated eventually to release Siliguri from Darjeeling District, amalgamating it with Jalpaiguri District.

According to a Study of genetic relationships of Indian Gurkha population on the basis of HLA-A and B Loci Antigens by M. Debnath and Tapas.K.Chaudhuri, NBU, quote extract

1. Among them, Gurkhas form the major population group in Darjeeling District of West Bengal and Sikkim. These groups are endogamous (Chatterjee 1974). Gurkhas are grouped into a large number of tribes, the chief of which are Mangar, Rai, Limbu, Sunwar and Tamang (Coon 1983: Subba 1985). It appears from the evidence that in ancient times people of Tibeto-Burman families spread themselves over the high plateau of the Himalayas and the country round about the mouth of the Ganges (Northey and Morris 1987). Gurkha population is suppos3d to belong to the above mentioned race. The ancestors of Gurkha population are also thought to be migrants from the neighboring Mongolian region.

2. The tribes of Mongolian stock are found along the whole length of Himalayas with languages close akin to those of the Tibetans on the Northern side, while further east similar people have driven the older Austro Asiatic speaking population out of most of Burma and Siam. The Aryan speakers from India entered Nepal probably both from west, along the hills, and from the plains from the south, although certainly much lese in number then the Mongolian element (Northey and Morris1987). It may be noted: that the identity of languages does not necessarily connote identity of the races and in Nepal itself the aborigines of whatever race largely changed the language for that of Mongoloid invaders, while today the same process of the language of the latter is gradually replaced by the Aryan.

3. Gurkhas were compared with other major world population it was found that HLA-A2 and A11 were higher in Greeks (Pachoula-Papasteriadis et al. 1989), Ukranian, Tibetan (Imanshi et al.1992), Chinese, Korean, Mongolian and Japanese (Tanaka et al.1997).

4. Several HLA-A and B haplotypes were significant in Gurkhas. Amongst them only A33-B44 which is characteristic haplotype of Korean and Japanese population occur with a significant positive linkage disequilibrium among Gurkhas. The distribution of these haplotypes supports a strong genetic affinity of Gurkhas with Korans and Japanese populations.

5. It has been reported earlier that Gurkha may have originated on the course of evolution from the Mongolian population directly, or from the stock of Mongoloid origin. It can be assumed from the philo genetic constructed by N.G.method that Gurkha has originated from mongoloid stock directly or Tibetan stock or there maybe one or more intermediate population between Gurkha and Mongolians/ Tibetans from which Gurkhas might have originated

These factors contribute to the theory the ethnological and anthropological background of the Gorkhas presume quite convincingly the Gorkhas racially are Mongoloid in origin related to the hoards of prototypes having descended in ancient times from central, east and south Asia and settled along the length and breadth of Himalayan hills, the tributaries of Indus basin, as well in the Gangetic and Jamuna northern plains. (cf. Probably the Khas-Khasis- the original Gushan -Gurkhan, Gurkha/Gorkha).

However this contemplation is akin to building castles in the air. Darjeeling District falls under provisions of the Govt. of India Absorbed Area (Laws) Act 1954 wherein the District (3149 sq.kms) as a ‘Partially Excluded Area’ is provided in the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of India and hence the state govt. tampering with any of its provisions is an infringement on the legal aspects of the Constitution.

It is perceived at the moment, the state require to come out clean and transparent on the constitutional provision of Darjeeling District within the interpretation of the Absorbed Areas (Laws) Act and whether it has fulfilled its commitment in protecting the Darjeeling hill people under provisions of the Fifth Schedule, Control and Administration of Scheduled Tribes, by implementing the statutory formation of Tribes Advisory Council (TAC) which is mandated to consist of 20 members of which not less than three fourth of the members being representatives of the state Legislative Assembly and the remaining five members amiable to the tribes. Although the TAC was specific to the provisions for Darjeeling District, being the only Partially Excluded Area in West Bengal it is a matter of great regret the Darjeeling hill people have been de-linked from the very purpose of the Fifth Schedule provision which as a matter of fact specifically provided for them within the framework of the Constitution, however perceived to be denied in implementation. Instead the provisions of TAC are seemingly applied only to the plains tribe more specifically to the tribes of Jalpaiguri District and elsewhere.

However interpreting the provisions of TAC in another aspect, it is probable the provision for the tribes of Darjeeling District maybe the implementation of DGHC in the tripartite accord 1988. If this is so it is the duty of the state to clarify the matter to the stakeholders, the Darjeeling hill peoples and not simply the leader and politicians highlighting any cause related to Gorkhaland or more properly all matters related to Darjeeling District which has a constitutional undertaking as provided in the deliberations of the Union Constituent Assembly, vide Advisory Committee’s Interim Report of 18 Aug 1947 of the Sub Committee on “Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam)” chaired by A.V.Thakkar.

Whereas the TAC largesse doled out to the Scheduled Tribes of Jalpaiguri District, if so is the case, is naturally considered out of purview from the statutory provision. This argument is based on the ground Jalpaiguri District was totally removed from the provisions of Backward Tracts transferred as Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas in the Govt. of India Order 1936 and the District effectively having come under the total administration of the State.

Both Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri District basically considered as Backward Tracts since the origination of the phrase in 1870 depicting areas inhabited by the autochthones, indigenous peoples, in India referred to as primitive people, and for which the territories inhabited by such people were never ever brought under the administrative reforms process at all. Since 1935 their interests were protected under the Excluded and Partially Excluded Area provisions, instilled with the idea of preserving these areas with a differential administrative setup unlike the Provinces till the time of the promulgation of the Constitution in 1950.

After which these Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas were forwarded into the provisions of Fifth and Sixth Schedule still instilled with the idea of an interim setup before formal integration within the federation as a Union state. This is to imply Darjeeling District as a Partially Excluded Area is constitutionally provided to integrate into the Union as a state which unfortunately is somehow considered being hindered by the state in violation of Constitutional legality.

The emphasis of GJMM applying for conversion of Gorkhas into tribes requires consideration irrespective of whether the scheme is applicable to the entire genre or not. A process of selection by the proper authority Registrar General of India (RGI) will eventually decide the fate. However with the implication of the B.K.Roy Burman Commission CRESP Report 2008 by the Govt. of Sikkim, recommending various Sikkimese hill communities to tribal status is an indication in view, similar communities when recognized in Sikkim as Scheduled Tribes would automatically apply to West Bengal based on the formation of Darjeeling District in 1866 as areas extracted from the kingdoms of Sikkim and Bhutan..

In the process of rightly demanding ST status for the Darjeeling hill communities some aspects of reference maybe recalled from the history of people in Nepal which is responsible for the origin of many of the Himalayan tribes.

On start it might be advisable to quote Sir Herbert Risley from The People of India, quote page 72, “All over India at the present moment tribes are gradually and insensibly being transferred into castes”. His research assertions mention in complete extract from the book, the underlined.

1. The leading men of an aboriginal tribe, having somehow got on in the world and become independent landed proprietors, managed to enroll themselves in one of the more distinguished castes. In early stages of heir advancement they generally find great difficulty in getting their daughters married, as they will not take husbands from their original tribe and Rajputs of the adopted caste will, of course, not condescend to alliance with them., but after a generation or two their persistency obtains its reward and they inter marry, if not with pure Rajputs, at least with the superior order of manufactured Rajputs…thus a real change of blood may take place …while in any case the tribal name is completely lost and with it all possibility of correctly separating this class of people from the Hindus of purer blood and tracing them to any particular Dravidian or Mongoloid tribe.

2. A number of aborigines, as we may conveniently call them, though the term begs an insoluble question, embrace the tenets of a Hindu religious sect, losing thereby their tribal name and becoming Vaishnavas, Lingayats, Ramayats or other like. Anyway, the identity of the converts as aborigines is usually, though not invariably, lost,…a case of true absorption.

3. A whole tribe of aborigines, or a large section of a tribe enroll themselves in the ranks of Hinduism under the style of a new caste, which claiming an origin of remote antiquity, is readily distinguishable by its name from any of the standard and recognized caste. Thus the great majority of the Kochh inhabitants of Jalpaiguri, Rangpur, and part of Dinajpur now invariably describe themselves as Rajbansis or Bhanga Kshtriyas – a designation which enables them to represent themselves as an outlying branch of the Kshtriyas of Hindu tradition who fled to Northeastern Bengal in order to escape from the wrath of Parasu-Rama. In a country where history masquerades in the garb of legend there is nothing prima facie improbable in the conjecture that the story of the Bhanga-Kshtriyas maybe really a mythological version of the true origin of the reigning family of Cooch Bihar. A chief of the higher race ruling a people of the lower is a phenomenon too common to require explanation.

4. A whole tribe of aborigines, or a section of a tribe, become gradually converted to Hinduism without, like the Rajbansis, abandoning their tribal designation. This is what happened to Bhumj (probably Bhowmik) of western Bengal. Here a pure Dravidian race have lost their original language and now speak only Bengali: they worship Hindu gods…and the more advanced among them employ Brahmins as family priests. The tribe will then have become a caste in the full sense of the word and will go on stripping itself of all customs likely to betray its true descent. The physical characteristics of its members will alone survive.

By such processes as these, and by a variety of complex social influences whose working cannot be precisely traced, a number of types or variety of castes have been formed which admit or being grouped as follows:

(i). The Tribal type, where a tribe like the Bhumj…insensibly converted into caste preserving its original name and many of its characteristic customs, but modify its animistic practices more and more in the direction of orthodox Hinduism, and ordering its manner of life in accordance with the same model. It has even been supposed that the Sudras of Indo Aryan tradition were originally a Dravidian tribe which was thus incorporated into the social system of the conquering race. As illustrations of the transformations that has taken place the Bagdi, Bauri, Chandal (Namasudra), Kaibartta, Pod and Rajbansi-Kochh of Bengal. In Madras the Mal, Nayar, Vellala and Paraiyan or Pariah, of whom the last retain traditions of a time hen they possessed an independent organization of their own and had not relegated to a low place in the Hindu social system.

The table of social precedence attached to the Cochin Census report 1901, Vol I p.181 shows that while a Nayar can pollute man of a higher caste only by touching him, people of the Kammalan group, including masons, blacksmiths, carpenters, etc, pollute at a distance of twenty four feet, toddy drawers (Iluvan or Tiyan) at thirty six feet ; Pulayan or Cheruman cultivators at forty eight feet; while in the cse of Paraiyan (Pariahs) who eat beef the range of population is stated to be no less than sixty four feet..

(ii). The functional or occupational type of a caste is so numerous and so widely diffused and its characteristics are so prominent that community of function is ordinarily regarded as the chief factor in the evolution of caste. Changes of occupation in their turn, more specially among the lower caste, tend to bring about the formation of separate caste.

(iii). The sectarian types comprises a small number of castes which commenced life as religious sects founded by philanthropic enthusiasts who, having evolved some metaphysical formula offering a speedier release from the taedium vitae which oppresses the east, had further persuaded themselves that all men were equal, or at any rate that all believers in their teaching ought to be equal. The Banhra of Nepal- Newars, who were originally Buddhist priests but abandoned celibacy and crystallized into a caste. Race dominates religion: sect is weaker than caste.

(iv). Caste formed by crossing: Modern criticism has been specially active in its attack on that portion of the traditional theory which derives the multitude of mixed or inferior caste from an intricate serious of process between members of the original four.

An older and more instructive illustration , dating probably from before the Christian era, of the formation of the caste by crossing, is furnished by the Khas of Nepal who are the off-spring of mixed marriages between Rajputs or Brahman immigrants an the Mongolian women of the country …but their off-spring must not be stigmatized as a progeny of a Brahman and a Mlechha-must on the contrary, be raised to eminence in the new order of things proposed to be introduced by their fathers. To this progeny also, then, the Brahmans, in still greater defiance of their creed, communicated the rank of the second order of Hinduism: and from these two roots, mainly, sprung the now numerous, predominant, an extensively ramified tribe of the Khas, originally the name of a small clan of creedless barbarians, now the proud title of the Kshatriyas, or military order of the kingdom of Nepal.

The offspring of original Khas females and of Brahmans, with the honours and rank of the second order of Hinduism, got the patronymic titles of the first order, and hence the key to the anomalous nomenclature of so many stirpes of the military tribes of Nepal is to be sought in the nomenclature of the sacred order. It maybe added, as remarkably illustrative of the lofty spirit of the Parbattias, that in spite of the yearly increasing sway of Hinduism in Nepal, and of the various attempts of the Brahmans in high office to procure the abolition of a custom so radically opposed to the creed both parties now profess, the Khas still insist that the fruit of commerce (marriage is out of the question) between their females and males of the sacred order shall be ranked as Kshatriyas, wear the thread, and assume the patronymic title. The Khas now call themselves Chhattris or Kshatriyas- a practice which, according to Colonel Vansittart, dates from Sir Jang Bahadur’s visit to England in 1850. Allied to the Khas are the Ektharia and the Thakurs, both of Rajput parentage on the male side, the Thakur ranking higher because their ancestors are supposed to have been rulers of various petty States in Nepal. The Matwala Khas, again, are the progeny of Khas men and Magar women, and the Uchai Thakurs of the same lineage on the female side.

(v). Castes of the national type: Where there is neither nation nor national sentiment, it may seem paradoxical to talk about a national type of caste. There exists, however, certain groups, usually regarded as castes at the present day, which cherish traditions of bygone sovereignty and seem to preserve traces of an organization considerably more elaborate than that of an ordinary tribe. The Newars, a mix people of Mongoloid origin, who were the predominant race in Nepal proper until the country was conquered and annexed by the Gurkha Prithivi Narayan in 1768, maybe taken as an illustration of such a survival. The group comprises both Hindus and Buddhists. The two communities are quite distinct, and each is divided into an elaborate series of castes. Thus among the Hindu Newars, we find at the top of the social scale the Devabhaja, who are Brahmins and spiritual teachers; the Surjyabansi Mal, members of the old royal family; the Sreshta, consisting of ministers and other officials; and the Japu who are cultivators.

According to Mr. Enthoven, the Bombay Marathas may be classified as a tribe with two divisions, Maratha and Maratha Kunbi, of which the former are hypergamous to the latter, but were not originally distinct.

(vi).Castes formed by migration: If members of a caste leave the original habitat and settles permanently in another part of India, the tendency is for them to be separated from the parent group and to develop into a distinct caste. Mr. Gait has pointed out that “the prolonged residence of persons of Bihar caste in Bengal generally results in their being placed under a ban as regards marriage, …that up-country barbers who settled in Bengal are called khotta and practically form a separate sub caste, as Bengali barbers will not intermarry with them, while they are regarded as impure by the barbers of upper India and Bihar by reason of having taken up residence in Bengal..

(vii) Castes formed by changes of custom: The formation of new castes as a consequence of the neglect of established usage or the adoption of new ceremonial practices or secular occupations has been a familiar incident of the caste system from the earlier times. We are told in Manu how men of the three twice-born caste, who have not received the sacrament of initiation at the proper time, or who follow forbidden occupations, become Vratyas or outcasts, intercourse with them is punished with a double fine, and whose descendents are graded as distinct castes. The Babhans or Bhuinhars of the United Provinces and Bihar, are supposed, according to some legends, to be Brahmins who lost their status by taking to agriculture, and the Mongoloid Kochh of Northern Bengal describe themselves as Rajbansis, or as Vratya or Bhanga (broken) Kshatriyas – a designation which enables them to pose as an outlying branch of that exalted community who fled to these remote districts before the wrath of Parasu Rama, and there allowed their characteristic observation to fall into disuse.

2010-06-26T18:55:00.001-07:00

SIBLAC tells to MEF over the surging threat to environment from Mega Hydel Projects

source VoiceofSikkim on Jun 26, 2010

25 June, New Delhi
To
Mr. Jairam Ramesh
Hon’ble Union Minister of State
(Independent Charge)
Ministry of Environment & Forest
Government of India
Paryawaran Bhawan, CGO Complex
New Delhi 110003

Sub: Haphazard Mega Hydel Power Projects in Sikkim vis-à-vis systematic genocide of Sikkimese identity

It is very strange and disgusting that despite popular rejections and protest against most of the haphazard mega hydel-power projects in Sikkim that has posed immense threat to our local environment, demography, National Security and geography, your Ministry is simply acting like a mute spectator.

These mega hydel projects particularly in the Dzongu area where alone more than six mega projects are either being cleared or under the process of commissioning as against the mere indigenous and vanishing tribal population of 6000 is beyond imagination.

Your Ministry speaks big about global climatic changes and concern but for all practical purposes you care least sidelining the basic facts prevailing in remote parts like Sikkim in your own country.

Your Ministry, without verifying the ground realities and recommendations of reputed national environmentalists and institutes, accords go ahead to all and sundry in Sikkim for reasons best known to you.

Under the circumstances, I once again request you to give a rethink to all the projects as already given go ahead by you in Sikkim. You must appreciate that development, an important factor, however should not and must not be at the very cost of one’s identity and survival.

With highest regards.

Tseten Tashi Bhutia
Former Minister, Sikkim
Dated: June 25, 2010 Cum
Camp: New Delhi

2010-06-18T06:52:00.000-07:00

SIKKIM: Prime Minister of Tibetan govt-in-exile in Sikkim

Gangtok, June 18 (PTI) Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government-in-exile Samdung Rinpoche today asked community members to take the middle path as espoused by the Dalai Lama in their long-drawn struggle for freedom.

Rinpoche, who is on a two-day visit here, held a meeting with the members of the Tibetan community at the Tsokhasum Hall at Nam-Nang here.

Rinpoche advised the community members to continue their struggle for the cause of Tibetan Freedom and the welfare of Tibetans especially those in Tibet. He also appreciated the support of the community members in this regard.

He also emphasized the middle path as espoused by the Dalai Lama and urged the Tibetan people to continue on this path for fulfillment of their aims and objectives.

The meeting was attended by the Tibetan Welfare Officer, D Dorjee, Sherab Phal chen from Ralang Monastery and a huge gathering of Tibetans from Gangtok.

2010-06-18T06:42:00.000-07:00

Jammu & Kashmir Annual Plan 2010-11 Finalized
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17:49 IST
The Annual Plan for Jammu & Kashmir for the year 2010-11 was finalized here today at a meeting between Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission Shri Montek Singh Ahluwalia and Chief Minister of J & K Mr. Omar Abdullah. The Annual Plan was finalized at Rs.6000 crores.

Planning Commission appreciated State’s plan to develop 690 MW power generation capacity in PPP mode. The balance hydro power generation potential also needs to be similarly exploited, as it holds the key to State’s economic growth and for generating resources to fund its development schemes. Wind farm based capacity should be expanded and non-conventional systems based on solar and bio-mass also need to be encouraged.

Employment generation in J&K is a priority area. Handicraft and Tourism sector hold high potential in absorbing unemployed youth. The State should take steps to draw up a skill development plan to enhance employability of its youths.

There are large gaps in the delivery of health services mainly due to shortage of manpower. The State should take appropriate steps to fill these critical gaps and have focussed attention on inclusive growth. On infrastructure development incentives in the form of policies should be offered to make private sector active partner in the development of both social and physical infrastructure.

Science & Technology and innovation have played a critical role in economic growth and development of States. The State Science & Technology Council, through the State Department of Science & Technology must be playing a catalytic role in integrating Science & Technology into the development process of the State. The S&T council should formulate a Science & Technology Vision for the State with a definite road map for S&T intervention. Technological solutions that are available, affordable, accessible and appropriate will have to be provided.

Mr Ahluwalia said that the State Government should work out an action plan for rapid development of the State during twelfth plan period which ensures that the fruits of development reach people in all parts of the State equally. More avenues of revenue generation should be explored and State has abundant natural resources to create more streams of revenue generation.

Briefing the Commission on the development strategy for the State, Mr Abdullah said that the Government would create investment friendly environment and fiscal discipline would be maintained to make process of development more sustainable. Horticulture and tourism would be focal point of development. Social services and road development would get priority in the plan outlay.

NNK/RK

2010-05-11T17:47:00.000-07:00

INDIA/NEPAL:Call for Hindu Nepal at Mumbai meet

Kathmandu, May 10 (IANS): A three-day religious meet that kicked off in India is seeking fresh action to restore Nepal as a Hindu state.

The international meet on Hinduism that began Sunday in Mumbai is being addressed by the chief of Nepal’s only openly royalist party, Kamal Thapa, and Indian politicians like Bal Thackeray, former chief minister of Maharashtra Manohar Joshi and senior Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Gopinath Munde.

Thapa heads the Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal, the only party that contested the historic election in 2008 campaigning for a Hindu kingdom in Nepal, going against the popular political wave led by the former Maoist guerrillas. The election resulted in the abolition of monarchy and Nepal being declared a secular republic.

“At the Mumbai meet, to be attended by over 1,500 delegates from all over the world, Thapa will be arguing for the restoration of a Hindu state in Nepal,” said Rajaram Shrestha, former mayor of Kathmandu and prominent leader of the royalist party.

The Mumbai meet is also being addressed by former Nepali minister Khum Bahadur Khadka, whose ruling Nepali Congress party is divided over the issues of state religion and monarchy.

Khadka has been advocating the restoration of monarchy and a Hindu state in Nepal.

Two months ago, BJP’s former chief Rajnath Singh had visited Kathmandu when he announced his party’s support for a Hindu state in Nepal.

Thapa’s party has said it will oppose the new constitution – that is expected to bring peace in Nepal – unless the government holds a referendum before it to decisively settle the issues of monarchy and a Hindu state.

Nepal’s deposed king Gyanendra, who left his throne after a pro-democracy movement in 2006, has also said recently that Nepal should become a Hindu state again and monarchy could return if people wanted it.

The pro-Hindutva group has been strengthened by the failure of the major parties to work in harmony and the new constitution is now not likely to be ready by its deadline of May 28.

Should that happen, Thapa is asking for fresh elections where royalists hope to make greater gains than in the 2008 polls when they were mostly defeated.

2010-05-09T18:03:00.000-07:00

OPINION: State Formation of the Indian Union

Source:THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE]

BY DARJMAN

07 May: The final analytical work of Hillman –the Analyst in Constitutionally determining the long aspired statehood for the Darjeeling hill peoples is slowly coming to a glorious and final end in the immediate days ahead during or after the Sixth Tripartite Meeting contemplated on 25 May 2010. The substance of this analysis is contemplated in prelude and in anticipation of the coming meet which should change the entire history of Darjeeling District in times to come. Even if no deliberate results proceed from this meeting it is constitutionally perceivable that the Sixth Tripartite meet is expected to be the final initiation in breathing a fresh breath of life to the Darjeeling hill people, to once again carry on life with the much inspired dreams and aspirations withheld in breath for a very long time. Constitutionally speaking since 1950 when the Constitution of India was promulgated to awaken the toiling masses of India from the slumbering, debilitating rule of foreign invaders.

Unfortunately for Darjeeling District and many such ‘Backward Tracts’ (1870-1935) in rest of the country administratively referred to as ‘Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas’, independence in 1947 and the relevancy of the Constitution in 1950, was incomparable in contrast to the rest of the country. The change in difference was hardly noticeable. The foreign rule was imperceptible while contrasting to the rule projected by our own countrymen infact if relative comparisons of the change in time is attempted many who have participated in both time period consider the basic happiness index was more appreciable than the present times wherein development and progress is always gaged with expenditure than the net life style gain. To illustrate this with an example is the sheer impact of population explosion not only in the entire country but visibly so in the Darjeeling hills whose natural beauty of mountains, rivers and forest are on the verge being reversibly impacted by the genie of development without even a side glance to the social and physical environmental impacts.

All the hill towns Darjeeling, Kurseong, Kalimpong as well as the smaller village town are on the brink of social, cultural and economic disaster at the humane end at the cost of the ecology while attempting to environmentally balance the ecological equation. This effort is nowhere in sight in claiming its achievement. Rather on the contrary the vision for the future, without any doubt perceivably and statistically is pessimistic. This being the present scenario with no possible constructive solution in sight, the only adventure is to attempt, at a last resort, holding on to even a straw, in order to salvage what remains of the hills by obtaining its own state, space, mind and perseverance in order to bail out the future generations before the gates of heaven finally closes. That is to obtain the state which it is only discovered, that obtaining it was a Constitutional right enshrined in the August book to deliver the Darjeeling hill peoples before the count of disaster. It seems the bell had already rung at the time of independence but made obvious only in 1950 by the provisions of the Constitution wherein the future of Darjeeling District was already written as the writings on the wall in the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936 declaring it as a ‘Partially Excluded Area’. This simple phrase remained undeciphered and insignificant till it was only recently discovered that its implication was very profound. The meaning and its delivery is yet not understood by the very people for whom it was implied to protect and preserve. No doubt the ruling ethnic majority had understood its meaning and implications in the very inception itself. Understanding which much backdoor politics and money may have changed hands in order to delude the innocent herd of sheep not as the proverbial shepherd but to sacrifice them at the alter.

Ad the adage goes truth cannot be hidden for long so the implication of ‘Partially Excluded Area’ relevant to Darjeeling District is now being understood by the sacrificial lamb who can now escape from the wrath, and save its life and in time its soul, by the translating the meaning of Partially Excluded Area in the provisions of the Constitution for the final deliverance.

The V and VI Schedule are the basic features incorporated in the Constitution for new state formations and that too provided only for the territorial areas of India identified since the time of East India Company territories were gradually being converted into administrative areas under provisions of the Regulating Act of 1773 onwards. Darjeeling District formally considered as an administrative unit in 1866 was kept out of the purview of the reforms process, like similar areas considered inhabited by tribes and hill peoples, and accordingly these areas were never ever administratively nor territorially attached to the Indian Provinces, so to say.

These areas were known as Non Regulated Areas and for all practical purposes even at the point of independence, and the transfer of power from the British to Indian sovereignty was normally formalized by the provisions of The (Foreign) Jurisdiction Act 1947 which seemed to have allowed the Central govt. jurisdiction in relation to areas outside India (namely, Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas) now understood to mean provisions for the administration of Scheduled Tribes and Tribal Areas (Scheduled Areas) within the meaning and provisions of the V and VI Schedules, which is the only provision in the Constitution allowing state formation and that too for areas previously identified and defined in the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936.

All the tribal areas so identified more or less have perceived to have been concluded their constitutional right by forming 14 States and 7 Union Territory (UT) out of Excluded Areas (EA), Partially Excluded Areas (PEA), Centrally Administered Areas (CAA), UT and 17 States out of V Schedule (12) and VI Schedule (5).

Somehow the right of tiny Darjeeling District have been inadvertently or rather advertently been left out not acts of omission or commission but actually in fact by devious means and misconceptions introduced by the vestment of the state to deny the constitutional right of the Darjeeling hill peoples for the benefit of the state however contrived and discriminatory. This resulting in the long years of the Darjeeling hill people grouping and grappling in the darkness of Gorkhaland illusion which though a magic word to garner the hill people in directing a united stand but on the other hand drastically implying closing the very doors of the Constitution by the implication of the terminology. The implication of the application of Nepali language in determining the Tribes in Census 1931 to the 26 tribes’ communities at the time seemed to have delisted practically all the Nepali speaking tribes to non tribes when the majority tribe population of Census 1931 was reduced to a minority tribes population in 1941. The delisted communities, no doubt genuine tribes, have applied for the tribe status once again. This was similarly expressed earlier by Subhash Ghissing and now the same stance has been repeated by Bimal Gurung in order to effect statuesque anti Census 1931. The delisting of many tribes except the Bhutias and Lepchas was a gargantuan blunder which denied Darjeeling District the large population majority required now to attempt statehood. The mistake has been a costly blunder and which no doubt the state has utilized it to its full advantage But the day of the awakening is at hand, and no matter what stands ahead the road is cleared for the future of Darjeeling hill peoples now to claim its constitutional right.

Having referred to the Constitution deeply it is in understanding, already stated earlier, the V and VI Schedule provisions of the Constitution are the state formation process applicable to all those Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Areas already mentioned in view of the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936. In order to find out the applicability of the two provisions V and VI Schedule, one is required to refer the Constituent Assembly debates and find the slot for its attachment.

The V Schedule area was discussed by the Advisory Committee’s Sub Committee on Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas other than Assam chaired by A.V.Thakkar in the interim report submitted on 18 Aug 1947. Darjeeling District being in Bengal, outside Assam, was discussed by this Committee and therefore its right to obtain statehood is provided therein – the V Schedule.

So it would be a constitutional fallacy if the provision of VI Schedule is applied to Darjeeling District as is being formented by certain political parties not with any ulterior motive but misunderstanding the entire issue by identifying Darjeeling District regionally with Assam. Infact it is guessed that the reason why the VI Schedule, now lying in suspended animation in Parliament, is seen to have been directed to be so remain after the protagonist discovered that the entire event was unconstitutional and had been mistakenly misplaced. It required being withdrawn before it became a bill itself and attempting at all costs to derail it becoming an act. Having controlled the damage and lest it at rest, it is believed now the true constitutional plank is being laid.

Now the entire format applied by the concerned seems to be, and properly so the V Scehdule. However Darjeeling District has a factorial deficiency wherein the actual requirement consists of two qualifications, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Areas. Only the former is applied to Darjeeling District because the latter is deficient in content and hence requires enlargement by appealing for recognition of more Scheduled Tribes in order to complete the program to obtain a state. With only one factor, the Schedule Tribes, the immediate attempt can only effect a Union Territory status and which it is believed to be so being implied at the moment as an Interim arrangement till the point of time the other members of the Darjeeling hill people achieve larger population to qualify as Scheduled Area, which when achieved can eventually complete the statehood formation process in time. Till such time Darjeeling District shall remain a Union Territory.

The Union Govt. and the President of India being the guardian of the Constitution is now perceived to be quite convinced that it is the right moment for the history of Darjeeling to be conferred its rightful constitutional provision by allowing it initially, as an interim arrangement, to form a Union Territory preceding statehood.

One of the most contentious issue is posed by the question of Centre agreeing to included the Dooars of Darjeeling District into any concept of the new dispensation. The issue of Dooars is a difficult proposition for the Centre to accept as Jalpaiguri District itself of which the Dooars form a part, does not come under any provisions of neither the V or the VI Schedule since the District was left out of the ambit Govt. of India Act 1935 as including Dooars with Darjeeling District becomes unconstitutional for the Centre to accept. The proper way to go about is to create another unit of Jalpaiguri District jointly advanced by the hill tribes and the plain tribes to obtain another state. In effect to create two states of Darjeeling District which is already conferred by the constitution of India and in due time, after certain formalities are complied to approach the Centre for another state of Jalpaiguri District which again in reference to Census 1931 will be found to be a genuine demand. This is a futuristic appellation and a design, not at all considered to divide Bengal, but allowing the much deprived people of North Bengal to find its own bearings and moors. This should complete the entire map of North east states as the nine jewels of the tribes of East India.

The Indian Independence Act 1947 requires to be cited here to engage all concerned to deliberate on both the issues of Darjeeling District and Jalpaiguri District forming into state/states to finally close the chapter of the entire country of India having integrated into a whole republic after the departure of the foreign rulers in 1947. What is most puzzling is the constitutional vacuum wherein on what basis West Bengal can holds remaining a state if the Darjeleing tribes are delineated which seems to be the factor on basis of which the state was conceived out of erstwhile Bengal. This is in consideration of the fact, East Bengal (East Pakistan now Bangladesh) is perceived to have been created based on the rights of the indigenous minorities the Chakma tribes. It is felt this tribe was inadvertently as well as tragically included in forming East Bengal despite the fact the tribe consisted of a population inhabitants of 87% Buddhists incorporated with an Islamic state, both being anathema and dislike each other since the advent of Islam in India. Infact Indian history relates the final annihilation of Buddhism in India was after the invasion of India by Islamic rulers. If at all this allusion is sensible it would be a shame in the history of India as well as its leaders to account for this perceived blame if at all true.

ANNEXATIONS:

1. Formation of States

2. Acts 1773 – 2011

2010-05-03T19:00:00.001-07:00

India closes ranks with Hamid Karzai

by M. K. Bhadrakumar

The talks in Delhi have made it quite clear that India will remain an effective partner for the Afghan government in the difficult period ahead, no matter the vicissitudes of the United States' AfPak diplomacy.

The Afghan President Hamid Karzai's two-day visit to New Delhi last week took place at a defining moment in the Afghan civil war. Mr. Karzai is about to embark on a crucial peace and reconciliation project. He just completed talks in three important regional capitals — Islamabad, Tehran and Beijing — explaining his strategy, for the success of which he needs the understanding from the regional powers. Tehran and Beijing were forthcoming in their support of the Afghan government whereas Islamabad views him as a rival claimant to piloting the peace process.

Secondly, “Afghanisation” is set to surge to the centre stage. The foreign minister-level meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) held in Tallinn, the Estonian capital, on April 23 officially set in motion a process to roll back the alliance's operations in Afghanistan. While this would be a natural process and not a “run for the exit,” as NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it, the political reality is that the western allies have reached agreement on basic guidelines for commencing the hand-over of responsibility for security to the Afghan forces on a case-by-case basis within this year. The international conference, slated to be held in Kabul in June, will further “tweak” the NATO's approach. Mr. Karzai formally invited India to take part in the conference.

The talks in Delhi have made it quite clear that India will remain an effective partner for the Afghan government in the difficult period ahead no matter the vicissitudes of the United States' AfPak diplomacy; the worsening security situation inside Afghanistan; the Pakistani military's undisguised power projection for “strategic depth”; and, least of all, the physical threat from Pakistani agents to the Indian presence in Afghanistan.

Dr. Singh summed up that his discussions with Mr. Karzai were “extremely productive.” Delhi underlined their strategic character by including Defence Minister A.K. Antony in the Indian delegation at the talks. Dr. Singh pointedly articulated India's “deep admiration” for Mr. Karzai's “courageous leadership in difficult times,” probably administering a word of advice to the Barack Obama administration to have a sense of proportions in judging the highly complex Afghan political situation. Broadly speaking, the Indian viewpoint has been consistently that there is an organic linkage between creating an enabling security environment and setting high yardsticks about an expansion of the footprint of the Afghan government or its accelerated progress on governance issues.

Interestingly, a lowering of the anti-Karzai rhetoric and grandstanding is of late visible in certain quarters within the Obama administration. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton conspicuously voiced a rethink recently. The big question, however, is how far down the ladder Ms Clinton's fair-minded estimation trickles down. Delhi would very much hope that her helpful words translate as U.S. policies on the ground in the aftermath of Mr. Karzai's visit to Washington on May 10-14 — although a systematic Pakistani attempt to queer the pitch of the visit is already afoot.

Two topics dominated Mr. Karzai's talks in Delhi — placing India's development and strategic partnership with Afghanistan within the “Afghanisation” process and, secondly, India's perspectives on the “reintegration” and reconciliation of the Taliban. Dr. Singh said, “India is ready to augment its assistance for capacity building and for its skills and human resource development to help strengthen public institutions in Afghanistan.”

India's assistance for Afghanistan already touches a massive figure of $1.3 billion. India can train Afghan specialists in various fields, provide training and equipment to the Afghan army and cooperate in a range of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotic activities. However, Delhi would be aware that any military deployment in Afghanistan is bound to be a potentially exhausting military mission and needs to be avoided. The Indian stance is strikingly similar to that of Russia or China, which also refuse to get militarily involved in Afghanistan. The challenge facing Indian diplomacy will be to figure out how economic expansion can be the key element of India's security strategy in Afghanistan. Arguably, emulating China's model, which places emphasis on making investments in resource-based projects will be a step forward for India. This could be done in collaboration with Afghan partners.

Without doubt, Mr. Karzai's visit helped to further refine the Indian thinking apropos the contours of an Afghan settlement. The Indian thinking rests on the following assessments. One, India regards the forthcoming jirga (tribal assembly) in May in Kabul and the Afghan parliamentary elections in September to be “important milestones.” Delhi agrees with Mr. Karzai's stance that in order for these processes to be legitimate and enduring, they should be Afghan-led. Two, these political processes can be optimal only if they go hand in hand with the international community's long term commitment to stability, peace and development in Afghanistan.

Three, the deterioration in the security situation is a hard reality and it needs to be firmly tackled on a priority basis within Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan, where the syndicate of terrorist organisations and other extremist groups operating in the region enjoy support and sustenance. Towards this end, apart from the NATO's surge, the Afghan security forces should be enlarged and developed in a professional manner and provided with adequate resources, combat equipment and enablers and training.

It would appear that Mr. Karzai allayed the Indian apprehensions regarding the strategy of “reintegration” of the Taliban. Delhi takes a cautious view of the process since in its view the Taliban may exploit the political space to capture power with Pakistani support, creating a fait accompli for the region, which was how the ISI implemented a phase-by-phase agenda of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan during 1994-97. Therefore, Delhi would expect the reintegration process to be “tackled with prudence, the benefit of hindsight, foresight and caution.” Also, Delhi stresses that any integration process should be “inclusive and transparent,” which is predicated on the assessment that Afghanistan is a plural society and the majority opinion is not only vehemently against the Taliban's extremist ideology but also staunchly opposes any role for the outsiders to covertly dictate peace.

Mr. Karzai shared his thinking apropos the upcoming jirga with Dr. Singh and it appears that there are no serious contradictions between the two sides. Significantly, Mr. Karzai made it a point to underline “our common struggle against terrorism and extremism.” The joint statement also underlined the two countries' “determination…to combat the forces of terrorism which pose a particular threat to the region.”

There has been a latent sense of uneasiness among sections of the Indian strategic community that Mr. Karzai appeared to be in a mood to “compromise” or “appease” the Taliban in a self-seeking manner in anticipation of a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Much of this misperception stemmed from the western propaganda — often pre-cooked in the ISI's kitchen — intended to dissimulate or to create an impression that Mr. Karzai is raring to go to accommodate the Taliban leadership and if anything at all is holding him back, it is only Mr. Obama's scepticism about the reconciliation strategy.

Delhi seems to understand well enough that what is unfolding is rather a grim struggle for the control of the Afghan peace process itself. Unsurprisingly, Mr. Karzai insists on his prerogative as the elected head of state to lead his country's peace process. On the contrary, Pakistani military would like to cast Mr. Karzai as merely one of the Afghan protagonists. Ostensibly, the Pakistani military wishes to work exclusively with the U.S. to reconcile the Taliban but in reality it wishes to seize control of the peace process or to dominate it, while extracting concessions from Washington in the form of military and economic aid. The Pakistani military banks on exploiting Mr.Obama's haste to effect a drawdown of the U.S. combat troops by mid-2011.

The ISI has not only shed its “strategic ambiguity” regarding its nexus with the Taliban but of late openly flaunts its influence with the hardline “Quetta Shura” and the Haqqani network, making it clear that Rawalpindi is capable of torpedoing any peace process which is left to the Afghans. Ironically, this nexus with elements expressly banned by the United Nations (at the instance of the George W. Bush administration) ought to make Pakistan a rogue state but the U.S. has been pragmatic about it and instead chooses to solicit the Pakistani military's help. An added factor is that influential figures within Mr. Obama's AfPak team who are vestiges of the Afghan jihad, enjoy old links with the Pakistani security establishment and willingly subserve the ISI's agenda pitting Mr. Karzai as the “problem” in any national reconciliation process.

Curiously, this political theatre is unfolding against a backdrop where “almost all Afghans, including Karzai's Pashtun supporters, the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance and even the Taliban oppose any major role for the ISI,” to quote Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani commentator, in a recent article in the Washington Post. Quite obviously, the Pakistani military's control of the foreign and security policies is at a high level in Islamabad. Delhi will do well to figure out that Mr. Karzai deserves all the support he needs at this juncture.

(The writer is a former diplomat.)
source; the hindu

2010-04-10T17:59:00.000-07:00

NEPAL: I am getting married on June 19 but its not arranged marriage – Manisha Koirala

FROM INDIAROCKS.COM

BY SUBHASH K. JHA

After her marriage Manisha Koirala will now spend more time in her home-town Kathmandu than in Mumbai.

One of Bollywood’s most beautiful and footloose divas, Manisha Koirala is all set to get married finally. Just back in Mumbai after an extensive shoot in Kerala for Malayalam film Manisha can barely contain her excitement.

She says, “Yes, I’m getting married to Samrat. He’s from Nepal, like me. But please, it is not an arranged marriage. Yes, our families know one another for some years now. So there was a comfort level between me and Samrat for a very long time. Gradually the bonding grew from friendship to love. And when Samrat asked me to marry him I agreed.”

Manisha returned to Mumbai from Kerala on Wednesday morning to the news of her marriage all over the place.

She laughs, “I was totally cut off in Kerala shooting for Shayam Prasad’s Malayalam film. I had no idea my marriage plans were being discussed in my absence. Now I see dates and venue in the papers. Like I said the wedding is on June 19. It will take place in Kathmandu and will be attended by Samrat’s and my close family and friends.”

Manisha will now spend more time in Kathmandu. “That’s where Samrat is based. He is into many kind of business ventures including a project in alternate energy. So yes, one thing will change. Mumbai used to be my first home. Now Kathmandu will be my first home. But I’ll continue to be a Mumbai girl at heart and will have a home here.”

So is her dream of a home in Paris over? “No way!” says the fiery Nepali beauty. “My dream home in Paris has just been postponed for a while. Now instead of me alone it will be my husband and I sharing a Parisian home.”

In fact the couple plans to honeymoon in France.

Speaking on cutting down her work Manisha says, “I’ve been cutting down my assignments for a few years now. So it’s not as if I’ve been working frantically. I will continue to do selected films after marriage.”

As forthright as ever, Manisha volunteers the information that she broke up with her last boyfriend, the American Chris Dolan long ago. “We split quite some time ago. But we continue to be friends. That’s the way I like it in my life. Even when a relationships ends the friendship continues. I don’t like any negativity around me. I’d like all my friends to wish Samrat and me a happy married life.”

Samrat apparently is shy of the limelight. “He had his picture removed from a social networking website as soon as our marriage was announced. Samrat will have to get used to public attention after we get married.”

2010-04-10T17:54:00.001-07:00

ESSAY: Tamangs are different

Subjugated and abused by Nepal’s first Hindu monarch, willfully referred to as ‘Tamangs’, this community has suffered much and continues to worry about what else must come, writes Furba Lama

MAHAYANA is one type of Buddhism and the other, Nyingmapa, was created by Gurupadmasamva, affectionately called Guru Rinpoche by Tibetans in Tibet, in the seventh century. Before this, there no Buddhism in Tibet and all Tibetan communities and sub-sects were followers of Bon Dharma. The Tamags were the first Tibetan sub-sect to embrace Nyingmapa Buddhism in Tibet at Palyul, where the first Nyingmapa Buddhist gompas (monasteries) were built. The word Tamang is wrong; neither is it a Nepali nor a Tibetan word. In fact, Tamag is the correct word and its pronounciation is correctly mentioned in the Tibetan-to-English dictionary (page 980) prepared and published by Sarat Chandra Das of Lhasa Villa, Darjeeling, in 1834 and it is also mentioned in the same dictionary (pages 780 and 781) that fifth Panchen Rinpoche invited Das to Tibet in 1879 and 1881. It also mentions that Panchen Rinpoche died of smallpox in 1882 and that the sixth Panchen Rinpoche took over as an infant in 1883.

The veracity of the word Tamag can be proven from its meaning: Ra-ta-ta=Ta; Dau-ma-ga-mag=Mag; therefore, the letter or word Ta, meaning horse, and Mag meaning army, gives the word Tamag, meaning Mounted Army (in Nepali Ghorchari Sena, Risalla, Aswarohi Sena). There were so many Tibetan sub-sects of which the Tamags were the main security and protection force of the palace and king. That is why Tamag is a Tibetan word that was willfully mispronounced and intentionally changed to Tamang by the so-called first Hindu monarch just after the creation of Nepal. Tamang is neither a Nepali word nor a Tibetan one.

Before the creation of Nepal, there were Tamags in the Temal Hill in the seventh century and since Nepal is not more than 244 years old, it means and proves that Nepal was created in 1767 after the tribal kings of different buffer states were subjugated by the so-called Hindu king who integrated their holdings into one nation called Nepal. But even after this unification, there was no common language in this newly created country. Of course, there were the Khas and Parbatay languages that were spoken by the Kamis, Damais and Sarkis, and even the Chettris, Bahoons and Thakuris spoke the Rajput and Rajasthani languages in 1767 when these were introduced in those buffer tribal states by the Rajasthani Rajput King of the Saha clan.

Nepali poet Bhanu Bhakta also belonged to the Bahoon community, also an intruder from Rajasthan, and the common mother tongue and language of these people were Rajasthani and Hindi. When these communities intruded into those tribal buffer states where the Khan and Parbatay languages were used by the Kamis, Damais and Sarkis, they introduced their languages which Bhanu Bhakta employed and translated the Ramayan in a very easy language which he called Nepali. Bhakta collected the script from Deonagari Lipi of Hindi and prepared the Nepali script and wrote on home-made Nepali paper. At the time that Bhakta created his language — called Nepali by the first Hindu king of the first Hindu country called Nepal 244 years ago — he was 29 years old. Therefore, from the 193rd birth anniversary celebrated by Nepalis all over the world on 13 July 2009 we can easily find that the age of the Nepali language is thus: 193-29 (Bhakta’s age at the time) = 164 years.

The Tamag community and their language is more than 1,067 years older than that of the Nepali/Gorkha community and their language, culture, costumes their religion. Therefore, this proves that the Tamags are a different tribal community, with their own spoken language and script that is approved by the Language Research Institute, government of India, at Mysore (Karnataka): Tamyig language. Since 2005 this language has been implemented in schools in Sikkim, and for which that state government has appointed Tamyig language teachers in different schools. Tamags have their own costumes, culture and eating habits. The community embraces and follows Nyingmapa Buddhism. In the seventh century, the Tamags were compelled by the so-called first Hindu king of “unified” Nepal in 1767 to give up their culture, costumes, language and main festivals (Sonam Lochar). Defiance invited severe punishment from the so-called Hindu King’s forces, who intruded from Kanauj (Rajasthan) and included the Rajputh communities of Chettris and Bahoons. This explains why the Tamags lost everything after the unification of Nepal.

Therefore, we still have doubts here in the Darjeeling Hill areas. Will the same be repeated here? Will Tamags be safe and secure, allowed to retain their culture, language, costumes, religions beliefs? The present Tamag generation is just uplifting itself, developing in Darjeeling, Sikkim, Assam, the Dooars and so many places elsewhere.

Tamags should come forward and do something about the preservation of Nyingpapa Buddhism and their culture, rituals and lifestyle. If these vanish, all Tamags will face an identity crisis. Each and every Tamag must keep in mind that they different than the other communities.

source; The Statesman

2010-04-09T16:33:00.001-07:00

SDF governement violated Article 371 F – SNPP

The Sikkim National People’s Party takes strong exception to the statement made by the Chief Minister that the provisions and safeguards of article 371F are fully protected despite the holding of the Municipal elections in Sikkim. The party draws the attention of the public to the fact that Clause (b)of Article 371F gives recognition to the Assembly of Sikkim elected in 1974 and reads as follows:
(b) as from the date of commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereafter in this article referred to as the appointed day)-
(i) the Assembly for Sikkim formed as a result of the elections held in Sikkim in April, 1974 with thirty-two members elected in the said elections (hereinafter referred to as the sitting members) shall be deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly constituted under this Constitution;
(ii) the sitting members shall be deemed to the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly elected under this Constitution; and
(iii) the said Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim shall exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Legislative Assembly of a State under this Constitution;

The Party wishes to reiterate that this Assembly of 1974 was elected with seats reserved for the Sikkimese of Nepali Origin (SNO) and was recognized by the Indian Constitution. Despite this fact the seat reservations for the SNO’s were done away with fraudulently and against the objectives and spirit of the 8th May Agreement of 1973. Despite the fact that the Nepali seats were declared general, for the last three decades there was an “unwritten understanding” that these general seats were for the SNO’s and no political party had come forward to break this understanding. But today the SDF Government by officially giving party tickets to non-SNO’s has not only completely violated the spirit of Article 371F, which calls for equality of treatment among all Sikkimese, but also directly affected the sentiments of the SNO’s, of which the CM himself is a member. It can be seen that the Chief Minister has never taken up the issue of restoration of seat for the SNO’s in the past and now in one blow he has opened the floodgates for a period of turbulence in Sikkimese politics by making the SNO’s even more insecure..

The party has already condemned and boycotted the Municipal Elections due to the fact that Article 371F is being repeatedly violated both in letter and in spirit, and with the distribution of the party tickets by the ruling SDF, a new and dangerous twist has been introduced to the never ending attack on the identity of the Sikkimese with scant regards to the one and only agreement which the Sikkimese people have with the Government of India.

The party therefore resolves:

1. To condemn the recently held Municipal elections as a meaningless exercise and a direct attack on the identity of the Sikkimese of Nepali Origin and appeals to the people of Sikkim to boycott and not co-operate with these new institutions which have been thrust upon the people trampling their Constitutional Guarantees.

2010-04-08T06:12:00.001-07:00

India and Iran's Afpak policy

BY Atul Aneja

How does India propose to get back into the game of realignments beginning to unfold in and around Afghanistan?

Iran's recent hyper-activism in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan has caused considerable consternation in large parts of the globe. In media circles, think-tanks and world chanceries, high-browed mandarins and their well-healed affiliates are trying to make sense of the latest, seemingly inscrutable piece of the Persian puzzle.

Yet Iran's deft moves in an area that the Persians have known well for thousands of years originate from deeply deliberated and well-grounded fundamentals. Ever since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has been ceaselessly battling the threat of a direct American attack or an invasion by a third country that is backed by the United States. The Iraq war of 2003 brought the American forces in an eyeball-to-eyeball face-off along Iran's western borders, while the entry of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan became a potential cross-border threat to Iran from the east.

Since 2003, the Iranians have been seeking the exit of American forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of their aspirations have a good chance of realisation, as the bulk of the forces are slated to leave Iraq next year. The U.S. exit from Afghanistan could begin in July 2011.

While the exit of foreign forces would mark a substantial advance, the Iranians have been looking further ahead to a post-exit scenario, in anticipation of a political vacuum that is likely to emerge once the American troops depart. Viscerally opposed to any repositioning by extra-regional players , Iran is working vigorously to establish a de facto alliance of regional countries that will dominate the geopolitical arena stretching from Turkey in the west to China in the east.

It is in this larger context of regionalising the geopolitical space that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set foot on Afghan soil on March 10. Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai — who fought running battles with the Americans who were more inclined to favour his rival Abdullah Abdullah during the recent Afghan elections — received the Iranian President warmly. Like the Iranians, Mr. Karzai has concluded that the Americans are tiring in Afghanistan and that the time has come to explore deeper alignments in an alternative camp that includes Iran, and has China, Pakistan, Central Asian republics and Russia as potential allies.

While engaging the Afghans on a new footing, the Iranians have also begun to cultivate Pakistan. A major shift in the contours of their relationship can be traced to October 2009, when the Pakistan-based Jundallah group, led by Abdolmalek Rigi, killed Nour-Ali Shoushtari, and other senior commanders of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). Incensed by these high-profile assassinations, in the Pishin area of the Sistan-Balochistan province, the Iranians sent a few days later their Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar to Islamabad, with the demand for Rigi's handover. Subsequently, Rigi was nabbed in a dramatic fashion when the Iranians forced a Kyrgyzstan airlines plane in which he was travelling from Dubai to Bishkek, to land in the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas. Influential voices in Pakistan say that Islamabad gave the vital tip off that led to Rigi's arrest. The Iranians, however, insist that the arrest was possible on account of their meticulous intelligence work, without any foreign involvement whatsoever.

Since the 2009-10 winter war in Gaza, during which Turkey openly distanced itself from Israel, the relationship between Tehran and Ankara has been warming up. Political goodwill is being translated into significant energy cooperation and both sides, despite resistance from several influential quarters, are looking at participating in the Nabucco pipeline, which will carry huge quantities of gas to Europe.

As the geopolitical alignments ahead of the U.S. pullout begin to emerge, India's absence is glaring. Piqued by India's high profile in Kabul, Pakistan's military establishment has been looking for openings that would allow it to achieve its maximalist objective of seeking India's hasty, and preferably unseemly, exit from Afghanistan.

However, two major hurdles have been impeding Pakistan's path so far. First, the rapid improvement in Indo-U.S. ties during the Bush presidency firmly deterred it from taking India head-on in Afghanistan. Second, the Afghan presidency, closely tied to New Delhi since 2001, was hostile to Islamabad.

However, the scenario changed dramatically with the exit of the Bush administration and the emergence of Barack Obama. Focussed on an exit strategy from Afghanistan, the Americans deepened their security dependence on the Pakistanis in the hope of achieving rapid success. As a result, the Indian fortress in Afghanistan which looked impregnable during the Bush era was breached. Pakistan utilised this opportunity to the hilt.

A staunch ally of India for several years, President Karzai after his re-election last year began to exhibit unusual warmth towards Pakistan. His description of India as a friend and Pakistan as a conjoined twin during his visit to Islamabad was widely seen as a demonstration of his waning affection towards New Delhi.

There has been a significant deterioration in India-Iran ties since New Delhi voted against Tehran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Iranian nuclear programme. In fact, the day India voted against Iran, it seriously jeopardised its project in Afghanistan. Without a geographically contiguous border, India can extend its reach into Afghanistan only through the Iranian corridor.

With its back to the wall, how does India propose to get back into the great game of realignments beginning to unfold in and around Afghanistan? It can draw some inspiration from its diplomatic conduct in the past — when it worked successfully with the Iranians, Russians and Central Asians, especially the Tajiks to unroll the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in 2001. With the recent visit of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to New Delhi where discussions on Afghanistan took place, India has taken its first major step in the right direction.

Mending fences with Iran has to be India's next major undertaking. However, in trying to rework its relations, India is left with only one weighty card, which it can play with good effect provided it begins to view its national interests independently and not through the tinted glasses of the U.S. With its huge requirements of energy, India needs to get back to the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project. But in doing so, it has to substantially modify the arrangement and turn it around to suit its core long-term interests.

Iran would, with considerable enthusiasm, welcome India's participation in this project, as is evident from the provisions included in the gas deal that was signed by Iran and Pakistan in Istanbul in March. Therein lies the opportunity for India to claw back into the arrangement and take it forward from there.

Instead of waiting for others like Pakistan to seize the initiative, India can benefit substantially by boldly and formally initiating the introduction of two significant players — Russia and China — into this tie up. The Russian gas giant Gazprom has already expressed its keen interest to participate in IPI. Gazprom's representative in Tehran, Abubakir Shomuzov, has called for the extension of IPI to China, in an arrangement that would tie Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran together in a giant project.

Russia's participation in the IPI would be crucial for India. With Russia firmly on its side, India can, with greater ease and confidence, engage with China in this cooperative enterprise. In the debate on the extension of IPI to China, the route that this pipeline can pursue would be of vital importance. If India has to take advantage of this extension, it has to insist that the pipeline passing through Iran and Pakistan should go through an Indian transit corridor and no other alternative route before entering China.

Such an arrangement would greatly help in making the IPI-plus arrangement more stable and workable. With China, Pakistan's all-weather friend as the final beneficiary, Islamabad would find it impossible to block supplies to India. In other words, the routing of the pipeline to China via India, and the interdependence that it would generate among the various stakeholders would become New Delhi's insurance policy for obtaining assured gas supplies from Iran via Pakistan.

There is a final diplomatic dimension which needs to be added if IPI-plus is to succeed. Critics of the IPI rightly point to the security problems that this project, in the current circumstances, is bound to encounter during the pipeline's passage through the turbulent province of Balochistan. A comprehensive dialogue may therefore be the way forward to resolve this problem. India, which in recent years has gone into a diplomatic shell, can take the high-ground and propose a comprehensive six-party process. Besides itself, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, China and Iran can become the core participants of this arrangement. Such a forum, carefully constructed, adequately resourced and energetically led can take head-on not only the question of Baluchistan, but all other issues that may stand in the way of a lasting trans-national energy partnership.

===================================================================================

Comments:

I beg to differ on this. First of all, Pakistan and Afganistan (AF-PAK/PAK-AF) is one region that's not going to stabilise now or ever. Pakistan was born with one thing in mind, "hate India" The jihad ideology will one day create civil unrest and mayhem in Pakistan, better not to get involved with a failed state and better to secure the borders.

from: sachin nair
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 01:18 IST

All issues considered, perhaps the shallow sea route through Pakistani waters on to mainland India and then on to China through Myanmar may be the best route for the pipeline. Of course, the pipeline would also involve passage through the shallow waters of Bangladesh. Bangladesh probably presents less of a hurdle to this route than Pakistan. The security aspects based on Pakistan's instability could thus be overcome by routing the Pakistani supply through an off-shoot from the main supply line from the sea.

from: Brahm Prasher
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 03:48 IST

Very good thought about having stability in Asia. I may also add, besides IPI+link there can ba a railway link among all Asean countries. Let the ancient civilisations come together so their populations could have better understaning of all the mythical cultures.

from: Kashmir Singh Bains
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 03:56 IST

The IPI pipeline is a non-starter in the short term, due to Pakistan's adverserial relationship. Though the pipeline extension from India to China sounds good in theory, there is no incentive for Pakistan or China to agree to this. They can go straight to China through Pakistan or the Wakhan corridor in Afghanistan, bypassing India. We still need to find ways to work with Iran and ensure the US plans of isolating it are unsuccessful, but just not through the IPI.

from: Venki
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 04:40 IST

This article is a nicely laid out analysis of ground realities of interdependent security/economic interests of multiple regional players. However,in giving a solution, the author is too optimistic in his expectation of cooperation amoung the participents. As an example,when it comes to implementation,China may not agree to depend on the pipeline transit through India, citing cost factor. Due to competing nature of the players involved,ultimately it may end up as series of BILATERAL pacts amoungst the nations involved. I hope I am wrong.

from: Vinod vinjamuri .
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 06:14 IST

I don't agree as IPI is more a headache than investment. Key for Iran lies in Russia and Israel.

from: raje
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 08:16 IST

There are interesting points in this article and I hope that in near future the union of Asian giants would happen to counter American and European influence in the world.

from: Varun Gaur
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 08:34 IST

A very good article. India's tendency to get itself tied to the apron string of US should be stopped. In the fight between US and Iran we need not tow the US line. We should have remained neutral. The IPI pipeline project is a good one but US will torpedo it somehow or other. It is already pressing Pakistan.

from: Guptan Veemboor
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 11:47 IST

The story is interesting but the analysis seems flawed. You forget the role of the US and our real long term ally, a natural one is the US not by any stretch of imagination the Islamic clergy run government. By ignoring US strategic interests we harm ourselves much more as the game plays out with Pakistan, who WE are joined at the hip with, being a major factor.

from: Varun Sood
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 12:28 IST

India should have a consistent policy towards Iran. It should not treat Iran as untouchable when it comes to the relation with US. India should back Iran in international fora such as UN and IAEA. There should be a great deal of cooperation between South Asian countries, China and Russia. If India still depends on Uncle Sam for its foreign policy issues and behaves as a regional big brother it will soon stand isolated in International area after being heavily exploited and let down by United States.

from: R. Mohanasundar
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 14:08 IST

Time and tide may change Iran's AfPak policy.India has to wait and watch and prepare its strategy in a balanced way.RADHA KUMUD DAS.

from: RADHA KUMUD DAS
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 14:11 IST

Interesting scenario! However, it is important not to abandon the links with the U.S. however tempting the Iranian pipeline is. In the final analysis, while Russia is a long time ally and a dependable one, China is not. And Iran is still under the control of extremists. Pakistan will fish in troubled waters as long as it can, but will be reined in by the U.S. who is its major donor. And Karzai can be brought back in once he realises that Pakistan is not a reliable entity.

The way to go forward is cautious diplomacy, no hasty moves.

from: Dr. Vijaya Rajiva
Posted on: Apr 7, 2010 at 17:19 IST

IPI pipeline is a pipe dream whichever way you route it. Iran has plenty other takers for its gas. It would use the gas card to win concessions from Russia, Pak and even Afghanistan and finally in any non-nuclear energy discussions with USA too, just to keep its nuclear programme going.
Pak. has no interest in giving India what it needs - cheap energy and energy security
Similarly China has no interest and it can lay different Afghan routes.
USA has no interest either! It needs to sell all the nuclear reactor tech and some fuel too.

from: Kamesh
Posted on: Apr 8, 2010 at 05:19 IST

As an Iranian, I can assure you that Iran has not only been a threat to the world at large but a threat to Iranians. I suggest you first live with the regime in Tehran and then put out such theories.

from: Banafsheh
Posted on: Apr 8, 2010 at 09:06 IST
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SOURCE; THE HINDU

2010-04-05T18:25:00.000-07:00

Behind China's India policy, a growing debate

BY Ananth Krishnan

External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi at a meeting in Bangalore.

Beyond the expected statements Chinese officials will exchange with External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna in Beijing this week, there is little consensus among different policymakers in Beijing on how to engage with a rising India.

Earlier this year, the United States' decision to approve a $ 6.4-billion arms sale to Taiwan sparked a series of agitated commentaries in China's military journals. The tone will sound somewhat familiar to an Indian audience: it reflected a growing anxiety among strategists that the U.S. was building a “crescent-shaped ring” to encircle and contain China. Interestingly, much of the debate focussed on what role India would — or would not — play in a supposed U.S.-led “encirclement.” Some strategists expressed concern that an eventual “integration of India” into an American alliance “would profoundly affect China's security,” as the official China Daily reported. Dai Xu, an Air Force Colonel of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), warned that China needed to be vigilant against this growing network running “from Japan to India” that would suffocate China.

Others, however, were not so convinced, and instead sought to calm the tensions. Pei Yuanying, former Chinese Ambassador to India, said India, as “an independent international power in the international arena,” was “unlikely to be part of any such U.S. scheme.” Shen Dingli, one of the leading voices in the strategic community in Beijing, also disagreed with Dai's views in an interview with The Hindu, suggesting that the current relationship was sound enough for China to have no reason to worry about India's ties with the U.S.

These differing views point to an ongoing debate in Beijing on a question that many policymakers are grappling with: how should China engage with a rising India? On one side of the debate are voices from the PLA, who are pressing Beijing to take a harder line with India and who see little room for cooperation between two rivals. On the other are voices in the Hu Jintao government and official think tanks, which are pushing for a more moderate and non-confrontational foreign policy line, one which they see as crucial to China's own self-interest and continued development.

The military view

The appearance of a number of articles and commentaries last year in military journals and official Communist Party-run newspapers has led some to suggest that the first group is increasingly beginning to have its voice heard. In recent months, articles in influential publications like the People's Daily, have taken a noticeably harder line on India, accusing New Delhi of “arrogance” and calling on China to take a stronger position on the border dispute. The People's Daily, in particular, has also begun to devote extensive coverage to India's military build-up, frequently speaking of an “India threat.”

The articles more or less reflected the “PLA view” of Sino-Indian ties, according to Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University who studies the Chinese military. According to him and other analysts, this view is predicated on three basic policy positions on India. The first assumes that India is seeking to become a great power. The policy response is to support Pakistan, which China continues to do, and confine India's influence to South Asia. The second, he says, assumes that India has “hegemonic ambitions in South Asia” — a phrase often used by the People's Daily last year. The policy response in China is to “oppose hegemony” by supporting smaller states in South Asia, like Nepal and Bangladesh. The third is on India's presence in the Indian Ocean, and the policy response is to strengthen China's naval capabilities.

The other view

Much as the PLA is influential, its view by no means reflects a consensus opinion among the highest policymakers. Besides the PLA, there are at least three groups which have a role in shaping China's India policy, including commercial lobbies, retired officials and a select group of India scholars in official think tanks. This section tends to view the relationship beyond the narrow military paradigm of the PLA. It argues that despite the persisting mistrust between the countries, it is in China's own interest, both from the point of view of sustaining its economic development and its standing as a responsible world power, to have harmonious relations with India and a peaceful periphery.

“Many people in the Chinese government realise that despite historical differences, there are growing commonalities in relations between the two countries and their positions on international issues,” says Ma Jiali, a leading South Asia scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), who advises the government on its India policy. “There is also the common goal that both countries do not want to see a unipolar world.” He considers “four roles” India plays in shaping his policy view — “a close neighbour, a developing country with common goals, a rising power and an increasingly important international player.” “The basic fact is,” he continues, “we must have good relations with India, or our national interest will be damaged.”

His view is echoed by Sun Shihai, another influential ‘India hand' at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He says he “completely disagrees” with the policy views voiced by the nationalistic commentaries in much of the official media last year. “Many of those reports misperceived India very deeply,” says Professor Sun. “Among most scholars at least, there is a growing awareness that India's power is rising, its international status is rising, and these facts are a reality that cannot be altered.” He believes that it is in China's self-interest to work with India on issues in which the countries have a common stake such as climate change and combating terrorism. “China has more respect [now] for India's rise, and it is in our interest to co-operate where we can, as we did so effectively last year at Copenhagen [on climate change],” he says. “But as two rising powers with growing international roles and strategic weight, cooperation and competition will be natural. What the governments need to do is manage the competition and avoid conflict. Most serious scholars are of this view.”

Reading the debate

Do these different views matter to India? Chinese foreign policy is ultimately decided at the highest levels of the ruling Communist Party's Central Committee using these various inputs. But how these inputs get used is “an extremely complicated process,” says Prof. Kondapalli. “Various groups put out their agenda to try and have their opinions heard, but what is eventually decided depends on who has greater influence at a given moment in time.” For now though, the outcome of this debate still seems uncertain. “The academic community appears to follow a soft and co-operative line while the PLA maintains its stridency to keep India on tenterhooks,” says Brigadier (retd.) Arun Sahgal of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.

Until there is greater clarity on its outcome, the mistrust between the countries will likely persist. For usually, it is only the harder “PLA view” of India that gets covered in the media, serving as fodder for the often over-hyped ‘China threat' perspectives dished out by strategic analysts. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that these views are more “newsworthy” than balanced views from the government and other scholars. But another factor behind misperceptions is the continuing opacity in China's own government, in both policy-making and the state's control of the media.

“The main problem in understanding China's policies is the lack of transparency, which often leads to misperceptions” Prof. Kondapalli says. Consequently, even extreme opinions, from any media outlet, often tend to be regarded as Beijing's official line, and drown out other views even if they are no more than voices in an ongoing debate. And until China becomes more transparent, analysts say, external observers will likely continue to imagine the worst when reading the tea leaves.

sOURCE: tHE hINDU

2010-04-05T18:23:00.001-07:00

SIBLAC demands Census to accord separate constitutional category

SOURCE:VoiceofSikkim

SIBLAC demands Census to accord separate constitutional category
01 April, Gangtok: Highlighting the distinct political identity awarded to the Bhutia lepcha (BL) community of Sikkimese origin by Article 371 (F) of Indian Constitution which ad beend endorsed by the Supreme Copurt, the Sikkim Bhutia Lepcha Apex Commitee (SIBLAC) has demanded the Census authorities to recognize the two communities as ‘separate constitutional category unlike the Schedule Tribes and Scheduled Castes’.

Copy of letter to the Director, Census-Operations follows below

To
Director,
Census Operations- Sikkim
Gangtok,
East Sikkim

Sir,
This has reference to the inauguration of conducting National Census 2011 to be carried out by your Directorate in Sikkim.

I would like to submit the following constitutional complexities and parameters to be observed while conducting and preparing the final report on Sikkim’s census for the year 2011.

1. Though a part of the Indian Union, Sikkim is principally governed by Article 371 F of the Indian Constitution, which infact is Sikkim’s First Constitution that bestows Sikkim with special status within the Union, an assertion authenticated and upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (RC Poudyal Vs Union of India and others).
2. Article 371 F of the Constitution recognizes the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a distinct political entity extending them with political rights that is reserved and recognized specifically as Bhutia Lepchas (BL) and not under any other category (s) whatsoever, including the Scheduled Tribes. The political rights of the BLs including the 12 seats and one for the Sikkimese Sanghas reserved in the Sikkim Assembly as BL reserved as been upheld and validated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the above cited case.
3. The Election Commission of India has mandated in its Chapter II Clause 3 (4) (c) as “if you are a candidate for a reserved seat for Sikkimese of Bhutia Lepcha origin in the Legislative Assembly of Sikkim, then you must be a person either of Bhutia or Lepcha origin, and in addition you must also be an elector or any assembly constituency in that State” (Annex I).
4. Despite, even the Government of Sikkim has accorded separate reservations for this distinct constitutional group for different purpose such as reservations in the Government employments (Annex II) and the civic bodies (Panchayats & Municipalities) (Annex III)

The rationale behind narrating all these constitutional complexities becomes noteworthy here since your organization is undertaking this ambitious periodical exercise which in the long-run would become the founding-base in determining the governmental policies, be it political-economic-social-cultural, or any other aspects concerning the human development.

It becomes question of first magnitude that the exercise of your regular decadal census must extend deserving recognition to the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a separate constitutional group. It is a matter of general fact that your census make classification on the basis of the recognition accorded to such sections by the Government of India as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Similarly, the BLs are also recognized as a distinct constitutional group by the Indian Constitution vide Article 371 F for all such purposes including Socio-Politico-Economic, whatsoever, as far as Sikkim’s special status is concerned as also guaranteed by Part XXI of the Constitution of India.

It is relevant to mention here that the BLs were included in the list of the Scheduled Tribes under Sikkim (Constitutional) Scheduled Tribes Order of 1978 for the purpose of economic upliftment. Some more sections were included in the Scheduled Tribe list in the year 2003. Given the current trend of political activism, more other additional section or sections of the population may be accorded with similar listings with the category and hence such practice in essence would keep on ever increasing. Therefore the constitutionally distinct category of the BLs cannot be mixed or parallel with any other category, be it the Scheduled Tribes or the Scheduled Castes.

At this backdrop, the clubbing of BLs with other communities under a single Scheduled Tribe category through your conventional method of census shall go detrimental to all the constitutional provisions as it stands now. Apart from generating constitutional complexities, such clubbing would yield instability to the constitutional provisions and recognition extended to the BLs of Sikkimese origin thus far since the formulations of policies of any Government would rely on the findings of this periodical census, be it political-social-economic-cultural.

Under the circumstances, we insist and claim that the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin are recognized as separate constitutional category unlike the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes or may be, as an alternative, provided in separate sub-class within the Scheduled Tribe category as being authenticated and practiced by the Election Commission of India, in the ensuing census report, keeping in consideration of all the constitutional provisions and its obligations with regard to Article 371 F and all the existing practices and precedence of the Government of Sikkim, without being prejudice to any.

Thank you very much,
Yours faithfully,

Tseten Tashi Bhutia
Dated:Gangtok,April1,2010

2010-04-03T18:17:00.000-07:00

BENGAL: Work on relics, 80 yrs on – Traces of centuries-old Buddhist settlement

BY SEBANTI SARKAR

Excavation under way on the mound of Rakshashi Danga. Picture by Siharan Nandi
Calcutta, April 2: The Archaeological Survey of India and the West Bengal State Archaeology Department have started excavating what could be a sixth or seventh-century Buddhist settlement in Murshidabad over 80 years after its discovery.

Rakshashi Danga or the Devil’s Mound is about 35km from Deka-Bichkandi, the state’s oldest Buddhist site dating back to the sixth century and discovered last year. The Rakshashi Danga site, where the ASI and the state’s archaeology department have been carrying out joint excavations since March 22, is at Chandpara mouza in a village called Pratappur in Murshidabad. The site was discovered by A.N. Dikshit in 1928-29.

The mound is probably connected to Deka-Bichkandi as some of the objects unearthed are similar. “The Deka site, now known to date from the sixth century, is 35km from the Rakshashi Danga site. The surrounding area has more mounds — Rajbari Danga (officially recognised as the Raktamrittika Mahavihara mentioned by Hiuen Tsang), Sanyasi Danga, Bhimki Tala and Nilkuthi Mound. None of them has been fully explored,” said Amal Roy, the superintendent of the state archaeology department team camping at Rakshashi Danga.

Several wall segments forming three-room units that measure about 10mx8m each, a narrow passage and signs of an entrance have been uncovered.

The bricks are hand-made, about 30-36cm long, 26cm wide and 5-6cm thick, such as those used in the pre-Pala era. One brick has a lotus design on its surface.

Roy said no figures had been found yet, but the excavation has already yielded a rich haul of dull red pottery, objects of shell, iron nails and pieces of stucco. “We have to wait for more extensive excavations to draw conclusions. But the objects certainly resemble other finds from the early medieval or pre-Pala period (approximately the seventh century),” he said.

Rakshashi Danga, about 200km from Calcutta, is about four to five metres high, higher than Rajbari Danga. “The ASI had taken it under its protection, but neither the state nor the Centre tried to find out what lies beneath the surface,” Roy said.

Work is on in six trenches with depths varying between 3 feet and 5 feet.

The walls indicate three rooms and suggest the presence of a large complex, only a corner of which has been revealed. There is not so much black ware as was found in Deka-Bichkandi.

The dull red pottery fragments are not decorative and mostly are home utensils like woks and bowls.

“The objects resemble the finds at Deka. Taken together the area could grow into a tourist hotspot once we manage to uncover it fully,” Roy, who had discovered the Deka site and pushed for its excavation, said.

“Another 80 per cent of the mound remains to be excavated. It is high and has remained undisturbed. Maybe we can find structures that have remained less broken. Work will continue till the first week of May.”

The archaeologists working at the site in Deka-Bichkandi had initially estimated the ruins to be closer to the age of the nearby monastery at Karna Suvarna, Chiruti. The seventh century monastery was the oldest known Buddhist relic in Bengal till Deka-Bichkandi was unearthed.

The monastery dates back to the time when Hiuen Tsang visited India. His writings mentioned a Mahavihara (monastery) close to the Karna Suvarna Nagari, but there is no mention of other monasteries or stupas. So the archaeologists at Rakshashi Danga may be rewriting history in many ways.

Gautam Sengupta, the director-general of the ASI, had earlier as the director of state archaeology initiated major excavations in this area and eased formalities for the effort.

source: The Telegraph
courtsey: Shri Barun Roy
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2010-04-03T04:18:00.000-07:00

SIBLAC demands Census to accord separate constitutional category

source:VoiceofSikkim

SIBLAC demands Census to accord separate constitutional category
01 April, Gangtok: Highlighting the distinct political identity awarded to the Bhutia lepcha (BL) community of Sikkimese origin by Article 371 (F) of Indian Constitution which ad beend endorsed by the Supreme Copurt, the Sikkim Bhutia Lepcha Apex Commitee (SIBLAC) has demanded the Census authorities to recognize the two communities as ‘separate constitutional category unlike the Schedule Tribes and Scheduled Castes’.

Copy of letter to the Director, Census-Operations follows below

To
Director,
Census Operations- Sikkim
Gangtok,
East Sikkim

Sir,
This has reference to the inauguration of conducting National Census 2011 to be carried out by your Directorate in Sikkim.

I would like to submit the following constitutional complexities and parameters to be observed while conducting and preparing the final report on Sikkim’s census for the year 2011.

1. Though a part of the Indian Union, Sikkim is principally governed by Article 371 F of the Indian Constitution, which infact is Sikkim’s First Constitution that bestows Sikkim with special status within the Union, an assertion authenticated and upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (RC Poudyal Vs Union of India and others).
2. Article 371 F of the Constitution recognizes the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a distinct political entity extending them with political rights that is reserved and recognized specifically as Bhutia Lepchas (BL) and not under any other category (s) whatsoever, including the Scheduled Tribes. The political rights of the BLs including the 12 seats and one for the Sikkimese Sanghas reserved in the Sikkim Assembly as BL reserved as been upheld and validated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the above cited case.
3. The Election Commission of India has mandated in its Chapter II Clause 3 (4) (c) as “if you are a candidate for a reserved seat for Sikkimese of Bhutia Lepcha origin in the Legislative Assembly of Sikkim, then you must be a person either of Bhutia or Lepcha origin, and in addition you must also be an elector or any assembly constituency in that State” (Annex I).
4. Despite, even the Government of Sikkim has accorded separate reservations for this distinct constitutional group for different purpose such as reservations in the Government employments (Annex II) and the civic bodies (Panchayats & Municipalities) (Annex III)

The rationale behind narrating all these constitutional complexities becomes noteworthy here since your organization is undertaking this ambitious periodical exercise which in the long-run would become the founding-base in determining the governmental policies, be it political-economic-social-cultural, or any other aspects concerning the human development.

It becomes question of first magnitude that the exercise of your regular decadal census must extend deserving recognition to the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin as a separate constitutional group. It is a matter of general fact that your census make classification on the basis of the recognition accorded to such sections by the Government of India as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Similarly, the BLs are also recognized as a distinct constitutional group by the Indian Constitution vide Article 371 F for all such purposes including Socio-Politico-Economic, whatsoever, as far as Sikkim’s special status is concerned as also guaranteed by Part XXI of the Constitution of India.

It is relevant to mention here that the BLs were included in the list of the Scheduled Tribes under Sikkim (Constitutional) Scheduled Tribes Order of 1978 for the purpose of economic upliftment. Some more sections were included in the Scheduled Tribe list in the year 2003. Given the current trend of political activism, more other additional section or sections of the population may be accorded with similar listings with the category and hence such practice in essence would keep on ever increasing. Therefore the constitutionally distinct category of the BLs cannot be mixed or parallel with any other category, be it the Scheduled Tribes or the Scheduled Castes.

At this backdrop, the clubbing of BLs with other communities under a single Scheduled Tribe category through your conventional method of census shall go detrimental to all the constitutional provisions as it stands now. Apart from generating constitutional complexities, such clubbing would yield instability to the constitutional provisions and recognition extended to the BLs of Sikkimese origin thus far since the formulations of policies of any Government would rely on the findings of this periodical census, be it political-social-economic-cultural.

Under the circumstances, we insist and claim that the Bhutia Lepchas of Sikkimese origin are recognized as separate constitutional category unlike the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes or may be, as an alternative, provided in separate sub-class within the Scheduled Tribe category as being authenticated and practiced by the Election Commission of India, in the ensuing census report, keeping in consideration of all the constitutional provisions and its obligations with regard to Article 371 F and all the existing practices and precedence of the Government of Sikkim, without being prejudice to any.

Thank you very much,
Yours faithfully,

Tseten Tashi Bhutia
Dated:Gangtok,April1,2010

2010-04-02T17:25:00.001-07:00

Flood of fears over China's projects

by Ananth Krishnan

China's dam-building spree along the Mekong river in south-western Yunnan province has raised fears among several of its neighbours, who say the dams have led to shrinking levels of water downstream.

Officials from Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, countries which lie in the Mekong basin, will on Sunday voice their concerns over eight dams that China is building along the Mekong, in talks with Chinese officials in Thailand.

The four countries in 1995 set up the Mekong River Commission (MRC) to facilitate joint management and water-sharing in the Mekong region, though China and Myanmar have so far refused to formally join the body. The Mekong runs almost half of its 4,400 km course in China's south-west, where it is known as the Lancang, before entering Myanmar and Laos.

The MRC's concerns closely echo those voiced by India in the past over China's plans to build dams along the Brahmaputra, or the Yarlung Tsangpo as it is known in Tibet. In both cases, China's position as an upper riparian or upstream-lying state has given it an advantage in controlling the rivers' resources, say experts. International laws allow China to build hydropower projects that do not divert or substantially alter the course of the rivers, though the absence of robust water-sharing arrangements has led to persisting concerns in several downstream countries, including India, over the future of their water security.

“We can see the level of the water is getting lower,” said Abhisit Vejjajiva, Prime Minister, of Thailand, last month. “We will ask the Foreign Ministry to talk with a representative from China in terms of co-operation and in terms of management systems in the region.”

An estimated 60 million people depend on the Mekong river in the five countries that lie downstream. China has already built three dams in Yunnan. Five more are in the works, including the massive $4-billion Xiaowan dam, scheduled to open in 2012, which is the world's highest dam.

But whether the dams are behind the Mekong's shrinking levels downstream still remains a much-contested question.

In May, the United Nations Environment Programme warned of a “considerable threat” the dams posed to water management in areas downstream, though China says the course and flow of the Mekong have been unaffected by its projects.

Speaking ahead of Sunday's talks, Chen Mingzhong, deputy Director-General of the Department of International Cooperation at China's Water Resources Ministry, said on Friday the dry weather in the lower Mekong areas was the “root cause” of the reduced run-off water downstream, and that the dams would help, not hinder, water management. Officials say the river's flow in China only accounts for 13.5 per cent of its net flow, according to their data.

The Chinese government views the dams as crucial to maintaining water security in its south-west, which is currently facing its worst drought in five decades, affecting more than 24 million people. The government has allocated 27 billion Yuan ($4 billion) to build more reservoirs and dams in Yunnan alone.

“The hydropower stations built on the Lancang River will not increase the chance of flood and drought disasters in the downstream. Instead, it will considerably enhance the capacity of flood control, drought relief, irrigation and water supply for the downstream countries,” Mr. Chen argued.

But his country's neighbours, however, remain unconvinced.

2010-04-01T19:23:00.000-07:00

The letter Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal wrote to Indira Gandhi when Sikkim Royal Palace was attacked by the Indian Army

source:Shital Pradhan

I believe this piece of article was more of a documentary as the title suggest "The Story of Sikkim". A part of a many story in opinions24x7 blog. The article gives a simple narration about Sikkim in brief. What i liked the most was the annexation part and as in my part what i see i share. So this interesting piece of extract is provided here which did touched my heart especially the "letter" send by our Chogyal (King) to Indira Gandhi when Sikkim Royal Palace was attacked by the Indian Army .

""Finally, in 1975, the Kazi (Prime Minister) of Sikkim went against the Chogyal and appealed to the Indian Parliament to change Sikkim's status to a full state of India. His appeal was approved. In April 1975, a 5,000-strong contingent of the Indian Army invaded Sikkim and surrounded the Chogyal's palace. His 300 bodyguards, who were themselves trained by the Indian Army, were caught and driven away, while one of them was shot. The Chogyal was arrested. In his last letter to Indira Gandhi, he wrote:

"I have no words when the Indian army was sent today in a surprise attack on Sikkim Guards who are less than 300 strong and were trained, equipped and officered by the Indian army who looked upon each other as comrades. This is a most treacherous and black day in the history of democratic India in solving the survival of our little country by use of arms."

The Chogyal died under Indian surveillance, supposedly of a weak heart. The Sikkim National Flag was lowered and subsequently banned, being replaced by the Indian Tricolour. A referendum was held under which 59% of the electorate came out to vote. Of them, 97.5% approved a merger with India. However, historians strongly dispute the statistics provided by the Indian Government as well as the fairness of the referendum, which was conducted by the Indian Army. Nonetheless, Sikkim was merged with the Indian Union as its 22nd State.

Interestingly, the treaty which enabled the merger had a special clause inserted into it by India: the merger of Sikkim and India could never be disputed in any court of the land, including the Supreme Court. Of all the instruments of accession signed between various Princely States and the Indian Union, only this one contains this special clause. Details of what actions Indian Intelligence agencies took before the annexation, including the accession of Bhutan to the United Nations, remain sketchy, mostly because the Government classifies it as a state secret."

WATER A SOURCE OF TENSION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAK

2010-03-31T17:41:00.001-07:00

A feud over water between India and Pakistan is threatening to derail peace talks between the two neighbors.

The countries have harmo- niously shared the waters of the Indus River for decades. A 50-year-old treaty regulating access to water from the river and its tributaries has been viewed as a bright spot for In- dia and Pakistan, which have gone to war three times since 1947.

Now, the Pakistanis com- plain that India is hogging wa- ter upstream, which is hurting Pakistani farmers down- stream. Pakistani officials say they will soon begin formal ar- bitration over a proposed Indi- an dam. At a meeting that started Sunday, Pakistan raised objections to new Indi- an dam projects on the Indus River and asked for satellite monitoring of river flows.

“Water I see emerging as a very serious source of tension between Pakistan and India,“ said Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Pakistan's foreign minister, in an interview Friday. He said he has raised the issue with Indi- an Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

A senior Indian government official denied India is violat- ing the treaty. He blamed Pa- kistan's water shortage on changing weather patterns and the country's poor water man- agement. He called the stri- dent rhetoric from Pakistani officials a “political gim- mick...designed to place yet one more agenda item in our already complex relationship.“ Indian officials declined com- ment on the record.

The latest dispute revolves around India's plans to build a 330-megawatt hydroelectric power project on the Kishen- ganga River, a tributary of the Indus. India says it is well within its rights to build the dam. The project has been on the drawing board since the late 1980s and is expected to cost about $800 million.

Pakistan says New Delhi's plans to divert the course of the river will reduce its flow by a third in the winter. That would make it unfeasible for Pakistan to move ahead with its own plans for a hydroelec- tric dam downstream.

Pakistan wants to put the Kishenganga project before an arbitration panel--the first time that mechanism of the treaty will have been used. If India agrees, a seven-person court of arbitration would in- clude two members appointed by each country, and three outsiders. India hasn't yet re- sponded formally to the pro- posal, according to the Pakis- tan delegation to the meeting.

“We're already a water- stressed country,“ Jamaat Ali Shah, Pakistan's Indus waters commissioner, said ahead of this week's meeting. India's construction of new dams is “aggravating the stresses.“

The water dispute comes as the relationship between the nuclear-armed neighbors is at an inflection point. India last month invited Pakistan to dis- cuss the resumption of regular peace talks, and the two countries' foreign secretaries met in Delhi February 25. A water squabble could upset those peace efforts.

That would deal a major blow to Indian Prime Minister Singh, who views engagement with Pakistan as the best way to contain terrorism. Mr. Singh wants Pakistan's aid in bring- ing to justice Pakistan-based militants that New Delhi be- lieves carried out the Novem- ber 2008 attacks in Mumbai, a bloody siege that killed 166 people.

Further deterioration of re- lations between New Delhi and Islamabad would also be a setback for Washington's ef- forts to stabilize the region.
Pakistan has told the U.S. that tensions with India on its east- ern border over the disputed territory of Kashmir have pre- vented it from cracking down more aggressively on Taliban and al Qaeda leaders directing the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Islamist groups in Pakistan have taken up the water issue as a new focus. “If our govern- ment doesn't act to resolve this issue then the people will take it in to their own hands. If water doesn't flow in to these rivers, then blood will,“ said Hafiz Khalid Waleed, the polit- ical affairs chief of Jamaat-ud- Dawah, an Islamic charity. In- dia and others call the charity a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba, the militant group it says or- chestrated the Mumbai terror- ist attacks in November 2008.
Mr. Waleed denies any link to terrorism, calling it “American propaganda.“

Water scarcity is a growing political issue across the globe, from the Middle East to the U.S. West. South Asia's wa- ter politics date back to Brit- ain's partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, when newly created nations India and Pakistan wrangled over how to divide resources.

The Indus River, whose wa- ters Britain had harnessed through a vast system of irriga- tion canals, was a crucial life- line to farmers in the Punjab region stretching across both countries. But India and Pakis- tan were fighting over control of Kashmir, where several In- dus tributaries begin.

After years of tense negotiations, India and Pakistan sign- ed the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 with the help of the World Bank. As part of the treaty--which is widely viewed by water experts as a model of how water conflicts can be managed--each side got unre- stricted use of three rivers and rights to use the others for nonconsumptive purposes such as flood control, naviga- tion and bathing. India was granted limited agricultural usage of Pakistan's rivers, plus the right to build hydroelectric projects, as long as they don't store or divert large amounts of water.

The treaty provides for bu- reaucrats appointed by both governments to meet regular- ly, exchange data, and resolve disputes. Commissioners have held more than 200 site in- spections and meetings since 1960, even during times of war.

Yet Pakistan's rows with In- dia have intensified as its wa- ter situation has worsened over the years. Water availabil- ity in Pakistan has fallen 70% since the early 1950s to 1,500 cubic meters per capita. It is expected to reach the 1,000-cubic-meter level con- sidered officially “scarce“ by international standards in 25 years, according to a report last year by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Pakistani officials acknowl- edge their water woes aren't caused by India's damming of rivers alone. Major reservoirs are filling with sediment picked up by the rivers on their routes to the sea. Canals are aging and breaking down.
The World Bank says soil ero- sion and poor irrigation are sapping roughly 1% from Pa- kistan's Gross Domestic Prod- uct growth.

Skeptics in India say Pakis- tan is simply looking for a scapegoat as it struggles to manage its internal water poli- tics.

The especially arid province of Sindh, for example, blames the powerful upstream prov- ince of Punjab for consuming too much.

“Their water management is in terrible shape, and it's con- venient to put the onus on In- dia,“ said G. Parthasarathy, a former Indian envoy to Pakis- tan.

But Pakistani officials say New Delhi's actions are ex- acerbating a precarious situa- tion.

This year the Pakistan prov- ince of Punjab--the political heartland of the nation and a major producer of wheat, rice, maize and sugar cane--is facing unprecedented water shortages. At harvest time in Mandi Bahauddin, an area in the north of Punjab province of relatively prosperous farm- land, the wheat still grows waist-high.

But farmers here complain that yields and incomes have dropped by a third in the past five years because of water shortages. In the past, canals used to supply water for irriga- tion year-round. They are now empty for about four months each year. That forces villagers to pump groundwater, which is fast turning brackish and causing diseases like hepatitis, said Tariq Mehmood Allowa- na, a local farmer and member of the provincial assembly.

In the past, the area's only problem was regular flooding.
India's dams stopped this, causing a dearth of water instead, says Mr. Allowana, who owns 25 acres of wheat fields.
The farmer represents the Pa- kistan Peoples Party of the late former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Farmers say they have stopped cultivating rice--a water-intensive crop--except for personal use. Nearby, more than half of the Chenab river bed has become a dusty plain where children play with the flow reduced to a trickle.

“India is engaged in an eco- nomic warfare against Pakis- tan. If the problem persists for another five years the whole area will become barren,“ said Mr. Allowana, as a group of farmers nearby filled irrigation channels from groundwater supplies using a diesel-fueled pump.

Over the years, tensions have built as Pakistan has ob- jected to the size and technical design of various Indian pro- jects. India says it has 33 In- dus-related hydrological pro- jects at various stages of im- plementation, and all have been contested in one way or another by Pakistan. India also says it has yet to make use of its limited rights to store water on Pakistan's rivers or use it for limited irrigation.

“We've found there's a pat- tern in Pakistan of raising technical issues ad nauseam to stall a project or delay a proj- ect indefinitely,“ the senior In- dian official said Friday.

In 2005 Pakistan raised is- sues with the Baglihar dam, an Indian power project on the Chenab river--one of those al- lotted to Pakistan--saying it would store too much water upstream and reduce down- stream flow to Pakistan.

The countries agreed in 2007 to let the World Bank appoint an independent expert, who ruled that India had to make minor modifications to the dam, such as lowering its height. Pakistan now contends the dam, which began opera- tions in 2008, is reducing the flow of the Chenab below lev- els stipulated in the treaty. In- dia denies this.

Pakistan wants Washington to play a mediating role with India--in the water dispute and wider issues like the Kash- mir conflict. The U.S. is push- ing for tighter relations with Pakistan as it steps up pres- sure on the Taliban in Afghan- istan but has to balance this with its close ties to India. For now, the U.S. is treading care- fully, offering Pakistan stepped-up economic aid and military hardware supplies.

Pakistan raised the water is- sue in Washington during an official visit last week. Secre- tary of State Hillary Clinton has signaled that Washington isn't interested in mediating on water issues.

A State Department spokes- person pointed to an interview Mrs. Clinton recently did with a Pakistani news channel in which she said it would be “sensible“ to stick to the Indus Waters Treaty for resolving disputes.

The Indian projects that Pa- kistan says are draining its wa- ter resources are primarily on Indus tributaries in Kashmir.
Some experts say the water is- sue is a back door way for Is- lamic militants to push their political agenda regarding Kashmir.

“They're saying, `We must liberate Kashmir to save our water,' “ said B.G. Verghese, a veteran journalist who has studied water issues closely and is a visiting professor at the Center for Policy Research, a New Delhi think tank.

--wsj@livemint.com

2010-03-31T17:18:00.001-07:00

India strengthens borders with friendly China

(TibetanReview.net, Mar31, 2010)

India said Mar 30 that it had initiated necessary steps to upgrade military infrastructure on its side of the northern borders in view of the rapid Chinese development and upgrade of facilities in occupied Tibet and East Turkestan. The Chinese military has upgraded its “force projection capability” along the northern borders, India’s Defence Ministry was quoted as saying in its annual report 2009-10.

The report was quoted as saying: “India also remains conscious and alert about the implications of China’s military modernisation. Rapid infrastructure development in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang province has considerably upgraded China’s military force projection capability and strategic operational flexibility.”

Regarding India’s efforts on its side of the border, the Hindu newspaper Mar 30 quoted the report as saying: “While efforts to build 73 roads near Sino-Indian border have been taken up with vigour, Indian Air Force upgraded advanced landing grounds, including at Daulat Beg Oldie, to facilitate landing of AN-32 transport aircraft while the Army is raising two Mountain Divisions in the north-east and plans to acquire ultra-light howitzers that can be dropped via helicopters at higher altitudes.”

The report was, however, said to be optimistic about Sino-India relations. It was cited as saying that based on strategic and cooperative partnership, relations with China had progressed well during the last year. There was convergence of views and actions on various issues in international fora and a regular mechanism for exchanges in military sphere has been established, it was cited as saying.

In another development, the Supreme Court of India on Mar 28 finally cleared the Army’s long-pending proposal to construct a strategic road near the trijunction of Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim. Among other things, the order mandates that 5percwent of the estimated project cost should be paid to the Sikkim government for undertaking compensatory afforestation.

The Indian Army is to construct two roads in the sensitive international border area in Sikkim, facilitating a strategic access route virtually overlooking occupied Tibet, a demand which had been pending clearance from the SC since 2005.]

The new road, to be built between Flag Hill and Dokala, passes through Pangolakha Wildlife Sanctuary. The Army had submitted to the court, ‘‘the road is required for operational purposes and to meet strategic requirement of the nation’’.

2010-03-28T03:28:00.001-07:00

SC OKs building border road overlooking China

Dhananjay Mahapatra | The Times of India

28 March, NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court has finally cleared the Army’s long-pending proposal to construct a strategic road near the trijunction of Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim. The clearance comes with certain conditions including a payment of 5% of the estimated project cost to the Sikkim government, which would use the money for compensatory afforestation.

The Army will construct two roads in the sensitive international border area in Sikkim, facilitating a strategic access route virtually overlooking China, a demand which had been pending clearance from the SC since 2005.

A Central Empowered Committee (CEC), constituted by the SC, went into the proposal as it involved Border Road Organization (BRO) constructing a new road between Flag Hill and Dokala passing through Pangolakha Wildlife Sanctuary. The Army said ‘‘the road is required for operational purposes and to meet strategic requirement of the nation’’.

After a site inspection by CEC members M K Jiwrajika and Mahendra Vyas, and amicus curiae A D N Rao, a report was submitted to a bench comprising CJI K G Balakrishnan and Justices S H Kapadia and Aftab Alam.

The report said: ‘‘The entire alignment of the proposed road passes through the high altitude alpine areas of the sanctuary [Pangolakha Wildlife Sanctuary] and would involve felling of 3,042 trees, 9,769 shrubs, 14,018 herbs and about 5,000 bamboos.’’

2010-03-28T00:23:00.000-07:00

NEW DELHI: PARISANGH CHARTS OUT PROGRAMMES, ENOS DAS PRADHAN CHOSEN NEW WORKING PRESIDENT

New Delhi:At a special meeting of its National Executive in New Delhi on March , the Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh agreed on some nationwide annual programmes and also discussed important issues like Gorkhaland and the problems of the Gorkhas in the Northeast. Also putting an end to the situation arising out of the resignation of Working President CK Shrestha, Rev Dr Enos Das Pradhan was chosen to assume the position.

To bring the Gorkha community together, the Parisangh decided that besides the Balidaan Diwas it observed on August 25 to commemorate the sacrifice made by Gorkhas during the Freedom Struggle, it would also observe Urja Sanchay Diwas on the second Sunday of May as well as Gorkha Gaurav Diwas on the second Sunday of November. While one would create awareness about the need to conserve energy in the context of global warming, the other would recognise the achievement of Gorkhas, from young students to national heroes. A three-day Nepali Film Festival would be organised in New Delhi in the second weekend of January every year to showcase Nepali movies made in India. The month of March every year would be designated as a special period for recruiting new members.

Earlier, BGP President Mrs Dil Kumari Bhandari announced the assumption of the post of Working President by Rev Dr Enos Das Pradhan, till now the National Vice President of BGP. The incumbent, CK Shrestha, had resigned from the post and the National Executive held in Siliguri on January 30 and had resolved that his resignation would be deemed as accepted if he did not rescind it by the end of February.

Other important discussions revolved around the formation of a Bharatiya Gorkha Foundation as a charitable wing of the BGP. It would be run by a trust and would create a fund to assist meritorious Gorkha students in professional education and in preparing for the Public Service Commission. It would also come to the financial aid of Gorkhas who faced with dislocation due to their ethnicity. The meeting also discussed the formation of a public limited company that would run a Gorkha-centred, Nepali-language television channel. The modalities of how the Parisangh could be associated with the project was discussed by the members. A real-estate development company, whose shareholders comprise mostly Parisangh members, pledged to uphold the community’s interests in its dealings while assuring the Parisangh of financial aid as a percentage of its net profits. The meeting endorsed a donation-cum-lucky draw, with attractive prizes, to create a corpus fund. The draw would be held in December 2010 at Dehradun.

In a remarkably open and frank discussion on the issue of Gorkhaland, the meeting deliberated on various aspects of the current demand for a separate state for the Indian Gorkhas. While some expressed apprehensions about how it was not possible, due to social considerations, to open support the demand, others felt that the Parisangh should take on the role of a facilitator of discussions between various political parties involved in the movement. Yet others said that while the Parisangh as a non-political organisation could not agitate for Gorkhland, it could initiate talks with political parties in the 22 states where the Parisangh has units and encourage delegation by these parties to create an all-India pressure group. The convenor of the BGP’s Task Force on Gorkhaland reported that they had started work on creating Gorkhaland support groups among political parties and organisations in the theatre of the movement. The Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh was emphatic that a separate state was a means of gaining the Gorkhas their rightful national identity and no device or agency other than a state of Gorkhland seemed likely, under present circumstances, to serve that purpose.

Various representatives from places like Nagpur, the entire Northeast, Uttarakhand, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal presented their views and suggestions.

source: Shri Barun Roy

2010-03-23T07:20:00.000-07:00

The Netanyahu-Obama Meeting in Strategic Context

March 23, 2010 | 0903 GMT

By George Friedman

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is scheduled to meet with U.S. President Barack Obama on March 23. The meeting follows the explosion in U.S.-Israeli relations after Israel announced it was licensing construction of homes in East Jerusalem while U.S. Vice President Joe Biden was in Israel. The United States wants Israel to stop all construction of new Jewish settlements. The Israelis argue that East Jerusalem is not part of the occupied territories, and hence, the U.S. demand doesn’t apply there. The Americans are not parsing their demand so finely and regard the announcement — timed as it was — as a direct affront and challenge. Israel’s response is that it is a sovereign state and so must be permitted to do as it wishes. The implicit American response is that the United States is also a sovereign state and will respond as it wishes.

The polemics in this case are not the point. The issue is more fundamental: namely, the degree to which U.S. and Israeli relations converge and diverge. This is not a matter of friendship but, as in all things geopolitical, of national interest. It is difficult to discuss U.S. and Israeli interests objectively, as the relationship is clouded with endless rhetoric and simplistic formulations. It is thus difficult to know where to start, but two points of entry into this controversy come to mind.

The first is the idea that anti-Americanism in the Middle East has its roots in U.S. support for Israel, a point made by those in the United States and abroad who want the United States to distance itself from Israel. The second is that the United States has a special strategic relationship with Israel and a mutual dependency. Both statements have elements of truth, but neither is simply true — and both require much more substantial analysis. In analyzing them, we begin the process of trying to disentangle national interests from rhetoric.

Anti-Americanism in the Middle East
Begin with the claim that U.S. support for Israel generates anti-Americanism in the Arab and Islamic world. While such support undoubtedly contributes to the phenomenon, it hardly explains it. The fundamental problem with the theory is that Arab anti-Americanism predates significant U.S. support for Israel. Until 1967, the United States gave very little aid to Israel. What aid Washington gave was in the form of very limited loans to purchase agricultural products from the United States — a program that many countries in the world participated in. It was France, not the United States, which was the primary supplier of weapons to Israeli.

In 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai while Britain and France seized the Suez Canal, which the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdul Nasser had nationalized. The Eisenhower administration intervened — against Israel and on the side of Egypt. Under U.S. pressure, the British, French and Israelis were forced to withdraw. There were widespread charges that the Eisenhower administration was pro-Arab and anti-Israeli; certainly no one could argue that Eisenhower was significantly pro-Israel.

In spite of this, Nasser entered into a series of major agreements with the Soviet Union. Egypt effectively became a Soviet ally, the recipient of massive Soviet aid and a center of anti-American rhetoric. Whatever his reasons — and they had to do with U.S. unwillingness to give Egypt massive aid — Egypt’s anti-American attitude had nothing to do with the Israelis, save perhaps that the United States was not prepared to join Egypt in trying to destroy Israel.

Two major political events took place in 1963: left-wing political coups in Syria and Iraq that brought the Baathist Party to power in both countries. Note that this took place pre-1967, i.e., before the United States became closely aligned with Israel. Both regimes were pro-Soviet and anti-American, but neither could have been responding to U.S. support for Israel because there wasn’t much.

In 1964, Washington gave Cairo the first significant U.S. military aid in the form of Hawk missiles, but it gave those to other Arab countries, too, in response to the coups in Iraq and Syria. The United States feared the Soviets would base fighters in those two countries, so it began installing anti-air systems to try to block potential Soviet airstrikes on Saudi Arabia.

In 1967, France broke with Israel over the Arab-Israeli conflict that year. The United States began significant aid to Israel. In 1973, after the Syrian and Egyptian attack on Israel, the U.S. began massive assistance. In 1974 this amounted to about 25 percent of Israeli gross domestic product (GDP). The aid has continued at roughly the same level, but given the massive growth of the Israeli economy, it now amounts to about 2.5 percent of Israeli GDP.

The point here is that the United States was not actively involved in supporting Israel prior to 1967, yet anti-Americanism in the Arab world was rampant. The Arabs might have blamed the United States for Israel, but there was little empirical basis for this claim. Certainly, U.S. aid commenced in 1967 and surged in 1974, but the argument that eliminating support for Israel would cause anti-Americanism to decline must first explain the origins of anti-Americanism, which substantially predated American support for Israel. In fact, it is not clear that Arab anti-Americanism was greater after the initiation of major aid to Israel than before. Indeed, Egypt, the most important Arab country, shifted its position to a pro-American stance after the 1973 war in the face of U.S. aid.

Israel’s Importance to the United States
Let’s now consider the assumption that Israel is a critical U.S. asset. American grand strategy has always been derived from British grand strategy. The United States seeks to maintain regional balances of power in order to avoid the emergence of larger powers that can threaten U.S. interests. The Cold War was a massive exercise in the balance of power, pitting an American-sponsored worldwide alliance system against one formed by the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has acted a number of times against regional hegemons: Iraq in 1990-91, Serbia in 1999 and so on.

In the area called generally the Middle East, but which we prefer to think of as the area between the Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush, there are three intrinsic regional balances. One is the Arab-Israeli balance of power. The second is the Iran-Iraq balance. The third is the Indo-Pakistani balance of power. The American goal in each balance is not so much stability as it is the mutual neutralization of local powers by other local powers.

Two of the three regional balances of power are collapsed or in jeopardy. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the failure to quickly put a strong, anti-Iranian government in place in Baghdad, has led to the collapse of the central balance of power — with little hope of resurrection. The eastern balance of power between Pakistan and India is also in danger of toppling. The Afghan war has caused profound stresses in Pakistan, and there are scenarios in which we can imagine Pakistan’s power dramatically weakening or even cracking. It is unclear how this will evolve, but what is clear is that it is not in the interest of the United States because it would destroy the native balance of power with India. The United States does not want to see India as the unchallenged power in the subcontinent any more than it wants to see Pakistan in that position. The United States needs a strong Pakistan to balance India, and its problem now is how to manage the Afghan war — a side issue strategically — without undermining the strategic interest of the United States, an Indo-Pakistani balance of power.

The western balance of power, Israel and the surrounding states, is relatively stable. What is most important to the United States at this point is that this balance of power also not destabilize. In this sense, Israel is an important strategic asset. But in the broader picture, where the United States is dealing with the collapse of the central balance of power and with the destabilization of the eastern balance of power, Washington does not want or need the destabilization of the western balance — between the Israelis and Arabs — at this time. U.S. “bandwidth” is already stretched to the limit. Washington does not need another problem. Nor does it need instability in this region complicating things in the other regions.

Note that the United States is interested in maintaining the balance of power. This means that the U.S. interest is in a stable set of relations, with no one power becoming excessively powerful and therefore unmanageable by the United States. Israel is already the dominant power in the region, and the degree to which Syria, Jordan and Egypt contain Israel is limited. Israel is moving from the position of an American ally maintaining a balance of power to a regional hegemon in its own right operating outside the framework of American interests.

The United States above all wants to ensure continuity after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak dies. It wants to ensure that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan remains stable. And in its attempts to manage the situation in the center and east, it wants to ensure that nothing happens in the west to further complicate an already-enormously complex situation.

There is very little Israel can do to help the United States in the center and eastern balances. On the other hand, if the western balance of power were to collapse — due to anything from a collapse of the Egyptian regime to a new Israeli war with Hezbollah — the United States might find itself drawn into that conflict, while a new intifada in the Palestinian territories would not help matters either. It is unknown what effect this would have in the other balances of power, but the United States is operating at the limits of its power to try to manage these situations. Israel cannot help there, but it could hurt, for example by initiating an attack on Iran outside the framework of American planning. Therefore, the United States wants one thing from Israel now: for Israel to do nothing that could possibly destabilize the western balance of power or make America’s task more difficult in the other regions.

Israel sees the American preoccupation in these other regions, along with the current favorable alignment of forces in its region, as an opportunity both to consolidate and expand its power and to create new realities on the ground. One of these is building in East Jerusalem, or more precisely, using the moment to reshape the demographics and geography of its immediate region. The Israeli position is that it has rights in East Jerusalem that the United States cannot intrude on. The U.S. position is that it has interests in the broader region that are potentially weakened by this construction at this time.

Israel’s desire to do so is understandable, but it runs counter to American interests. The United States, given its overwhelming challenges, is neither interested in Israel’s desire to reshape its region, nor can it tolerate any more risk deriving from Israel’s actions. However small the risks might be, the United States is maxed out on risk. Therefore, Israel’s interests and that of the United States diverge. Israel sees an opportunity; the United States sees more risk.

The problem Israel has is that, in the long run, its relationship to the United States is its insurance policy. Netanyahu appears to be calculating that given the U.S. need for a western balance of power, whatever Israel does now will be allowed because in the end the United States needs Israel to maintain that balance of power. Therefore, he is probing aggressively. Netanyahu also has domestic political reasons for proceeding with this construction. For him, this construction is a prudent and necessary step.

Obama’s task is to convince Netanyahu that Israel has strategic value for the United States, but only in the context of broader U.S. interests in the region. If Israel becomes part of the American problem rather than the solution, the United States will seek other solutions. That is a hard case to make but not an impossible one. The balance of power is in the eastern Mediterranean, and there is another democracy the United States could turn to: Turkey — which is more than eager to fulfill that role and exploit Israeli tensions with the United States.

It may not be the most persuasive threat, but the fact is that Israel cannot afford any threat from the United States, such as an end to the intense U.S.-Israeli bilateral relationship. While this relationship might not be essential to Israel at the moment, it is one of the foundations of Israeli grand strategy in the long run. Just as the United States cannot afford any more instability in the region at the moment, so Israel cannot afford any threat, however remote, to its relationship with the United States.

A More Complicated Relationship
What is clear in all this is that the statement that Israel and the United States are strategic partners is not untrue, it is just vastly more complicated than it appears. Similarly, the claim that American support for Israel fuels anti-Americans is both a true and insufficient statement.

Netanyahu is betting on Congress and political pressures to restrain U.S. responses to Israel. One of the arguments of geopolitics is that political advantage is insufficient in the face of geopolitical necessity. Pressure on Congress from Israel in order to build houses in Jerusalem while the United States is dealing with crises in the region could easily backfire.

The fact is that while the argument that U.S. Israel policy caused anti-Americanism in the region may not be altogether true, the United States does not need any further challenges or stresses. Nations overwhelmed by challenges can behave in unpredictable ways. Netanyahu’s decision to confront the United States at this time on this issue creates an unpredictability that would seem excessive to Israel’s long term interests. Expecting the American political process to protect Israel from the consequences is not necessarily gauging the American mood at the moment.

The national interest of both countries is to maximize their freedom to maneuver. The Israelis have a temporary advantage because of American interests elsewhere in the region. But that creates a long-term threat. With two wars going on and two regional balances in shambles or tottering, the United States does not need a new crisis in the third. Israel has an interest in housing in East Jerusalem. The United States does not. This frames the conversation between Netanyahu and Obama. The rest is rhetoric.

Koirala's death robs Nepali politics of its centre

2010-03-20T17:19:00.001-07:00

Koirala's death robs Nepali politics of its centre

Prashant Jha

Girija Prasad Koirala's death on Saturday afternoon marks the end of an era in not only Nepali but also sub-continental politics. As a warrior for democracy over six decades, a five-time Prime Minister and architect of the ongoing peace process with the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Koirala was an integral part of Nepal's modern political history. But he has passed away at a time when the task of institutionalising the democracy he fought for remains incomplete.

G.P. Koirala, or GPK, was born in Bihar in 1925, where his father, Krishna Prasad Koirala, was in exile for defying the autocratic clan-based Rana regime. His father believed that Nepal could not be free of despotic Rana rule as long as their patrons, the British, ruled India. G.P. Koirala's elder brother, B.P. Koirala (also known as BP), was imprisoned in the Quit India Movement. In early 1947, Nepali exiles in India and Kathmandu-based dissenters formed the Nepali National Congress.

G.P. Koirala joined politics in this broader setting. In March 1947, he led Nepal's first workers strike at Biratnagar Jute Mills. Though firmly opposed to the use of violence, he accepted the party's decision to launch an insurrection against the Ranas in 1950. He served as the political commissar on the far-eastern front in the country's first democratic revolution.

But the tenuous democracy did not last. B.P. Koirala was sworn in as Nepal's first democratically elected Prime Minister in 1959 but King Mahendra engineered a royal coup soon after. Both BP and GPK were arrested and spent seven years in prison. They subsequently went back to live in exile in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and struggle for democracy from there.

In the early 1970s, the party decided to use violence against the autocratic regime. Under G.P. Koirala's leadership, NC hijacked a Nepali state-owned aircraft which was ferrying cash. Koirala also printed fake Indian currency, and procured weapons. But this phase did not last long. After emergency was declared in India in 1975, the Koiralas returned to Nepal and continued their movement in a non-violent manner.

Long seen as BP's ‘havaldar', Girija Koirala finally came into his own after his brother's death in the early 1980s. Along with Ganesh Man Singh and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, he became a part of the troika that constituted the Nepali Congress leadership. As general secretary, he tirelessly expanded the party organisation. Koirala accepted Ganesh Man's lead in forging an alliance with left groups against autocracy. With mass people's participation, and support of Indian politicians like Chandra Shekhar, democracy was restored in 1990. A new constitution was drafted instituting constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy.

The Nepali Congress won a majority in the 1991 elections. But senior leader and interim Prime Minister Bhattarai lost his seat. Koirala was the next natural candidate to lead the government. From fighting against the state, Koirala was now in charge of governance.

As Prime Minister, Koirala is credited with creating a democratic environment which enabled media and civil society to take roots. He opened up the economy, and expanded services outside Kathmandu. But he did little to ensure independence of public institutions and dumped the party's socialist commitment for a neo-liberal trajectory. He was blind to the nascent, but growing, assertion of marginalised ethnic communities. Koirala practised ‘coterie' politics; relatives and associates indulged in large-scale corruption; and he marginalised senior party leaders. He finally had to resign after an intra-party rebellion three years into his tenure.

This failure to institute democratic norms and political instability would cost Nepal dearly. The Maoist insurgency had picked up. Royalist forces became active. Koirala took over as Prime Minister twice again in 1998 and 2000. His stewardship of the country after the royal massacre in 2001, and willingness to stand up to the Royal Nepal Army's allegiance to the palace instead of the democratic government deserve appreciation. But his working style remained authoritarian and he paid little attention to key governance and policy issues.

The weaknesses and infighting of the democratic forces and growing Maoist violence allowed the new and ambitious monarch, Gyanendra, to assume an active role. He dismissed a democratic government in 2002 and appointed hand-picked nominees. To his credit, Koirala saw it as a ‘regressive' step and firmly opposed it. When Gyanendra assumed executive power through a coup in 2005, Koirala's instincts were proven right.

GPK was now back to doing what he knew best — fighting for democracy. Since 2002, he had also been talking to the Maoist chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda', to convince him to give up violence and concentrate on democratic politics. The royal regime created a context for the parliamentary parties to join hands with the Maoists. With Indian help, they signed the 12-point agreement in Delhi in November 2005. Older parties agreed to dump the monarchy and support the formation of a Constituent Assembly while the Maoists committed themselves to multiparty democracy.

This paved the way for the April 2006 People's Movement. The king was forced to concede that sovereignty rested with the people, and Girija Koirala became the Prime Minister one more time. This was truly Koirala's defining moment. All his sins of the 1990s seemed to be forgiven for his bold leadership in restoring peace and democracy in Nepal. He had stood firm against the right wing dictatorship, and had also helped a violent, ultra-left group accept the necessity of democracy. In November 2006, Koirala signed the peace agreement with Prachanda formally announcing the end of the civil war.

Though the Maoists unexpectedly won the Constituent Assembly elections, GPK expected to become Nepal's first president for his role in ensuring a smooth transition to a republic. But the Maoists did not support him, triggering a rupture that would later widen. His decision to foist his unpopular daughter, Sujata, as the NC's leader in the present government in 2009 eroded his credibility significantly. His party today is facing a deep existential and leadership crisis.

More crucially, the Maoist-non Maoist polarisation has increased. The peace process (which involves integrating and rehabilitating former Maoist combatants and addressing conflict crimes and justice) and constitution writing (for which the deadline is May 28, 2010) are in limbo. Realising the gravity of the situation, Koirala had recently taken a lead in setting up a High Level Political Mechanism which included the Maoists, who are otherwise in opposition, to address these issues.

Girija Prasad Koirala has left at a time when his centrist politics would have been a moderating influence on all sides. Only he could stand up to the spoilers — the right wing within his party, Nepal Army hawks, Maoist dogmatists and even Indian security hawks. The greatest tribute to him, and his six-decade-long political life, would be for Nepal to institutionalise peace and write a democratic constitution.

source: The Hindu

2010-03-20T09:00:00.000-07:00

Scheduled Tribes Regional Identity of All Darjeeling Hill Peoples

BY DARJ MAN

The entire feature of the interim arrangement addressed to the Home Minister, P.Chidambaram by Roshan Giri, General Secretary GJMM is based on the ethnological history of Darjeeling District and the draft proposal tabled on the Tripartite meeting on 18 March 2010 is the step in the right direction.

To refer the Darjeeling hill peoples back to Census 1931 status identifying the entire population 3,19,635 (Area 1164 sq.miles) were ‘All Tribes’ as compared to Census 1941 total population 3,76,369 out of which only 1,41,301 (37.54%) retained tribal status whereas 2,35,068 (62.46%) were seemingly delisted for simply the latter population having declared their mother tongue as Nepali (originating from Sanskrit an Indo Aryan language considered spoken by the majority ethnic Indian community and accordingly considered a language of India than ethnic Nepal). According to United Nations recognition of country wise ethnic languages it is interesting to recall it is Newari script and language that is recognized and not Nepali.

It therefore follows from the above contention of thinking that the delisting of 62.46% of the Darjeeling hill peoples tribal identity was withdrawn simply because of the fact that Nepali was mentioned as the mother tongue. Based on this assumption it is only proper and justified that the wrong done then requires to be undone in relisting the Darjeeling hill peoples back to the tribal status as of Census 1931. So the conception of declaring All the Gorkhas as Scheduled Tribes as a precondition mentioned in the interim arrangement is not only necessary but an injustice carried on past 79 years. This is a very important issue relevant and connected to state formations considering the fact the right to self determination, as understood by the provisions of the Constitution, if at all the Govt. of India Act 1935 is to be considered the benchmark for state formations, seems the indigenous national minorities (ST) only has the right to statehood.

This being the Constitutional provision for state formation, Darjeeling District and its entire inhabitants have been described as “Backward Tracts” (now meaning ST) since the Scheduled Districts Act 1874, Govt. of India Act 1919 and eventually the Backward Tract designation changed to mean ‘Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas’. The former is said to have contained more than 60% ST population whereas the latter a minimum of 25%, on basis of which the Govt. of India Act 1935 prevailed. The inhabitants of such designated areas were administered as if it was a British dominion under the Crown than British Indian provinces.

The delisting of the majority Darjeeling hill tribes to non-tribes was significant and damaging to the political history of the District in the sense, the withdrawal of a large tribal population from the tribal list to non-tribals diminished the “actual” ‘Excluded’ features of the hill tribes to a ‘Partially Excluded’ disadvantageous climb-down adversely affecting the contents of the indigenous national minorities thereby marginalizing the aspects of self determination, to mean state formation, to a veritable large degree.

Another important aspect which requires enquiry and investigation is the fact, that the all tribal status of Census 1931 was reduced marginally, though unjustifiably in Census 1941 only. However what requires to be examined is, at the time the Govt. of India Act 1935 implied by the Govt. of India Order 1936 came into force, the Darjeeling hill peoples were already effected by the change of status of a major population on basis of which, the status of Darjeeling District had already undergone a change from ‘Backward Tracts’ (All Tribes) to mean fully ‘Excluded’ relegated to ‘Partially Excluded’. This is another damaging feature adversely affecting the fundamental rights of Darjeeling hill peoples to imply the right to self determination in demanding a state post the promulgation of the Constitution in 1950.

Had the 1935 Act contained Darjeeling District as an Excluded Area, based on Census 1931 and not on Census 1941, but on the estimated, with a majority reduced tribal population in 1935, is itself an issue which requires to be explained by the concerned Census authority. The idea to imagine is, had Census 1931 was taken into consideration in formulating the Govt. of India Act 1935 and Order 1936, Darjeeling District would rightly have been an Excluded Area and not Partially Excluded as was designated in the aforesaid Act and Order which markedly infringed the right of the Darjeeling hill peoples to a constitutional disadvantage unjustifiably.

The overall effect of the perceived discrimination was that the constitutional status of Darjeeling District instead of being incorporated in the Fifth Schedule (Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes) was marginalized to the Sixth Schedule (restricted to Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram) on basis of which in 2005 the Bill on Gorkha Hill Council Darjeeling in West Bengal remains pending in the Rajya Sabha as amended by the Parliamentary Standing Committee in 2007.

The drawback of the Bill is the territorial contents of the area, containing only the three subdivisions of the District in which Siliguri subdivision has been fragmented to exclude areas of Darjeeling District (Siliguri Municipal Corporation under the Siliguri District Parishad [Mahakuma] with all development projects contained in Siliguri Jalpaiguri Development Corporation). Darjeeling District if at all the constitution is to be effectively implemented, cannot be fragmented from its area content, because in effect, which the ordinary ethnic majority community of the state is unable to accept the fact constitutionally Darjeeling District as a territorial area has never been part of erstwhile Bengal nor West Bengal State.

Hence the charge the statehood demand of the Darjeeling hill peoples will bifurcate West Bengal does not hold any water. On the contrary West Bengal should be grateful to the Darjeeling hill people for having allowed exploitation of resources to the coffers of Bengal since Darjeeling District was formed in 1866 partly out of Sikkim and Bhutan.

source:
THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE]

2010-03-17T17:13:00.001-07:00

GJM ‘ST’ proposal rings alarm bells – Tribal Status only for ‘Economic Benefits’ for ‘all communities’ in the region – Dr Harka Bahadur Chettri

March 17, 2010 — himalgroup

BY ROMIT BAGCHI
The Statesman

SILIGURI, 16 MARCH: Alarmed over the GJMM proposal for a blanket conversion of the Gorkha community into the Scheduled Tribe status to avail of the expected Interim Council largesse, the non-Gorkha ethnic population in the Darjeeling hills, which includes the Bengalis and the Biharis among others, has started doubting the GJM leadership’s concern for them.

“Associated with the Darjeeling hills in weal and woe for generations, we are appealing to them to keep our interests in view while taking up the hill cause with the Centre and the state government at the 18 March tripartite dialogue,” they said.

According to Mr Subhamay Chatterjee, a fourth generation resident in Darjeeling and himself associated with the GJM movement since its inception, the party proposal, almost echoing the Subash Ghisingh rhetoric was a shock. “We have nothing to say about the demand to incorporate the Gorkha community in the Scheduled Tribe status. But what about us, the non-Gorkha ethnic population inhabiting the hills for generations? We expected at least a mention about us in the draft document sent to the Centre for consideration. Though there is a minority cell proposal in the communiqué sent by the Centre to the GJM we wonder if it alludes to the religious or the ethnic minorities. We appeal to the hill leadership not to give a short shrift to our interests while pursuing the Gorkha community cause at the 18 March three-way dialogue,” he said.

Echoing, another Darjeeling resident, Dr Pratapaditya Guha said that the GJM leadership seemed least bothered about the well being of the non-Gorkha ethnic population in the hills. “Being minority we have right to be safeguarded in the fast moving political trajectory in the hills. We hope that the GJM leadership would not show the same hauteur Mr Subash Ghisingh displayed towards us,” he said.

Expressing the same anguish, another resident Mr Nitin Prasad said that the non-Gorkha population had grown apprehensive of its ethnic security in the emerging scenario. “We are part and parcel of the Darjeeling tapestry and we are proud of its inclusive legacy. We deserve a modicum of understanding from those spearheading the statehood struggle,” he said.

Recounting a recent experience, a resident Ms Rina Dey, said that the primary school council authority had rejected her application for a teaching job because of her ethnic status. (A condition imposed by the West Bengal or Gorkha Government ?!!)

“The posts are reserved for the Nepali-speaking (Gorkha only ?!!) applicants. Is this instance a portent for what is awaiting us in post Interim Darjeeling?” she asked.

Allaying the fear, the GJM media secretary, Dr Harka Bahadur Chhetri said that the non-Gorkha minorities should also embrace the tribal status to avail of the facilities the party was striving to secure for the hills.

“We must understand that the tribal status has only economic implication. Embracing it does not rob one of cultural identity. We have proposed it only for fast economic uplift of the long neglected region. Nobody should read more into it,” Dr Chhetri said.

2010-03-16T19:21:00.001-07:00

India and its troublesome neighbours

by M. K. Bhadrakumar

Asking the right questions can be terribly important in most circumstances. Especially in the dry pitiless world of international politics littered with bleached bones, of angled skylights and twisting branches.

One of India's leading corporate newspapers reported that China has “opened another anti-India front — this time in Nepal … Besides acquiring major construction projects in Nepal, the Chinese are also opening language centres in Nepali cities … [the] underlying objective appears to be to unleash anti-India propaganda in that country.”

Past pattern shows that the report may well turn out to be the stuff for India's “China-watchers” to fill up their future columns.

A think-tanker or two may also wet his toes. In these salubrious autumn days in Delhi, a seminar may even be trumped up over high tea to discuss upcoming Chinese language centres in Nepal. However, questions must be asked. How is it that Chinese construction companies' remarkable success in winning projects in Nepal becomes an “anti-India” activity? Doesn't Nepal have a right to award contracts to Chinese companies — just as the Saudis, Iranians, Nigerians or Chileans are increasingly doing? Looking beyond, other questions arise including some troubling ones.

Why should China teach the Nepalese their ancient language if the intention is to disseminate invidious propaganda? Chinese, after all, is one of the most difficult languages to master. The Chinese are a practical people and it seems logical that Beijing's purpose will be is served quickly and most efficiently if its anti-India propaganda is dished out in Nepalese language. Virginia Woolf compared translations to a mangled train after the accident.

What is worrisome is why so many Hindi-knowing Nepalese would want to learn Chinese. Yes, the really troubling question ought to be why India's neighbours neighbouring countries are getting so manifestly attracted to fostering close ties with China.

It is up to us to find a logical answer, which of course is possible only in a full and free spirit of stocktaking. stock-taking. Clearly, for posing such difficult questions, a pre-requisite is that we must be a self-confident people. Equally, intellectual forays get delimited when there is a growing “militarisation” of the mind.

Lastly, for asking the correct questions, we must have a mind where, as Rabindranath Tagore famously taught us a long time ago, “the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into the dreary desert of dead habit.”

Alas, our China-watching has become pedestrian and cliché-ridden. We will pay a price for this since China is a very serious power and it is rapidly transforming. Even assuming that that adversarial instincts in inter-state relations could remain immutable, there is a strong case to be made in favour of applying reason while making judgment. What else could we have expected Beijing to do other than what it did when we posed a development project in Arunachal Pradesh to the Asian Development Bank for funding?

To frame the question differentially, why is every Indian ambassador expected to take up with maniacal zeal all instances of “cartographic aggression” — display of Indian boundaries other than ditto what India claims? The point is, under international law, precedents could constitute a needless vector. Which is why sometimes a country, rightly or wrongly, may feel compelled to act precisely against precedent-setting joyful mountaineering expeditions and proceed to create a fait accompli — as India probably did in Siachen in 1984. The ADB is a major international institution and Beijing acted in its best interests. There is enough professionalism in South Block to have anticipated the high probability bordering on the certainty that Beijing would act precisely in the fashion it did.

The question is, why then did North Block press its proposal to the ADB since, as it now transpires, India does have the capacity to mobilise “domestic” funds for the undertaking of development projects in its sensitive border regions? In retrospect, did South Block know at all what North Block was doing when the latter approached the ADB? Did the Department of Economic Affairs seek MEA's political clearance? These questions are extremely relevant since often enough the our right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing — including on highly sensitive issues involving relations with Pakistan or China — given the exasperating vanity fair going on all the time between the czars on Raisina Hill.

Indeed, our narrative on China gets muddied when we dwell on its dealings with India's neighbours. Our discourses are demanding the impossible — that if China develops friendly relations with its South Asian neighbours, it will be deemed as a hostile act. No doubt, India has a right to safeguard its interests against Chinese policies that are patently directed against its interests. Surely, India has the prerogative to build up its military sinews. the sinews of its military strength. But then, we should also have the intellectual clarity to frame our responses to the situations surrounding us. Whereas, what is often enough seen is the propensity to take shelter under a dubious thesis that was first propounded by a minor Pentagon analyst in her late 20s — who since moved on, unsurprisingly, to the Rand Corporation — known as the “string of pearls.”

The advocates of the thesis have vociferously portrayed the Chinese activities in the South Asian region as unalloyed acts of hostility directed against India with the grand design of creating an arc around India's neck that would stifle our performance as a regional power. A colossal amount of damage has been done by the Indian acolytes of the “string of pearls” thesis. Some dispassionate analysis will be is in order. Take the three big pearls for a good, close look — Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

The recent developments in Myanmar show that not only have the Indian “experts” been completely off the mark in assuming that Yangon was about to become a Chinese pearl, China may actually be caught in a tangled web. Not only does Beijing lack the stranglehold over Myanmar, as our experts blithely believed, but the issue is more about how Beijing could easily extricate itself from supporting the isolated regime in Yangon. We are seeing a curious spectacle of Yangon taking full advantage of Beijing's predicament.

To cull out an expression from an American scholar, “Pulled from many directions, China's task resembles balancing a stool missing a leg.” Again, too many people in our strategic community seem not to care that Sri Lanka first offered the Hambantota port for development to India. New Delhi thumbed its nose at it, disdainfully showed its thumb up, whereupon Colombo turned to Beijing for help. We seemed to have forgotten that Sri Lanka was a sovereign country and wanted to exploit its unique factors to its advantage for economic development. We are no one to dictate whether it needs such modern facilities at Hambantota or has any right to make the port an important transportation hub in the Indian Ocean.

At any rate, we have nothing to fear about Sri Lanka becoming a pearl in a Chinese string, as there are very few people on this planet who treasure their autonomy of thinking and action as the Sinhalese do — and to boot, it, they are first-rate practitioners of the art of diplomacy. Again, reams and reams of paper have been wasted on the Chinese “presence” in Gwadar. But what is coolly overlooked is that China of its own volition turned down the Pakistani offer to run the Gwadar port after its development with considerable Chinese aid.

Arguably, China would benefit by out of a direct access to the Persian Gulf but it factored in that a managerial role in Gwadar was superfluous for achieving the purpose. Nor does China harbour rancour that Pakistan decided that Gwadar is best managed by a Singaporean firm with American links. (Curiously, Gwadar has become an American pearl — just as Myanmar too might, too, if the determined American diplomacy toward Yangon makes headway.) China-Pakistan relationship has literally become a no-go area for rational analysis in our country. Myths are galore, pride mixes with prejudice and self-righteousness. Take Chinese “military assistance” to Pakistan. Does China possess the technology, which the U.S. is systematically passing on to Pakistan? Izvestiya reported that during the visit by Defence Minister A.K. Antony to Moscow recently, the two sides discussed the development of a new supersonic missile “invincible to interception,” which “no army in the world possesses.” Has China, which faces a worldwide embargo, got any competing military technology to pass on to Pakistan? Also, let us not completely overlook that China is coping to balance its “all-weather friendship” when the U.S. is systematically tightening its vice-like AfPak grip.

In sum, we need to analyse why our neighbourhood diplomacy is faltering. Ask Bahadur why Maithili isn't good enough for him. The Myanmar regime offered a level-playing field for India. An Indian company could have undertaken Hambantota port development. The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project offered a rare enterprise for making Islamabad a stakeholder in good-neighbourly relations.

(The writer is a former diplomat.)

2010-03-14T06:05:00.001-07:00

OPINION: A question of assimilation

It cannot be gainsaid that the role of the Bengalis has much to answer for as far as the persistent demand for separation from West Bengal being raised in the hilly terrain is concerned. But perhaps it cannot explain the whole separatism syndrome reigning in the hills, writes Romit Bagchi

INDIA boasts of a hoary legacy of assimilation. History bears witness to the fact that innumerable ethnic communities and tribes came from all corners of the world, settled and were integrated into the national mainstream in course of time. No one was rejected and the flexibility of what was known as “Varna Dharma”, which later degenerated into the rigid caste system, is supposed to have played a crucial role in the process of assimilation.

And this has been possible because of the spiritual ethos embedded deep in the body of India’s thinking. Since time immemorial, this country has been preaching the unity of humankind in spirit — the spiritual essence being the deepest core of all that exists. Diversity on the surface, whatever its kind, is nothing but a veneer for the essential unity in the One, which only exists. The Varna system, which was, in its original form, an immensely flexible instrument, helped all to get not just a place but a rightful position in the socio-political hierarchy according to the collective propensity of each community and tribe.

And this assimilation is no insignificant achievement, keeping in view the tumultuous upheavals that the incursions often brought about in their wake in India’s socio-political landscape. Now it is said, and probably with some truth, that the spirit of assimilation keeps waning and India as a whole has slipped into a rut of bigotry. The wide expanse of the mental horizon, once deemed to be the quintessence of Indian originality, no longer holds its pre-eminence in the country’s general mode of reflection.

This charge has been levelled particularly against Bengalis in regard to the non- assimilation of the Gorkha community based in the Darjeeling hills into the socio-cultural mainstream. The typical Bengali snobbery is being put down as the principal impediment to the natural process of assimilation.

It is said that the Bengalis, being the ruling race, have not taken sufficient pains to bridge the gaping chasm between themselves and their under-developed Gorkha brethren. Separatism in the mental landscape of the marginalised community would not have taken such an inveterate turn had the Bengalis displayed even a modicum of tolerance and warmth, it is believed.

It cannot be gainsaid that the role of the Bengalis has much to answer for as far as the persistent demand for separation from West Bengal being raised in the hilly terrain is concerned. But perhaps it cannot explain the whole separatism syndrome reigning in the hills.

English authors W Brook Northey and CJ Morris, in their famous book, The Gurkhas, while dwelling on the incompatibility of Gorkhas in general to the typical Indian temperament, said, “The Gurkha differs from the people of India as much in appearance as he does in character. His Mongolian origin is responsible for a vein of humour and bonhomie that is not found in the more solemn and austere races of Aryan descent. Coming from a strange country, which though bordering on India, is so far removed from it in matters of language, customs and even thought that the young Gurkha, naturally, feels himself to be a stranger in a strange land when first he sets foot in India. His ignorance of the language, which, though naturally lessening in course of time, serves to accentuate his awkwardness and seeming inability to understand what is required of him, occasionally gives people who are unfamiliar with him and his ways the impression that he is inclined to be somewhat surly and aloof. Many years’ service even often seems to fail to create any desire in the Gurkha to interest himself in people, European or otherwise, with whom he is not directly concerned, or who are unable to speak or understand his language. Once his confidence is gained, however, he reveals, little by little, his true character and proves himself a staunch and faithful friend.”

This peculiar characteristic that caught the discerning eyes of the European researchers seems to hold still, though the development of mind and its resultant individualism in the community, whether in Nepal or in other parts where they are concentrated, seems to transform their attitudinal perceptions on life as a whole.

It should be remembered that Nepal happened to be a land-locked country, apparently shut off from the world for a long time in its history. It is said that there was a time when the people chanced to get acquainted with the world beyond their own land only through the yarns spun by those members of the government who trudged once every five years to Peking to offer tribute to the Chinese government as per the terms of a treaty completed between China and Nepal in 1793.

This apart, the farthest point in other directions which the affluent and hardy in the community reached was Benares, the most eminent among the places of pilgrimage for the Hindus across the region.

The situation somehow changed with the ascendancy of Jung Bahadur Rana, doubtless the most remarkable ruler in the political arena of the nation, in 1845. Overruling the long held prejudices against the outside world, he voyaged to England in 1850. This was indeed an epoch-making event, which later played a momentous role in bringing Nepal nearer to British India. Another descendent to the line, Sir Chandra Shamsher Bahadur Rana, a remarkable ruler again, by all accounts, carried things further, bringing about sweeping reforms in a nation that had remained veiled into an age-old gloom of ignorance and prejudice regarding the march of civilisation in several parts of the world. He too visited England and strove thereafter to remodel the socio-political structure of his country on the lines of the occidental ethos.

This being the situation, it is natural that the process of the development of mind and its resultant individualism has taken a long time in assuming concrete shape among a people completely shut out, as they were for a considerably long time, from the momentum of subjective transformation in consequence of the advent of occidental civilisation.

It might be said again that the political uncertainty haunting the Himalayan nation for some time, resulting in the ouster of the century-long system of monarchial despotism and the consequent experiments with myriad political views, signals the advent of the age of reason and individualism with its concomitant challenge to all those canons associated with the era of the symbolic conventions which held Nepal enthralled for ages.

And reverting back to the Gorkhaland tangle, one might say that the homeland movement in the Darjeeling hills has a far deeper connotation that gets swamped in the shrill cry for identity and development. Perhaps the deeper yearning is for assimilation in the Indian mainstream through collective assertiveness. The “homeland” cry might be a manifestation of the subjective urge among a growing number of individuals to step out of the rut of separatism and to carve a role for themselves in the national domain.

Nepalese settlers in India have been assimilated on the physical plane as far as possible in the course of time. But they are aware that they are far from being integrated mentally in the country they have accepted as their native land. And the Gorkhaland movement, when shorn of its xenophobic baggage, manifested in self-determined stridency, might reveal a deeper poignancy associated with the subjective craving for a rightful place in the national discourse.

( source:The Statesman)

2010-03-14T06:02:00.001-07:00

NEPAL: Nepal army refuses to induct Maoists

FROM GULF TIMES, DOHA, QATAR

Nepal Army chief General Chhatraman Singh Gurung has refused to hire fighters from the opposition Maoist party’s guerrilla army en masse.

Gurung, who became army chief last year after his predecessor, General Rookmangud Katawal, caused the collapse of the Maoist government, told visiting UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs B Lynn Pascoe that the fighters of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) should not be taken en masse in the Nepal Army.

The general’s stand goes against a peace pact signed between the Maoists and the ruling parties in 2006 that saw an end to a communist insurrection that had killed over 13,000 people.

It was also the stand adopted by Katawal that led to the Maoist government trying to sack him last year.

Gurung said the PLA could be accommodated in the police, border security forces and other non-military agencies. They could also be sent overseas for jobs or be rehabilitated with an economic incentive.

The general said some PLA combatants could be inducted in the army individually if they met the international yardsticks followed for recruitment. At his meeting with Pascoe Friday, Gurung also expressed concern at Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda giving training to the PLA in their cantonments and urging them to be ready for another revolution if the government failed to implement the new constitution by May 28.

The general has also negated a UN count that put the strength of the PLA at over 19,000, saying Prachanda had been caught admitting in a secretly taped video that there were only about 6,000-7,000 bona fide fighters. The army chief’s statement comes at a time the government is trying to slash the allowances to the PLA.

There is growing uncertainty over the fate of the fighters with their own leaders saying the new statute should be promulgated before they are disbanded while the ruling parties are demanding the discharge of the PLA first.

Gurung’s statement is bound to trigger Maoist anger. It has already been condemned by party spokesman Dinanath Sharma who said it was a political statement.

Sharma also said the integration of the PLA was a matter to be decided by the parties and not the army, which is bound to obey the government.

Pascoe is an envoy of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sent to assess Nepal’s fraying peace process. He has asked the coalition government to rehabilitate the guerrilla army of the Maoists and democratise the national army, warning that Nepal still had two armies though the communist uprising had ended four years ago.

“The question of the future of the two armies should not remain unresolved any longer,” said B Lynn Pascoe in a statement issued by the UN on Thursday.

“Unfortunately, Nepal today still has two armies, and no agreed strategy for what to do about this… We encourage leaders to engage in serious, good-faith discussions leading to agreements and actions.”

Pascoe, who arrived in Kathmandu on a three-day visit Wednesday, held talks with Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda and Girija Prasad Koirala, who heads the largest party in the government, the Nepali Congress. He is also expected to inspect the cantonment in Shaktikhor in southern Nepal where part of the 19,600-strong Maoist army – the People’s Liberation Army – has been confined since they ended their 10-year “People’s War” in 2006.

The peace pact signed by the ruling parties and the Maoists, which ended the insurrection, had agreed to induct the PLA combatants into the state army.

However, the merger is yet to take off due to opposition by senior army officials and now ruling party leaders who are accusing the Maoists of having inflated the strength of the PLA.

Pascoe said the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army personnel along with the democratisation of the Nepal army and the enforcement of a new constitution in May were the two major tasks before the government.

“The effective integration and rehabilitation of former combatants is one of the most important factors distinguishing those countries that successfully navigate these transitions to peace,” he said.

“Former combatants need to be afforded a real stake in the economic, political and institutional life of the country.”

The army, which had supported deposed king Gyanendra in seizing power in 2005 and was charged with gross violation of human rights, has refused to toe the line even after the fall of the royal regime and its pledge to obey the elected government.

Army personnel named in torture and extrajudicial killings have not been punished despite court orders for their arrest.

With the parties having failed 10 deadlines in the process of drafting the new constitution, Pascoe indicated the UN had realised that the May 28 deadline for the new constitution may also fail and recommended backup action in that case. “We strongly encourage that every effort be made to accelerate progress in the days and weeks ahead,” he said.

“At the same time, inclusive discussions are needed to prepare carefully for the possibility that a final draft of the constitution will not be completed by the deadline.” The Maoists, who went to war demanding the new constitution, have warned of a new revolt if the ruling parties fail the May 28 deadline.

There is also mounting anger and frustration among civil society members at the delay and many constitutional experts have warned that a failure to meet the deadline would see chaos and violence. IANS

2010-03-13T18:42:00.001-08:00

NEPAL: Nepal to push for zero tariff facility

FROM SOUTH ASIAN MEDIA NET / MY REPUBLICA

KATHMANDU: A government delegation led by Commerce Secretary Purushottam Ojha is visiting the United States in the first week of April to push for special bilateral trading arrangement, seeking zero tariff facility for Nepal´s key exports and support for infrastructure development.

Previously, Ministry of Commerce and Supplies (MoCS) had planned the visit under the leadership of Minister Rajendra Mahato, but the visit was postponed after Nepali Embassy sought additional time to confirm appointments with the US officials concerned.

The team will mainly discuss on Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), a pact that US Trade Representative (USTR) Office has prescribed for Nepal to win special market access facility in the world´s largest economy.

“It will also push for zero duty for Nepal´s dying readymade garment industry, apprise investors and officials there about investment avenues and opportunities here and seek assistance for trade related infrastructure development,” Ojha told myrepublica.com.

For the purpose, the team will hold talks with senior officials of Department of Commerce, US Trade Representative, senators and congressmen. The delegation will also meet with the officials of the State Department, seeking assistance to develop trade related infrastructure.

It will also interact with US business organizations, and work for establishing a reliable and workable private-private ties — a mechanism that could help investors on the other side of the Atlantic to know and update on business and investment opportunities here.

To foster such ties, MoCS has included chiefs of Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI), Confederation of Nepalese Industries (CNI) and Garment Association Nepal (GAN) in the delegation.

“The main objective of the visit is to get a tangible and formal public and private links established so that economic engagements between the two countries could be rejuvenated,” said Ojha.

Amid political turmoil and instability, Nepal´s trade and economic relations with the largest economy of the world have faded in recent years. In recent years, Nepal has received almost nil US investment and its major exports like readymade garment have also collapsed.

As a result, bilateral trade between Nepal and the US stands very nominal with Nepal enjoying trade surplus of Rs 180 million. In such a situation, officials believe that the signing of TIFA and acquisition of special preferences will give new impetus to bilateral trade and investment.

Traders too argue that the facility will instantly give boost to Nepal´s exports like handmade woolen carpet, pashmina and other items that are barely covered under GSP (generalized system of preferences).

As a response to Nepal´s past efforts to win zero tariff facility for readymade garments, USTR had forwarded the text of TIFA to the Commerce Ministry a few months ago. The ministry had instantly responded positively to the offer, suggesting certain changes in the text.

source: Barun Roy

2010-03-11T20:47:00.000-08:00

Domicile certificates must be properly scrutinized: ASYA

GANGTOK, March 10: All Sikkim Youth Association (ASYA) has reiterated that the people of Sikkim will ‘continue to face injustice’ until and unless the Sikkim Subject Certificates or Certificate of Identifications issued to the people here are not properly scrutinized.

There has been no proper scrutiny of the above domicile certificates even after 35 years of democracy in Sikkim, said the ASYA in a press statement today. The government had on occasions formed committees to look into this issue but their reports have never been disclosed resulting in waste of public money, it said.
The association expressed its fears that if the identification papers are not scrutinized by a committee then a person with fake documents could reach the Assembly in future. The ASYA also slammed certain organizations trying to raise the merger issue.

source; sikkim express

2010-03-11T02:25:00.001-08:00

India needs real time decision support system to nab criminals: Chidambaram

PTI

Home Minister P. Chidambaram on Thursday advocated a robust real time decision support system to track down terrorists and organised criminals who have developed various channels of communication with the help of technology.

“The terrorists and organised criminals have developed overt and covert technologies including Information Communication Technology. This has made the job of law and order professionals far more challenging than ever before,” he said addressing the Silver Jubilee function of National Crime Record Bureau.

The Home Minister said the country needs solutions that can offer robust, real-time and validated decision support systems for the police leadership to evolve remedial and pro-active strategies.

“The sheer magnitude of crime in a federal polity of our geographical size makes this task a really challenging one,” he said.

Mr. Chidambaram said the challenges posed by criminality in general and other more serious manifestations of crime in particular like terrorism, insurgency, left wing extremism, trans-national crimes, drugs and arms trafficking, cyber crimes tend to establish that war against the Indian state is being fought more in the hinterland than on the borders.

“Today, we are fighting our battles on individual pitches. We need to connect, coordinate and supplement our efforts both at micro and macro levels,” he said.

Referring to the Home Ministry’s Rs 2,000 crore ambitious Crime, Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) project, the Home Minister said a conscious decision has been taken to mandate the NCRB to roll out the CCTNS.

“Through the CCTNS, we intend to create a national databank of crime and criminals and their biometric profiles,” he said.

This database will have a handshake with databases of 21 other agencies of the criminal justice system like courts, jails, immigration and passport authorities, and subsequently, be extended to other national agencies through the NATGRID so that terror and crime could be fought more professionally.

“It will also create a mechanism to provide public services like registration of online complaints, ascertaining the status of case registered at the police station, verification of persons etc,” he said.

Mr. Chidambaram, however, expressed disappointment over the initial delay in implementation of the CCTNS project. “If we remain firm, determined and have complete control, it is possible to limit the slippage in some stages“.

The Home Minister said though the initial easy tasks of the CCTNS project has been completed, the key works were yet to be done and hoped that the NCRB would be able to do it efficiently and in time.

2010-03-10T22:21:00.000-08:00

Dams in Sikkim: – Blessing or curse

With reference to your article dated March 3, 10 titled “Precarious Gangtok if earthquake hits” regarding the assessment of NMID is timely. The people in the State are living in a fool’s paradise. It is a disaster waiting to happen.

The disastrous situation is compounded by the fact that all the 30 or more odd dams already constructed, under construction or on the anvil for tendering or negotiations with construction companies are concentrated in an area of 70 kms by 40 kms which is high density of dams per square kilometer.

Also, it is true that dams are required for power generation and would contribute to revenue generation to this revenue starved state. And on the positive side dams are relatively less polluting than thermal and coal power plants. However dams are environmentally damaging and also leave carbon footprints.

On the other hand such huge number of dams in such small geographical area in a geologically fragile area of young mountains like the Himalayas could pose a serious risk. Also, it is an established fact that Sikkim falls in high seismic zone 4 and dams are known to increase the seismicity of the areas in which they are located.

The presence of dams are known to cause local climatic changes, ecological damage, harm the river based biosphere and its diversity. The local population could be affected adversely in terms of demography and if it is a primitive tribe than negative acculturation could occur.

The Chief Minister of the State is forward-looking and development oriented and does talk of sustainable development. However, the State policy for power development to go for maximum power generation of 5000 Megawatts in a short period of time could spell disaster in the long term for state and does not appear to be balanced. Maybe he is ill advised in the matter. Even Ministry of Environment based on study of Teesta River by an independent study group has kept in abeyance six dam proposals. Further, the long term values of dams are doubtful as Himalayan Glaciers are receding at an alarming pace.

Also, recently in the papers there was a news item of loss of more than Rs. 80 crores due to non-construction of one dam and the State Government standing as guarantor. Such allegations are serious matter and have to be clarified.

Most saddening is the efforts made by Lepchas of Dzongu and elsewhere to preserve the sanctity of the Holy place of Dzongu where Panam and Teesta Projects are coming up. They have been labeled as anti-development and anti-progressive. It is a fact that Dzongu is a Buddhist sacred place as well. Just because you act out of your deep faith and reverence you should not be condemned. Even the Chogyals, the past rulers of the erstwhile Kingdom of Sikkim had made a law to ensure the sanctity of the place. For the Lepchas and all Himalayan Buddhists this making of dams in the holy land of Dzongu is a sacrilege and pains their hearts. It is similar to Ram setu or Ayodhya or Mecca or Jerusalem. All arguments of development and economics are subsidiary to human faith and values.

There are enough number of dams in East and South Sikkim for economic and revenue purposes. It would keep with the green image of Chief Minister to leave North and West Districts for pristine aesthetics for preservation of environment for the future generations of Sikkim and the entire country. Here in these two Districts the focus could be on ecotourism, educational institutions, hospital tourism, knowledge based and software enterprises. The climate and environment are eminently suitable for such enterprises. Our youths and younger generation could be easily absorbed into such knowledge based enterprises without harming the environment.

Therefore in the public interest the State Government should have a moratorium on new dams and take out a white paper on the dams under construction and also those dams which are under proposal or consideration. The white paper should clearly highlight the cost benefit analysis, agreements drawn so far, potential environmental costs and means of damage mitigation due to dams. Failure to do so would reflect badly on the attitude and integrity of the State Government.

ST Gyaltsen,
Gangtok

APPEARED IN VOICE OF SIKKIM

2010-03-10T18:10:00.000-08:00

Sikkim:Governor inaugurates seminar on Social Violence and Police

Gangtok: “A relatively stable society has less chaos and more order while a society in transition experiences breakdown of transitional norms, and customary checks and balances on human behaviors, and hence greater incidence of unruly behavior. Causes of violence as well as the means to deal with them, must be sought in the totality of human environment – Physical, economic, political, socio-cultural and technological”. This is said by Governor of Sikkim, Mr. Balmiki Prasad Singh.

The Governor was speaking as chief guest at the inauguration of an international seminar on Tuesday, March 9, organized by Sikkim University in collaboration with Centre for Public Affairs, New Delhi, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi Groupe Europeen de Recherche sur les Normativites, Paris. Theme of the two-day seminar is Social violence and Police: Cross-national experiences”. Inaugurated by the Governor at a local hotel, the day’s programme was presided by Mr Ved Marwah, Chairman, Centre for Public Affairs and former governor of Jharkhand and Manipur.

Governor Mr. Singh said that social violence is an inevitable aspect of almost all societies. However, its nature and extent varies across societies and cultures.

Violence is a complex phenomenon because of its multiple causes. Various theories have tried to explain the causes of violence, ranging from political, economic, socio-cultural, ethnic, developmental and so on. He said, “we are living in an era of political, social and religious turbulence”.

The police including the paramilitary units, Mr. Singh said, are the principal agents of the State’s internal sovereignty. “Should the police retain its old structure or make a transition and device new structures congruent with democratic polity with economic and scientific advancement, or there is any need to divide police functions into sub categories like law and order maintenance and crime investigations”, the Governor asked. On the occasion the Governor released an annual report of Sikkim University.

Mr. Marwah, Prof. Ajay Mehra, Director, Centre for Public Affairs, Prof. Rene Levy Director, Groupe European de Recherche sur les Normatives (GREN), Paris, and Prof. Mahendra P. Lama, Vice Chancellor , Sikkim University, also deliberated on the seminar topic.

The programme was attended by Mr. S.M Limboo, Dy. Chairman of Planning Commission of Sikkim, Mr. Sonam Tshering Bhutia, Member of the Commission, delegates from France, Delhi and other parts of the country, members of Non Government Organizations, Professors and Lecturers, officials and staff of Sikkim University.

SOURCE:SIKKIM REPORTER

2010-03-07T04:34:00.001-08:00

Pakistan Army: the struggle within

by Praveen Swami

Early last month, Pakistan's army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani, outlined a rather different vision. In a presentation to the media, he asserted that the Pakistan army was an “India-centric institution,” adding this “reality will not change in any significant way until the Kashmir issue and water disputes are resolved.” His words were not dissimilar in substance from the language used by jihadists such as Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Mohammad Saeed in recent speeches.

Later this year, President Zardari will make a decision that could force open the faultlines between the military-led establishment and the Pakistan People's Party. Gen. Kayani is scheduled to retire in November 2010. Mr. Zardari, as the commander-in-chief, holds the power to appoint his successor.

Ever since Gen. Kayani — a former Inter-Services Intelligence chief — took office, the Pakistani state has set out on escalating tensions along its eastern frontier. Fighting along the Line of Control has increased, and jihadist infiltration escalated reversing an eight-year trend. Last week, Jammu and Kashmir secessionists were told by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir that his country had reverted to its traditional policies on the state — policies that included unconcealed support for jihadists. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's secret envoy Satinder Lambah, who has been holding secret meetings with his Pakistani counterpart Riaz Mohammad Khan, has discovered that Islamabad no longer appears interested in pursuing a five-principles path to peace advocated by the former President, Pervez Musharraf.

The army, it has long been evident, loathes its commander-in-chief: Mr. Zardari, for example, is never invited to address the staff at military installations.

Last year, Mr. Zardari was forced to hand over control of the National Command Authority, which controls Pakistan's nuclear assets, to Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani. The military also appears to have been working hard to strip Mr. Zardari of his sole source of authority over the army. In January, Parliament's constitutions reforms committee unanimously agreed that Article 243 be amended to give the Prime Minister—rather than the President — effective power to appoint the services chiefs. Even as things stand, Mr. Zardari could face resistance if he picks a chief of his choice. Defence Secretary Syed Athar Ali is a former Lieutenant-General; his predecessor in office, retired Lieutenant-General Iftikhar Ali Khan, refused to sign on the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's orders sacking the then army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

But come November, Mr. Zardari will likely hold the ace in his hand — and a bitter struggle could break out if he chooses to play it.

Gen. Kayani's three years in office have enabled him to build a substantial constituency within the army. For a variety of reasons, the army chief was able to promote a record number of top officers, and give others coveted positions. In 2008, Gen. Kayani promoted six officers to the rank of Lieutenant-General, and assigned several other Lieutenants-General and Major-Generals to prestigious offices. Last year, four more officers were promoted Lieutenants-General. From March onwards, eight Lieutenants-General will retire — including ISI Director-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Chief of General Staff Muhammad Mustafa Khan, Quartermaster General Zahid Hussain, and commander of the Karachi-based V Corps Shahid Iqbal. New opportunities will thus arise for Gen. Kayani to dispense patronage.

Islamabad military gossip has it that Gen. Kayani may use his goodwill within the army to lobby for a further year in office, as part of a deal which would also secure Mr. Zardari's position. Gen. Kayani may also attempt to have himself selected chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. General Tariq Majeed, head of the JCSC, is due to retire just days before Gen. Kayani — a coincidence that could ease the move. If that indeed is Gen. Kayani's intention, though, he will unlikely be satisfied with the largely ceremonial position of JCSC chief. He could lobby for supervisory powers over top appointments — a move that would likely have President Zardari's support, since it would create tensions between the JCSC and the new army chief.

Gen. Kayani's own favoured choice for his successor, should he not secure an extension for himself, is the current ISI chief, Gen. Pasha, who is due to retire on March 18, 2010. However, Gen. Pasha has had a relatively brief tenure as Pakistan's spymaster — a fact which, read along with the critical state of affairs in the country, could justify an extension. Lieutenant-General Masood Alam, who heads the critical Peshawar-based XI Corps, was recently given an extension on just these grounds. However, Gen. Pasha has never commanded a Corps — normally a prerequisite for the top job.

Lieutenant-General Nadeem Taj will likely be the second in line for the army's top job, if Gen. Pasha's extension does not come through early in March. Now serving as commander of the Gujranwala-based XXX Corps, Gen. Taj is scheduled to retire only in April 2011 — and thus has time on his side. Long a key Musharraf aide, Gen. Taj was appointed Director-General of Military Intelligence, a position he held until February 2005. Later, he commanded the Lahore-based 11 Infantry Division, and served as commandant of the Pakistan Military Academy.

But any move to appoint Gen. Taj is likely to encounter intense resistance from the United States — and with some reason. Gen. Taj was made ISI Director-General in September 2007, just before Gen. Kayani replaced Gen. Musharraf as army chief. By late that year — as Gen. Kayani brought about changes in policy that the army saw as more consonant with its interests than the pro-western position of President Musharraf — Gen. Taj found himself in trouble with the U.S. In August 2008, President George W. Bush was reported to have complained that it had become “impossible to share intelligence on the al-Qaeda and the Taliban with Pakistan because it goes straight back to the militants.” Eventually, in October 2008, Gen. Taj was moved out of the ISI — but rewarded with charge of a prestigious Corps.

Khalid Shameem Wynne, Lieutenant-General who leads the Quetta-based XII corps and the army's southern command, appears the third in line for the top job — and least contentious among those in the race. From a family with a long military tradition — his father, Colonel Arshad Wynne, served during the India-Pakistan war of 1971— Gen. Wynne started his career in the 20 Punjab Regiment. He held several important posts, notably serving as Deputy Chief of General Staff, and commanding the prestigious Siachen-focussed 323 Infantry Brigade. Little is known about Gen. Wynne's political affiliations, perhaps because he has none. Notably, Gen. Wynne has had no tenure at the ISI, unlike both his rivals for the top job — and, of course, Gen. Kayani himself.

Wars of succession in the Pakistan army have often had significant political outcomes. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's October 1999 appointment of Lieutenant-General Ziauddin Butt — an engineering officer — precipitated the coup which led to Gen. Musharraf taking charge as President. President and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto picked the junior-most — and supposedly most subservient — candidate for the army chief's job. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who Bhutto described as “my monkey,” returned the compliment first by naming the Prime Minister Colonel-in-Chief of the Armoured Corps — and then sending him to the gallows. General Abdul Waheed Kakkar, appointed army chief by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in the course of a bitter power struggle with Mr. Sharif, forced both politicians to resign.

Popular consensus has it that the Pakistan army is a battleground between Islamists and pro-western professionals. In fact, as scholars like Ayesha Siddiqa have shown us, the military is an independent political actor, representing a set of concrete interests: the military is, after all, Pakistan's largest owner of land and custodian of an industrial empire that runs everything from breakfast-cereal plants to banks. The army, thus, is not just the custodian of the ideological and territorial boundaries of the state; it is, in key senses, the state itself.

Gen. Musharraf was reviled by the army for having allowed Pakistan to be drawn into a war that threatens its primacy. Gen. Kayani has responded by seeking to repair the army's relationship with its long-standing Islamist allies —and by seeking to find a way out of the war in Pakistan's northwest by escalating tensions along its eastern border. It is no coincidence that jihadist operations like the November 2008 attack on Mumbai took place soon after Gen. Kayani took office. His successor will have to decide if the army's interests lie in this direction, or in charting a new course.

India has enormous equities in the looming struggle for control of the Pakistan army — and must watch its course with great care.

2010-03-06T16:16:00.000-08:00

Bangladesh perspective

Air Cdre (Retd) Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury, ndc, psc

BANGLADESH, lying between the Himalayas in the north and the Bay of Bengal in the south, offers the only land route connecting South and Southeast Asia. Any invasion into South Asia from the East must pass through Bangladesh; the Japanese tried to do just that in the World War II. The British colonization of India also started from Bengal when the Bay of Bengal became the point of ingress. Bangladesh's close proximity to both India and China, two rising power in the 21st century, adds to its geographic importance.

India shares more than 3000 km of border with Bangladesh. The border is well demarcated except few stretches totalling about 9 km that remains unresolved due mainly to lack of political will. India envelops Bangladesh on three sides; similarly, Bangladesh almost dissects the north-eastern India from the heartland.

Lying only 30 miles north of Bangladesh is the strategically important Nathu La pass that connects India with China through Tibet. Despite rapprochement with India, the Chinese have not recognized the so-called “McMahon Line” or renounced claim on the Indian state of Arunachal. Thus, in the unlikely event of an India-China conflict, the access to or denial of the use of Bangladesh territory to the belligerent forces will be of utmost strategic importance. As India becomes an economic powerhouse its need for shorter, faster, and more diverse means of communication between the northeast and the rest of India becomes more urgent and therefore, the need to transit across Bangladesh.

Although Bangladesh-Myanmar land border is demarcated, inflow of minority Arakanese refugees has been a source of tension for many years. The Bay of Bengal spans the vital maritime route between SE Asia and ME. Bangladesh has vital interest in the Bay, but its neighbours - India and Myanmar - dispute its maritime boundary claim. Unless resolved amicably, the maritime boundary issue could be a serious irritant in inter-state relations.

Water and Energy: Bangladesh's primary strategic concerns

While the demand for fresh water continues to rise in Bangladesh, as elsewhere in the world, its supply dwindles. Some of the major rivers are being diverted upstream in India. The Ganges or Tista, once mighty rivers, have reduced to trickles. Lack of information from India regarding proposed Tipaimukh dam over the Barak has been a concern for Bangladesh.

The Chinese government's plan to divert the Brahmaputra could be a major issue affecting millions in India and Bangladesh. Unless the riparian countries join together to ensure optimum use of water, there is the likelihood of conflict and tension in the region in future. Our industrial growth continues to suffer due to shortage of electricity. Meanwhile, a regional power grid could be established to import power from countries such as India, Nepal and Bhutan, which have great potential for hydroelectricity.

Water and energy could be the two most important areas of regional cooperation or confrontation.

Bangladesh's national security priorities

Based on the discussion so far, it can be concluded that the danger of Bangladesh getting involved in an armed conflict with either India or Myanmar or with a country beyond the border is remote. Bangladesh's grievances with India could be addressed if the Mujib-Indira Pact of 1973 is implemented. Although the Maritime boundary has not yet been demarcated, the negotiation is already on with Myanmar and India, the prognosis so far is that a negotiated settlement will be arrived at with the spirit of compromise and cooperation. It is important for us to remember that rivers are the common heritage of mankind and an equitable share of the resources would benefit us all.

On the non-traditional front, however, there are quite a few challenges. The first is the threat of terrorist activities inside the country and across the border. All the SAARC countries have recognized this and they have signed a number of protocols to that effect. In the past, the Indians alleged that separatists from NE states used Bangladesh territory as sanctuary and even used our territory to smuggle in arms and ammunition. Bangladesh continued to deny their presence here. It is now alleged that some top-ranking security officials of Bangladesh were involved in the process. That is indeed deplorable, if true. These are the issues that we need to take care of for the future. In this respect the suggestion put forward by our PM to create a Counter Terrorism Task Force manned by security personnel from all South Asian countries will be a step in the right direction.

The neighbours have viewed Bangladesh's population as a possible security concern. But the good news here is that as the economy prospered and education spread, the population growth reduced. Since 1971, the population has doubled but per capita income has gone up nearly seven times. Instead of being afraid of hungry mass migrating across the border, our neighbours, India and Myanmar should invest here and enter into greater economic activities to the mutual benefit of all so that the people have no incentive to leave. One of our biggest security insurance would be to turn Bangladesh into a regional hub of transportation, transhipment, and transit that would attract investment and boost national economy. A powerful economy means a robust national security.

Bangladesh military and national security

Bangladesh armed forces are to provide a robust response to traditional security threats whenever and from whatever sources those appear. Building up an army, air or naval force is a long drawn out affair. Just because we do not have a threat in sight does not mean we have no need of an armed force. The purpose of the military is to ensure that the threat is not allowed to develop and nipped in the bud. A standing military provides quick response to crush the threat before it gains an upper hand. Our armed forces must be able to inflict sufficient damage to an aggressor to deter him from launching an attack in the first place, what is called deterrence capability. Given the financial resources that are made available now for the military, we would be able to further develop our forces to meet the challenges that might appear.

In the non-traditional sphere, we already have the threat of religious extremists who want to establish an Islamic state by violent means. We also have the extreme leftists who in the name of establishing a classless society are in fact, looting the countryside. Coupled with these are the separatist elements from across the border trying to use Bangladesh as sanctuary; arms and drug smugglers use Bangladesh as a conduit. The armed forces would be called upon to help the law enforcing agencies whenever required. Military's training and operational doctrine, force structuring and equipment procurement should reflect these urgent security imperatives.

Bangladesh armed forces had done a great job in peacekeeping missions worldwide. Although these do not contribute directly to national security, the goodwill that they earn in the international arena helps us boost our national image. Moreover, exposure to international arena, dangers and hazards of operations under different climatic, cultural and operational conditions enhances military professionalism, thus helping national security posture. Employment of armed forces in nation building works such as construction projects, disaster management, medical emergencies not only enhance the forces' professional capability but also contributes directly towards mitigating comprehensive security besides bettering civil-military relations.

Conclusion

National security is a vital issue for the nation, yet it is not often discussed in public. It is considered to be a classified matter best left to the military; ordinary citizen would not be privy to it. In the developed world research, debates and discussions are carried out in the universities and national security issues are in the open for all to participate. Thanks to organization such as Dhaka University, BIISS, BEI etc., we now have a pool of experts who could make important contribution in the security debate. While the issues are debated in civil society, media and on the floor of the parliament, the military and other security agencies would provide vital inputs so that a correct judgment could be arrived at. As the theoretical structure of the national security undergoes revision, we need to focus on the security challenges of Bangladesh, now and in the future, and prepare ourselves to face those challenges

source:The Daily Star

2010-03-05T23:38:00.000-08:00

An Open Letter to the People of Sikkim

Jan 17, 2009

The Sikkim National Peoples Party (SNPP) has always maintained that Sikkim’s association with the Union of India was the result of the aspirations of the Sikkimese people for participation in the democratic institutions of India, but reiterates that the terms of association were completely different as compared to the other states of the union. This fact was made explicit by the 35th amendment to the constitution in 1974, which gave the status of an associate state to Sikkim with complete internal autonomy and the right to self determination, which was a unique experiment in India’s constitutional history. These special provisions were later mutilated, and illegally changed by the 36th amendment in 1975 ( An illegal amendment imposed on the people of Sikkim without their consent.), when article 371f was inserted into the constitution, but it still explicitly retained all the provision of an associate state, of course, in a different and more malleable/manipulative form.

The party reminds the people that continuity of our old laws were one of the major guarantees incorporated in the constitution and that the people have stood up for this right occasionally in the past when the people of Sikkim rose together in 1992 to oppose the Income Tax issue, in 1998 against the employment exchange, in 2007 in favour of rule 4(IV) and countless other times. Unfortunately we are now again facing the same situation with the imposition of the Income tax act, which has splintered Sikkimese society in a way which does not bode well for the future. The party through its sister organization, Citizens for Clarity on Art. 371F, has determined that despite explicit provisions for safeguard and continuity of old laws, around 184 central acts have been extended to Sikkim, in violation of constitutional norms, during the last 3 decades despite sporadic protest by the people as mentioned earlier. These extensions are in complete violation of the constitutional safeguards and it is a rather unfortunate matter that while almost 75% of the violation have been committed by the state government, 25% of the violations have been directly committed by agencies of the Central Government.

The party feels that now the time has come for the people to realize that if we do not protest strongly and in a firm manner, the wrong signals shall go to the people and government of India that all is well in Sikkim and that the people have accepted whatever is thrown at them. This fact has been reflected recently when our Chief Minister recently received one of his nonsensical “National Awards” for the best health services in the country. Every Sikkimese knows this is a lie, as it is commonly seen that our people have to travel to Siliguri for a simple MRI or a simple appendix operation. In fact the party has determined that no doctor in Sikkim has ever had his own child delivered in Sikkim, a fact cruelly subdued and suppressed by these sycophantic and meaningless awards and propoganda, which gives others the impression that Sikkim is on the right path of progress, and the people too stunned to react.

The party stands by the belief that violation of these terms has created a situation where none of the communities of Sikkim feel secure in any way any more. This insecurity is seen by the fact that the Lepchas have been agitating for the last almost 800 days on continuous fast for the preservation of their homeland. We have to remember that the Lepchas are among the most vulnerable which has been justified by their declaration as an aboriginal tribe as per UN guidelines. The Bhutias have recently come up with the demand to relocate them so as to save their way of life and their unique culture. We cannot forget the circumstances which have prompted them to ask for such an extreme demand which is clearly an open indication of their insecurities. The small but significant community of old businessness/plainsman are at a crossroad today where their very identity is at stake as there is no coherent policy for them even after 3 decades and this insecurity has been compounded recently when they were not included in the IT exemption given to the others and has led to their isolation and heightened insecurity. The worst fate has been reserved for the Sikkimese of Nepalese origin (SNO), who were the prime motivator for the democratic movement in 1975, but who today have even lost their basic rights like seat reservation. Because of these and other violations, the SNO are losing their identity rapidly and this crisis has been aggravated by the recent disclosure by the BJP of the dual citizenship of our chief minister. The party has now reasons to believe that the documents provided by the BJP functionaries are a copy of the originals and cannot be considered a forgery. This has been ascertained by the party through its sources in Nepal who have verified that the document numbers disclosed by the BJP functionaries, are indeed recorded in the concerned registers in the concerned departments of the Republic of Nepal. The party feels that these are serious matters especially considering the fact, that in the past our CM has been associated with the Maoists of Nepal, as well as extreme fascist forces which were promoting a “Greater Nepal”. This fact has been quoted extensively by the national and international press in the past. The seriousness is that not only will such disclosures be a disaster for the SNO in Sikkim and a threat to national security, but it shall also negatively effect the democratic aspirations of the Nepali/Gorkha people of India as a whole who are already under duress, and have been demanding the state of Gorkhaland. Therefore it has now become imperative that this sort of things are nipped in the bud in time before further damage to the security of the nation.

The party in its meeting, on the 12th of Jan, 2009, discussed these issues at length and concluded that it has become essential that a permanent solution at the earliest as it is shameful that we are in this confused situation after more than 3 decades, and the impunity and the rate at which the violations are taking place, we shall soon have nothing to object about as everything shall have been violated. Therefore, to remind everyone of the sacrifices the Sikkimese people have had to make for these special terms in the past, and also to remind them that we should not let go so easily, the party further passed the following resolutions unanimously.

The party shall call for an all Sikkim Bandh for 12 hours on 26th January and has decided to raise black flags all over Sikkim along with the National flag that day. The National flag shall signify the Sikkimese peoples commitment to the democratic institutions of the Union, and the black flag shall demonstrate the resentment of the Sikkimese people to the blatant violations in the terms of association of 1973 as enshrined in the constitution .

The Bandh shall also be used to pressurize the present CM, Shri Pawan Kumar Chamling, to live up to his constant declaration of his commitment to the ethics of democracy and morality, and step down from his chair so that investigations regarding his natinality can be carried out in a fair manner and the real truth is laid before the people at the earliest.

We appeal to the people of Sikkim to consider what we have put forth as we feel we have reached a critical time in our political existence where if we do not do something now, we shall forever lose control of our destiny which was otherwise the salient feature of the 8th May agreement of 1973, the precursor to Sikkim’s association with the Union of India. We shall loose the right to self determination and the almost complete internal autonomy, which exists even today as article 371f but which has become almost meaningless. The party would like to go as far to the extent of comparing Sikkim’s fate with that of our neighbour Tibet, where despite the word “Autonomous” and fancy sounding legal instruments, the world knows how it is leading to an almost extinction of their way of life and culture. The Sikkimese have to give the right message to the State and the Central government that we are not going to tolerate these violations and specifically, we shall not let the Central government treat Sikkim like the Central Chinese Government is treating Tibet. And the party has decided that the best day to send the message would be the 26th. January, The Republic Day. Therefore we appeal to all Sikkimese to remember that we have lost almost all our rights because we shy away from confrontation and protests and the fear that a protest, unless called by the ruling party shall flop. This sort of thought and fears shall not stop our party and our workers, though we are a new and a small party, but we shall strive to make sure that we bring this issues to focus for the benefit of our coming generations.

Biraj Adhikari
President SNPP

source:www.articlebase.com

2010-03-05T23:34:00.000-08:00

SIKKIM:371F-All a question of status

7 February 2010

by Jigme N Kazi

SEVERAL political and social organisation leaders and intellectuals spoke in unison on the issue of Article 371F at a seminar organised in Gangtok by the All Sikkim Educated Self-Employed & Unemployed Association on 28 January. They reminded the ruling Sikkim Democratic Front government, the Centre and the people at large on the need to preserve the distinct identity of Sikkim and the Sikkimese people within the framework of the article.

Former chief minister Nar Bahadur Bhandari, while referring to the political turmoil in the kingdom in 1973, termed the “andolan”, often described as a “mass movement” by anti-Sikkim propagandists in the ’70s and thereafter, a “conspiracy” to topple the Chogyal, erase Sikkim’s separate international identity and merge it with India.
Bhandari, who led an anti-merger movement in the 1970s and ousted the pro-merger Sikkim Congress led by LD Kazi in the first assembly elections after the controversial merger in 1979, said the need of the hour was for everyone to work for unity among all communities and preserve Sikkim’s unique and distinct status under the Constitution as reflected in Article 371F.

He reiterated the stand that the article reflected the spirit of the historic 8 May 1973 Tripartite Agreement, signed by the Chogyal, the government of India and leaders of three major political parties in Sikkim representing the three ethnic communities — Nepalese, Bhutias and Lepchas.

Former Lok Sabha member Pahalman Subba, and former minister and senior Congress leader KN Upreti, felt the need to form a common “forum” on the issue of Article 371F which, according to them, had been diluted ever since the declaration of minority Bhutia-Lepchas as being “tribals” in 1978 followed by the 1979 abolition of seats reserved for Sikkimese Nepalese in the assembly.

Prominent among those who resented the gradual and systematic dilution of the provisions of the special article and spoke on the need to work unitedly on the issue of preserving the special safeguards provided for Sikkim under the article included the president of the state BJP unit, Padam Chettri; the president of the Sikkim National People’s Party, Biraj Adhikari — the party still demands the restoration of Sikkim’s pre-merger “assotiate state” status; former Communist leader and presently convenor of the Matri Bhoomi Suraksha, Duk Nath Nepal; and former minister and convenor of the Sikkim Bhutia-Lepcha Apex Committee, Tseten Tashi Bhutia, who is regarded as one of the few vocal leaders of the minority Bhutia-Lepcha tribals.

While Nepal warned the people of the “conspiracy” to erase Sikkim’s special status under the Constitution, Adhikari said the people needed to take a fresh look at what happened during the merger period in order to move forward decisively. The BJP chief said that while the Centre could not escape responsibility for the gradual dilution of the special provisions, the state must equally share the blame.
On the issue of income-tax, prominent member of the old business community, Prem Goyal, who is also coordinator, Nagrik Sangarsha Samiti, said it was better that the Income-Tax Act was not extended to the state as some sections of the people, particularly the business community, felt discriminated against as they were now forced to pay income-tax while bonafide Sikkimese hailing from the three ethnic communities (Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalese), who were former citizens of the kingom of Sikkim and subjects of the Chogyal and possess Sikkim Subject Certificates and others had been exempted.

While Bhutia questioned the motives of those who played communal politics in the state by unjustifiably dubbing minority Bhutia-Lepcha leaders “communal”, this scribe spoke on the need for unity among the people for economic and political empowerment, saying that, “If the Nepalese leadership go after cash the Bhutia-Lepcha (BLs) leaders would also go after cash. But if they go for a cause the BLs would also go for a cause.” Bhutia said he was prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice if the Sikkimese came forward for the right cause.

The seminar, part of the Association’s Janchetna Abhayan programme aimed at creating public awareness on certain vital issues that concern Sikkim and its people, raised more questions, posed more challenges and perhaps will evoke surprising responses not only from its participants but from the public in general.

The writer is editor, Sikkim Observer

2010-03-05T18:55:00.001-08:00

Sonia inaugurates elite health institute in Shillong

IANS

United Progressive Alliance (UPA) chairperson Sonia Gandhi on Friday inaugurated the first postgraduate medical institute in northeast India here and stressed on the need for an urban health programme like the government's flagship rural health scheme.

The North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional Institute for Health and Medical Sciences (NEIGRIHMS) in the Meghalaya capital has been designed in line with the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi and Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education and Research (PGIMER), Chandigarh.

“With the inauguration of the medical institute, an important aspect of late prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's vision has been fulfilled,” Sonia Gandhi said at the inauguration.

“The institute was conceived as a centre of excellence in healthcare which will have the best of health services facilities in eastern India.”

“Besides treatment and providing numerous health services, the institute would play an important role in research and development,” the Congress president said.

“The UPA government has given special attention to all-round development of northeast India.”

The NEIGRIHMS, an autonomous institute established by union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, has a sophisticated cardiology department, well-equipped neurology and urology departments and a 30-bed intensive care unit (ICU).

The institute, conceived by Rajiv Gandhi 23 years ago, has been functioning since 2002 first as an interim facility and later built a sprawling campus on the outskirts of Shillong at a cost of Rs.423 crore. It also plans to begin its telemedicine project soon.

Former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had declared NEIGRIMS a national institute on Jan 22, 2000, when he visited Shillong.

Sonia Gandhi also underscored the importance of initiating an urban healthcare programme on the lines of the government's flagship National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), particularly with cases of tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and cancer on the rise.

“I strongly feel the need to launch a health programme in the urban areas which will be similar to the NRHM,” she said.

Union Health Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad, Minister for Development of North Eastern Region (DoNER) B.K. Handique, Meghalaya Chief Minister D.D. Lapang and Minister of State for Water Resources Vincent H. Pala were also present on the occasion.

Sonia Gandhi is also to lay the foundation stone for the Rajiv Gandhi Congress Bhavan here.

On Saturday, she will visit Mizoram capital Aizawl where she will lay the foundation stone of the Rajiv Gandhi sports stadium.

Central Public Works Department (CPWD) is constructing the 20,000-seat stadium, the first such facility in the mountain state. The 12th finance commission had granted Rs.250 million for the Rs.1.32 billion project.

2010-03-05T18:52:00.000-08:00

Maoists aiming to overthrow state by 2050: Centre

Vinay Kumar

The Union government on Friday said the objective of the Maoists engaged in an armed ‘liberation struggle' was to overthrow the Indian state by 2050, as indicated by documents seized from them.

Union Home Secretary G.K. Pillai said that an in-depth analysis of Maoist operations also pointed to assistance by former Army men.

Speaking at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis here, Mr. Pillai said the Maoists did their homework before launching attacks and their approach was that of a well-trained army — surveying the place, making notes and studying every aspect.

“After every attack, they do a post-mortem and analysis. The analysis is as good as any that the armed forces of any country do,” he said. Mr. Pillai said as many as 908 people lost their lives last year — the highest since 1971 — in naxal violence. “It is quite likely that the violence will go up in 2010 or 2011 before the tide begins to turn,” he added.

‘No reverses'
The Home Secretary said that even though the joint anti-naxal operations were going on, the rebels had not suffered any significant reverses, and that the government would need seven to eight years to have full control over the areas lost to the Maoists.

“The operations have not hit even five per cent of hardcore militants. The real armed cadres are yet to come out,” he said. According to him, they would not come for talks unless they felt the heat and that whatever statements they were making about peace were not serious.

Referring to the offer to halt anti-naxal operations, Mr. Pillai said the left-wing extremists were against allowing any kind of development. “They destroy school buildings, health centres and blast mobile towers.”

The Maoist influence was spread over 34 districts in eight States, he said.

Mr. Pillai said the rebels were looking to regroup and building their own army to implement their plans. He added that if they were willing to hold talks with the government, they should first give up violence.

“Under-development and administrative vacuum at some places are coming in handy for them,” Mr. Pillai said. He stressed the need for training and strengthening the police forces.

Sources in the Home Ministry said that in the nine days following the offer of talks on February 22, there have been 22 acts of violence involving Maoist cadres — seven in Bihar, four in Chhattisgarh, six in Jharkhand, three in West Bengal, and one each in Karnataka and Orissa — in which 12 civilians and two security personnel lost their lives.

‘Stop hostilities'

Meanwhile, the Maoists said a cessation of hostilities by both sides for a specific time-period was the minimum requirement before talks.

“If the rulers think the Maoists are proposing ceasefire from a position of weakness, they are gravely mistaken. It is because the CPI (Maoist) has great concern for the oppressed people that it has proposed a ceasefire that could be of some help to poor Adivasis living in conditions of the worst famine of the decade and brutal state terror,” a statement from Azad, spokesperson of the Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist), said

2010-03-05T01:53:00.001-08:00

NEPAL: Nepal running out of time

source: ASIA TIMES

BY DHRUBA ADHIKARY

KATHMANDU: Nepal’s transition from a Hindu monarchy to a secular republic is not going smoothly, and not just over the fast-approaching May 28 deadline for the nation’s new constitution.

Nepal’s three major parties are at loggerheads in the special assembly formed to draft the constitution over the structure of a proposed federal system. The opposition Maoists insist that federal states be created on an ethnic basis, while the ruling Nepali Congress party and its coalition partner believe the states should be formed on a geographic basis.

The Constituent Assembly was formed after a 2008 election when members voted overwhelmingly to abolish the monarchy and restructure the country into autonomous states. The powers of the last king, Gyanendra, had been steadily curtailed since a disastrous period of his rule ended in April 2006 amid a popular revolt.

In the Constituent Assembly the opposition Maoists, who form the largest block with 40% of the seats, favor an executive presidency, while the Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist are floating a parliamentary system.

At the same time, public opposition to the idea of federalism is growing, as seen in the successful anti-federalism campaign being carried out by the National People’s Front (Rashtriya Janamorcha), a small left-leaning party.

“Federalism is a recipe for Nepal to disintegrate, like the former Yugoslavia,” said Chitra Bahadur KC, the party leader. In his view, Nepal’s marginalized peoples would be better served through greater decentralization. A successful general strike his party organized in January is forcing the assembly to listen to his concerns.

Another small party, the royalist Rashtriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal (RPP-Nepal), is calling for a national referendum on federalism, as well as on secularism and a restoration of the monarchy. It last week launched a general strike that brought Kathmandu Valley, which encompasses the capital and two other districts, to a standstill.

RPP-Nepal has only four members in the national assembly, but its protest campaign has attracted a wide following. Even the powerful Maoists were forced to cancel an important meeting due to the chaos and the RPP-Nepal’s large rallies managed to block the entrance to Simha Durbar, the seat of central government.

The party also wants a referendum to address Nepal’s status as the world’s only remaining Hindu state, which was abolished in 2008 when Nepal became a republic. More than 80% of the population are from the Hindu faith, also known as Sanaatan Dharma (the eternal law).

Hinduism, the third-largest religion after Christianity and Islam, is known for its tolerance towards other faiths. Nepal, with a sizeable Muslim population, does not possess the type of religious rivalries seen in India.

This, however, is undergoing a subtle change. There are growing feelings that too much tolerance could impact on Nepal’s Hindu way of life, especially if there is a lack of reciprocity from other faiths. The concern has grown since the proselytizing activities of Western groups that had entered Nepal in the garb of non-governmental organizations were exposed.

The Hindu backlash against Nepal becoming a secular state has grown since 2006 when the monarchy first fell and the state was established, but the leaders of some prominent political parties believe the recent popular movements may also be a power play by right-wing elements. And they are also jittery about a possible revival of the monarchy.

Kamal Thapa, who heads RPP-Nepal, denies that his party is working to restore the monarchy’s absolute rule. “All our party believes in is the restoration of a ceremonial institution that provides a symbol of unity for a country that is known for its ethnic diversity,” Thapa told Asia Times Online.

Thapa’s ideas appeal to many, as the 2006 declaration that made Nepal a secular nation was made without consulting the people. The May 18 declaration was made in a parliament that had been restored through royal proclamation, and the person who made it, Girija Prasad Koirala, was sworn in as prime minister by Gyanendra himself.

That declaration was illegitimate and should have been challenged there and then, according to Bishwanath Upadhayaya, a former chief justice and the head of the panel that drafted the 1990 constitution. If the changes were the outcome of a mass movement or a revolution, it should have been documented as such, he maintains.

Instead, sweeping changes were abruptly announced by Koirala on the grounds of bringing the Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) to an end and bringing the rebels into mainstream politics at all costs.

Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal (popularly known as Prachanda) has now become one of two important figures who concede that the secularization of Nepal was a mistake. The other person is none other than the incumbent President Ram Baran Yadav.

Yadav made this clear to a controversial Indian holy man, Chandraswami, when he was on a pilgrimage to Nepal. Former prime minister Koirala purportedly evaded the question. Unlike rulers in Delhi, media reports indicate that India’s Hindus want the religious identity of neighboring Nepal to remain unchanged. For them, too, this is an emotional issue.

If Nepal’s secularization was a mistake, this could be rectified when Nepal receives its new constitution. There is no need for a simultaneous restoration of the monarchy, which ceased being the custodian of the nation’s Hindus after the notorious palace massacre of 2001. Nepal could now learn to stand as a Hindu republic, not a kingdom.

Dhruba Adhikary is a Kathmandu-based journalist.

2010-03-05T01:36:00.000-08:00

NEPAL: Marwari community threatens to quit Nepal if security not improved

Representatives of the Marwari community-known for their involvement in various businesses-said on Wednesday they would be compelled to quit Nepal if the government continued its apathy towards improving security situation in the country.

They lamented, series of murders carried out in the recent days and continued threats received by businessmen from criminal groups shows businessmen are not safe.

“Marwari community has invested all its money here and is helping the country’s economy,” said Banwari Lal Mittal, chairman of the Mittal Group of companies, addressing a function in Kathmandu Wednesday. “However, the government is not serious to protect our lives.”

Mittal added, the extortionists ask donations and ransoms as high as Rs. 50 million from businessmen.

Addressing the same function, Marwari Sewa Samiti chairman Tola Ram Duggad said the government is urging foreigners to invest in Nepal at a time when it is not even able to protect local investors. Duggad added, the political instability in the country is responsible for the deteriorating law and order situation of the country.

He also ascribed the political wrangling to the deteriorating law and order situation in the country.

Meanwhile, a delegation of Marwari Sewa Samiti and the Marwari National Council met with Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal on Wednesday and urged him to take immediate action against the murderer of Arun Singhaniya.

On Monday, Janakpur Marwari Sewa Samiti chairman and Janakpur Media Today Group owner Arun Singhaniya was shot dead in Janakpur.

Less than 24 hours after this murder, the managing director of Bharatpur Medical College was shot at in Lazimpat, one of the busiest streets of the capital.

source:Barun Roy

2010-02-28T07:48:00.001-08:00

NEPAL: Nepali Boy Is The World’s Shortest Man, Says Guinness World Records

KATHMANDU, Feb 27 (Bernama): Guinness World Records has verified Khagendra Thapa Magar, Nepal’s shortest man, as the shortest man in the world after verifying his height and weight, China’s Xinhua news agency reported, citing a local daily on Saturday.

According to The Himalayan Times daily, Thapa Magar was awarded a certificate to this effect in Rome Friday night.

According to Min Bahadur Rana, chairman, Khagendra Thapa Magar Foundation, 17-year-old Khagendra was awarded the Guinness certificate and a medal Friday night.

According to the Guinness verification team, Khagendra is 56 cm tall and weighs just 5 kg.

Rana added that Khagendra would be registered as the shortest man of the world in Guinness World Records after six months when he turns 18. He has also been given the registration number-154894.

Currently, China’s He Pingping, who is 74.93 cm tall, has been registered as world’s shortest man. He was recognized as the shortest man after the death of Gulma Mehta, a 57.15 cm tall man from India.

Euro Television Network had assisted Khagendra to go to Italy in his quest for the Guinness record. The French Embassy in Nepal had provided visas to Khagendra, his father Rup Bahadur Thapa Magar and chairman of the foundation Min Bahadur Rana to visit Italy.

---------------------------------------------------------------

A shortest human in the World is a Nepali
Agencies

Khagendra Thapa Magar
KATHMANDU, Feb 27 (Bernama):Guinness World Records has verified Khagendra Thapa Magar, Nepal’s shortest man, as the shortest man in the world after verifying his height and weight, China’s Xinhua news agency reported, citing a local daily on Saturday.
According to The Himalayan Times daily, Thapa Magar was awarded a certificate to this effect in Rome Friday night.
According to Min Bahadur Rana, chairman, Khagendra Thapa Magar Foundation, 17-year-old Khagendra was awarded the Guinness certificate and a medal Friday night.
According to the Guinness verification team, Khagendra is 56 cm tall and weighs just 5 kg.

Khagendra Thapa Magar - World's Shortest Boy
Rana added that Khagendra would be registered as the shortest man of the world in Guinness World Records after six months when he turns 18. He has also been given the registration number-154894.
Currently, China’s He Pingping, who is 74.93 cm tall, has been registered as world’s shortest man. He was recognized as the shortest man after the death of Gulma Mehta, a 57.15 cm tall man from India.
Euro Television Network had assisted Khagendra to go to Italy in his quest for the Guinness record. The French Embassy in Nepal had provided visas to Khagendra, his father Rup Bahadur Thapa Magar and chairman of the foundation Min Bahadur Rana to visit Italy.

JOURNEY TO THE RAJAH OF SIKKIM's RESIDENCE AT TUMLOONG

2010-02-28T07:44:00.000-08:00

SERIES: HIMALAYAN JOURNALS by Joseph Dalton Hooker
-Episode 82 Vol II

source: Barunroy

THIS SERIES WAS MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH THE CONTRIBUTION OF ABDUL KALAM EZANI

THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE] EXCLUSIVE

HIMALAYAN JOURNALS

CHAPTER XXV

JOURNEY TO THE RAJAH OF SIKKIM's RESIDENCE AT TUMLOONG

We started on the 3rd of November for Tumloong (or Sikkim Durbar), Dr. Campbell sending Tchebu Lama forward with letters to announce his approach. A steep ascent, through large trees of _Rhododendron arboreum,_ led over a sharp spur of mica-schist (strike north-west and dip north-east), beyond which the whole bay-like valley of the Ryott opened before us, presenting one of the most lovely and fertile landscapes in Sikkim. It is ten miles long, and three or four broad, flanked by lofty mountains, and its head girt by the beautiful snowy range of Chola, from which silvery rills descend through black pine-woods, dividing innumerable converging cultivated spurs, and uniting about 2000 feet below us, in a profound gorge. Everywhere were scattered houses, purple crops of buckwheat, green fields of young wheat, yellow millet, broad green plantains, and orange groves.

We crossed spur after spur, often under or over precipices about fifteen hundred feet above the river, proceeding eastwards to the village of Rangang, whence we caught sight of the Rajah’s house. It was an irregular low stone building of Tibetan architecture, with slanting walls and small windows high up under the broad thatched roof, above which, in the middle, was a Chinese-looking square copper-gilt canopy, with projecting eaves and bells at the corners, surmounted by a ball and square spire. On either gable of the roof was a round-topped cylinder of gilded copper, something like a closed umbrella; this is a very frequent and characteristic Boodhist ornament, and is represented in Turner’s plate of the mausoleum of Teshoo Lama (“Tibet” plate xi.); indeed the Rajah’s canopy at Tumloong is probably a copy of the upper part of the building there represented, having been built by architects from Teshoo Loombo.

It was surrounded by chaits, mendongs, poles with banners, and other religious erections; and though beautifully situated on a flat terrace overlooking the valley, we were much disappointed with its size and appearance.

On the brow of the hill behind was the large red goompa of the Tupgain Lama, the late heir-apparent to the temporal and spiritual authority in Sikkim; and near it a nunnery called Lagong, the lady abbess of which is a daughter of the Rajah, who, with the assistance of sisters, keeps an enormous Mani, or praying-cylinder, revolving perpetually to the prayer of “Om Mani Padmi hom.” On this side was a similar spur, on which the gilded pinnacles and copper canopy of the Phadong* [Phadong means Royal, and this temple answers to a chapel royal for the Rajah.] goompa gleamed through the trees. At a considerable distance across the head of the valley was still a third goompa, that of Phenzong.

We were met by a large party of armed Lepchas, dressed in blue and white striped kirtles, broad loose scarlet jackets; and the little bamboo wattle hat lined with talc, and surmounted by a peacock’s feather; they escorted us to the village, and then retired.

We encamped a few hundred feet below the Rajah’s house, and close by those of Meepo and the Tchebu Lama’s family, who are among the oldest and most respectable of Tibetan origin in Sikkim. The population on this, the north side of the Ryott, consists principally of Sikkim Bhoteeas and Tibetans, while the opposite is peopled by Lepchas.

Crowds came to see us, and many brought presents, with which we were overwhelmed; but we could not help remarking that our cordial greetings were wholly from the older families attached to the Rajah, and from the Lamas; none proceeded from the Dewan’s relatives or friends, nor therefore any in the name of the Rajah himself, or of the Sikkim government.

Tchebu Lama vainly used every endeavour to procure for us an audience with his highness; who was surrounded by his councillors, or Amlah, all of whom were adherents of the Dewan, who was in Tibet. My man Meepo, and the Tchebu Lama; who were ordered to continue in official attendance upon us, shrugged their shoulders, but could suggest no remedy. On the following morning Campbell was visited by many parties, amongst whom were the Lama’s family, and that of the late Dewan (Ilam Sing), who implored us to send again to announce our presence, and not to dismiss at once the moonshie and his office,* [It is usual in India for Government officers when about to transact business, to travel with a staff (called office) of native interpreters, clerks, etc., of whom the chief is commonly called moonchie.] who had accompanied us for the purpose of a conference with the Rajah. Their wishes were complied with, and we waited till noon before proceeding.

A gay and animated scene was produced by the concourse of women, dressed in their pretty striped and crossed cloaks, who brought tokens of good-will. Amongst them Meepo’s wife appeared conspicuous from the large necklaces* [The lumps of amber forming these (called "Poshea") were larger than the fist: they are procured in East Tibet, probably from Birmah.] and amulets, corals, and silver filagree work, with which her neck and shoulders were loaded: she wore on her head a red tiara (“Patuk”) bedizened with seed pearls and large turquoises, and a gold fillet of filagree bosses united by a web of slender chains; her long tails were elaborately plaited, and woven with beads, and her cloak hooked in front by a chain of broad silver links studded with turquoises. White silk scarfs, the emblem of peace and friendship, were thrown over our hands by each party; and rice, eggs, fowls, kids, goats, and Murwa beer, poured in apace, to the great delight of our servants.

We returned two visits of ceremony, one to Meepo’s house, a poor cottage, to which we carried presents of chintz dresses for his two little girls, who were busy teazing their hair with cylindrical combs, formed of a single slender joint of bamboo slit all round half-way up into innumerable teeth. Our other visit was paid to the Lama’s family, who inhabited a large house not far from the Rajah’s.

The lower story was an area enclosed by stone walls, into which the cattle, etc., were driven. An outside stone stair led to the upper story, where we were received by the head of the family, accompanied by a great concourse of Lamas. He conducted us to a beautiful little oratory at one end of the building, fitted up like a square temple, and lighted with latticed windows, covered with brilliant and tasteful paintings by Lhassan artists. The beams of the ceiling were supported by octagonal columns painted red, with broad capitals.

Everywhere the lotus, the mani, and the chirki (or wheel with three rays, emblematic of the Boodhist Trinity), were introduced; “Om Mani Padmi hom” in gilt letters, adorned the projecting end of every beam;* [A mythical animal with a dog's head and blood-red spot over the forehead was not uncommon in this chapel, and is also seen in the Sikkim temples and throughout Tibet. Ermann, in his Siberian Travels, mentions it as occurring in the Khampa Lama's temple at Maimao chin; he conjectures it to have been the Cyclops of the Greeks, which according to the Homeric myth had a mark on the forehead, instead of an eye. The glory surrounding the heads of Tibetan deities is also alluded to by Ermann, who recognises in it the Nimbus of the ancients, used to protect the heads of statues from the weather, and from being soiled by birds; and adds that the glory of the ancient masters in painting was no doubt introduced into the Byzantine school from the Boodhists.] and the Chinese “cloud messenger,” or winged dragon, floated in azure and gold along the capitals and beams, amongst scrolls and groups of flowers. At one end was a sitting figure of Gorucknath in Lama robes, surrounded by a glory, with mitre and beads; the right hand holding the Dorje, and the forefinger aised in prayer. Around was a good library of books. More presents were brought here, and tea served.

2010-02-28T07:31:00.000-08:00

Excerpts from the book "Sikkim : The Wounds of History"

"This book is not about the people's revolution of 1973. Enough books have been written about that. Rather it shall focus on retracing the constitutional jugglery which took place to define Sikkim's status within the Union of India. The question of status is important here because we need to determine whether it is correct to club Sikkim with other 'regular' states of the Indian Union"

"There are so many questions which have not been answered yet, and this state of continuing confusion has caused the wounds of history to fester again...., which have been around for more than three decades now, and shall have to be addressed if Sikkim is to move on into the future....."

"Declassified documents and transcripts..... by the CIA show Henry Kissinger... Z.A.Bhutto... were offered the same explanation officially by the Govt. of India"

"Sikkim has not signed the instrument of accession , and in the future .... Sikkim Assembly passes a resolution to reverse the earlier resolution , then what would the Government of India do ? "

"But there is one more interesting 'old law' left .... The Government of Sikkim Act, 1974. This came to force ... and was recognized and given legitimacy by India after the 35th Amendment of the Constitution. ......... So is the Constitution of Sikkim still in existence ?"

"If a proud citizen like me has been forced to doubt certain aspects of my existence and nationality, then the country has some explaining to do to me and also the coming generations"

2010-02-27T19:09:00.001-08:00

India-China Timeline

*1962: Sino-Indian War; China seized Aksai Chin and overran Arunachal Pradesh.

*1967: There were two skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the 'Nathu La incident,' and the other the 'Chola incident.'

*1986-87: Chinese and Indian forces clashed in Arunachal Pradesh

*1988: Relations began to thaw. India and the People's Republic of China agreed to broaden bilateral ties in various areas, working to achieve a "fair and reasonable settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute.

*1993: Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Premier Li Peng signed the border agreement.

*1998: Sino-Indian relations hit a low point following India's nuclear tests in May. George Fernandes declared that "China is India's number one threat", hinting that India developed nuclear weapons in defense against China's nuclear arsenal.

*2004: The two countries proposed opening up the Nathula and Jelepla Passes in Sikkim which would be mutually beneficial to both countries.

*2006: China and India re-opened Nathula, an ancient trade route which was part of the Silk Road.

2010-02-27T19:06:00.000-08:00

Indo-Pak talks: Just for the sake of political time pass

Our nation needs to take a stronger stand. The Indian government must make it clear to Pakistan that there will be no talks on Kashmir which is an integral part of India rather talks will be held on the regions illegally occupied by Pakistan.

INDO - PAK dialogue is not a new phenomenon. In fact, this news now doesn’t attract any enthusiasm from any quarter at times when it has become a well established fact that both sides will keep on banging their heads on a wall with pre-conceived notions and none going to trust the other even a bit on any issue.

The history of India-Pakistan relations since 1947 i.e. when Pakistan came into existence after partition of the country on August 14, and a separate nation was carved out purely on religious basis, is known to all and it is also no secret that it was Pakistan which attacked India first every time it got an opportunity.

After analysing that it would be not possible for Pakistan to win from India in any direct confrontation, Pakistan policy makers decided to experiment it with fighting a ‘proxy war’ with India in which their tactics was to used the youth of the region in the name of religion and thus with the help if their intelligence agency the ISI, the blue print for taking up the militancy against India was drawn and by 1990, they began their strikes in the Kashmir valley in form of militant attacks in which their first target was to flush out Kashmiri Pandit families living in the Kashmir valley in a phased and planned manner.

After succeeding in this game plan, they began attacking the key installations of the Indian government present in the valley. After almost 20 years now there is some respite following the fencing along the Indo-Pak border and after the US making attacks on militant camps and their groups in Afghanistan and in regions present along the Pak-Afghan border that the incidents of militancy have come down significantly in the valley.

Now after the Indian government has started plying its own Railways in the valley, and we have been having elections done in the Kashmir region for the legislature both for the assembly and for the Parliament, and have been making our own elected government in the state, what is the need to discuss Kashmir with Pakistan? When we claim and repeatedly say in every world forum that ‘Kashmir is an inseparable part of India,’ then why our secretaries, ministers talk on the land which is already in the possession of Indian government?

It is simply ridiculous on our part to talk on something which is already ours. Instead of Kashmir, there should be discussion on taking back the land which has been illegally occupied by Pakistan i.e. Pak occupied Kashmir or the PoK as it is better known. By this yardstick, tomorrow I have little doubt if our leaders start discussing Himachal Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh or Sikkim with China.

If tomorrow Beijing exerts pressure on the Indian government and we start secretary level talks in Delhi over these states stating them as disputed region and acknowledging the same, it would be political hara-kiri. A blunder for which the coming generation would only curse the political class of today that they did no homework before getting into the rounds of talks with the Pakistani delegation which arrived in Delhi for talks including terrorism.

Time has come when the Indian government must make it clear to Pakistan that there will be no talks on Kashmir which is an integral part of India rather talks will be held on the regions illegally occupied by Pakistan and same should happen with China.

A large part of Kashmir is under the occupancy of Chinese troops. Sadly we show the entire map of Kashmir in India but that’s also cheating with the countrymen as most of the region shown in the map which is often used by our Met department to show weather on the Indian TV channels lies either with China or Pakistan.
But we never feel comfortable in talking about that region in any debate/seminar or on any global platform including the United Nations, SAARC, ASEAN summit etc.

After being a responsible nuclear power and having one of the best armies in the world, if we can’t talk for our rights and for legitimate part of our nation’s territory, we must stop showing and holding political dramas every now and then because that would only waste our precious time and money. When our political class and bureaucratic set up know each others competence to tackle international issues it is better they don’t put extra burden on the state exchequer for making political gossip amidst five star lunches and dinners.

source:merinews

2010-02-26T02:14:00.000-08:00

Bangladesh & Sikkim: Nepal’s Response

M. R. Josee
Senior Journalist

Britain’s 1947 departure from India, new China’s emergence in 1949, including her re-establishment of authority in Tibet, have had national security policy implications for Nepal — and continues to do so.

Other regional developments, too, have had their impact, particularly the creation of Bangladesh and the merger with, or annexation of Sikkim, by India in the 1970s.

Before that, note must be taken of Nepal’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1960 — a decision that was also influenced by geo-strategic considerations, including the imperative of broadening her contacts beyond her immediate periphery.

Nepal’s policy of trade diversification, begun with a trade treaty with Pakistan in 1962, can thus be interpreted as an attempt to maximize her security vis-à-vis powerful neighbors.

It had come in the wake of initial bilateral contacts in 1952, under the auspices of the consultative committee of the Colombo Plan, and subsequently at Bandung. (Author)

It was inevitable that the ripple effects of the 1971 creation of Bangladesh from East Pakistan through the active intervention of India should have been felt beyond the region.

The carefully planned dismemberment of Pakistan through the instrumentality of Indo-Soviet collaboration formalized on August 9, 1971 via a 20-year friendship treaty that possessed all the hallmarks of a security pact, was noted with deep anxiety in Nepal, as elsewhere.

Though Nepal, faced with a fait accompli, had no option other than to finally accept the reality of Bangladesh, her public policy makers noted the disturbing implications, national security-wise, that Pakistan — cultivated, among other reasons, as a countervailing force against India — underwent a sudden transformation: from a close to distant neighbor.

Its effect on Nepal’s national security policy mindset would become dramatically manifest a few years later, spurred by developments in the neighboring kingdom of Sikkim. That happened in less than two years’ time through a carefully orchestrated anti-Chogval (ruler) movement in 1973-74 that led, ultimately, to Sikkim’s integration with India in 1975.

It is also clear that Nepal’s sense of tranquility and security was rudely disturbed by developments in Sri Lanka, particularly India’s overt military intervention in 1987, following the Indo-Lanka Accord of July after which the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) declared war against Indian forces deployed on the Island. After suffering over 1,100 casualties, India’s military intervention was ended in 1989.

NEPAL’S RESPONSE

The elimination of Sikkim’s distinct personality and the uprooting of a dynasty that could be traced back at least from Pungshoq Namgyal’s installation in 1642 (B.S.K Grover, Sikkim and India…), set the stage for a fundamental re-think of Nepal’s national security options.

Basically, it took the shape of the Zone of Peace (ZOP) proposal unveiled in Kathmandu on February 25, 1975 by King Birendra at a farewell reception for dignitaries who had gathered for his coronation.

Its rationale was projected elliptically by his explaining that “we are not prompted out of fear or threat from any country or quarter… As heirs to a country that has always lived in independence, we wish to see that our freedom and independence shall not be thwarted by the changing flux of time…when conciliation is replaced by belligerency and war.” (HM King Birendra’s Peace Proposal for Nepal)

The very first reference to a Nepal-specific zone of peace was in King Birendra’s address to the Fifth NAM summit in Algiers on September 8, 1973, thus: “Nepal situated between two of the world’s most populous countries, wishes within her frontiers to be enveloped in a zone of peace.”(The Rising Nepal, September 9, 1973)

It will be appropriate to recall that although by the time of the Popular Movement of April 1990, 116 sovereign nations had extended Support to ZOP, India refused to do so.

Over the years, India’s mainstream media had made it abundantly clear that India’s refusal to do so was that endorsement would cancel her special status in Nepal purportedly secured in the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty — one that could not be compared to Nepal’s ties with any country including China, Nepal’s other immediate neighbor.

ZOP was formally cremated when the drafters of the 1990 Constitution in their collective wisdom threw out the ZOP baby along with the Panchayat bathwater. A few years earlier ZOP had been inscribed into the directive principles of the Panchayat constitution through its third amendment.

Therein the following foreign policy objective was enunciated: “to work towards making Nepal a Zone of Peace by adopting the basic ideals of the United Nations and the principles of nonalignment”. (Author)

No authoritative answer has been provided to date for thus killing a key national security policy initiative. Most independent analysts believe such a move was inspired by a desire to placate India, which had lent powerful support, including via its media, to toppling the panchayat order and transforming the monarchy from a ruling to a reigning entity.

NATIONAL SECURITY GQALS/POLICY SIDELINED

In addition to ZOP’s rubbishing, the decade after 1990 witnessed the deliberate, neglect of national security goals and policies.

This writer has it on excellent authority that an attempt soon after 1990 by a group of academics to set up an independent institute to pursue strategic studies from a Nepali perspective was spiked by the Nepali Congress government installed after general elections following the drafting of the November 1990 Constitution. (Source who requested anonymity)

For long, “foreign policy issues were solely decided by the prime minister, who held on to the foreign affairs portfolio till the bitter end, without virtually any debate in political circles, or indeed, as can be made out, much input from HMG’s ministry of foreign affairs.” (Author)

It was in that environment of opacity that Prime Minister Koirala, during his official visit to India in December 1991, categorically told the international media in New Delhi that “the forcible expulsion of southern Bhutanese by the Thimphu regime was a matter that fell wholly within Bhutan’s domestic jurisdiction.” (Author)

Whatever the reasons that prompted Koirala’s truly egregious comment, it triggered an upsurge in ethnic cleansing activities within Bhutan. Thus, within year of that statement, the Bhutanese refugee population in Nepal shot up to about 100,000 from a figure of around 10,000 at the time of Koirala’s India mission.

Thereafter, “Koirala’s government continued to turn a blind eye to the problem until in 1993 when it finally agreed to seek bilateral talks with the Thimphu regime. Completely disregarding the fact that the problem clearly involved Nepal, Bhutan and India, the country of first asylum or transit, Koirala agreed that talks should be bilateral, not trilateral, and, furthermore, that they should be led by the two home ministers, not foreign ministers. Meetings at foreign ministers’ level were to come much later. (Author)

Clearly, lacking transparency in the functioning of the ministry of foreign affairs, led by the prime minister, and sans a national debate on the multi-faceted implications of the Bhutanese refugee crisis, including on her national security, this issue has lingered on unresolved until today, despite about a score of rounds of formal talks. Despite all that, not one Bhutanese refugee has been repatriated to Bhutan, as of this writing.

What is perhaps its most disturbing aspect from the point of view of Nepal’s national security is India permitting — some claim, assisting — Bhutanese refugees to cross through at least 100 km. of Indian territory before entering Nepal, but preventing them from returning home.

Another national security policy disaster was the failure of a succession of post-1990 governments to stem the flow of illegal migrants across the open Nepal-India border and the inability, during that period, to bring about effective control of cross-border movement there, including by criminal elements.

The impact of cross-border terrorism on national security is too obvious to merit any further elaboration here.

(The author is a senior journalist of Nepal)

2010-02-25

3300 CRORES RAIL PROJECT WORK STARTS

2010-02-26T01:59:00.000-08:00

SIKKIM: Work starts on Sikkim link

sILIGURI Feb. 24: The construction of a new railway link connecting north Bengal to Sikkim has begun with Ircon International Limited, a public sector undertaking incorporated with the Indian Railways, starting work on the 44km stretch between Sevoke and Rangpo two years after the plan was mooted.

The general manager of the Northeast Frontier Railway, Shiv Kumar, and senior officials of the railways and Ircon, attended the ground-breaking ceremony at Rangpo on the Bengal-Sikkim border on Saturday.

Ircon sources said the estimated project cost is around Rs 3,300 crore.

Ircon’s general manager, eastern region, Anil Kumar Gupta, said engineers were already working on the access roads to reach the proposed track alignment. “The terrain is a challenging one and we have to first reach the areas through which the railway line will pass. After that, we will be able to conduct a survey and arrive at the final estimate,” Gupta said.

He said Ircon had experience in constructing railway lines in Jammu and Kashmir.

“An estimated 70 per cent of the total stretch to Sikkim will have to be either through tunnels or viaducts in order to make progress through one hill to the other, spanning deep gorges. The viaducts will have to be constructed on high pillars,” the general manager said.

The project will take five years to complete once the funds are sanctioned. The first railway link to the Himalayan state will help boost the state’s economy as well as its economic mainstay, tourism.

Senior officials of the NFR said after the Sevoke-Rangpo track laying is completed by 2015, there are plans to take the link up to Gangtok.

“The railway connectivity to Sikkim is important as the India army has deployment along the border with China in the state. The railway line will vastly improve troop movement as they will not have to rely solely on the state’s only road link with the rest of India, NH31A,” an official said.

2010-02-08T22:41:00.000-08:00

SERIES: HIMALAYAN JOURNALS by Joseph Dalton Hooker
– Episode 68 Vol II

source: Shri Barun roy

DR. CAMPBELL LEAVES DORJILING FOR SIKKIM

On the 28th of the month the Singtam Soubah came up from Yeumtong, to request leave to depart for his home, on account of his wife’s illness; and to inform me that Dr. Campbell had left Dorjiling, accompanied (in compliance with the Rajah’s orders) by the Tchebu Lama. I therefore left Momay on the 30th, to meet him at Choongtam, arriving at Yeumtong the same night, amid heavy rain and sleet. Autumnal tints reigned at Yeumtong, and the flowers had disappeared from its heath-like flat; a small eatable cherry with a wrinkled stone was ripe, and acceptable in a country so destitute of fruit.* [The absence of _Vaccinia_ (whortleberries and cranberries) and eatable _Rubi_ (brambles) in the alpine regions of the Himalaya is very remarkable, and they are not replaced by any substitute.

With regard to Vaccinium, this is the more anomalous, as several species grow in the temperate regions of Sikkim.] Thence I descended to Lachoong, on the 1st of October, again through heavy rain, the snow lying on the Tunkra mountain at 14,000 feet. The larch was shedding its leaves, which turn red before they fall; but the annual vegetation was much behind that at 14,000 feet, and so many late flowerers, such as _Umbelliferae_ and _Compositae,_ had come into blossom, that the place still looked gay and green: the blue climbing gentian (_Crawfurdia_) now adorned the bushes; this plant would be a great acquisition in English gardens. A _Polygonum_ still in flower here, was in ripe fruit near Momay, 6000 feet higher up the valley.

On the following day I made a long and very fatiguing march to Choongtam, but the coolies were not all able to accomplish it.

The backwardness of the flora in descending was even more conspicuous than on the previous day: the jungles, at 7000 feet, being gay with a handsome Cucurbitaceous plant. Crossing the Lachoong cane-bridge, I paid the tribute of a sigh to the memory of my poor dog, and reached my old camping-ground at Choongtam by 10 p.m., having been marching rapidly for twelve hours. My bed and tent came up two hours later, and not before the leeches and mosquitos had taxed me severely.

On the 4th of October I heard the nightingale for the first time this season. Expecting Dr. Campbell on the following morning, I proceeded down the river to meet him: the whole valley was buried under a torrent or debacle of mud, shingle, and boulders, and for half a mile the stream was dammed up into a deep lake. Amongst the gneiss and granite boulders brought down by this debacle, I collected some actinolites; but all minerals are extremely rare in Sikkim and I never heard of a gem or crystal of any size or beauty, or of an ore of any consequence, being found in this country.

I met my friend on the other side of the mud torrent, and I was truly rejoiced to see him, though he was looking much the worse for his trying journey through the hot valleys at this season; in fact, I know no greater trial of the constitution than the exposure and hard exercise that is necessary in traversing these valleys, below 5000 feet, in the rainy season: delay is dangerous, and the heat, anxiety, and bodily suffering from fatigue, insects, and bruises, banish sleep, and urge the restless traveller onward to higher and more healthy regions. Dr. Campbell had, I found, in addition to the ordinary dangers of such a journey, met with an accident which might have proved serious; his pony having been dashed to pieces by falling over a precipice, a fate he barely escaped himself, by adroitly slipping from the saddle when he felt the animal’s foot giving way.

On our way back to Choongtam, he detailed to me the motives that had led to his obtaining the authority of the Deputy-Governor of Bengal (Lord Dalhousie being absent) for his visiting Sikkim. Foremost, was his earnest desire to cultivate a better understanding with the Rajah and his officers. He had always taken the Rajah’s part, from a conviction that he was not to blame for the misunderstandings which the Sikkim officers pretended to exist between their country and Dorjiling; he had, whilst urgently remonstrating with the Rajah, insisted on forbearance on my part, and had long exercised it himself. In detailing the treatment to which I was subjected, I had not hesitated to express my opinion that the Rajah was more compromised by it than his Dewan: Dr. Campbell, on the contrary, knew that the Dewan was the head and front of the whole system of annoyance. In one point of view it mattered little who was in the right; but the transaction was a violation of good faith on the part of the Sikkim government towards the British, for which the Rajah, however helpless, was yet responsible. To act upon my representations alone would have been unjust, and no course remained but for Dr. Campbell to inquire personally into the matter. The authority to do this gave him also the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the country which we were bound to protect, as well by our interest as by treaty, but from which we were so jealously excluded, that should any contingency occur, we were ignorant of what steps to take for defence, and, indeed, of what we should have to defend.

On the 6th of October we left Choongtam for my second visit to the Kongra Lama pass, hoping to get round by the Cholamoo lakes and the Donkia pass. As the country beyond the frontier was uninhabited, the Tchebu Lama saw no difficulty in this, provided the Lachen Phipun and the Tibetans did not object. Our great obstacle was the Singtam Soubah, who (by the Rajah’s order) accompanied us to clear the road, and give us every facility, but who was very sulky, and undisguisedly rude to Campbell; he was in fact extremely jealous of the Lama, who held higher authority than he did, and who alone had the Rajah’s confidence.

2010-01-31T04:51:00.000-08:00

ESSAY: Wisdom out of the box

BY LHENDUP G BHUTIA

Mumbai: My grandfather is a distant memory. Tall, dark-skinned, a little hunched, he spoke only Tibetan and Nepali. We did not spend much time with each other, but I still remember that every morning he woke me up and took me to our chausham (prayer-room).

There I was made to clasp my hands and touch with my head a wooden box, about four feet by two. After this little act of obeisance, I was free to go and play. The day he passed away, he did not have the strength to come and rouse me from my sleep. But someone else called me in and made me pay my respects to the box.

And then one day, the box was opened. It contained a bunch of antiquated papers, all neatly stacked and without any binding. They featured writings in Tibetan, with tiny drawings of people in meditation. It was called Lam remd (roughly translated as ‘stages to a path’) and contained prayers (to help attain enlightenment).

Unlike most other Tibetans, my grandfather Abo Kunga did not come to India in 1959, when the Dalai Lama took refuge in India.

He came as a tradesman in 1945 to Kalimpong, which was then a small hamlet by a river in what is now northern West Bengal. He made the journey sometimes on foot, sometimes on mule, carrying silverware and wool atop 11 mules, traveling sometimes for two weeks at a stretch, surviving on yak cheese, dried meat and tsampa (barley flour that, with a little warm water, could make for a quick meal). This 10 day long trip that sometimes stretched to 14 was undertaken every month, and the trade was so good, he not only rented a house and a stable, he even brought my grandmother.

And then in early 1950, China invaded Tibet and they could never return.

When news reached of the invasion, I’m told the first thing my grandmother prayed for was not her house in Lhasa, nor her relatives, but for the book of Lam remd she owned in Tibet. But relatives who sneaked out of Lhasa brought bad news: the book had been destroyed in a fire. She did not cry on hearing that; instead she gathered enough money to travel to Dharamsala, get a reprint of an original Lam remd, and seek out the Dalai Lama to bless it. She died when my father was only 15, and the book was passed on.

When the Dalai Lama stated last year that a “cultural genocide” was taking place in China, he could have as easily been speaking about the genocide of these Tibetan books. Many of them were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s when monasteries and libraries were burnt; some were lost while the Tibetans were fleeing the marching Chinese, and many more were simply lost in the march of time.

As a matter of fact, there are ten kinds of Tibetan books, the more important ones being on Tibetan medicine, Buddhist religion and philosophy, architecture, grammar (of Sanskrit and Tibetan), and translated works of Indian scholars on Buddhist philosophy, mathematics and astronomy. Their content is invaluable, as Sonam Topgyel, assistant librarian at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (LTWA) in Dharamsala explains. “Some extremely important Indian works were lost forever when the Nalanda University was destroyed by the Turks,” says the librarian of one of the world’s largest libraries containing Tibetan books. “But these are still available in Tibetan translation,” he adds. But these works, till now preserved in Tibetan, now risk being lost forever, if not lost already.

There is, however, a significant attempt going on to find these books and preserve them. At the forefront of this endeavour is a Mormon from Utah by the name E Gene Smith. He is a leading Tibetologist, the founder of the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (TBRC) in New York, and the subject of a new documentary, Digital Dharma (that has been directed by veteran television and documentary filmmaker Dafna Yachin) which is almost ready for release. The TBRC has more than a 1, 00,000 Tibetan books, making it the largest collection of Tibetan literature outside Tibet.

Since 1968, Smith has been travelling across the world, collecting these books for preservation. And he has also helped reprint them, so that each one of these books is now not locked up in some dingy corner awaiting disintegration, but has a hundred other copies. This way, he hopes, the culture of a nation will not become a passing memory.

But of late, he has started a new project: digitising these books. About 8,000 volumes of these books, ranging from religion to medicine, have now been uploaded on the internet. “We reprinted the books so that more people could access them. But imagine the reach when you upload it on the internet!” Smith says.

Along with this project of preserving and maximizing the reach of these books, Smith is also busy with what he calls a project of “giving back”.

Five years ago, the LTWA in Dharamsala, along with many other monasteries and libraries in Chinese-occupied Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, India and Central Asia received a hard disk, containing 300 GB of different Tibetan prayers. That small hard disk, no bigger than the size of their fists, contained, to the utter amazement of many monks, content that could dwarf many a library. But a recurrent trouble bothered them. “They didn’t get strong enough anti-viruses, and the computer kept crashing,” says Smith.

It wasn’t the first time Smith had faced a problem. When he had first started reprinting Tibetan books, the Tibetans themselves weren’t happy. “Tibetan books are not like the ones we use. They are not bound and are long. The first set of reprints was like our modern notebooks and centrally bound, and most did not like this. I rectified this issue, by simply getting them bound from the top,” adds Smith.

Similarly, he solved the problem of the viruses too. Since last year, these libraries and universities, 70 till now, have been receiving brand-new Apple Macintosh computers that are more virus-resistant and have a storage capacity of 400 GB. Topgyel of LTWA says, “It is so much easier to use the Mac to read these texts. We don’t have to go through large libraries to find the relevant information.”

Widely acknowledged as a saviour of Tibetan culture and literature, Smith believes his task is still incomplete. “Several thousands of Tibetan texts are still lost across continents. What we have accomplished is nothing more than retrieving a solitary drop from the ocean,” says Smith.

As for me, my parents discarded a lot of old belongings when we shifted home a few years ago. But the book in the box still remains. And I still clasp my hands and touch my head with it. Not because it is religious, but because it tells me who my grandfather was and where he came from.

source:Barun Roy

2010-01-31T01:20:00.000-08:00

‘Sikkim: The Wounds of History’ reopened by Biraj Adikhari

‘Time has come when we need to bring a sense of closure to history’

GANGTOK, January 27: Claimed as a ‘hard look’ through the lens of the Constitution by a ‘new generation’ Sikkimese into the tumultuous events of 1973 which changed Sikkim and its spillover into present, Sikkim National People’s Party (SNPP) Biraj Adikhari authored book ‘Sikkim: The Wounds of History’ was released by the party treasurer Diley Namgyal Kazi and working president Tseten Lepcha here on Republic Day.

Running over 131 pages, the book’s central theme plays around the pre and post events of Article 371 F, the Constitutional shield of Sikkim. Due to the conflict introduced by certain procedures and provisions of the Constitution of India, the Sikkimese people are today increasing looking back to whatever protections they had, asserts Adikhari in his book.

Admitting that the subject matter is an old story, Adikhari said that the book is a fresh and totally radical look with some serious questions.

“This book is not about the people’s revolution of 1973. Enough books have been written about that. Rather it shall focus on retracing the constitutional jugglery which took place to define Sikkim’s status within the Union of India. The question of status is important here because we need to determine whether it is correct to club Sikkim with other ‘regular’ States of the Indian Union”, said Adikhari in his introduction of the book.

The author said that the book shall enquire into the fact that ‘after the merger/annexation, were the Sikkimese people expected to shed their distinct identity which was cultivated over the decades, and if their identity is to remain then how do they address it constitutionally’. The book ‘shall also point out the controversial steps which were taken in this whole exercise so that it invigorates the younger generation to take interest in their political past because, unfortunately, succeeding generations of Sikkimese children are growing up having a distorted version of their own history, as none of these facts are included in the school curriculum in Sikkim’, he said in the introductory part.

Questioning on the 35th amendment of the Indian Constitution that turned Sikkim into an ‘associate State’ which was retracted seven months later paving way for the 36th amendment which officially declared Sikkim to be a ‘regular State’, Adikhari said that ambiguity was further compounded considering the declaration of emergency in the country.

“At a time when India’s most powerful opposition leaders were almost voiceless, the Constitution was amended not once but twice to accommodate Sikkim. So how much of a voice did the representatives of Sikkim have in these debates for something as important as constitutional amendments”, said Adikhari in his book.

Claming the outcome of the tumultuous transition of Sikkim into a part of the Indian Union was the raging debate among the younger generation on who is a Sikkimese, Adikhari’s book adds that ‘while the Sikkimese is confused about his rights within India, the normal Indian citizen is even more confused about his rights in Sikkim today’.

He had highlighted some landmark verdicts, which he said, seems to suspend the most fundamental rights of non-Sikkimese Indians in Sikkim.

Due to the massive rate of influx during the last three decades, the rapid demographic changes have increased the urgency for a clear distinction between who is a Sikkimese and who is not and special provisions accorded by Article 371F should be acknowledged by all, said Adikhari. Perhaps a new nomenclature like ‘associate State’ needs to be cooked up, he added.

Justifying the issues reinforced in his book, Adikhari said that he is bringing this up because he believes ‘time has come when we need to bring a sense of closure to history’. “There are so many questions which have not been answered yet, and this state of continuing confusion has caused the wounds left over from history to fester again. These are the wounds of history, which have been around for more than three decades now, and shall have to be addressed if Sikkim is to move into the future”, said Adikhari.

While releasing the book, the SNPP president said that he wrote the book because he had been ‘jailed’ on Republic Day last year along with the party treasurer and working president because he was claiming that Indian Constitution had been ‘violated’.

There are two types of constitution existing in Sikkim which is very unfortunate, said Adikhari adding that he is attempting to clear the confusion in his book. The book is not an extensive book but is done in a simple manner to be a first hand reference on the history of Sikkim, he added.

Excluding the introductory part, the book has six chapters on Sikkim’s history starting from the uprising to the insertion of Article 371F in the Indian Constitution. The book has also five appendixes – May 8 Tripartite Agreement of 1973, the Constitution (35th) Amendment Act 1974, The Government of Sikkim Act 1974, Resolution Dated 10/4/75 passed by the Sikkim Assembly and The Constitution (36th Amendment) Act 1975.

source: sikkim express

2010-01-31T01:06:00.000-08:00

ESSAY: Cry freedom

It remains a riddle why India’s Nepali community, celebrated for its spirit of loyalty and sacrifice, was left out in the cold when the rest of the country was aroused from a century-long slumber of self-oblivion, writes Romit Bagchi

A CHARGE is often made against India’s Gorkha community that it took no remarkable part in the country’s freedom movement. Such a summary dismissal of a community as regards its loyalty to the nation has assumed serious undertones in the context of the Gorkhaland agitation that continues in the Darjeeling hills. To repudiate the charges, the Gokha leadership in the hills takes recourse to a few names like Dal Bahadur Giri, Durga Malla, Ram Singh Thakuri and others. This has been continuing for years and in this process a serious aspect remains ignored.

Did the national leadership spearheading the anti-colonial struggle make any worthwhile effort to involve the community in the national mainstream? There are possibilities that the casually hurled insinuation against the community will lose much of its force if a serious attempt were made to answer the question.

History, of course, bears witness to the fact that the Gorkha regiment served as cannon fodder for British forces during World Wars I and II. The Punjab regiment also played the same role. Yet the common people of Punjab participated in India’s struggle for freedom even if the Gorkha community remained largely conspicuous by its irresponsiveness to the anti-colonial upsurge.

Rather, a few organisations like the Hillmen’s Association chose a subservient role towards the British regime. They never tired of debunking the nationalist fervour gripping the country, the objective being to curry favour with the imperial government. Even the literary movement launched principally by Parasmani Pradhan remained engrossed in developing the Nepalese culture and language. And the first political outfit in the hills, the All India Gorkha League, also steered clear of the freedom struggle and concentrated instead on the interests of the community.

The loyalty of a large section of the upper middle class and middle class in the hills towards the British crown was evident beyond any question during the times when the freedom struggle in Bengal was showing an extremist penchant. The oppression of the colonial government in course of the Civil Disobedience Movement provoked some Bengali youths associated with a secret society known as the Dhaka Anusilan Samity to make an attempt on the life of the former governor of Bengal, Sir John Anderson, during his stay in Darjeeling, the summer capital of the imperial government, in May 1934. The attempt was, however, unsuccessful.

But before the governor’s arrival and the consequent Lebong Race Course shooting incident, Darjeeling’s local elite presented an address to Anderson assuring him of full loyalty against the tide of extremist forms of nationalism. “We are sure your Excellency will find a congenial atmosphere in the bracing climate of these hills and your Excellency will undoubtedly feel a happy change here, especially after the heated political controversies which characterise life in the plains below. We are not so ambitious as our brethren of the extremist political party in the plains. We assure your Excellency of our readiness to respond to any call on our people at all times and in any emergency,” ran the address.

With the preponderant mood of the elite strongly inclined to the imperial power and the level of the political consciousness of the common people, principally comprising tea plantation labourers and recruits for the military regiments, remaining abysmally undeveloped, it was but natural that the appeal of nationalism was weak in the hills. Some isolated sparks of ascendant nationalism were found here and there, though.

Way back in 1906-07, when the representatives of the hills were busy appealing to the British regime to carve out a separate administrative unit for the Darjeeling hill areas, a few Indian Nepalis participated in the Swadeshi movement, having a connection with the extremist groups in lower Bengal. Even a journal, Gorkha Sathi, was published from Calcutta to spread nationalistic ideas among the Neapli populace. The government later banned it.

When Mahatma Gandhi launched the non-cooperation movement in 1918-19, a galaxy of nationalist figures emerged on the hill horizon. Apart from Dal Bahadur Giri, there were Bhaktavir Lama, popularly known as “Asahayogi Lama”, Agam Singh Giri, Ramchandra Giri, Khargabahadur Bista and Dharanidhar Koirala, who took charge of the anti-colonial movement in the hills.

Two women, Helen Ahmed, a Christian Lepcha from Kurseong, and Mahadevi Chettri, a Nepalese, participated in the national struggle for independence under Gandhi’s leadership.

The national leadership, however, did not take much of an initiative to involve the common people in the nationalist struggle. Some who became leaders came into close contact with the national leadership and tried their best, despite the limited resources, to arouse the nascent spirit of nationalism in the local populace. But the Darjeeling hills were more or less kept out of the tempo of the anti-colonial movement, with the leadership displaying rather inexplicable lethargy in seizing the initiative from the pro-colonial elitists as regards mobilising public opinion in the nationalist direction. No conscious efforts were made to link the anti-colonial struggle with the day-to-day problems of the populace, though grievances were mounting, particularly among the plantation labourers against their exploitation.

Later, the Communist Party of India tapped the fount of grievances with immense dividends.

Things, however, started changing somewhat with the election of Subhas Chandra Bose as president of the Indian National Congress in 1938-39. He appealed to Indian Nepalis in the Darjeeling hills to join him at a meeting of the Bengal Provincial Congress held in Jalpaiguri in 1939. Responding to the appeal, an estimated 1,000 people from remote hill areas enrolled.

That the spirit of nationalism was latent in the subjective world of Indian Nepalis awaiting initiation became evident when the Indian National Army came into being with its appeal to Indian prisoners of war to join the fight for independence. During World War II, when British rule collapsed in Singapore and Burma and the Japanese took control, a large number of the POWs were recruited in the INA and these recruits comprised several Indian Nepali soldiers.

Captain Durga Malla and Major Dal Bahadur Thapa, both from Kalimpong sub-division, were captured, court martialled and then hanged for their participation in the war against the British in Southeast Asia under the INA and its leader, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose. Malla was hanged on 29 August 1944 and Thapa on 9 March 1945, a few months before the historic INA trial started in the Red Fort.

Apart from these two martyrs, there were several Indian Nepali soldiers from Darjeeling, Assam and Dehra Dun who were recruited as INA officers and fought for the country valiantly, like Colonel Dilman Singh Thapa, Dal Singh Rana, Major Puran Singh Khawas and Captain Ram Singh Thakuri.

Special mention must be made of Captain Ram Singh Thakuri, who remains immortal as the military musician for the Azad Hind government-in-exile because of the tunes he set to the INA’s marching songs. These tunes are time- transcending in their electrifying appeal.

Corkha National Liberation Front chief Subash Ghisingh made a significant comment during the nationwide celebration of Subhash Chandra Bose’s centenary in 1997. He said in public that the Indian Gorkha community could forget everything, but would always remember Bose’s peerless struggle for India’s independence.

This outburst of emotion for the revolutionary leader made one thing clear: that if ignited with loving sincerity, the patriotic fervour smouldering in the Indian Gorkha community would have consumed pro-British elitist leanings. It remains a riddle why the community, celebrated for its spirit of loyalty and sacrifice, was left out in the cold when the rest of the country was aroused from the century-long slumber of self-oblivion.

source: Statesman/ Shri Barun Roy

2010-01-31T01:00:00.000-08:00

Citizenship to Gorkhas:
High Court asks Centre, EC to file affidavits

Taking up a petition on granting of Indian citizenship to people of Nepal residing in India post January 26, 1950, the Calcutta High Court today directed the Centre to state its position on the matter through an affidavit.

A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice M S Shah and Justice Bhaskar Bhattcharya directed the Centre, Election Commission of India, secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, the West Bengal government and others to file affidavits within four weeks, after which the case would be taken up for hearing.

The direction was passed in response to a PIL filed by Siliguri-based organisation ‘Janachetana’ demanding cancellation of Indian citizenship granted to Gorkhas, who are originally citizens of Nepal, after January 26, 1950.

Petitioner’s counsel Sakya Sen told court that there were two treaties — Britain India Nepal Tripartite Agreement of 1947 and Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 — which stated that Nepalese citizens would enjoy many rights in India if they reside here but would remain citizens of that country in a reciprocal arrangement.

He also said a gazette notification of August 23, 1988, by the Centre had sought to clarify misconceptions regarding citizenship of Gorkhas stating that those who came to India before January 26, 1950, could claim citizenship of the country. Those who came after that date would remain citizens of Nepal. The petitioner claimed that there has been a large influx of Nepali citizens into India, mainly in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts of West Bengal and that they had been “unlawfully” granted electoral rights here.

Sen submitted that there has been a sudden surge in the electoral rolls in these areas and alleged that the Election Commission of India and the State Election Commission had not properly verified the applications for inclusion in the electoral rolls. Admitting the petition, the Division Bench directed that the matter would be heard again on April 9.

source:indian Express/Barun roy

2010-01-24T19:28:00.000-08:00

SIKKIM EMBLEM

by Tenzin C. Tashi
source: Proud to be Sikkimese- Shri Shital Pradhan

The ‘Kham-sum-ongdu’, the coat of arms of the Namgyal dynasty melds oriental symbolism with British heraldry. The symbol of religious and political government, the ‘Kham-sum-ongdu’ literally means the conqueror of the three worlds or ‘lokas’, these being:

1. ‘Kama loka’ – the world of sensual pleasure
2. ‘Rupadhatu loka’ – the realm of the material world ...
3. ‘Arupadhatu loka’ – the spiritual world or world of formless spirits

The two griffins symbolise the mythological horse of Indra as well as Tachog Balaha, one of the manifestations of Avalokiteshvara or Chenrezig.

The twelve rings within the shield represent the ‘twelve interdependent contributories of origination of all phenomenon.’

The eight lotus petals symbolize the Eight Fold Path which is to bring peace and harmony to Sikkim.

The helmet, symbolising the defensive force of our land is crested by a conch shell which depicts the propagation of Dharma in Sikkim.

The Kham-sum-ongdu has now been adopted by the Government of Sikkim as its official emblem.

2010-01-23T21:42:00.000-08:00

SERIES: HIMALAYAN JOURNALS by Joseph Dalton Hooker – Episode 57 Vol II

COURTESY: SHRI BARUN ROY

THIS SERIES WAS MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH THE CONTRIBUTION OF ABDUL KALAM EZANI

THE HIMALAYAN BEACON [BEACON ONLINE] EXCLUSIVE

HIMALAYAN JOURNALS

JOSEPH DALTON HOOKER, M.D., R.N., F.R.S.

CHOOMBI DISTRICT

On the following morning we proceeded up the valley, towards a very steep rocky barrier, through which the river cut a narrow gorge, and beyond which rose lofty snowy mountains: the peak of Tunkra being to our left hand (north). Saxifrages grew here in profuse tufts of golden blossoms, and _Chrysosplenium,_ rushes, mountain-sorrel (_Oxyria_), and the bladder-headed _Saussurea,_ whose flowers are enclosed in inflated membranous bracts, and smell like putrid meat: there were also splendid primroses, the spikenard valerian, and golden Potentillas.

The ascent was steep and difficult, up a stony valley bounded by precipices; in this the river flowed in a north-west direction, and we were obliged to wade along it, though its waters were bitterly cold, the temperature being 39 degrees. At 15,000 feet we passed from great snowbeds to the surface of a glacier, partly an accumulation of snow, increased by lateral glaciers: its slope was very gentle for several miles; the surface was eroded by rain, and very rough, whilst those of the lateral glaciers were ribboned, crevassed, and often conspicuously marked with dirt-bands.

A gently sloping saddle, bare of snow, which succeeds the glacier, forms the top of the Tunkra pass; it unites two snowy mountains, and opens on the great valley of the Machoo, which flows in a part of Tibet between Sikkim and Bhotan; its height is 16,083 feet above the sea by barometer, and 16,137 feet by boiling-point. Nothing can be more different than the two slopes of this pass; that by which I had come presented a gentle snowy acclivity, bounded by precipitous mountains; while that which opened before me was a steep, rocky, broad, grassy valley, where not a particle of snow was to be seen, and yaks were feeding near a small lake not 1000 feet down. Nor were snowy mountains visible anywhere in this direction, except far to the south-east, in Bhotan. This remarkable difference of climate is due to the southerly wind which ascends the Tibetan or Machoo valley being drained by intervening mountains before reaching this pass, whilst the Sikkim current brings abundant vapours up the Teesta and Lachoong valleys.

Chumulari lies to the E.N.E. of the Tunkra pass, and is only twenty-six miles distant, but not seen; Phari is two marches off, in an easterly direction, and Choombi one to the south-east. Choombi is the general name given to a large Tibetan province that embraces the head of the Machoo river, and includes Phari, Eusa, Choombi, and about thirteen other villages, corresponding to as many districts, that contain from under a dozen to 300 houses each, varying with the season and state of trade. The latter is considerable, Phari being, next to Dorjiling, the greatest Tibetan, Bhotan, Sikkim, and Indian entrepot along the whole Himalaya east of Nepal. The general form of Choombi valley is triangular, the broader end northwards: it is bounded by the Chola range on the west from Donkia to Gipmoochi, and by the Kamphee or Chakoong range to the east; which is, I believe, continuous with Chumulari. These meridional ranges approximate to the southward, so as to form a natural boundary to Choombi. The Machoo river, rising from Chumulari, flows through the Choombi district, and enters Bhotan at a large mart called Rinchingoong, whence it flows to the plains of India, where it is called at Couch-Behar, the Torsha, or, as some say, the Godadda, and falls into the Burrampooter.

The Choombi district is elevated, for the only cultivation is a summer or alpine one, neither rice, maize, nor millet being grown there: it is also dry, for the great height of the Bhotan mountains and the form of the Machou valley cut off the rains, and there is no dense forest. It is very mountainous, all carriage being on men’s and yaks’ backs, and is populous for this part of the country, the inhabitants being estimated at 3000, in the trading season, when many families from Tibet and Bhotan erect booths at Phari.

A civil officer at Phari collects the revenue under the Lhassan authorities, and there is also a Tibetan fort, an officer, and guard. The inhabitants of this district more resemble the Bhotanese than Tibetans, and are a thievish set, finding a refuge under the Paro-Pilo of Bhotan,* [There was once a large monastery, called Kazioo Goompa, at Choombi, with upwards of one hundred Lamas.

During a struggle between the Sikkim and Bhotan monks for superiority in it, the abbot died. His avatar reappeared in two places at once! in Bhotan as a relative of the Paro-Pilo himself, and in Sikkim as a brother of the powerful Gangtok Kajee. Their disputes were referred to the Dalai Lama, who pronounced for Sikkim. This was not to be disputed by the Pilo, who, however, plundered the Goompa of its silver, gold, and books, leaving nothing but the bare walls for the successful Lama! The Lhassan authorities made no attempt to obtain restitution, and the monastery has been consequently neglected.] who taxes the refugees according to the estimate he forms of their plunder. The Tibetans seldom pursue the culprits, as the Lhassan government avoids all interference south of their own frontier.

NEPAL: Madhesis have it far better

2010-01-22T02:19:00.001-08:00

NEPAL: Three years later

BY PRASHANT JHA

Madhesis have it far better in January 2010 than in January 2007

By Bikash Rai

This week marked the third anniversary of the Madhes movement. Over three weeks in January 2007, the spontaneous uprising in Tarai rocked the foundation of Nepali state and nationalism, challenged established forces, ensured federalism, and reconfigured politics. At a time when the Madhes is weaker and more fragmented than it has been since then, it would be instructive to look back at the lessons from the plains.

Here is what the Madhesis told the existing Nepali state: change or perish. In specific terms, this meant political representation, substantive inclusion, reframing symbols of nationhood, and treating citizens who wore dhoti, did not know how to speak Nepali, and had kinship links across the border with dignity and not scorn. If the Kathmandu establishment refused to do so, it would cost the state its legitimacy and erode political authority among one third of its own people. Despite the hiccups, resistance by sections in the capital, and the entrenched social prejudices, the Madhes has won this battle politically and intellectually. What remains is transforming it into institutions.

The second message was to the Maoists: beware of what you have unleashed. Though the Maoists had sowed the militant Madhesi consciousness, the movement itself acquired a strong anti-Maoist tilt. This was due to the failure of the Maoists to push for federalism in the interim constitution, the recklessness of the Maoist Madhesi leadership, the class character (mid-sized landlords), political orientation (anti-communist), the caste mix of Madhesi leaders, and the perception that the Maoists were a part of the same Pahadi club.

The Maoists have since become more careful, but a similar pattern of ex-Maoists turning to ethnic radicalism can be discerned in the western Tarai. The Maoists and most Madhesi parties remain at loggerheads, but in some ways their commitment to federalism now makes them natural allies.

The people also gave a clear signal to the Nepali Congress, which the grand old party failed to read: reform or shrink. Instead of making the Madhes agenda its own, the NC misread the public mood entirely and felt that the andolan would only hurt the Maoists. The NC home minister (Krishna Sitaula) was seen to have suppressed the movement.

Leaders like Ram Baran Yadav spent all their time in bashing Madhesi leaders and claiming it was sponsored by reactionaries. And the party was a late and reluctant convert to federalism. The failure to innovate meant life was tough if you were a moderate Madhesi NC leader. This breed, led by Mahant Thakur, waited for a year but then left when the pressure from below became intense. The NC’s rout in the elections was a result of its failure in the Madhes.

But the starkest message was to the new Madhesi political class that had created, and capitalized on the Madhes movement: be inclusive of all communities in Tarai, and fight for us in Kathmandu. Through the past three years, the trend has been that as any Madhesi leader or party has come close to Kathmandu or joined the government, it has lost legitimacy and credibility back home in Tarai.

Instead of using the period to build an organisation, and force issues, the leaders have been extremely amenable to co-option, and making a quick buck by looting the state. A glance through the last names of the martyrs reveals that people of all Hindu castes, Dalits, Muslims. But the structures of the Madhesi parties reveal they adopted exclusivist and discriminatory practices and did with Dalits, Muslims and Tharus what hill elites had done with them. This is why the various communities are now finding their own ways of political articulation.

The last year has not been good for the Madhes. Its most powerful party split. It has been unable to force the vice-president back into his position, and get language rights recognised. Madhesi reactionary leaders who had nothing to do with the movement have been able to corner all the advantages and win a share in the power structure. The distance with the Tharus, who are actually allies in the battle against the old regime, grew. The inclusion bill was never operationalised. And India (by splitting the MJF and not backing the VP) showed that it will happily sacrifice the Madhes if it clashes with its interests at the centre.

But history’s twists and turns should not make us ignore the larger picture. It is far better being a Madhesi in Nepal in January 2010 than it was in January 2007. That is the Madhes movement’s biggest achievement.

SOURCE: nEPALTIMES.COM

2010-01-21T18:45:00.000-08:00

Sikh ShaheedNanak Singh’s 2nd Memorial - Keynote speech by Lieutenant General. (Retd) S K Sinha

Lieutenant General S.K Sinha said:

I feel greatly honoured being here to deliver the Second Shaheed Nanak Singh Memorial lecture. Sardar Nanak Singh was a science graduate with a law degree who gave up a career in the Police and joined the Bar to serve the national cause. He became the leading human rights activist of his province and he fearlessly defended the soldiers of Azad Hind forces, for which he suffered reprisals. He believed in the unity of the country and was opposed to Partition. A spirited and dedicated citizen, he made the supreme sacrifice for a noble cause. While trying to save students who had organized a peace march against the division of the country, he was done to death in Multan during the pre Partition communal carnage. A worthy citizen with a worthy name, he sacrificed his life for a worthy cause. Today, while paying my humble tribute to the memory of this great man, I have chosen to speak on Defending India’s Integrity. This is in line with the cause for which Sardar Nanak Singh attained martyrdom.

I belong to a generation which in its early years had been under foreign rule. As a young Army officer connected with combating communal carnage in Punjab during the Partition holocaust, I recall with horror what happened at that time in which millions got killed and millions got uprooted. Jinnah’s obduracy and propagation of two nation theory, fitted well with the policy of Divide and Rule pursued by the British. The communal tornado which raged in the country following Jinnah’s Direct Action Day in Kolkata, made it impossible for the country to hold together. The British now chose to Divide and Quit. Jinnah and his communalists had their way and the country was partitioned. I still recall their slogan of that time, “Hans ke lia hai, Pakistan Larke lenge Hindustan.”

There were many prophets of gloom in 1947. They predicted that India being a multi ethnic, multi lingual and multi religious behemoth could not hold together. On the other hand, they felt that a strong common religious bond will enable Pakistan to remain united, despite the geographical separation of its two wings. They were proved wrong on both counts. For the last over six decades, we have been fighting both external enemies and internal forces of different hues, threatening our national integrity. We have ensured that our nation’s integrity has remained inviolate. This does not mean that we can afford to be complacent. Today, both external and internal threats to our national integrity are greater than ever before. Let us first discuss the dimensions of these threats before considering how we should meet the grave challenges posed by them.

We have chosen a polity which is fundamentally different from our two powerful neighbours, who are both nuclear weapon powers. One has established the dictatorship of the proletariat with one party rule as opposed to our opting for the freedom of the individual and a multi-party system. The other believes in religious fundamentalism and a theocratic State as against our choice of pluralism and a secular polity. These two neighbours have formed a nexus and they are hostile to India. The USA is the lone super power in the world which should be our natural ally because both India and the USA are vibrant democracies. Lately, a strategic consensus has been developing between India and the USA. However, in its national interests the USA has been showing a tilt towards China for economic reasons and towards Pakistan for its support in the war against terror. India must be self reliant in tackling the threats to her national integrity.

China is our big neighbour in the North with whom we share a 4,000 kilometer border in the Himalayas. In the past, the pendulum of power used to be South of the Himalayas but it has now swung decisively to the North. We have an unresolved border dispute with China which led to a war between us in 1962. We suffered a humiliating defeat in that war due to our unpreparedness and the failure of both our political and military leadership. The 1967 artillery duel in Sikkim to an extent restored our prestige. After the famous Mao smile of the Seventies, relationship between our two countries improved and diplomatic relations were restored. Dialogue to resolve the border dispute has continued for the past seventeen years with hardly any progress. However, tranquility has been maintained on the border and there has been no instance of exchange of fire. China’s policy appears to be to keep the borders with India tranquil but not solve the border dispute; trade with India but arm Pakistan. After Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, a marked improvement took place in Sino-Indian relations. China gave up its stand that Sikkim was not a part of India. It now recognized Sikkim as a State within India. Nathu La was opened for trade. Trade between the two countries shot up to 40 US million dollars. Importantly, during Vajpayee’s visit, it was agreed that while delineating the border, inhabited areas will not be disturbed. This implied that there would be no change in the present position of Towang. Despite these positive developments, China has continued with its policy of keeping India locked in South Asia. It has put in place, a string of pearls encircling India. It has established naval bases at Coco Islands in Myanmar, at Hambantola in Sri Lanka and at Gawdar in Pakistan. It has been trying to establish its influence in Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It has been arming Pakistan with both conventional and nuclear weapons. With its encirclement policy, China is trying to chain India like a lion in a cage. Simultaneously, China has tremendously increased its military capability in Tibet. A railway line and an oil pipe line has been constructed from Gormo to Lhasa with the former being extended to the Nepal border. A super East West highway has been constructed in Tibet. Operational airfields, missile bases and logistic dumps have been developed. China has the capability to maintain 24 divisions in Tibet and concentrate such a large force there in two to three weeks. Another point of concern is the Chinese plan to divert the Brahmaputra to feed its arid regions and produce 40,000 MW of electricity. This will have a catastrophic effect on India’s North East. Since 2007 there appears to be a marked downslide in Sino-Indian relations. China has raised the pitch of its rhetoric on Arunachal Pradesh, claiming it to be part of its territory. It has been trying to block Asian Development Bank loan to India. It continues to oppose India’s membership of the Security Council. A think tank in China has advocated steps to disintegrate India, breaking her into several States. Its State controlled newspaper has warned that India should not forget 1962.

Our other powerful neighbour is Pakistan. The origin and history of Pakistan is one of relentless hostility towards India. Pakistanis misread history and fancy themselves as the descendents of the Central Asian conquerors, who in the medieval period, repeatedly invaded and subjugated India. The fact however is that they are the descendents of the indigenous people who converted to Islam. Their romanticized view of martial superiority received a setback in 1947 when Pakistan could not grab Srinagar and the Valley, a big jolt in 1965 when their aggression was defeated and got shattered by a humiliating surrender in 1971. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto talked of one thousand years war with India. Realising that India could not be defeated in a conventional war Zia-ul-Haq adopted the strategy of thousand cuts to bleed India to death in Kashmir. And today Zardari talks of one thousand years of war on ideology over Kashmir. Having failed to achieve this goal in Kashmir, Pakistan has now extended its terrorist attacks to the metropolitan cities of India. The macabre drama in Mumbai on 26/11 was the mother of terror attacks. It humbled our Nation like the debacle in 1962 had done. With US assistance, Pakistan organized the Taliban which captured power in Afghanistan and forced the Soviet Union out of that country. Encouraged by Taliban’s success in Afghanistan, Pakistan started large scale cross border terrorism in Kashmir. Pakistan has become the epicentre of terrorism in the world. Forced by the US to join the war against terror, Pakistan Army has now been fighting the Taliban. This has invited the wrath of the latter. Suicide bombings leading to large scale casualties have become a daily routine in Pakistan. The political, economic and security scenario in Pakistan is very volatile. Despite all their assurances, there can no guarantee that its nuclear arsenal will not fall into the hands of the Jihadis. A major portion of Pakistan Army is now deployed on its Western border. This has weakened Pakistan’s military capability on its eastern border with India. Pakistan Army is too embroiled on its western border and in dealing with terrorist violence in its mainland, to undertake any military offensive against India. Yet with US assistance it continues to strengthen its military with modern weapons, in preparation for a showdown with India. In case India forces a war on Pakistan, the terrorists and the Taliban, who have been nursed as strategic assets by Pakistan Army, are likely to sink their differences and join in a common Jihad against India.

Our other neighbours do not have the capability to pose a viable military threat to our country. However, Nepal and Bangladesh can cause security concerns. Nepal is facing a period of turmoil with Maoists gaining considerable strength. They make no secret of their anti-India stand. It is a pity that at one stage our Government had outsourced our foreign policy in Nepal to our Communists. The growing power of Maoists and the increased Chinese influence in Nepal, adversely affect Indias’s security interests. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujeebur Rahman, Bangladesh’s relations with India became increasingly sour. The demographic invasion from Bangladesh continued unabated. Indian insurgent groups of the North East were given asylum and assistance in Bangladesh. The intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the ISI and the DGSI, provided them support. With growing religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh, Jihadis from that country found the environment friendly to launch terrorist attacks in India. During her first tenure as Prime Minister, Sheikh Haseena could do little to alter the situation because of her slender majority and political compulsions. With her recent landslide victory in the last elections giving her a massive mandate, she has been trying to alter course of Bangladesh. She is taking action against religious fundamentalists in her country and trying to improve relations with India. The recent handing over of the President of ULFA, the leading insurgent outfit of North East, who had been living in Bangladesh for the last thirty years, shows a marked change of policy towards India. This is a most welcome development. Our other two land neighbours are Bhutan and Myanmar. The former has been our most friendly neighbour who has always supported us at all international forums. The former King introduced democracy in the country which now has a constitutional monarchy. Bhutan has political stability. Myanmar has been under military rule. India’s sympathy for the jailed popular leader and Nobel peace laureate, Aung Syi , has been the cause for official relations between the two countries not being too cordial. Chinese influence has been growing in Myanmar. Our only maritime neighbour is Sri Lanka. The recent wiping out of the LTTE in that country has been a welcome development. However, unless the Tamil problem is solved politically, peace and normalcy may be elusive in that country.

I have tried to give a broad brush resume of the situation in our bordering countries. China and Pakistan pose serious threats to our national integrity. Besides external threats, we also face serious internal threats. These are from secessionism and terrorism of both Jihadi and Naxal variety.

Secessionist movements erupted in the North East starting with Nagaland in 1956. This was followed by insurgency in Manipur, Mizoram and Tripura. These have been basically tribal insurgencies. Culturally and historically, the tribes in the North East had not been assimilated with the rest of India. The population of these areas is sparse and these regions are in the remote fringe areas on the border. Naga insurgency has been dormant for the last thirteen years with cease fire holding. Hopefully a peaceful solution may emerge in due course. Over two decades ago, insurgency came to an end in Mizoram with a political settlement. Today, Mizoram is the most peaceful State in the North East. The violence in Tripura is more in the nature of ethnic conflict between the tribal population and the immigrants from erstwhile East Pakistan in the wake of Partition. The original inhabitants have been reduced to a minority in the State. The ongoing militancy in Manipur is a matter of concern. Today, Manipur is the most disturbed State in the North East.

The ULFA insurgency in the Brahmaputra Valley in Assam has been the most serious such movement in the North East. The population of Assam is more than double the combined population of the six remaining States of the North East. With its oil and tea wealth, Assam is economically much richer than these States. Abutting on the narrow Siliguri corridor, Assam provides the only land link from our mainland to the large land mass in the North East. I was Governor of Assam for six years. When I assumed that office in 1997, militancy was at its peak in the State. We managed to turn round the situation with a three prong strategy of unified command, economic development and psychological initiatives. Unified command ensured that the Army, the Para Military and the Police worked as complementary rather than competing forces. Intensified and coordinated operations broke the back of ULFA militancy. The militants suffered heavy casualties and a large number surrendered with weapons. The final blow was delivered by the Bhutanese Army. The militant camps in the bordering jungles of Bhutan were wiped out. As part of economic development, we installed one lakh shallow tube wells in the Brahmaputra Valley, turning Assam from a rice deficit to a rice surplus State. The influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh had been the root cause for insurgency in Assam. I took up this matter in my 42 page printed report to the President. It was serialised and published in full in every newspaper of Assam. This had a very healthy impact in winning over the people. We projected the three icons of Assam, the great spiritual leader Mahapurush Shankardev, the great warrior Lachit Borphukan and the great statesman Lokpriya Gopinath Bordoloi as our national heroes. Lachit’s statue was installed at the National Defence Academy, and a gold medal instituted in his name. Bordoloi was posthumously awarded the Bharat Ratna, fifty years after his death. I declared that my aim was to make the people of Assam proud of their past and the rest of India proud of Assam. All this led to spectacular results isolating the militants from the people. Over a period of time, 81 ULFA militants were apprehended by villagers in rural areas. Half of them were lynched and the remainder handed over to the Police. Surrenders of ULFA militants started being watched appreciatively by the local people. By 2003 ULFA militancy was virtually over. Unfortunately, on account of a policy of appeasement and vote bank politics, pressure on ULFA was called off and they were allowed to rest and regroup. ULFA violence again started but now it lacked popular support, as in earlier days. Lately through military operations much attrition has been inflicted on ULFA. Its top leadership is in disarray and its President, Arbind Rajkhowa who had been operating from Bangladesh for thirty years, is now in our custody.

Religious fundamentalism has been the basic cause for the secessionist movement in Jammu and Kashmir. Militancy in that State has been a mix of terrorism, insurgency and proxy war. Kashmir has been an international hotspot ever since 1947, embroiled in the coils of the then prevailing Cold War. I moved from Assam to Kashmir in 2003 and was Governor of that State for five years till 2008. We tried out the same three pronged strategy that had worked in Assam. We reduced the level of violence from an average of 10 a day to 1 a day. We tried to woo the separatists with massive doses of economic aid. We installed one thousand micro hydel projects based on water mills. Each of these produced 5 to 8 megawatt of electricity. Villages on the mountains which had not seen an electric bulb now had 30 to 40 light points. By day, the power could be used for grinding corn or operating loom. As part of psychological initiatives, we launched a big campaign to promote Kashmiriyat. This stands for amity and brotherhood across religious divide. Religious fundamentalism has got too deep rooted amongst the intelligentsia in the Valley and their Pakistan connection has become too strong.

Thus we could not achieve the same amount of success as in Assam. Our major weakness in Kashmir has been on the media front. Margaret Thatcher once said that the media is the oxygen for the terrorists. The Valley media spewing venom against India has a free run and hardly any attempt is made to counter the baseless anti-India propaganda by separatists and unscrupulous politicians. Thus a total non-issue of constructing temporary prefabricated shelters on100 acres of land, traditionally used to put up tents for pilgrims, was projected as an attempt to change the demography of the Valley. A communal tornado was raised on this issue leading to a prominent Indian journalist and some human rights activists, advocating that India should pull out from the Valley. Similarly the recent Shopian case in which two young women had drowned in a river was falsely projected as a case of rape and murder by Security Forces, to generate anti India feelings. Through such tactics, life in the Valley is often brought to a standstill by widespread agitation for weeks as happened during the Amarnath and Shopian agitations.

Jihadi terrorism in Kashmir commands a certain amount of sympathy from the local people, but it is a different story elsewhere in the country, where it has no popular support except from some sleeper cells. In the last few years, city after city in the country has suffered Jihadi terrorism sponsored from Pakistan. The 26/11 Mumbai terror attack was the most recent and most devastating in this series. Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed the master mind behind 26/11 had spoken on November 3, 2000, “ Jihad is not about Kashmir only. Fifteen years ago people would have found it ridiculous if someone had told them about the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Insha Alla, today I announce the break up of India. We will not rest till the whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan.” While repeated terrorist attacks were taking place against our cities, the Government had been pathetically ineffective in dealing with the menace. It lacked the political will because of its anxiety to keep its vote bank intact. The horrendous Mumbai episode forced it to change course.

The other type of terrorism we face is of the Left extreme variety - the Naxal or Maoist terrorism. The Prime Minister has referred to it as the most serious security challenge facing the country. 20 States, 233 districts and 2000 Police Stations in the country are affected by this menace. The Naxal movement is led by people totally dedicated to the teachings of Marx and Mao. They have been able to gain the support of the backward and deprived people, particularly the tribals, promising them an El Dorado. A Red corridor has been established from the borders of Nepal through Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chattisgarh, and Madhya Pradesh to Andhra Pradesh. The thickly forested area of 7000 square miles, mostly in Chattisgarh, with a population of 20,000 tribal people in 237 villages has become a Naxal haven. They call this a liberated zone where they run a parallel government, administering justice through public courts. Through extortion from businessmen, contractors and even government officials, they manage to raise 500 to 700 crores a year. They have been able to acquire a formidable array of weapons and explosives. Their total strength is estimated to be 20,000 underground and 50,000 over ground workers. They have been carrying out spectacular strikes like looting a district police armoury in Orissa and carrying away 500 rifles, and attacking a district jail in Bihar in broad daylight rescuing their colleagues as also releasing other prisoners. They have also been holding up prestigious railway trains like Rajdhani Express in West Bengal besides attacking railway stations and police stations in different States. Of course all this has not happened overnight. This has been happening over a period of years. Primarily due to bad governance, the State has not been able to prevent all this and has allowed the grass to grow under its feet.
Having discussed at length the external and internal threats to our national integrity, I shall now discuss the strategy that we need to adopt. Before doing so, I must mention that we as a nation suffer from the dead weight of history. We succumbed repeatedly to invaders during the millennium before Independence. Possibly, the Panipat syndrome of unpreparedness and lack of strategic vision continues to remain in our genes. This has got compounded by vote bank politics and policy of appeasement in dealing with security issues. Political parties have been colluding with illegal migration from Bangladesh. The Government has been soft in tackling Jihadi terrorism. Similarly attempt is being made to resolve the Kashmir issue through a policy of appeasement by providing bounty for families of terrorists killed in encounters and the possibility of further loosening the political links of the State with the Centre. All this only whets the appetite of the separatists. Obama is learning to his cost that terrorists cannot be won over by appeasing their co-religionists. His appeasing speech at Cairo and Istambul had no influence over Al Qaeda as shown by the suicide bomber in the airliner over Detroit on last Christmas day. American military thinker, George Tanham was not wrong when he wrote that India does not have a strategic doctrine.

We have been facing threats from Pakistan since 1947 and from China since mid fifties. We have to work on a two front strategy but we have never tried to force a two front strategy on Pakistan. During the 1965 and 1971 wars, we did not activate Pakistan’s western border, even when we had a friendly Government in Kabul. We did not have a deep strike capability across the desert, either in 1965 or 1971, to attack Pakistan’s vulnerable road and rail communication in Sindh, not far from the border. Our thinking has been defensive mired in ditch cum bund, in the Punjab. In Kashmir we ignored scope for offensive in Gilgit Baltistan area where local discontent with Pakistan could be exploited. We ignored Sardar Patel’s warning in 1950, about the threat arising from the Chinese occupation of Tibet. We paid dearly for this in 1962. Even today while China has been feverishly increasing its military capability in Tibet and building elaborate infrastructure, we have done little to improve our capability in the Himalayas. Recently a retired Naval Chief has stated that we cannot match Chinese naval might and our Air Chief has expressed concern over the fact that our Air Force is one third the size of the Chinese Air Force. For nearly thirty years we have been trying to acquire self propelled medium artillery but have so far not been able to do so. The acquisition of tanks, submarines and fighter planes has also been similarly delayed. For the past many years, 30% of funds allocated for modernization of our Defence Forces, remain unutilized due to our archaic and cumbersome procedures. China with an economy three times as large as India’s has been spending 4.3% of its GDP on Defence, while we spend less than 3% of our GDP on Defence. After the Kargil war, the then Government had approved the recommendations of the working group for reorganizing our higher defence command. Even after ten years, the crucial recommendation for one point military advice has not yet been implemented. We have a headless integrated defence staff without a Chief of Defence Staff. A cosmetic integration of Services Headquarters with Ministry of Defence has been carried out, which does not serve much purpose. It is imperative that our shortcomings in Defence preparedness be removed on a war footing.
We do not need to go in for an arms race with China and try to equal its military capability. An attacker needs a three to one superiority. In the mountains, this ratio should preferably be even higher. We must have at least half if not a little more of China’s military strength in the Himalayas, to deter military aggression. It is true that 2010 is not 1962 but we must not permit too big an asymmetry between Chinese and our military capability in the Himalayas. We also need to break the Chinese encircling strategy by reaching out to countries in the region like, Iran, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Viet Nam. We must have a strong Blue Water Navy to dominate the Indian Ocean. In so far as Pakistan is concerned, we must ensure that we have an edge over Pakistan at all times both in conventional and nuclear weapons. We should force a two front strategy on Pakistan. In case of aggression by Pakistan we should have the capability for a counter offensive causing maximum damage where it hurts most.

Secessionist threats in the North East have to be tackled through inflicting maximum attrition on the militants. Concurrently through economic development and psychological initiatives, the militants should be isolated from the people. We need to win hearts and minds as was successfully demonstrated in Assam. As for the secessionist movement in Kashmir, apart from containing violence we need to give priority to media management for effectively countering anti-India propaganda. Policy of appeasement must be shunned as that only whets the appetite of separatist. The decision to provide bounty for the families of militants killed in encounters in Kashmir was unfortunate. Jammu and Kashmir has already got more autonomy than other States in the country. We should not in the name of more autonomy dangerously weaken the State’s political links with the Centre. The solution of Jammu and Kashmir should not be Kashmir centric. It has to be Jammu and Kashmir centric. The LOC should be made into an international border. Trade and cultural relations as also co-operation in disaster and environment management, on either side of the LOC should be encouraged.

For the past many years, little was being done to tackle Jihadi terrorism on our mainland or to tackle Naxal terrorism. Under a new dispensation in the Home Ministry, dynamism has been introduced in our approach to these problems. The setting up of National Investigating Agency, National Counter Terrorism Centre and enacting special law, are all steps in the right direction. It is fortunate that there has been no major terrorist attack in any of our cities after 26/11. Naxal terrorism is now being tackled vigorously. Violence has to be countered with violence but at the same time, equal if not greater vigour should be displayed in implementing development plans in the affected regions. The Police and the Paramilitary must be provided modern weapons. Concurrently Police reforms should be carried out to prevent politicization of the Police. The Police Station is the cutting edge of the Police administration. It has remained most neglected. We need to put an end to this. The number of Police stations has to be increased substantially and so must and the quality of manpower and facilities for them.

In conclusion, I submit that a strong India capable to counter all the external and internal threats to her integrity, is the need of the hour. This will also be the best tribute we can pay to the memory of the great patriot, Sardar Nanak Singh, who sacrificed his life for the country. India has been a land of peace. In thousands of years of our history we have never committed military aggression against any country. We do not covet any territory and we would like to uphold peace in our region. Ashoka the Great carried out his unmatched policy of peace from a position of great military strength. Our efforts to promote peace from a position of military weakness landed us in great trouble in 1962. While we should concentrate on making ourselves strong to deal with security threats, we need simultaneously to make every effort to promote peace. I am glad that Dr Rami Ranger, the worthy son of Sardar Nanak Singh, has set up a forum to promote friendship between India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. I wish him and his colleagues success in this noble endeavor.

source:The Sikh Times

2010-01-21T18:37:00.000-08:00

Merger is the only solution for both Sikkim and Darjeeling people

Sikkim-Darjeeling United Front formed

20 Jan, Gangtok: The two allies Gorkha National Congress and the Sikkim Jan Shakti Party have together come under one dictum raising the slogans for merger of Sikkim and Darjeeling. While interviewing with the press in the capital today the duo associates has given birth to separate body “Sikkim-Darjeeling united Front” which spearheads under the president ship of DK Bomjan, is told. The formation of new Front would be pressurizing state government for formulating official ground for merger of Sikkim and Drajeeling. While addressing to a media President Bomjon said that the state of Sikkim should seek for its fragmented geographical boundry with the WB government as well as centre for which centre probably would take some reasonable steps. The people of both the territories have an ethnic ties even after the separation during the colonial regime but after the separation ties gradually disintegrated with time, he said. It is not a Gorkha thing but it’s all about safe guard of people of both the places, no matter tomorrow the people may have to wander like a refugee in own homeland if immediately things are not sorted out.
The newly formed body would effortlessly work to make the slogan more focused among the mass by penetrating to each and every corners within various places inside Sikkim. While talking to the media Vice President Niren Rai GNC stressed that today Darjeeling stands alone in own homeland after separation from Sikkim in the history. The movement of Sikkim Darjeeling United Front will voice the concern to all walks of people of Sikkim, is said.

2010-01-20T05:30:00.000-08:00

Tibet: Connectivity, Capabilities and Consequences

P. Stobdan

January 9, 2009

Since 1951, China had fueled massive economic investment in Tibet. In recent decades, infrastructure assumed the salience in China’s Tibet strategy, especially under its ‘Go West’ policy, launched by Jiang Zemin in 2000. The stated goal was to usher Tibet into an era of modernity and prosperity. The policy gained more urgent priority since 2003 when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao showed greater commitment to make Tibet a part of China’s economic miracle. The 1,100 kilometer railway to Lhasa that cost $4.2 billion has symbolized China’s success in Tibet. Even the Indian Defence Minister Mr. A K Antony accepted the fact that there was no comparison of such development on the Indian side, when he visited a forward location in December 2007.

In 2007, China’s State Council had approved 180 projects for Tibet that would cost over 770 billion yuan ($10.2) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan. Reports suggest that more than 77 percent projects have already commenced. According to the Tibet Autonomous Regional Development and Reform Commission, over 200 billion Yuan were spent during the year 2008.

On October 14, 2008, Chinese military engineers and workers began digging a tunnel in Tibet’s Galung La Mountain in Nyingchi Prefecture to build the most difficult highway to China’s last road-less Medog County that borders Arunachal Pradesh. China’s state media prominently highlighted the significance of the 141 km long road connecting Medog with Tibet’s main East-West highway. The project will be completed by 2010.

The great concern for India is the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP), also known as the ‘Great Western Line’. The project is worth China’s $60 billion that aims to divert more than 40 billion cubic meters of water annually from China’s longest river, the Yangtze, and its tributaries through a tunnel under the Yellow River to northern China. The initial phase is expected to be ready by 2010. But a section of the route has already been used for meeting the water requirements during the Beijing Olympics. The initial two routes of the project will take water from the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze basin through the Yellow River to Beijing, Tianjin, and other booming cities in the north. The third route plans to divert waters from Tibet’s Yalong, Dadu and Jinsha rivers to the northern plains. The Brahmaputra project forms the second phase of the third route. The project was envisaged on the assumption that by 2030 the Yangtze basin will not have sufficient water for transfer to the north. The major concern here is: why is China going ahead with the SNWTP if there is inadequate water available for rerouting?

The project’s aim is to divert the Tsangpo at the Shoumatan Point (the ‘Big U-turn’) for constructing the world’s largest hydroelectric plant at the knick-zone to generate 40,000 Megawatts of electricity, and for diverting 200 billion cubic meters of water annually to the arid north. The project will involve enormous engineering complexity on the scale of the Tibet railway system and the Three Gorges dam. Media reports also suggest China’s proposal to use nuclear explosives to blast a 15 kilometer tunnel at the U-turn.

The great challenge for India regarding the project is that India has no water sharing treaty with China. China has rarely bothered to share information prior to flood situations. As a result India often becomes vulnerable to environmental threats. Also, there is no record of China consulting the lower riparian states before undertaking construction of dams upstream.

As the economies of India and China grow, both are going to compete not only for oil and gas but also for water resources. One can conclude that China as the upstream state would treat water as a strategic commodity.

Points raised during the Discussion

China is unwilling to discuss the issue with India at the bilateral level.
There is a need to discuss water diversion by China at the United Nations and the issue also needs to be brought before the International Court of Justice.
The potential impact on India of China blocking the Brahmaputra river needs to be examined.
Prepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

source: IDSA.